

Rhetoric, Gender, Weakness, and Shame

Paul's somatic self-presentation in the Corinthian correspondence

Daniel L, Christiansen

DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY (AWARDED BY OU/ABERDEEN)

Award date:
2015

Awarding institution:
University of Edinburgh

[Link URL to thesis in UHI Research Database](#)

General rights and useage policy

Copyright, IP and moral rights for the publications made accessible in the UHI Research Database are retained by the author, users must recognise and abide by the legal requirements associated with these rights. This copy has been supplied on the understanding that it is copyright material and that no quotation from the thesis may be published without proper acknowledgement, or without prior permission from the author. Unless otherwise stated, this thesis is provided under the terms of a CC BY re-use license, where use of any part of this thesis must be attributed to the author.

Users may download and print one copy of any thesis from the UHI Research Database for the not-for-profit purpose of private study or research on the condition that:

- 1) The full text is not changed in any way
- 2) If citing, a bibliographic link is made to the metadata record on the the UHI Research Database
- 3) You may not further distribute the material or use it for any profit-making activity or commercial gain
- 4) You may freely distribute the URL identifying the publication in the UHI Research Database

Take down policy

If you believe that any data within this document represents a breach of copyright, confidence or data protection please contact us at RO@uhi.ac.uk providing details; we will remove access to the work immediately and investigate your claim.

RHETORIC, GENDER, WEAKNESS, AND SHAME:
PAUL'S SOMATIC SELF-PRESENTATION
IN THE CORINTHIAN CORRESPONDENCE

A Thesis Presented for the Degree of Doctor of Philosophy in Biblical Studies
at the University of Aberdeen

Daniel L. Christiansen

AAS — Portland Community College

BA — Multnomah University

MA — Western Seminary

2015

I, Daniel L. Christiansen, confirm that the work and composition of this thesis is entirely my own, and that it has not been accepted in any previous application for any degree. All quotations have been clearly and properly distinguished by use of quotation marks or indented block paragraphing. All sources of information have been specifically acknowledged.

A handwritten signature in black ink, appearing to read 'D. L. Christiansen', with a long horizontal flourish extending to the right.

Daniel L. Christiansen 9 October 2015

ABSTRACT

The apostle Paul's presentation of his own physical body within the Corinthian correspondence functions as a gender-nuanced argument for authoritative leadership that mirrors the humiliated and shameful glory of the crucified Christ. Paul is committed to exercising his authority only in keeping with weakness, lack of rhetorical power, and feminized shame. He boasts that his own servile and feminizing sufferings are patterned after those of Christ. Even the apostle's apparently glorious experiences are accompanied by the infliction of suffering and the removal of an ability or right to speak. Lastly, his Sinai account demonstrates that even Paul's boast of open speech and self-disclosure is implicated in a feminizing act of unveiling his own shame and weakness. Even as he argues for his superiority to Moses on the basis of what at first glance appears to be a masculine apostolic boldness, the apostle's status is called into question. For his boldness and openness of self-presentation habitually reveal Paul to be shamefully weak and socially feminized. Paul's willing self-humiliation is predicated upon an insistence that in his body he will mirror the socially-gendered shame and weakness of the glorious and powerful crucified Christ.

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

In completing a work that has consumed some five years, to whom do I give recognition? Certainly my influences stem from a time long before I began work on the thesis. Students and colleagues over the years have raised many questions in my mind and illumined my understanding. J. R. R. Tolkien and Lawrence Block; *Beowulf*, Borges, and E. B. White; Judith Butler, Eco, and Yeats—each have shown me their own ways of seeing, and encouraged me to appreciate the many possibilities of our common world. I am certain to have forgotten a host of influences for, as award-winning novelist Sue Grafton has noted, we “discard more information about ourselves than we ever care to preserve.... The memory is like orbiting twin stars, one visible, one dark, the trajectory of what’s evident forever affected by the gravity of what’s concealed.”¹ I offer my sincere apology to anyone from whom deserved recognition is herein withheld.

There are, however, a few persons I gladly acknowledge. My mother, who taught her child the joy of books by reading from both the King James Bible and *Curious George*; my father, who—without warning or interpretation—allowed his nine year-old son to read *The Merchant of Venice*; and my AP English teacher, Lloyd Johnson, who taught me never to be content with less than the best in either literature or thought. Sappho’s words ring true of each of them within my heart: “αἶ με τιμίαν ἐπόησαν ἔργα / τὰ σφὰ δοῖσαι (By giving their own deeds / They honoured me).”²

The further one dives into specialized methods of reading a text, the fewer colleagues there are to comprehend and share excitement and concerns. I have been blessed to have colleagues both expert and loving. Dr. Domani Pothen, who knows the importance and force of gendered thought and life, and who more than once has closely read and carefully discussed the form and implications of the thesis. Reverend Dr. Nate Baxter, whose rhetorical acumen has kept my reading honest more than

¹ Grafton, *O is for Outlaw*, 28.

² Sappho, *Poems* fr. 32.

once. Dr. Karl Kutz, with whose appreciation of the Classical mind and texts I am able to feel at home. And beyond the strict requirements of my work, I have also been blessed by the support of friends. Nate and Tiffany, Domani, Karl and Laurie, Becky and Jim, your prayers, friendship, and care have lightened what you know to have been sometimes dark days.

My advisory team deserves thanks, though of course they are hereby officially absolved from any weaknesses within my thesis. Dr. Michael Bird, your insight, humour, and commitment both disciplinary and personal have been a joy to me. That you did not abandon me as an advisee when you changed institutions (and continents) was a source of great encouragement both to my wife and to myself. I will forever be your *padawan*! Dr. Jason Maston, your willingness to step in to the middle of an ongoing thesis is greatly appreciated. Your attention to detail, and our sometimes disagreement regarding methodology have strengthened my work. Dr. David Wenham, thank you so much for your willingness to provide your experience and time for my betterment: your humility and insight have been refreshing. You, sir, truly are a scholar and a gentleman. And of course, there is the apostle himself. Thank you, Paul, for being so brilliant and sometimes abstruse—you have provided me with years of ongoing frustration, contentment, and joy.

Above all others, I thank my family for their care and support. Timothy and Adina, you have been sources of strength and encouragement to your father over the years. I hope that I have not abandoned fatherly love and friendship in my pursuit of scholarship. Ana, you know that I would have given up on numerous occasions without your confidence and gentle shoves toward the goal. As I have told my students, you truly are a “Proverbs 31 woman.” You have purchased our real estate, planted vineyards, and provided clothing and food for your family and others; you run the household, rise early, speak wisely, and are never idle. Because of this, I have been blessed to sit with elders in the gate. I rise up to call you blessed and praise you for doing what you do surpassingly well.

ABBREVIATIONS

AARAcadS	American Academy of Religion Academy Series
AB	Anchor Bible Commentary
<i>ABQ</i>	<i>American Baptist Quarterly</i>
<i>ABR</i>	<i>Australian Biblical Review</i>
ACNT	Augsburg Commentaries on the New Testament
AHR	American Historical Review
<i>AJA</i>	<i>American Journal of Archaeology</i>
<i>AmAnth</i>	<i>American Anthropologist</i>
AnBib	Analecta Biblica
<i>AUSS</i>	<i>Andrews University Seminary Studies</i>
BETL	Bibliotheca Ephemeridum Theologicarum Lovaniensium
<i>BKCOT</i>	Walvoord, John F. and Roy B. Zuck (eds), <i>Bible Knowledge Commentary: Old Testament</i>
BNTC	Black's New Testament Commentaries
<i>BQ</i>	<i>The Baptist Quarterly</i>
<i>BR</i>	<i>Biblical Research</i>
<i>BTB</i>	<i>Biblical Theology Bulletin</i>
BZNW	Beihefte zur Zeitschrift für die neutestamentliche Wissenschaft und die Kunde der älteren Kirche
<i>CBQ</i>	<i>Catholic Biblical Quarterly</i>
CCSS	Catholic Commentary on Sacred Scripture
<i>CQ</i>	<i>Classical Quarterly</i>
<i>CTR</i>	<i>Criswell Theological Review</i>
<i>DNTB</i>	<i>Dictionary of New Testament Biblical Theology</i>
ECC	Eerdmans Critical Commentary
Ebib	Études Bibliques
EKKNT	Evangelisch-katholischer Kommentar zum Neuen Testament
<i>ETL</i>	<i>Ephemerides theologicae lovanienses</i>
<i>ETR</i>	<i>Études théologiques et religieuses</i>
<i>ExpTim</i>	<i>Expository Times</i>
fr.	fragment
GBS	Guides to Biblical Scholarship
<i>GL</i>	<i>Ginza Rabba Left Volume</i>
<i>GR</i>	<i>Ginza Rabba Right Volume</i>
<i>GRCNT</i>	<i>Greco-Roman Culture and the New Testament: Studies Commemorating the Centennial of the Pontifical Biblical Institute</i>

<i>HCRHP</i>	<i>Handbook of Classical Rhetoric in the Hellenistic Period (330 B.C—A.D. 400)</i>
<i>HTR</i>	<i>Harvard Theological Review</i>
HUZT	Hermeneutische Untersuchungen zur Theologie
<i>HvTSt</i>	<i>Hervormde teologiese studies</i>
IBC	Interpretation: A Biblical Commentary for Teaching and Preaching
ICC	International Critical Commentary
IVPNT	Intervarsity Press New Testament Commentary
<i>JAAR</i>	<i>Journal of the American Academy of Religion</i>
<i>JBL</i>	<i>Journal of Biblical Literature</i>
<i>JECS</i>	<i>Journal of Early Christian Studies</i>
<i>JFSR</i>	<i>Journal of Feminist Studies in Religion</i>
<i>JETS</i>	<i>Journal of the Evangelical Theological Society</i>
<i>JHS</i>	<i>Journal of Hellenic Studies</i>
JPS	Jewish Publication Society
JPSTC	The JPS Torah Commentary
<i>JR</i>	<i>Journal of Religion</i>
<i>JSNT</i>	<i>Journal for the Study of the New Testament</i>
JSNTSup	JSNT: Supplement Series
<i>JSOT</i>	<i>Journal for the Study of the Old Testament</i>
JSOTSup	JSOT: Supplement Series
<i>JSP</i>	<i>Journal for the Study of Pauline and His Letters</i>
<i>JTS</i>	<i>Journal of Theological Studies</i>
K&D	Keil, C. F. and F. Delitzsch, <i>Biblical Commentary on the Old Testament</i>
KEK	Kritisch-exegetischer Kommentar über das Neue Testament (Meyer Kommentar)
LCL	Loeb Classical Library
LHBOTS	Library of Hebrew Bible/Old Testament Studies
<i>List</i>	<i>Listening: Journal of Religion and Culture</i>
LNTS	Library of New Testament Studies
<i>LQ</i>	<i>Lutheran Quarterly</i>
LSJ	Liddell, Scott, Jones, <i>A Greek-English Lexicon</i>
LT	Loeb Translation (indicating that the translation of a Greek or Latin text is that provided in LCL rather than the author's own).
LXX	Septuagint
<i>Message</i>	Wenhua Shi, <i>Paul's Message of the Cross as Body Language</i>
MT	Masoretic Text
NAC	New American Commentary

NCB	New Century Bible (Commentary Series)
<i>Neot</i>	<i>Neotestamentica</i>
<i>NGTT</i>	<i>Nederduitse Gereformeerde Teologiese Tydskrif</i>
NIBCNT	New International Biblical Commentary on the New Testament
NIGTC	New International Greek Testament Commentary
NIVBC	New International Biblical Commentary
<i>NLH</i>	<i>New Literary History</i>
<i>NovT</i>	<i>Novum Testamentum</i>
NTG	New Testament Guides
NTOA	Novum Testamentum et Orbis Antiquus/Studien zur Umwelt des Neuen Testaments
<i>NTS</i>	<i>New Testament Studies</i>
NTTS	New Testament Tools and Studies
<i>OEBGS</i>	<i>The Oxford Encyclopedia of the Bible and Gender Studies</i>
OSCLGT	Oxford Studies in Classical Literature and Gender Theory
OTL	Old Testament Library
<i>OTE</i>	<i>Old Testament Essays</i>
Perseus	Perseus Digital Library (www.perseus.tufts.edu)
<i>PRSt</i>	<i>Perspectives in Religious Studies</i>
RelArts	Religion and the Arts
<i>RelSRev</i>	<i>Religious Studies Review</i>
SBL	Society of Biblical Literature
SBLDS	SBL: Dissertation Series
<i>SBLJ</i>	<i>Society of Biblical Studies Journal</i>
SBLSCSS	SBL: Septuagint and Cognate Studies Series
SBLSem	SBL: Semeia Studies
SBLStBL	SBL: Studies in Biblical Literature
<i>SignsJ</i>	<i>Signs: Journal of Women in Culture and Society</i>
SNTS	Society for New Testament Studies
SNTSMS	SNTS Monograph Series
<i>Sōma</i>	Robert H. Gundry, <i>Sōma in Biblical Theology: With Emphasis on Pauline Anthropology</i>
SP	Sacra pagina
SRI	Socio-Rhetorical Interpretation
<i>ST</i>	<i>Studia Theologica</i>
<i>Stoics</i>	Michelle V. Lee, <i>Paul, the Stoics, and the Body of Christ</i>
<i>SwJT</i>	<i>Southwestern Journal of Theology</i>
<i>TDNT</i>	<i>Theological Dictionary of the New Testament</i>

THKNT	Theologischer Handkommentar zum Neuen Testament
<i>ThTo</i>	<i>Theology Today</i>
TNTC	Tyndale New Testament Commentaries
<i>TS</i>	<i>Theological Studies</i>
<i>TynBul</i>	<i>Tyndale Bulletin</i>
WBC	Word Biblical Commentary
WC	Westminster Commentaries
<i>WTJ</i>	<i>Westminster Theological Journal</i>
WUNT	Wissenschaftliche Untersuchungen zum Neuen Testament
WUNT2	Wissenschaftliche Untersuchungen zum Alten und Neuen Testament, Series 2
<i>WW</i>	<i>Word and World</i>
ZNW	<i>Zeitschrift für die neutestamentliche Wissenschaft und die Kunde der älteren Kirche/Zeitschrift für die neutestamentliche Wissenschaft und die Kunde des Urchristentums</i>

TABLE OF CONTENTS

	Acknowledgements	iv
	Abbreviations	vi
Chapter One	Introduction and Methodology	1
1.1	Statement of Thesis	1
1.2	Delimitation of Biblical Texts	2
1.2.1	Rationale for Selection of Texts	2
1.2.2	Texts for Examination	8
1.2.3	Excluded Texts	9
1.3	Methodologies: SRI	12
1.3.1	History of SRI	12
1.3.2	Distinctives of SRI	13
1.3.3	SRI and Other Approaches	15
1.3.3.1	Ben Witherington’s “SRI”	15
1.3.3.2	Unclear connections with SRI	17
1.3.3.3	Feminist / gender interpretation	18
1.3.4	The Notion of <i>Habitus</i>	27
1.3.5	Textures of SRI	34
1.3.5.1	Inner Texture	35
1.3.5.2	Intertexture	37
1.3.5.3	Social and Cultural Texture	40
1.3.5.4	Ideological Texture	43
1.3.5.5	Sacred Texture	45
1.4	Summary of SRI Application	46
Chapter Two	Literature Review	48
2.1	Lexical and Referential Beginnings	48
2.1.1	Bultmann (<i>Theology of the New Testament</i>)	49
2.1.2	Robinson (<i>The Body</i>)	51
2.1.3	Gundry (<i>Sōma in Biblical Theology</i>)	53
2.1.4	Summary of the Beginnings	58

2.2	The Move from Terminology to Rhetoric	60
2.2.1	Martin (<i>The Corinthian Body</i>)	61
2.2.2	Shackleford (<i>Biblical Body Language</i>)	65
2.2.3	Sandnes (<i>Belly and Body in the Pauline Epistles</i>)	66
2.2.4	Lee (<i>Paul, the Stoics and the Body of Christ</i>)	69
2.2.5	Kim (<i>Christ's Body in Corinth</i>)	72
2.2.6	Shi (<i>Paul's Message of the Cross as Body Language</i>)	75
2.3	Summary of Literature Review	79
2.4	Organization of Chapters Three—Six	81
Chapter Three 1 Corinthians 2:1-5		83
3.1	Structure and Focus of the Passage	85
3.1.1	Structural Integrity	85
3.1.2	Argumentative Integrity	87
3.1.2.1	The crucified Christ as message	88
3.1.2.2	Paul's weakness as messenger	89
3.2	Weakness of the Apostle	94
3.2.1	The Gendered Force of the Body	95
3.2.1.1	Modern analyses of the body	96
3.2.1.2	Greco-Roman physiognomy	98
3.2.1.3	Hebrew physiognomy	100
3.2.1.4	Persistence of the physiognomic principle	102
3.2.1.5	Gender and the physiognomic principle	104
3.2.2	Paul's Weakness and Persuasive Power	106
3.2.3	Crucifixion and the Gendered Body	110
3.2.3.1	Crucifixion, shame, and gender	111
3.2.3.2	Crucifixion, slavery, and gender	115
3.2.3.3	Crucifixion as the power of God	123
3.3	Rhetoric of the Apostle	128
3.3.1	Paul's Greco-Roman <i>Habitus</i>	129
3.3.2	Paul's Λόγος, Πάθος, and ἦθος	134
3.3.3	Paul's Proclamation and Persuasion	141
3.3.4	Gender and Persuasive Rhetoric	146
3.4	Chapter Summary	153

Chapter Four	2 Corinthians 11:16—12:11	157
4.1	Structure of the Passage	157
4.1.1	Structure of Chapters 10—13	159
4.1.2	Structure of the Fool’s Speech	166
4.2	Paul’s Inoffensive Boasting (Delivery)	168
4.3	Paul’s Offensive Boast (Content)	177
4.3.1	Paul’s <i>Peristasenkatalog</i>	180
4.3.1.1	Paul’s concerned attitude and status	183
4.3.1.2	Paul’s circumstantial sufferings	186
4.3.1.3	Paul’s imposed sufferings	191
4.3.2	Paul’s Damascus Descent	205
4.3.3	Paul’s Narrative of Ascent	213
4.3.3.1	Paul’s heavenly journey	215
4.3.3.2	Paul’s σκόλωψ τῆ σαρκί	222
4.4	The Offence of Sufferings	235
4.5	Chapter Summary	245
Chapter Five	2 Corinthians 3:7-18	248
5.1	1 Cor 11:2-16 as Intertextural Key	249
5.1.1	Structure of 1 Cor 11:2-16	252
5.1.2	Analysis of 1 Cor 11:2-16	262
5.1.3	Gendered Expectations of Veiling	264
5.1.3.1	The veiling of women	265
5.1.3.2	The veiling of men	279
5.2	2 Cor 3:7-18 and the Unveiled Face	283
5.2.1	Structure and Argument of 2 Cor 3:7-18	284
5.2.2	The Effects of Veiling	291
5.2.3	Moses’ Veiled Face	300
5.2.4	Paul’s Unveiled Face	311
5.3	Summary of 2 Cor 3:7-18	322
5.4	Chapter Summary	323
Chapter Six	Conclusion	325
6.1	Review	326
6.2	Prospectus	329
Bibliography		334

CHAPTER ONE: INTRODUCTION AND METHODOLOGY

In this chapter I will provide a statement of my thesis, after which the biblical passages to be considered throughout the thesis will be identified, along with the rationale for choosing these passages and not others. I will define and outline the approach of Vernon K. Robbins' socio-rhetorical investigation (SRI),¹ which will then be applied throughout the thesis to specific passages within 1 and 2 Corinthians. Just prior to a brief prospectus of the remainder of the thesis, this chapter will provide an identification of this thesis' contribution to the ongoing discussion within Pauline studies regarding gender, rhetoric, and power. The major works of recent literature dealing with Pauline somatic concerns will be reviewed, broadly critiqued, and conceptually summarized in Chapter Two.

1.1 Statement of Thesis

The thesis of this paper is that Paul's somatic rhetoric—his explicit mention and implicit presentation of his own gender-determined body—functions within the Corinthian correspondence to subvert his audience's expectations regarding power and authority. In a culture where weakness and shame are cothematized with the feminine, virtue and masculinity are coterminous, and where persuasive rhetoric and moral authority are conflated, the apostle's gendered somatic rhetoric redefines the acceptable and good body as that which is feminine, weak, limited, and self-effacing. Within the context of a life empowered by the crucified Christ, Paul accomplishes this

¹ Cf. Robbins, *Exploring Texture*; Robbins, *Tapestry*; Robbins, *Invention of Christian Discourse*.

redefinition by means of explicit reference to his own bodily limitations, display of his own physical weaknesses, and by socially-coherent implicit references to the nature of gender and communication. This redefined acceptable and authoritative body is illustrated in Paul himself, and serves as the basis for his claim to authority and leadership while presenting himself as a culturally-obvious feminine, weak, and shameful figure. The claims of this thesis will be examined and supported through an application of the SRI analytic to a representative number of texts within the Corinthian correspondence. This multifaceted suite of methods will seek to provide for a recognition and more nuanced discussion of gendered somatic rhetorical concerns within the Pauline Corinthian correspondence.

1.2 Delimitation of Biblical Texts

Within the broader parameters of the Corinthian correspondence as a whole, I will be examining a limited number of specific passages (1 Cor 2:1-5; 2 Cor 11:16—12:11; [1 Cor 11:2-16]; 2 Cor 3:7-18) selected from among those in which Paul's gendered rhetorical self-presentation may be discerned. In the present section I will discuss my rationale for passages to be examined, as well as my presumptive treatment of the Corinthian correspondence as a literary unity, ending with a brief overview of other passages considered for inclusion and the reasons for their ultimate rejection.

1.2.1 Rationale for Selection of Texts

The limitation of texts to those in the Pauline corpus could be viewed as purely a personal preference, and such a view would not invalidate the academic

choice; however, there are also programmatic reasons for the choice. Compared with the rest of the New Testament, the Pauline corpus does provide a greater degree of authorial self-presentation, and within the Pauline corpus as a whole, the Corinthian correspondence is generally recognized as being heavily autobiographical. In addition, the investigation of two letters sharing both incident and audience provides for a degree of intertextual analysis not as easily accomplished through a reading of texts (e.g., Galatians and Romans) connected only by authorship and by subsequent collection into a broader canon. In other words, the initial limitation of passages to those found within the Corinthian correspondence is governed by pragmatics.

I will treat 1 and 2 Corinthians in their present form as the text under examination.¹ While I recognize the importance and intensity of the debate that has been engaged in over the years regarding the authorship and date of specific passages within these two canonical letters, I am presuming for the purposes of the present thesis the literary integrity of the Corinthian correspondence in its present canonical shape and order. The *historical* unity and ordering of 1 and 2 Corinthians should not be considered relevant to the thesis as laid out above. A number of published arguments make it clear that various positions have been confidently held with regard to the integrity of these letters (or lack thereof), as well as to the historical and logical (or fragmented) order of the correspondence.² My purpose in the present thesis is not

¹ Such a presumption, of course, does not preclude the activity of textual criticism as needed to determine a scholarly consensus with regard to the final content of these letters. As the primary text for this investigation I have used the main body of NA²⁷ revised (Aland, Aland, *et al.*, eds., NA27). Where secondary readings of the critical text are chosen, or where I have personally amended the text, appropriate notation will be provided. Except where otherwise noted, English translations (whether of ancient or modern texts) throughout this thesis are my own.

² Dunn, *Beginning from Jerusalem*, 834-838; Savage, *Power through Weakness*, 191-192; Crafton, *Agency*, 12-13; Wright, *The Resurrection of the Son of God*, 299; Hall, *The Unity of the Corinthian Correspondence*; Georgi, *Opponents of Paul*, 9; Yeo, *Rhetorical Interaction in 1*

at all to argue the historical integrity and ordering of the Corinthian correspondence, but to heuristically treat it as an ongoing literary integrity.³

Within the Corinthian correspondence I have chosen passages in which Paul provides a clear somatic self-presentation. I recognize that Paul's physical body has many experiential connections to and logical implications for the mystical Body of Christ, physical congregations, the broader body politic, and the entire κόσμος, as well as for the physical bodies of individual members of his immediate audience.⁴ While such connections and implications will be noted at appropriate junctures within the discussion, the determination of passages under examination has been based on the initial perception that Paul's somatic *self*-presentation has at least an implicitly gendered element present in the argumentation. At this point, let me review both the importance of *somatics* in my choices, and discuss the importance of *gender's* place in this examination.

That the human body is constructed as a signifier of and within social boundaries has been a scholarly consensus for decades.⁵ The documentation and discussion of this constructed nature have been vibrant, especially with recognition of the plasticity of the body's communicative force with regard to gender.⁶ Sociologists, literary critics, phenomenologists, and queer theorists all share a general agreement that the human body is of profound significance in ways that extend beyond the "mere

Corinthians; Mitchell, *Reconciliation*, 65-68, 186-192; Murphy-O'Connor, *Paul: A Critical Life*, 253-254; Thiselton, *First Corinthians*, 14-15; Harris, *Second Corinthians*, 14-15; Schmithals, *The Theology of the First Christians*, 120; Becker, *Letter-Hermeneutics*.

³ Cf. Jeffrey and Maillet, *Christianity and Literature*, 98-99.

⁴ Robinson, *The Body*; Martin, *Corinthian Body*; Lee, *Stoics*.

⁵ Berger and Luckmann, *Social Construction of Reality*; Laqueur, *Making Sex*; Dover, *Greek Homosexuality*; Boswell, *Christianity, Social Tolerance*.

⁶ Kiefer, *Sexual Life in Ancient Rome*; Rouselle, *Porneia*; Douglas, *Purity and Danger*.

physicality” of eating, drinking, copulation, and defecation.⁷ Even from such an unexpected source as musical theory comes the following:

[B]odily motion or bodily movement is a kind of mediator between music and emotion. In other words, it’s not so much that music imitates emotion or imitates an emotional pattern, it’s that it resembles or latches onto bodily motions that are associated with emotions. So, take a very simple example: generally speaking, sad people will tend to walk more slowly, and move slowly, and perhaps even speak more slowly than happy people.... Generally speaking, happy music or music used in a joyful context will be upbeat, it will be fast.... And that, again, is another way of reminding us, I think, of the importance of the body as the sort of mediator of music.... My body is part of who I am. My body is intrinsic to my identity. I am embodied. That is profoundly Christian.⁸

While the specific nature of the body’s significance continues to be perceived differently from discipline to discipline and even from one practitioner to the next, recognition of this significance is seldom questioned. Until quite recently, however, this discussion seems to have proceeded largely without the engagement of Pauline scholars. Of course, as this is a claim of absence, no attempt will here be made to demonstrate its validity through citation. The commentaries’ relative lack of discussion regarding the lived body will be noted in the main chapters of the thesis.

Within Pauline studies, the body has been discussed as the limiting place and even as the causal nexus of sin. Within such discussions, σάρξ (flesh) and σῶμα (body)⁹ have been functionally if not formally equated¹⁰ and then assigned a role in

⁷ Merleau-Ponty, *Phenomenology of Perception*; Bakhtin, *Rabelais and His World*; Douglas, *Implicit Meanings*; Foucault, *The Care of the Self*; Leder, *The Absent Body*; Butler, *Bodies That Matter*; Korte, *Body Language in Literature*; Barthes, *Pleasure of the Text*, 16-17; Easthope and McGowan, eds., *A Critical and Cultural Theory Reader*, 133; Jasper, “Body and Word,” 776-777.

⁸ Begbie, “What We Learn about Time,” 24:10—26:14; cf. Plato, *Leg.* 7.815e.

⁹ Here and throughout this thesis, only the first occurrence of a foreign term or phrase will be provided a translation. Notwithstanding, longer phrases and passages will be translated, even though their constituent parts may have already appeared in the text.

Within the literature, σῶμα is variously transliterated (e.g., *sōma*, *soma*). I recognize that part of the inconsistency is due to typographic limitations in earlier publications; I also realize that conflicting

opposition to that of non-material and non-sinful πνεῦμα (spirit). Schmithals is representative, here, writing “In regard to anthropology we must mention above all the dualism of ‘flesh’ (or ‘body’) and ‘Spirit,’ with whose help ... Paul makes vivid use of the either-or of sin and grace or of law and gospel.”¹¹ Along with the aforementioned division between σάρξ and πνεῦμα, the body also has been discussed and debated in distinction to the resurrection body (witness, e.g., the exchange between Harris and Geisler, which included on the latter’s part a charge of heterodoxy with respect to Harris’ affirmed relationship between Christ’s resurrection and his physical pre-crucifixion body).¹² And, of course, the incarnation of Christ has been widely discussed in terms of its defining impact upon fallen humanity.¹³ However, as noted above, the nature of the individually-experienced and gendered body as an indicator and determiner of the form and meaning of social structures seems to have been largely ignored. As Dale Martin notes, “modern interpreters of I Corinthians have seldom raised other questions that might inform an ideological analysis of this early Christian debate about the body. For example, do the different views correlate with class or status differences in the church?”¹⁴ This narrowness of inquiry is perhaps due to the terminologically-centred and atomistic approach of many

representations of the term within a single paragraph may be disconcerting. Nevertheless, I have attempted to retain the style of each writer, rather than level all occurrences to the use of a properly accented Greek font. This same pattern has been followed with regard to all Greek and Hebrew terms.

¹⁰ Cf., e.g., the review of Robinson, *infra.*, 24-25.

¹¹ Schmithals, *The Theology of the First Christians*, 64.

¹² Harris, *Raised Immortal*; Harris, *From Grave to Glory*; Geisler, *The Battle for the Resurrection*.

¹³ E.g., Dunn, *Christology in the Making*; Cortez, *Embodied Souls, Ensouled Bodies*; Crisp, *Divinity and Humanity*; van Driel, *Incarnation Anyway*; Morris, *Logic of God Incarnate*; Brown, *Divine Humanity*; Torrance, *The Incarnation*; Torrance, *Incarnation*.

¹⁴ Martin, *Corinthian Body*, 104.

commentaries, which tends to preclude either recognition or nuanced discussion of such bodily concerns.¹⁵ It will be shown in §1.3 how SRI welcomes and facilitates such somatically-focused discussion.

Even where the importance of the physical body is generally acknowledged, recognition of the gendered aspect of social construction and argumentation has been largely absent from Pauline commentaries, and so the choice of such passages will serve to extend the discussion into new areas. The value of feminist/gendered interpretive approaches and the barriers to their acceptance will be discussed more fully in §1.3.3; for the moment, the following statement by the epistemologist Lorraine Code aptly summarizes the major concepts of non-objectivism, patriarchalism, and the co-implication of gender, class, and race within social structures.

At a time when theorists are familiar with the influence of Wittgenstein's philosophy and with Foucault and postmodernism, it would be unacceptable to characterize language as a neutral or transparent medium through which experiences pass untouched on their way to becoming knowledge. Problems of interpretation, understanding, and evaluation attend all speech acts and linguistic exchanges: most acts of communication are—more or less successfully—acts of translation. Feminists have contended that women in patriarchal societies have to perform these acts of translation twice over: to translate both from idiolect to idiolect and from an androcentered language into a language that can achieve some connection with their experiences. More recent feminist analyses of difference and diversity point to a still more complex process. Translation has to take place not just across gender lines, but across lines constituted by race, ethnicity, class, sexual preference, and age. These lines crisscross to form meanings that construct difference variously, according to the variables pertinent to specific situations and negotiations. It is rarely legitimate, prior to conversation and interpretation, to assume the existence of 'a common language.'¹⁶

¹⁵ Watson, "Why We Need Socio-Rhetorical Commentary," *passim*.

¹⁶ Code, *What Can She Know*, 58.

Notwithstanding its relative absence from discussions within the commentaries, it cannot be denied that the presence of gender has a controlling influence upon argument and upon social expectations.

1.2.2 Texts for Examination

In light of the discussion above, the following passages were chosen for examination: 1 Cor 2:1-5; 2 Cor 11:16—12:11; 2 Cor 3:7-18. In each of these passages, Paul provides a somatic self-presentation that provides a window into the culture's cothematization of gender, rhetorical expectations, power, and authority. In 1 Cor 2:1-5, I examine how the apostle's self-described bodily weakness and self-proclaimed lack of rhetorical ability would be perceived as feminine (and thus shameful) traits and activities. The consequent lowering of the apostle's status will be evaluated in light of the bodily suffering, low status, shameful existence, and rhetorical/argumentative weakness of the crucified Christ himself. In 2 Cor 11:16—12:11, Paul's *Peristasenkatalog* (list of hardships), Damascus escape account, and "thorn in the flesh" episode will be read in light of the Greco-Roman expectations regarding bodily integrity, social power and somatic boundaries, and the acceptable method of self-confession regarding courage, strength, and weakness. It will be shown that each of these expectations has gendered implications, and that the apostle fails to meet the expectations in such a manner as to show himself in a feminine light before his Greco-Roman audience. In 2 Cor 3:7-18, Paul's self-comparison to Moses will be seen as having specifically somatic concerns, as well as discussing explicitly rhetorical elements. The apostle's claims regarding (non-)veiling and his openness of speech and self-disclosure will be demonstrated as having distinct gender

implications. Once again, it will be shown that Paul would be viewed in a shameful feminine light by his audience, and that this low status is the basis on which he claims his authority as an apostle of Christ. Although 1 Cor 11:2-16 does not deal with *Paul's* physical body, it will also be examined as an intertextual means of evaluating the argument within 2 Corinthians 3 as regards the habitual Greco-Roman connection between veiling and gender-expectations.

1.2.3 *Excluded Texts*

In the following brief discussion of passages excluded from this thesis' examination, the elements of gender, rhetoric, weakness, and shame should be kept in mind. It is not that other passages have been excluded to remove unfavourable data from the thesis; rather, the choices have been made to demonstrate whether—where these elements seem to be present within a text—their interpenetrations evidence a consistent pattern of implication. It should be noted that I am not claiming the appropriateness of a gendered shame reading for all of Paul's self-presentations. No such universal key can be presumed to exist, especially given the complexity of Paul's thought and the breadth of his addressed contexts.

1 Cor 4:1-21, 2 Cor 1:3-11, and 2 Cor 6:3-13 could have been included in the study, as they each contain a *Peristasenkatalog*. In comparing the passages, however, the list beginning in 2 Corinthians 11 was found to be lengthier and more complete within itself, and also to provide a richer complex of connections to its surrounding passages (Damascus escape and “thorn in the flesh”) than any of these three options; thus the former was considered to be a better choice for inclusion. 1 Cor 6:12-20 (and even 6:12—7:40) deals with the physical body and is explicitly concerned with issues

of authority structures, gender, and gendered expectations; however, it does not address either the demands of rhetoric, *Paul's* body, or his *self*-presentation. The apostle does speak of his own body in 1 Cor 9:1-27, with a bare hint of gendered issues in the mention of a wife in 9:5; however, the demands of rhetoric/speech and discussion of weakness are mostly absent, while the focus appears to be on the rights of a presumed position of authority. The results of the present examination may prove to be fruitful when later applied to this passage, but the elements were not clearly enough present to warrant inclusion of the text for study. Of course, 1 Corinthians 12 deals with $\sigma\omega\mu\alpha$, but it is not the *physical* body that is in view, nor is Paul primarily concerned with *himself* in this passage. On the other hand, 1 Corinthians 15 *is* concerned explicitly with the physical body; once again, however, it is not *Paul's* body or self-presentation that is in view. 2 Cor 4:1—5:10 is another example of a smaller *Peristasenkatalog*, and was thus not considered necessary for inclusion in the present study. Since it follows directly after the Moses passage, however, I have included some intertextual discussion of it within the appropriate chapter of the thesis.

Outside of the Corinthian correspondence, Gal 4:12-20 is the passage most closely meeting the criteria I have laid out for inclusion in this thesis. Paul is clearly making a *self*-presentation, and it is at least on the surface somatic in nature; his argument is connected with issues of sacred authority, and there is explicit mention of weakness and shame. Indeed, the passage is a prime candidate for examination, except that it falls outside the Corinthian boundaries. It may prove fruitful to examine this passage along the same lines as those applied to the “thorn in the flesh” discourse. Throughout Galatians, there are other passages dealing with the physical body (i.e.,

circumcision); however, they do not appear to address Paul's own body or the demands of rhetoric. Phil 1:12-26 contains limited references to Paul's own somatic weakness and suffering, though there is no obvious connection with rhetorical expectations; in content, if not in form, it is a short and incomplete *Peristasenkatalog*; the same may be said regarding both Col 1:24-29 and 2 Tim 2:1-13, except that the mention of hardships here are even less filled-in than in Philippians. 2 Th 3:6-10 contains language (or at least concepts) familiar from 2 Cor 11; however, the mention of physical toil as apostolic ministry for the benefit of others is so brief as to prove unfruitful for this study. The suffering and weakness mentioned in Rom 8:18-27 is neither Paul's own nor (considering the context of struggling against sin) is it necessarily somatic in nature; the element of rhetorical expectations is absent.

Passages in Acts may also be considered for later examination: Paul's anger at being unlawfully beaten in 16:35-40; Paul's stoning recounted in 14:11-20. These passages, however, serve more as intertextual commentary on the passages already included. Lastly, all the crucifixion passages within the Gospels could be examined within this thesis, except that they are not *Pauline*; indeed, the crucifixion of Christ is discussed at various points within this study, as it is the apostle's basis for a subversive redefinition both of the acceptable body and of authoritative leadership.

1.3 Methodologies: SRI

This thesis will pursue a multifaceted, integrated approach to interpretation, along the line made popular by Vernon K. Robbins' work in SRI.¹⁷ Within this section I will briefly outline SRI's history, define SRI's distinctives, and contrast it with other methods. The value of feminist and gender interpretation will be discussed, as well as the connection which exists between these and SRI. I will introduce the sociological notion of *habitus* as a rationale for the use of approaches and affirmations that may not have been intelligible to a Greco-Roman audience or authors, and discuss SRI's value in the present study as it relates to rhetoric, power, and gender. I will follow with a discussion of SRI's various approaches or "textures," and conclude with a summary of SRI's projected use within this thesis.

1.3.1 History of SRI

Though Robbins began publicly developing his approach in the mid-1970s, he coined the term "socio-rhetorical" in 1984;¹⁸ from that time to the present he has increasingly laid out and refined the multiform analytic now widely associated with his term.¹⁹ The works most often cited by Robbins' followers are his two 1996 explorations of SRI: *The Tapestry of Early Christian Discourse*, and *Exploring the Texture of Texts*, while his latest non-commentary production is the wide-ranging *The*

¹⁷ Robbins, *Exploring Texture*, passim; Robbins, "Beginnings and Developments in Socio-Rhetorical Interpretation," passim; Robbins, "Socio-Rhetorical Interpretation from its Beginnings to the Present," passim; Robbins, *Tapestry*, passim; Gowler, "Introduction: New Boundaries," passim.

¹⁸ Gowler, "Socio-Rhetorical Interpretation," 191; Gowler, Bloomquist, *et al*, "Editors' Preface," vii; Robbins, *Invention of Christian Discourse*, 1-5; Kloppenborg, "Ideological Texture," 64 n.1; Bloomquist, "Paul's Inclusive Language," 165-166; Wanamaker, "By the Power of God," 221; Robbins, "Review of Witherington, What's in the Word," [n.p.].

¹⁹ Cf., *inter alia*, Robbins, "Using a Socio-Rhetorical Poetics," passim; Robbins, "Present and Future," passim; Robbins, "Argumentative Textures," passim; Robbins, "Divine Dialogue and the Lord's Prayer," passim; Robbins, "From Heidelberg to Heidelberg," passim.

Invention of Christian Discourse. SRI has been lauded by numerous practitioners across the disciplines (e.g., Duane F. Watson, Charles A. Wanamaker, John H. Elliott, and Willi Braun), who acknowledge their debt to Robbins' work and term it "groundbreaking," "comprehensive," "innovative," and "one of the most significant and healthy approaches to the analysis of sacred texts to have appeared in many years."²⁰

1.3.2 *Distinctives of SRI*

The goal of SRI is to encourage interdisciplinary cooperation by setting "specialized areas of analysis [literary, rhetorical, social, historical, cultural] in conversation with one another."²¹ In the midst of an interpretive environment ever-more fragmented by new and competing methods, Robbins purposed to "integrate major strategies of the new movements and methods through a rhetorical approach that focuses on literary, social, cultural and ideological issues in texts. [These] issues exhibit the common ground among these movements and methods—namely, a growing perception that texts are performances of language, and language is part of the inner fabric of society, culture, ideology and religion."²² Russell B. Sisson's evaluation that SRI "brings biblical interpretation into the forefront of philosophical, linguistic, and social scientific discussion"²³ reflects a broad-based agreement that Robbins' approach is truly dialogic in nature: that is, SRI is integrative, multidisciplinary, accepting of new insights, and consensus-building, rather than

²⁰ Duling, "Whatever Gain I Had," 222; Gowler, "Text, Culture, and Ideology," 96; Wanamaker, "By the Power of God," 194; Bloomquist, "Paul's Inclusive Language," 165; Watson, "Keep Yourselves from Idols," 281; Watson, "Introduction [to Vernon Robbins]," 69.

²¹ Robbins, *Tapestry*, 3, 9-10, 13, 16, 41, 237, 243.

²² Robbins, *Tapestry*, 1.

²³ Sisson, "Common Agōn," 263.

atomistic and divisive in approach or exclusionary in its goal.²⁴ SRI is followed by a growing number of biblical scholars, who recognize that the use of multiple interpretive approaches is productive, placing varying insights side-by-side in order to deepen the reader's analysis and insight into a text.²⁵ SRI "consciously and programmatically negotiates [... the dynamics of social cultural, gender-based, ideological, and intercultural analysis of sacred texts ...] in a manner that generates significantly new modes of rhetorical analysis and interpretation as it proceeds."²⁶ Robbins has not so much invented a new method as he has demonstrated the possibility of integrating multiple existing methods on a single field of study and has championed a respectful approach to the heteroglossic interpretations resulting from that field's play. SRI is not a method in itself, but an analytic using a fluid suite of methodologies.²⁷

The multiform approach of SRI always keeps in mind that interpretation of texts suffer when they are subjected to a narrowness of approach and compartmentalization of disciplinary investigation. The practical assumption of many interpretive methodologies is that their approach is the only one needed—or at least

²⁴ Watson, "Why We Need Socio-Rhetorical Commentary," 134-135, 140, *passim*; Gowler, Bloomquist, *et al.*, "Editors' Preface," vii-viii; Duling, "Encomium," xiii; Combrink, "Shame on the Hypocritical Leaders," 1; Gowler, "Text, Culture, and Ideology," 90, 96; Bloomquist, "Paul's Inclusive Language," 165-166, 171, 193; Wanamaker, "By the Power of God," 194, 221; Sisson, "Common Agōn," 242, 263; Wachob, "James and Psalms," 280; Watson, "Keep Yourself from Idols," 281; deSilva, "Toward a Socio-Rhetorical Taxonomy," 303; Newby, "Quranic Texture," 333-334; Watson and Robbins, "Dialogue between Vernon Robbins and the Reviewers," 109, 115; Dean, "Textured Criticism," 90; Gowler, "Socio-Rhetorical Interpretation," 194-195, 200, 203; cf. Robbins, *Tapestry*, 1, 9, 13, 16, 18-27, 40-43, 237, 243.

²⁵ Robbins, "Intertextuality—A Response," *passim*, esp. 301-302; Robbins, "Socio-Rhetorical Interpretation," 196; Schüssler Fiorenza, "Ethics of Biblical Interpretation," 14.

²⁶ Robbins, "From Heidelberg to Heidelberg," 348; Olbricht and Eriksson, "Rhetoric, Ethic, and Moral Persuasion: Introduction," 7-8; Combrink, "Challenges and Opportunities," 106-107, *passim*.

²⁷ Gowler, "Socio-Rhetorical Interpretation," 194-196, 203; Newby, "Quranic Texture," 93-94; Culpepper, "Mapping the Textures of New Testament Criticism," 72-74, 77; Robbins, "Response [to Reviewers]," 101.

the best available. The historical outworking of such compartmentalization and the need for an integration of various interpretive models within biblical criticism has been ably discussed by Fernando F. Segovia, in his introduction to *Reading from this Place*.²⁸ Robbins has pointed out that each of the many interpretive methods appearing over the last few decades

has great strengths, but when interpreters use only one of them, the result is too limited. When an interpreter uses them interactively, a rich and responsible approach is available for dealing with belief, action, and life in the world today. No interpreter will ever use all of the resources of socio-rhetorical criticism in any one interpretation. But no interpreter ever uses all of the resources of any method in an interpretation. The purpose is to build an environment for interpretation that provides interpreters with a basic, overall view of life as we know it and language as we use it.²⁹

In short, then, it might be said the overall value of the SRI analytic is that it recognizes the safety and wisdom to be found in a multitude of counselors.

1.3.3 SRI and Other Approaches

In light of its distinctives, Robbins' SRI should be located in respect to certain other approaches to the text. Such a contrast and comparison as provided here may assist in a greater understanding of the analytic. In the following paragraphs, I will discuss SRI's relation to the "socio-rhetorical commentary" of Ben Witherington III, to certain scholars whose connections with SRI are not explicitly clear, and lastly to feminist and gender interpretation.

1.3.3.1 Ben Witherington's "SRI." While SRI is embracing rather than divisive in nature, integrating existing critical methods within itself, it must still be

²⁸ Segovia, "And They Began to Speak in Other Tongues," 1-31; Combrink, "Contribution of Socio-Rhetorical Interpretation," 92-94.

²⁹ Robbins, *Exploring Texture*, 2.

insisted that there does exist a stable core to this analytic. Indeed, its very focus on the value of heteroglossic readings and the use of multiple genre-appropriate methodologies to texts is that which sets SRI apart from other approaches. With this focus in view, a word should be said here regarding the series written and edited by Ben Witherington and initiated in 1995 by his publication of *Conflict and Community in Corinth: A Socio-Rhetorical Commentary*. Though Witherington has taken on Robbins' methodological title for the series, it has been noted that he does not apply SRI's analytic philosophy in his work. The resultant confusion of terms has been decried by both Robbins and others. In a strikingly combative spirit, David Gowler accuses Witherington of "hijacking" the term and of "misleadingly" using a "classic 'bait-and-switch'" approach to replace Robbins' "sophisticated multi-dimensional approach" with his own conservative commentary methods.³⁰ In a 2012 review of Witherington's work, Robbins states in like manner that everyone "knows the problem of putting new wine in old wineskins. It may be even more problematic to put old wine in new wineskins and advertise the product as new wine in new wineskins."³¹ In an article discussing the nature and requirements of commentary writing, Duane Watson likewise notes that while Witherington's work claims to be socio-rhetorical, it does "not move beyond traditional historical-critical methods of interpretation with an emphasis in social history."³²

Apart from the question of a "hijacking" of SRI's terminology, the concern of these two reviews is Witherington's application of traditional exegetical methods and

³⁰ Gowler, "Socio-Rhetorical Interpretation," 193-194.

³¹ Robbins, "Review of Witherington, What's in the Word," [n.p.].

³² Watson, "Why We Need Socio-Rhetorical Commentary," 129; so also Combrink, "Contribution of Socio-Rhetorical Interpretation," 104-105.

classical macro-rhetorical categories to non-oration genres, as well as what Gowler and Robbins perceive to be Witherington's lack of sensitivity toward the multiple cultures which should impact one's goals and methodologies when interpreting the New Testament.³³ Later in this thesis, I will discuss the relative *applicability* of macro- and micro-rhetorical investigation to Pauline literature; at this point, it suffices to say that Witherington's approach is not widely considered to be a form of or option within Robbins' SRI.

1.3.3.2 Unclear connections with SRI. There are some scholars who may appear to have no connection with SRI, even though they evidence a multi-disciplinary inclusionary approach to the interpretation of the biblical text. In some cases, there may simply be no connection other than a coincidence of approach. The work of Daniel Patte, Fredrik Ivarsson, Matthew Bates, and of Pieter J. J. Botha and Johannes Vorster, are examples of scholarly approaches clearly in line with, if not explicitly formed by, SRI. Each of these writers has sought to highlight the "epistemic status of rhetoric"—the concept that historical and literary sources do not provide one with an objective simplex but with "perspectival discourses constructing ... worlds and symbolic universes."³⁴ They seek to broaden the scope of rhetorical investigation by consciously integrating studies of value-systems, the role of personhood, and the body's function in society and discourse. All of this is undertaken with an attitude of celebrating "contradiction and contrariety."³⁵

³³ Cf., e.g., Porter and Dyer, "Oral Texts," passim.

³⁴ Schüssler Fiorenza, *Rhetoric and Ethic*, 26-27; cf. 42-44.

³⁵ Patte, "Acknowledging the Contextual Character," passim; Ivarsson, "Vice Lists and Deviant Masculinity," 163-164; Bates, "Beyond Hays," passim; Botha and Vorster, "Introduction: Rhetoric, Scripture and Theology," 19, 21, passim.

Other scholars are clearly indebted to Robbins' analytic, even though they do not explicitly acknowledge that debt in their writing. Among the most obvious are Jerome Neyrey and Wesley Wachob, each of whom has contributed an article to a *Festschrift* for Robbins. Though the articles are in honour of Robbins' work and impact, neither mention Robbins, and Neyrey's article does not even mention SRI, nor make use of its terminology. In this same *Festschrift*, Dennis Duling begins his article by stating that his study—while having “much in common” with it—is “not an exercise in Vernon Robbins' groundbreaking socio-rhetorical criticism.”³⁶ Lastly, there is the strange case of James D. [Hester] Amador who in an article published well after Robbins' coining of the term, uses an approach well in line with SRI, and writes that his insights are “the result of the exploration of a methodology which I call ‘socio-rhetorical criticism’.”³⁷ The influence of Robbins' SRI analytic is clear to be seen, even when the terminology may be absent; given the afore-mentioned broad impact of Robbins' work over the last forty years, it may be safe to assume some unnoticed or unacknowledged influence on a number of interpreters. Even where direct influence is not able to be demonstrated, it is clear that SRI has given a terminology and focus to a broader base of interdisciplinary work within biblical interpretation.

1.3.3.3 Feminist / gender interpretation. Robbins is admittedly indebted to other scholars who have developed their own methodologies over the years (e.g., M. M. Bakhtin and Anthony Thiselton, each of whom are eclectic and broadly inclusivist

³⁶ Duling, “Whatever Gain I Had,” 222.

³⁷ Amador, “Socio-Rhetorical Criticism and the Parable of the Tenants,” 221.

in their approach).³⁸ This indebtedness extends not least to feminist theologian Rebecca Chopp and her inclusionary endeavours to “seek discourses of emancipation for marginalized, embodied voices and actions in the text.”³⁹ In addition to Robbins’ own acknowledgment of this indebtedness, there has been a reciprocal recognition of this connection. Elisabeth Schüssler Fiorenza has singled out SRI as “one of the few Christian Testament studies that attempt to take rhetorical and feminist theoretical insights seriously.”⁴⁰ Fiorenza’s complaint against other approaches is that even when they are multi-disciplinary, they tend to ignore “ethical emancipatory and feminist-rhetorical terms,” and do not own their “political [ethical] roots and space.”⁴¹ Such approaches claim a “neutral academic” stance, not recognizing the ethical and political effects of their own interpretive activities.⁴² But every interpreter *is* located, and without a recognition of such positioning, textual interpretation is unable to produce ethical pronouncements and practice—which things are surely the goal of biblical interpretation.⁴³ In Fiorenza’s view, if “rhetorical criticism would engage with feminist theory a ‘full turn’ of biblical studies would be possible.”⁴⁴

³⁸ Robbins, *Invention of Christian Discourse*, 4; Thiselton, “Biblical Studies and Theoretical Hermeneutics,” 107; Jeffrey and Maillet, *Christianity and Literature*, 58; Robbins, “Response—Using Bakhtin’s Lexicon Dialogicae,” passim; Bakhtin, *The Dialogic Imagination*; Bakhtin, *Speech Genres*.

³⁹ Robbins, *Tapestry*, 11, 16; cf. Chopp, *Power to Speak*, passim.

⁴⁰ Schüssler Fiorenza, “Challenging the Rhetorical Half-Turn,” 32-33.

⁴¹ Schüssler Fiorenza, “Disciplinary Matters,” 9-12; Schüssler Fiorenza, “Challenging the Rhetorical Half-Turn,” 36; Schüssler Fiorenza, *Rhetoric and Ethic*, 10; Code, *Rhetorical Spaces*, 42.

⁴² Smit, “Rhetoric and Ethic?,” 385-387.

⁴³ Watson, “Why We Need Socio-Rhetorical Commentary,” 136-138; Schüssler Fiorenza, “Disciplinary Matters,” 16-19, 30-31; Schüssler Fiorenza, “Ethics of Biblical Interpretation,” 4, 13; Schüssler Fiorenza, *Rhetoric and Ethic*, 12, 25-26, 28, 30, 32, 44-46; Dewey, “Feminist Readings,” 170-171; Schneiders, “Feminist Ideology Criticism,” 8; Boxall, *New Testament Interpretation*, 158.

⁴⁴ Schüssler Fiorenza, *Rhetoric and Ethic*, 13, cf. 4, 11.

Feminist and Christian ethics occupy common philosophical space, as expressions of traditions which investigate what it means for individual human beings to flourish within—as well as to challenge the injustices of—their communities.⁴⁵

Feminist and gender studies are intimately joined with the broader concerns of emancipation, and the scholarly and experiential barriers confronted by feminists are akin to those confronted by any oppressed or marginalized group or class.⁴⁶

The necessity and value of feminist or gender interpretation of literature and society are so widely noted that appropriate bibliographic references must be culled to a manageable number, rather than searched out.⁴⁷ Gender is an ubiquitous presence in our lives, demanding that we constantly evaluate our selves and critically interpret our culture—including its literary representations—in light of gendered performance expectations “that shape the way we form our personal, familial, and social core narratives and that have major influence on how we make meaning in our lives.”⁴⁸ As

⁴⁵ Parsons, *Feminism and Christian Ethics*, 1-13, 38, 63-65, 91-92, 111-120, 144-147, 173-174, 222-242, 175-179.

⁴⁶ Osiek, “Social Sciences and the Second Testament,” 93; Boxall, *New Testament Interpretation*, 147, 151; Schüssler Fiorenza, *Bread not Stone*, xiii, 2-8, 86; Schüssler Fiorenza, “Disciplinary Matters,” 29-32; Schüssler Fiorenza, *Rhetoric and Ethic*, ix, 5, 48-55; Code, *Rhetorical Spaces*, xiii, 43-44; Schotroff, “Not Many Powerful,” 181; Coakley, *Powers and Submissions*, xiii; Day and Pressler, eds., *Engaging the Bible in a Gendered World*, xix; McDonough, *Staging Masculinity*, 5-17.

⁴⁷ Schüssler Fiorenza, *Bread not Stone*, 24-25, 32, 37-38, 46, 86; Schüssler Fiorenza, “Ethics of Biblical Interpretation,” 11-14; Schüssler Fiorenza, “Challenging the Rhetorical Half-Turn,” 41-45; Chopp, *Power to Speak*, 107-115; Økland and Boer, “Toward Marxist Feminist Biblical Criticism,” 15-16; Økland, “Textual Reproduction as Surplus Value,” 184-185; Coakley, *Powers and Submissions*, xiii; Yee, “Author/Text/Reader and Power,” 114-115; Burrus, “Mapping as Metamorphosis,” 2; Code, *Rhetorical Spaces*, 13-15; Barton, “Introduction,” 3; Ciampa, “Approaching Paul’s Use of Scripture,” 310; Day and Pressler, eds., *Engaging the Bible in a Gendered World*, xvii-xix; Pippin, “Eros and the End,” 193; Castelli, “Heteroglossia,” 76, 93; Loader, *NT on Sexuality*, 82-83, 89, 92; Thiem, “No Gendered Bodies,” 458, *passim*; Neuger, “Image and Imagination,” 156-157; Jasper, *Because of Beauvoir*, 3-4.

⁴⁸ Neuger, “Image and Imagination,” 156-157; Chopp, *Power to Speak*, *passim*, esp. 115-124; Schüssler Fiorenza, *Bread not Stone*, xiii-xv, 4-8, 43-63, 86, 136-143; Schüssler Fiorenza, “Exploring the Intersections,” 6, 10, 15-16; Isherwood, *Fat Jesus*, 33-35, 37-96; Økland and Boer, “Toward Marxist Feminist Biblical Criticism,” *passim*; Økland, “Textual Reproduction as Surplus Value,” 182-184, 191-192; Kirova, “Early Fathers of Marxist Feminism,” 26-27, *passim*; Prosic, “Schizoid Coitus,”

Caroline Walker Bynum has pointed out, “the questions of feminists have changed the course of scholarship. It is no longer possible to study religious practice or religious symbols without taking gender—that is, the cultural experience of being male or female—into account.”⁴⁹

Yet, even with the wide-spread discussion and documentation of gender’s impact on literature and culture, the abjection of feminist and gender-sensitive methods still proves to be a barrier in critical interpretation of the New Testament and other literature.⁵⁰ The tendency within academia is for women’s voices and concerns to be classified as non-academic and thus unimportant.⁵¹ The situation puts one in mind of Robert Louis Stevenson’s comment: “A fact is not called a fact, but a piece of gossip, if it does not fall into one of your scholastic categories. An inquiry must be in some acknowledged direction, with a name to go by; or else you are not inquiring at

51; Parsons, *Feminism and Christian Ethics*, 27-35, 116-120, 161-163, 222-223; Coakley, *Powers and Submissions*, 31, 98; Guerin, Labor, *et al*, *Handbook of Critical Approaches to Literature*, 202-203; Code, *Rhetorical Spaces*, xiii, 29, 35, 43-44; Burrus, “Mapping as Metamorphosis,” 3-4; Edwards, “Gender Theory and Criticism,” 420-425; Messer-Davidow, “Feminist Theory and Criticism,” 299-301; Buell, “God’s Own People,” 162-163; Marchal, “Mimicry and Colonial Differences,” 101; Day and Pressler, eds., *Engaging the Bible in a Gendered World*, xii, xvii; Russell, “Emasculation of Antony,” 132-134; Hawkins, “Does Paul Make a Difference?,” 171-172; Loades, “Feminist Interpretation,” 81-85, 87; Butler, *Bodies That Matter*; Butler, *Gender Trouble*.

⁴⁹ Bynum, “Introduction,” 1-2; cf. Moore, “O Man, Who Art Thou,” 1-2; Foxhall, “Introduction,” 7-8; Tolbert, “Protestant Feminists and the Bible,” 14-15; Ehrensperger, *Paul and the Dynamics of Power*, 19, 22-24, 27-31, 188; Levine, “Feminist Criticism,” 163-164; Sawyer, *God, Gender and the Bible*, 15-17; Fonow and Cook, “Feminist Methodology,” 2230.

⁵⁰ Osiek, “Social Sciences and the Second Testament,” 91-92; Schüssler Fiorenza, *Bread not Stone*, xvii-xix, 43-46, 95-98; Schüssler Fiorenza, “Challenging the Rhetorical Half-Turn,” 35, 44, 47; Code, *Rhetorical Spaces*, 1-22, 58-82; Cameron, *Feminism and Linguistic Theory*, 32-46, 86-89, 105, 131-132, 146, 150-151, 154-155; Parsons, *Feminism and Christian Ethics*, 52-58; Økland and Boer, “Toward Marxist Feminist Biblical Criticism,” 1-2; Nortjé, “On the Road to Emmaus,” 271-272; Coakley, *Powers and Submissions*, 26-27, 98; Chopp, *Power to Speak*, 66, 79-80, 111-112; Jasper, *Because of Beauvoir*, 8-11, 15-20, 25-26, 37-39, 41-42, 47-48, 155-156; King, “Question of Identity,” 219; King, “Introduction: Gender and the Study of Religion,” 1-2; Braun, “Fugitives from Femininity,” 317; Thiselton, *The Hermeneutics of Doctrine*, 303-304; Guerin, Labor, *et al*, *Handbook of Critical Approaches to Literature*, 196, 200-201, 212; McDonough, *Staging Masculinity*, 19.

⁵¹ Schüssler Fiorenza, *Rhetoric and Ethic*, 3, 33, 43; Code, *Rhetorical Spaces*, 48, 60, 133, 172-176, 196-197.

all, only lounging; and the workhouse is too good for you.”⁵² While academia has traditionally viewed itself as neutral, as “gender-blind,” it has become clear that “the product of any research process is a construction of, not a reflection of, what the reality is about.”⁵³ Feminist scholarship has pointed out the ironic blindness of this presumed gender-blindness, as well as the male bias inherent in traditional manners of engaging with philosophy and critical interpretation.⁵⁴

In great part, the necessity of feminist and gendered approaches is due to a combination of those two factors: the impossibility of a truly neutral or objective interpretive stance, and the tendency for male interpreters to believe in their own neutral objectivity. Though white male Euro-Americans often appear to assume their social and personal location is somehow universal, the very existence of feminist and gendered “push-back” demonstrates that the assumption is false.⁵⁵ Annette Kolodny, in her oft-quoted article “Dancing through the Minefield,” shows that the gendered state and experiences of both reader and author radically influence a reader’s expectations and either allow or foreclose multiple interpretations of a text. This influence must be brought into the open, in order to broaden the possibilities of

⁵² Stevenson, “Apology for Idlers,” 122.

⁵³ Fonow and Cook, “Feminist Methodology,” 2221, 2215; cf. Code, *What Can She Know*, 58; Segovia, “And They Began to Speak in Other Tongues,” 20, 30; O’Connor, “Epistemological Significance,” 47; Ciampa, “Approaching Paul’s Use of Scripture,” 301-305; Köstenberger, “Gender Passages in the NT,” 261-263; Barthes, *Pleasure of the Text*, 32-33; Hass, “Future of English Literature and Theology,” 842-843; Eagleton, *Literary Theory*, 13-14.

⁵⁴ Witt, “Feminist Interpretation,” esp. 539, 542, 549; Code, *Rhetorical Spaces*, 28, 31-33, 37, 45-53; Padgug, “Sexual Matters,” 16; Schüssler Fiorenza, *Bread not Stone*, 24-25, 32, 37-38, 49-50, 62-63, 98-108, 132-133, 144; Parsons, *Feminism and Christian Ethics*, 29, 50-54, 180-199, 203-207; Jeffrey and Mailet, *Christianity and Literature*, 189; Waetjen, “Social Location,” 85, 88-91, passim; Yee, “Author/Text/Reader and Power,” 115-118; Buell, “God’s Own People,” 187-190; Day and Pressler, eds., *Engaging the Bible in a Gendered World*, xx; Kolodny, “A Map for Rereading,” 452; Castelli, “Heteroglossia,” 83; Cameron, *Feminism and Linguistic Theory*, 32, 57-58, 70-71, 73, 89-90, 171; Edwards, “Gender Theory and Criticism,” 423; Thiselton, *The Hermeneutics of Doctrine*, 303-304, 344.

⁵⁵ Schüssler Fiorenza, *Rhetoric and Ethic*, 42.

interpretation and allow for ethically responsible readings and enactments of texts. In summary, Kolodny states that “[if] feminist criticism calls anything into question, it must be that dog-eared myth of intellectual neutrality.”⁵⁶

This is all to say that readers and interpreters are socially constructed and culturally located no less than are the texts and authors which they read. Even among conservative biblical scholars, there has long been a recognition that “the ‘hermeneutical circle,’ that necessary interrelationship of text and reader, qualified the objectivity of all reading” so that there is no bias-free, neutral ground of interpretation to be found.⁵⁷ There is no purely objective stance available, no “view from nowhere,” no “immaculate perception”; even the choice “of one’s object of study is not independent of the studying subject.”⁵⁸ No matter how innocuous one’s choices may appear to be, every position held is the result of a position *taken*. As Roland Barthes has written, “any completed utterance runs the risk of being ideological.”⁵⁹ And this locatedness of authors and readers necessarily results in a “plurality of interpretations based on the text itself; no one interpretation [... can ...] exhaust the meaning of the text.”⁶⁰

⁵⁶ Kolodny, “Dancing through the Minefield,” 25, *passim*.

⁵⁷ Tolbert, “Politics and Poetics of Location,” 307, 315.

⁵⁸ Solevåg, *Birthing Salvation*, 28-29; Harrill, *Slaves in the New Testament*, 1; duBois, “Ancient Masculinities,” 322-323; Neyrey, “Social-Scientific Criticism,” 181; Meeks, *The First Urban Christians*, 5; Schottroff, Schroer, *et al*, *Feminist Interpretation*, 17-19, 183; Code, *Rhetorical Spaces*, 24, 31-36, 38, 43, 53-54, 132-136, 181-182, 200-204; Schüssler Fiorenza, “Response to ‘The Social Functions of Women’s Asceticism,’” 5, 13-14; Sawyer, *God, Gender and the Bible*, 46-47; Boer, “Julia Kristeva, Marx, and the Singularity of Paul,” 210; Bourdieu, *Field of Cultural Production*, 215-218; Booth, *Rhetoric of Fiction*, 3-20, esp. 16-20; Mesnard, “Power of Uncertainty,” 327; Formisano, “Perpetua’s Prisons,” 330.

⁵⁹ Barthes, *Pleasure of the Text*, 50.

⁶⁰ Segovia, “And They Began to Speak in Other Tongues,” 17; cf. Solevåg, *Birthing Salvation*, 27; Barthes, *New Critical Essays*, 79-89; Guerin, Labor, *et al*, *Handbook of Critical Approaches to Literature*, 247.

Not that this state of affairs implies a hermeneutical impasse, merely the necessity of recognizing the differing social location of both author and reader, in order to “produce rather than obstruct meaning, so that understanding is productive and not merely reproductive.”⁶¹ Given the located and constrained nature of interpreters, a multiform, interdisciplinary approach is vital to any fuller understanding of a text. Simply put, the more “sets of eyes” one has on a text, the less is likely to be missed and the more confident one may become of an informed interpretation.⁶² It must, however, be noted that it “is not the production of multiple interpretations of a text in itself that is liberative, it is instead the reading of texts *with equal seriousness* from multiple perspectives.”⁶³ That feminist and gendered readings are themselves biased is not to be denied; what is to be denied is the ability or right of another supposedly neutral or scientifically-objective approach to foreclose such readings on the basis of them not fitting or supporting a “normal” position.⁶⁴ Because of their “more open and honest ... advocacy” regarding the social and somatic locatedness of the interpreter, feminist and gendered interpretation provides a much-needed balance to many “malestream” critical investigations which do not recognize their own lack of neutrality.⁶⁵ As Daniel Patte has so eloquently stated in his scholarly

⁶¹ Clark, “General Hermeneutics,” 112-113; cf. Tolbert, “Politics and Poetics of Location,” 314-315.

⁶² deSilva, “Embodying the Word,” 123-124, 126-129; Sawyer, *God, Gender and the Bible*, 5-7; Barton, *Roman Honor*, 14, 16-17.

⁶³ Tolbert, “Reading for Liberation,” 274; Jasper, “Study of Literature and Theology,” 28; Thiselton, *The Hermeneutics of Doctrine*, xvii, 3, 122-125, 335-336.

⁶⁴ Code, *Rhetorical Spaces*, 1-17, 23-31; Levine, “Feminist Criticism,” 158-160; White, “Religion and the Hermeneutics of Gender,” 94, 78-79, 95; Coakley, *Powers and Submissions*, 68; King, “Introduction [Empirical Investigations],” 195-196; Braun, “Fugitives from Femininity,” 328-329; Guerin, Labor, *et al*, *Handbook of Critical Approaches to Literature*, 203.

⁶⁵ Tolbert, “Protestant Feminists and the Bible,” 13; Exum, “Murder They Wrote,” 46; O’Connor, “Epistemological Significance,” 57-58; King, “Introduction: Gender and the Study of Religion,” 8-10; Shaw, “Feminist Anthropology,” 65-66; Rapport and Overing, *Social and Cultural*

self-appraisal of androcentrism, Euro-American male interpreters must move from speaking *for* others, through *listening to* others, ultimately into a willing state of speaking *with* others.⁶⁶

Since an objective, value- and presupposition-free reading of biblical texts is not possible, it is desirable to make use of methods which allow for polyphonic readings. While Bakhtin developed the concept of polyphony in light of the Russian novel, it has been demonstrated that it has broad applicability to other genres, including New Testament texts.⁶⁷ As Paul Ricoeur notes, even “real-life” persons, events, and histories may be profitably viewed in terms of fictional narrative. He sees this as due in part to the parallel nature of *character* in literature (character as the signifier of one who is presented as engaging in a continuously-coherent series of actions) and in life (character as the signifier of the self’s temporal continuity).⁶⁸ Explicitly affirming Bakhtin’s approach, Thiselton affirms that various canonical authors may address the same object of thought from their distinct vantage-points, without producing a contradiction “*since the conversation continues without finality. It constitutes an ongoing process within the canon, in which several voices speak as subjects from their own context and world.*”⁶⁹ So also may successive readers apply their own varied horizons of understanding and experience to the text, resulting in a heteroglossic tapestry of interpretation and response.

Anthropology, 142; Guerin, Labor, *et al*, *Handbook of Critical Approaches to Literature*, 201; Braun, “Fugitives from Femininity,” 318; Thiselton, *The Hermeneutics of Doctrine*, 123.

⁶⁶ Patte, “Acknowledging the Contextual Character,” *passim*.

⁶⁷ Guerin, Labor, *et al*, *Handbook of Critical Approaches to Literature*, 351-355; Green, *Mikhail Bakhtin*, *passim*.

⁶⁸ Ricoeur, *Oneself*, 140-163.

⁶⁹ Thiselton, “Future of Biblical Interpretation,” 21, *passim*; Barthes, *New Critical Essays*, 79-89.

The particular impact of gendered interpretation on Pauline studies may also be noted. For example, Fredrik Ivarsson notes that “[i]mportant aspects of Paul’s rhetoric can be overlooked if we do not pay heed to ancient gender ideology.”⁷⁰ And Joseph Marchal recognizes that in studies of the apostle’s mimetic pleas “the differences between Paul and his audience(s) are underexamined. The rare exceptions to this general rule have been the feminist rhetorical work of scholars like Antoinette Clark Wire, Elisabeth Schüssler Fiorenza, and Cynthia Briggs Kittredge.”⁷¹ The exceptional nature of these scholars’ work is due to their willingness to “read across the grain” and to examine texts from multiple points of view and through multiple methods. This multi-disciplinary inclusivism—acceptance of heteroglossic voices in a text and culture—is a hallmark of feminist criticism; as such, it fits naturally with the SRI analytic as described above.⁷² In part, feminist and gender criticism is clearly and naturally aligned with SRI’s approach, since both are inclusionary and based on a recognition of there being no social structuring apart from bodies and no bodies without gender—that is, they both take seriously the importance of cultural and somatic locatedness in evaluating the significance of a text.⁷³

⁷⁰ Ivarsson, “Vice Lists and Deviant Masculinity,” 183-184, *passim*.

⁷¹ Marchal, “Mimicry and Colonial Differences,” 106.

⁷² Levine, “Feminist Criticism,” 156, 162; Hass, “Future of English Literature and Theology,” 851-853; Chopp, *Power to Speak*, 2, 12, 42, 84-95, 127-128; Økland and Boer, “Toward Marxist Feminist Biblical Criticism,” 20; Barton, “Introduction,” 1-2; Thiselton, “Biblical Studies and Theoretical Hermeneutics,” 104-107; Jeffrey and Maillet, *Christianity and Literature*, 82-83; Guerin, Labor, *et al*, *Handbook of Critical Approaches to Literature*, 244-245, 302-304; Yee, “Author/Text/Reader and Power,” 109, 112-113; Buell, “God’s Own People,” 281, 285, 294-295, 303, 305-308; Schüssler Fiorenza, *Rhetoric and Ethic*, 9; Schotroff, “Not Many Powerful,” 63; Geisterfer, “Full Turns and Half Turns,” 142-144.

⁷³ Combrink, “Challenge of Making and Redrawing Boundaries,” 14; Robbins, *Invention of Christian Discourse*, 8, 14, 16, 110-112, 118-119, 489-490, 516-517; Rapport and Overing, *Social and Cultural Anthropology*, 153; Schüssler Fiorenza, *Bread not Stone*, xiv-xxv, 2-3.

1.3.4 *The Notion of Habitus*

My intention in this thesis is to engage in an etic argument, rather than to produce a purely emic account. Throughout the analyses of the passages I will mine support, comment, and challenges from the works of various scholars without regard to their awareness either of the SRI analytic or of feminist and gender interpretative methods. I am fully aware that, “in various places, we do violence to certain thinkers by integrating their thought into a theoretical formation that some of them might have found quite alien. [I] would say in justification that historical gratitude is not in itself a scientific virtue.”⁷⁴ Such a questioning of historical privilege ought also to extend to the ancient sources under investigation, for societies and individuals engage in practices and discourses which they identify as having a specific significance, yet which clearly have further significance to those observing from the outside. What is unacknowledged or even unnoticed by the society under investigation is not so much being ignored, as it has been set beyond the boundaries of possible discourse, constituted as beyond the grammar of the language of those who are considered ideal members of the discussion. In other words, the society’s settled expectations veil the world from the agent’s eyes, bringing about a misapprehension of her own intent.

Because the ideal social participant neither needs nor expects an explanation for that which is or is not socially and rhetorically acceptable or coherent, it is the outsider to the discourse who may be able to identify most carefully what is left unsaid as the ground of the ancient author’s position-taking.⁷⁵ This value of an etic

⁷⁴ Berger and Luckmann, *Social Construction of Reality*, 17.

⁷⁵ Kraemer, *Unreliable Witnesses*, 9-11, 259-260; Harrill, *Slaves in the New Testament*, 3; Mesnard, “Power of Uncertainty,” 327-328; cf. Wander, “Third Persona,” passim; Black, “The Second Persona,” passim; Barton, *Roman Honor*, 290; Macherey, *Theory of Literary Production*, 95-100.

approach is illuminated by Pierre Bourdieu's notion of *habitus*, the concept that a social participant is not conscious of the rationale underlying specific social practices.

Bourdieu's summary is worth recording at length: the *habitus*

fulfills a function which another philosophy consigns to a transcendental conscience: it is a socialized body, a body which has incorporated the immanent structures of a world or of a particular sector of that world—a field—and which structures the perception of that world as well as action in that world And when the embodied structures and the objective structures are in agreement, when perception is constructed according to the structures of what is perceived, everything seems obvious and goes without saying. It is the doxical experience in which one attributes to the world a deeper belief than all beliefs (in the ordinary sense), since it does not think of itself as a belief.⁷⁶

One thinks, believes, and acts in accordance with the demands of her surrounding social structures or “field,” unable to see beyond her own locatedness. In other words, the body's logic is independent of all else but the practice formed and allowed by those “structuring structures” with which it complies.⁷⁷

Bourdieu has been criticized as leaving no room for individual will in this structuring of relationships,⁷⁸ however, it might be better to say that he has not so much devalued the role of the individual as he has heightened our recognition of those social forces which condition the individual's acts.⁷⁹ Similar objections have been voiced against Maurice Halbwachs' theory of social or collective memory. Responses in defence of Halbwachs' concept have also pointed out that such a memory beyond the particular limitations of individual personal experience and consciousness need not imply a removal of the individual, but only another “layer” of influence upon

⁷⁶ Bourdieu, *Practical Reason*, 81-82; cf. Bourdieu and Wacquant, *Invitation*, 22-23.

⁷⁷ Cf. Ricoeur, *Oneself*, 153-157, 176.

⁷⁸ West, “Contribution of Tamar's Story,” 195-196; Lovell, “Thinking Feminism,” 27.

⁷⁹ Glancy, *Corporal Knowledge*, 52-56, 74-78.

one's decision-making ability.⁸⁰ It is not that individuals lack the freedom to choose the manner in which they will view other persons and the world; it is that their social situatedness makes them not *entirely* free so to choose. Persons are neither constrained by force, convinced by reason, nor moved by self-serving calculation to submit to their own situatedness. Rather, the "choices" being made are effected "through the schemes of perception, appreciation and action that are constitutive of *habitus* and which, below the level of the decisions of consciousness and the controls of the will, set up a cognitive relationship that is profoundly obscure to itself."⁸¹ *Habitus* depends upon the individual's internalization of implicitly persuasive social structures—a cooperative "structuring of structures," and this includes one's willing acceptance of gender distinctions and expectations.⁸² It is, in Maud Gleason's words, "the point of intersection of culture and the flesh."⁸³

This same distinction is made by Judith Butler in her theory of foreclosure or abjection. She notes that the body

is a material reality that has already been located and defined within a social context. The body is also the situation of having to take up and interpret that set of received interpretations. As a field of interpretive possibilities, the body is a locus of the dialectical process of interpreting anew a historical set of interpretations which have already informed corporeal style. The body becomes a peculiar nexus of

⁸⁰ Castelli, *Martyrdom and Memory*, 11-24.

⁸¹ Bourdieu, *Masculine Domination*, 37; cf. Bourdieu, *Outline of a Theory of Practice*, 72, 76, 80; Bourdieu and Wacquant, *Invitation*, 18; Rohrbaugh, "Social Location of Thought," 116.

⁸² Horrell, "Converging Ideologies," 104-105, 107; Braun, "Fugitives from Femininity," 330-332; Guerin, Labor, *et al*, *Handbook of Critical Approaches to Literature*, 246-247; Parsons, *Feminism and Christian Ethics*, 46-48, 66-84; Code, *Rhetorical Spaces*, 73-74; Schüssler Fiorenza, "Exploring the Intersections," 17; Schüssler Fiorenza, *Bread not Stone*, xx-xxiii; Sawyer, *God, Gender and the Bible*, 8-9, 13-15; Cameron, *Feminism and Linguistic Theory*, 168-170, 172; Neuger, "Image and Imagination," 154-155; Bynum, "Introduction," 15; Ross, "Human Persons as Images of the Divine," 101.

⁸³ Gleason, *Making Men*, xii.

culture and choice, and ‘existing’ one’s body becomes a personal way of taking up and reinterpreting received gender norms.⁸⁴

It is true that Butler’s concern here is predominantly with the resignifying of gender and societal roles with regard to alternate sexualities. Susanne Mrozik’s investigation has shown, however, that Butler’s theorizing should be considered informative for Paul’s rhetorical self-presentation, as it may be subsumed under the broader issues of somatic idealization. Mrozik’s discussion of Buddhist concerns could as well be transposed onto Greco-Roman physiognomy with little modification. “For instance, virtue is commonly associated with beauty, a fair complexion, health, and high caste. The close relationship Buddhists posit between body and morality means that bodies rarely appear as morally neutral in Buddhist literature. To the contrary, bodies are valued—albeit not systematically or consistently—on a continuum from abject to virtuous.”⁸⁵ Even the manner in which one experiences one’s own self is determined by one’s relative position within the social structure.⁸⁶ For one’s practical self-experience is a product of social interaction with the Other, exemplified by that Other’s gaze. This gaze is a “symbolic power whose efficacy depends on the relative position of the perceiver and the perceived and on the degree to which the schemes of perception and appreciation that are brought into play are known and recognized by the person to whom they are applied.”⁸⁷

Butler argues that the situational, mostly unconscious, foreclosing and limiting of the self is precisely that which brings about the existence of one’s self *as self*.

⁸⁴ Butler, “Variations,” 28-29; cf. Butler, “Changing the Subject,” 345; Sawyer, *God, Gender and the Bible*, 8-9.

⁸⁵ Mrozik, “Materializations of Virtue,” 16, 21-22.

⁸⁶ Armour and St. Ville, “Judith Butler—In Theory,” 3-7.

⁸⁷ Bourdieu, *Masculine Domination*, 65.

One's identity is defined in and by its own circumscription and denials. One's self is produced and maintained by virtue of a negating and denying of all those associations and activities which have come to be seen as constituting a threat to—an “unraveling of”—that “I” which is perceived as being already in existence. And the societal structure in which this “I” resides and acts is similarly constructed through a rejection or abjection of all those modes of being, relating, and doing which may appear to threaten an unravelling of those subjects which together comprise the existing social structures. Any modification of the structuring of the self that is not accompanied by a corresponding modification of acceptable possibilities of self-definition within the surrounding social structures, will prove disconcerting and painful. Change in social structure will prove similarly disconcerting, if it is not accompanied by harmonious modifications of those possibilities which are limited or foreclosed in terms of self, since it will otherwise threaten the perceived stability of those subjects which have come to self-realization within the parameters of the prior social structures and strictures.⁸⁸

This complex of subject-society foreclosures and limitations, as presented by Butler, is also in accord with Pierre Bourdieu's critique of domination. Both Butler and Bourdieu have noted that any modification of subject or of *habitus* will of necessity engage the existing structures on their own terms. “Habitus is creative, inventive, but within the limits of its structures, which are the embodied sedimentation of the social structures which produced it.”⁸⁹ As Butler summarizes, I must “work within the norms that constitute me ... What I can do is, to a certain

⁸⁸ Butler, “Changing the Subject,” cf. also Butler, *Bodies That Matter*.

⁸⁹ Bourdieu and Wacquant, *Invitation*, 18. More generally, one may look at the entire argument of Bourdieu, *Masculine Domination*.

extent, conditioned by what is available for me to do within the culture and by what other practices are and by what practices are legitimating.”⁹⁰ In other words, one may not simply “leave the playing field” and go home with the ball. Even radical and rebellious change is defined and enabled within and by virtue of its relations to the externally-imposed structure or self-definition which it purports to deny or destroy.

I recognize that for certain readers, the inclusion of feminist or gender approaches will be especially troublesome, as such methodologies seem to be modern importations onto the ancient text. And of course, they are. Neither Paul or Aristotle would have argued as I do here, using the categories I have chosen. There was no fully-formed gender criticism prior to the 1970s, and we must not assume that ancient writers and audiences were *conscious* of these gendered concerns. Not only are these *approaches* to the biblical text modern, but they may also produce *results* which would not be intelligible to the Greco-Roman audience or author. Indeed, the identification of women with weakness, shame, and silence was pervasive and persistent to the point where it would neither require nor allow discussion—that is, this identification was *habitual*. Thus—especially in the absence of ancient women writers—there can be no *explicit* support gleaned from Greco-Roman sources for these interpretive methods.⁹¹

Nevertheless, there are elements within the Pauline texts (veils, speech, silence, even explicit mention of ancient gender categories) that suggest the appropriateness of a gendered approach to analysis.⁹² In addition, the broader Greco-

⁹⁰ Butler, “Changing the Subject,” 345; cf. Butler, “Variations,” 23-29; Gleason, *Making Men*, xxiv-xxvi.

⁹¹ Gleason, *Making Men*, 58.

⁹² Økland, *Women in Their Place*, 13-14.

Roman cothematization of the feminine with weakness, silence, and shame is obvious and well-documented. The presentation of women as inferior, incapable, and unclean is to be seen across the literary genres (tragedy, history, comedy, philosophy, letters), in the visual arts, and in the legal codes. Indeed, it will be seen that this conflation of the feminine with the shameful and undesirable may be traced from well before Paul's time down through the European Renaissance even to our own day. This gendered *habitus*—the pervasive influence of gender on all aspects of interpretation and social construction—can no longer be denied.

The notion of *habitus* assists in understanding how an etic investigation may be useful to one's understanding of an ancient text. Paul and his audience are socially located, and speak within and from their contemporary structures. Even should Paul desire to change the social structuring of his and the Corinthians' world (by inverting the acceptable relations of authority and leadership to weakness and domination), he will necessarily approach this task in terms of the very structures he desires to change. The argumentation used to achieve such a goal uses terms and approaches consciously understandable to those involved in the process, even while the "inner workings" of logic and force perceived by an outside observer remain invisible from the inside. In order to most fully appreciate a social situation and argument we must ask not merely what the text meant, but what discussions will best assist in discovering and acting upon the text's implications in our world. The text in its own located particularities keeps us grounded, but our own horizons must draw us out from the world of the text into an ethical enactment of its implications.⁹³

⁹³ Ehrensperger, *Paul and the Dynamics of Power*, 16-17; Schüssler Fiorenza, *Rhetoric and Ethic*, 27.

1.3.5 Textures of SRI

The various tools or textures used in the SRI analysis will be set forth in this section. The multidisciplinary nature of SRI is well-suited to an investigation of the Corinthian correspondence. These letters are full of explicit references to bodily weakness, trembling, and fear; they also contain finely-nuanced arguments based upon, for instance, the veiling and unveiling of Moses, of Paul, and of wives. Within the broader discourses of gender, sexuality, and community, such arguments serve to subvert the audience's expectations of authority and power. A familiarity with Greco-Roman philosophical, medical, and rhetorical materials, as well as the methodologies appropriate to their investigation, are necessary for exposing the thrust of Paul's presentation. More contemporary studies (including those of social and gender structures) will be useful for enabling and encouraging a continuing dialogue with the apostle's words. While no single method will serve to properly appreciate this correspondence, SRI allows for a use of any and all such methods as they are deemed appropriate to the text's many facets, thus giving space and honour to each of the text's many voices.

My presumptive position regarding the literary unity of the Corinthian correspondence also has more than merely a practical limiting value within this thesis. It has also a heuristic value uniquely suited to the nature of these letters, and to the nature of SRI. The problems involved with outlining the Corinthian letters by content or structure are well known, and some interpreters therefore conclude the letters to be historically as well as logically disjointed. These conclusions will be addressed at appropriate points in the thesis. The SRI approach of this thesis may assist in accepting each of the logics discerned within the correspondence, without denying

other logics and presentations. That is, SRI's ready affirmation of heteroglossic meaning should fit well with these texts whose very form and content are often perceived as being heteroglossic in nature. It also seems fitting that these texts which deal in part with a community's misevaluation of heteroglossolalia may be approached interpretively through a multi-voiced analytic; that is to say, the very community which apparently struggled with affirming the value of the *other* above one's own self, may have its texts evaluated in a multi-voiced manner.

1.3.5.1 Inner Texture. Inner texture is that quality of the text evidenced by repetition or modulation of word, phrase, argument, or literary unit. This texture "brings both literary and rhetorical techniques together" in order to more richly understand the text's form and aesthetic sensibilities.⁹⁴ One might say that investigation of inner texture is an examination and appreciation of a text's "physical map."⁹⁵ It is a process of discovering a text's own use of language—the medium of its own communication—rather than that inferred from outside the text in question.⁹⁶ An SRI approach will explicitly deny the possibility (or desirability) of an interpretive method boundaried by any text treated as single and self-sufficient; however, it will value the use of such a method *as one approach among others* for the very fact of its diversity from other approaches and their conclusions.

In its rhetorical turn, this process may observe the apparently "physical" macro-rhetorical structures of the text such as the Classical *inclusio*, *propositio*, and *conclusio*. More often, however, it will raise awareness of less formal or *micro-*

⁹⁴ Robbins, *Exploring Texture*, 3.

⁹⁵ Robbins, *Exploring Texture*, 7; deSilva, "Sociorhetorical Interpretation," 73.

⁹⁶ Robbins, *Tapestry*, 27-29.

rhetorical elements such as unexpected diction, and repetition of word or theme. That is, inner texture may concern itself with any number of ways in which a text's flow of argumentation or persuasion might be demonstrated.⁹⁷ This persuasion should not be understood as limited to that leading to action, but more broadly as inducement of an audience toward an attitude.⁹⁸ Rhetorical argumentation is properly understood as subservient to the larger communicative goals of the text.⁹⁹ In its attention to the larger structures of the text, rhetorical examination avoids—or balances—what has sometimes been noted as a weakness of literary criticism, which pays attention to “isolated stylistic effects [that] lend themselves readily to quotation, whereas the discussion of formal development in the large is unwieldy.”¹⁰⁰

In its turn as literary criticism, examination of inner texture will also attempt to explain the “feel” of a text's diction, artistry, and internal rules. It will concern itself with the self-contained world of the text, which operates within its own logical and presuppositional boundaries.¹⁰¹ In the words of Robbins' own chapter subtitle, this is the process of “getting inside a text”¹⁰² and, moreover, the process of staying therein. The voices heard within an approach to inner texture are those of the implied author, of the narrational speakers and characters of the text itself.¹⁰³ Robbins explicitly notes within this context even the theoretical impossibility of either

⁹⁷ Mack, *Rhetoric and the New Testament*, 19, 25; Burke, *Rhetoric*, 50.

⁹⁸ Burke, *Rhetoric*, 50.

⁹⁹ Tribble, *Rhetorical Criticism*, 5-10.

¹⁰⁰ Burke, *Rhetoric*, 70; cf. Guerin, Labor, *et al*, *Handbook of Critical Approaches to Literature*, 319-320.

¹⁰¹ Robbins, *Exploring Texture*, 5.

¹⁰² Robbins, *Tapestry*, 7.

¹⁰³ Robbins, *Tapestry*, 28.

rhetorical or literary analysis being conducted *in absentia* of a flesh and blood reader. That is, he affirms “a text does not become a text until someone reads it. Prior to its being read, it is a written artifact with webs of signification buried in it as if it were a tomb. Only readers can bring the webs of signification into the world of meaning and meaning effects.”¹⁰⁴ Likewise, award-winning novelist and feminist cultural critic Ursula K. Le Guin states that without a reader, a piece of writing is “little black marks on wood pulp. The reader, reading it, makes it live: a live thing, a story.”¹⁰⁵ Thus, the historical “real” author and past and present readers—along with all the varied voices of their external worlds—will not be ultimately foreclosed; however, *as one method among many*, the value of an insulated approach to literary criticism is affirmed by the SRI analytic.

1.3.5.2 *Intertexture*. SRI analysis of intertexture deals with the relations between a text’s own language and self-contained rules of presentation on the one hand, and the language and worlds of “external” texts and material data on the other.¹⁰⁶ Intertextural analysis focuses on

a text’s representation of, reference to and use of phenomena in the “world” outside the text being interpreted. In other words, the intertexture of a text is the interaction of the language in the text with “outside” material and physical “objects,” historical events, texts, customs, values, roles, institutions, and systems.¹⁰⁷

My reason for including the above definition in full is to demonstrate the difficult position of intertexture with relation to inner texture. Intertexture concerns itself with

¹⁰⁴ Robbins, *Tapestry*, 30.

¹⁰⁵ Le Guin, “Where Do You Get Your Ideas From?,” 198. While her immediate and major reference is to works of fiction, Le Guin’s larger argument is generally applicable to all written texts.

¹⁰⁶ Robbins, *Tapestry*, 30; deSilva, “Sociorhetorical Interpretation,” 85.

¹⁰⁷ Robbins, *Exploring Texture*, 40.

many of the most basic relations of a text to its environment: the language that it shares with other texts, the events that form its background, the expectations and customs of its intended audience. It is obvious that no text truly has a language and set of “world-rules” all its own; to the extent that such a condition were true, that text would be incomprehensible to all other language-speakers and worlds. “Without this sharing of social and cultural patterns of thought and behavior, no *communication* would even be possible.”¹⁰⁸

The boundaries between inner texture analysis and intertexture analysis may be considered on their face to be as inconsequential as the spelling difference between the terms “inner” and “inter.” In the SRI analytic process, however, intertexture may be treated as distinct from inner texture, at least in terms of the interpreter’s intentional focus on the appropriate relationalities of the text. Both direct and indirect quotations of other texts are part of intertexture, as are allusions to other texts. Changes made to a text’s wording, setting, or purpose, may all be used as voices speaking from and to the primary text under analysis.

Intertexture is concerned not only with other written or spoken texts, but also with *events* outside the boundaries of the text, without regard to constraints of time, geography, or explicit recognition.¹⁰⁹ When such events are reconfigured, amplified, or otherwise contextualized by the text, the distinctions may be treated as voices heard across the boundaries existing between the text and event.¹¹⁰ As Bakhtin has

¹⁰⁸ Elliott, *What is Social-Scientific Criticism?*, 37. Here and throughout this thesis, emphasis in quoted material may be assumed to be present in the original, unless otherwise stated.

¹⁰⁹ deSilva, “Sociorhetorical Interpretation,” 93.

¹¹⁰ Robbins, *Exploring Texture*, 48-53.

noted, the process of this dialogue is rich and ongoing and cannot be limited by the imposition of externally-imposed demands of an interpreter.

There is neither a first nor a last word and there are no limits to the dialogic context (it extends into the boundless past and the boundless future). Even *past* meanings, that is, those born in the dialogue of past centuries, can never be stable (finalized, ended once and for all)—they will always change (be renewed) in the process of subsequent, future developments of the dialogue. At any moment in the development of the dialogue there are immense, boundless masses of forgotten contextual meanings, but at certain moments of the dialogue’s subsequent development along the way they are recalled and invigorated in renewed form (in a new context). Nothing is absolutely dead: every meaning will have its homecoming festival.¹¹¹

That is, a full understanding of a text may be approximated only when earlier, contemporary, and subsequent events and texts are brought to bear upon it, in order to shed light upon its message and implications.¹¹²

Actions and relationships within a text’s presentation and argumentation may be shaped by certain assumptions: these assumptions may be either generally and visibly known to all who observe a society (social intertexture)¹¹³ or “insider knowledge” gained only by those who belong to or who have developed intimate relationships with a society (cultural intertexture).¹¹⁴ The distinction between these two forms of intertexture is clearly stated in Robbins’ analysis of Malherbe’s approach:

Malherbe’s analysis, then, is ‘cultural’—it concerns particular self-understandings within particular contexts. He is not investigating Cynic philosophy as a general social phenomenon—the kind of

¹¹¹ Bakhtin, “The Problem of Speech Genres,” 170; cf. Macherey, *Theory of Literary Production*, 91-100, 113; Chopp, *Power to Speak*, 46-47, 99-101; Bird, “Rosemary Hennessy,” 229; Fuentes, “How I Started to Write,” 27.

¹¹² Robbins, *Invention of Christian Discourse*, 77-78; Bates, “Beyond Hays,” 263-274.

¹¹³ Robbins, *Exploring Texture*, 62-63; Robbins, *Tapestry*, 127-128.

¹¹⁴ Robbins, *Exploring Texture*, 58-62.

knowledge that most people in Mediterranean society would already have. Rather, he is investigating particular cultural understanding—the kind of knowledge that only people ‘on the inside’ of this particular sphere of culture will have.¹¹⁵

Finally, intertexture also treats with the interplay of history and the text, through an examination of the manner in which the text reinterprets or otherwise exposes an alternate way of viewing “objective” historical reality.¹¹⁶ Of course, it is widely recognized that the past is not objectively accessible, due not least of all to the imprecision of available data on the one hand and to the sometimes over-abundance of data on the other. However, the interpretation of a text-recorded event still “requires knowledge of social, cultural, and ideological phenomena operative in it.”¹¹⁷ That is to say, the meaning of an event is not found in the bare event, but in that event’s relationalities to all those other events, places, persons, and presumptions that were productive of and were produced by the event.¹¹⁸

1.3.5.3 Social and Cultural Texture. There is a sense in which social and cultural texture is more closely allied to inner texture than to any of the other textures of SRI. Social and cultural texture is concerned not with the effect society and culture have had upon the shaping of the text under examination (social-cultural intertexture), but with the kind of culture and society espoused by the world of the text itself. For literature does not merely describe—it implicitly *prescribes* through persuasive force that the reader shall willingly enter into the social constructs of the author’s world. This texture is thus the expression of the inner texture outward, rather than the

¹¹⁵ Robbins, *Tapestry*, 113; Malherbe, “Gentle as a Nurse,” ; cf. Berger and Luckmann, *Social Construction of Reality*, 186.

¹¹⁶ Robbins, *Tapestry*, 118; deSilva, “Sociorhetorical Interpretation,” 102-103.

¹¹⁷ Robbins, *Exploring Texture*, 63.

¹¹⁸ Malina, “Why Interpret the Bible with the Social Sciences?,” 123-129.

reflection of an external world upon the surface of the analyzed text. In Robbins' words, this textural analysis

takes interpreters into sociological and anthropological theory. The issue here is not simply the intertexture of a text but its social and cultural nature *as* a text. What kind of a social and cultural person would anyone be who lives in the "world" of a particular text? Investigation of the social and cultural texture of a text includes exploring the social and cultural "location" of the language and the type of social and cultural world the language evokes or creates.¹¹⁹

Of course, analysis of what kind of world is being espoused will require that the options be recognized, and so social and cultural texture also bears at least an affinity of tools if not of purpose to social-cultural intertexture. Richard Rohrbaugh has noted the complexity—including the ambiguities—of relationships existing between social thought and social action. However, he also argues that certain social locations (e.g., gender classes) are well-enough defined that they may be compared to well-defined actions taking place with distinction among them. The more specific the description becomes of both group and group dynamics, the more plausible it is to affirm a "social location of thought" that may be relied upon as an interpretive and heuristic model.¹²⁰ To the extent that a social group is discerned as relatively homogeneous, activity unique to the group may be assumed as flowing from the group's consciousness. On the other hand, it may be argued that the relatively homogeneous nature of the activity itself causes the group to cohere, and thus the group's consciousness may be seen as the result of the action. This interactivity of individual willingness and social structurings has been already discussed in the preceding section on *habitus*.

¹¹⁹ Robbins, *Exploring Texture*, 71; Robbins, *Tapestry*, 144; cf. Segovia, "And They Began to Speak in Other Tongues," 23.

¹²⁰ Rohrbaugh, "Social Location of Thought," 106, *passim*.

The avenues available for examination of this texture are specific social topics, common social and cultural topics, and final categories. I will not here discuss these elements in any great detail, but only provide a sense of the questions to be asked. Specific social topics here refer to the manner in which a group speaks about or views its relationship to the world. The group may view the world as capable of manipulation—either by magic or by social pressure; it may view the world in a fatalistic manner, and this fatalism may lead the group to look forward either to a time of redemption or to a time of great hardship. Depending upon a “sociologically grounded typology of [a group’s] religious responses to the world,”¹²¹ the interpreter’s options for positing specific self-world interactions are foreclosed.¹²² The inner world of a text must be used to interpret and be interpreted by the intertextual audience’s live options.¹²³

Among the common social and cultural topics most important to an interpretation of ancient Mediterranean texts are those of community and shame, status and boundary, dyadism and individualism, and purity.¹²⁴ Common social and cultural topics may be profitably approached by applying tools of social-scientific criticism to a text: this is done in order to provide “the detail by which the broader delineations of social history are corroborated and critiqued.” By dealing with

¹²¹ Robbins, *Tapestry*, 153.

¹²² Elliott, *What is Social-Scientific Criticism?*, 37.

¹²³ Robbins, *Exploring Texture*, 72-75.

¹²⁴ Malina, “Is There a Circum-Mediterranean Person,” ; deSilva, *Honor, Patronage, Kinship and Purity*, 23-42; Schneider, “Of Vigilance and Virgins,” 1, 17; (Schneider notes that the one exception to the general anthropological assumption of dissimilarity within the Mediterranean area, is the concept of honour-shame relationships); Robbins, *Exploring Texture*, 75-86; Robbins, *Tapestry*; Martin, *Corinthian Body*; Newbold, “Boundaries and Bodies,” passim; Witherington, *Paul Quest*; Neyrey, “Unclean, Common, Polluted, and Taboo,” passim; Malina and Neyrey, “First-Century Personality,” passim; Neusner and Chilton, “Uncleanness,” passim; Douglas, “Pollution,” passim.

“content and context, matrix and meaning, details and the ‘big picture,’” the text is analyzed “as both a reflection of and a response to the social and cultural settings in which the text was produced.”¹²⁵

Analysis of social and cultural texture may also deal with final cultural categories, a subset of analysis still in its infancy with regard to biblical studies. This approach discerns distinct rhetorical goals and modes of discourse within differing cultures or social groups, especially with regard to the group’s interaction with those outside the group in question. Of course, a given culture’s perceived relationship to another may vary from one vantage point to another: a writer may assume himself to be dominant while his audience is liminal, though that audience feels settled and self-affirmed in their own cultural existence and expression. Final cultural categories are determiners or reflections of the manner in which a group self-represents their “propositions, reasons, and arguments.”¹²⁶

1.3.5.4 Ideological Texture. Ideological texture is unique among the approaches within the SRI analytic in that it concerns itself primarily with persons, rather than with a text. Though inner texture, social and cultural texture, and sacred texture (even, to some extent, intertexture) deal with persons as constructs or as secondary subjects of inquiry, ideological texture has real and specific persons in constant and conscious view. For this SRI approach, a text is “the object of people’s writing and reading. The issue is the social, cultural, and individual location and perspective of writers and readers. Ideological analysis of a text, then, is simply an agreement by various people that they will dialogue and disagree with one another

¹²⁵ Elliott, *What is Social-Scientific Criticism?*, 33, 3, 8.

¹²⁶ Robbins, *Exploring Texture*, 86-89; Robbins, *Tapestry*, 167-168.

with a text as a guest in the conversation.”¹²⁷ And the “various people” gathered around a text will include original author, implied audiences, real audiences, interpreters of past and present days with conflicting views.¹²⁸ Indeed, the affirmation of ideological texture is what makes the practice of an SRI analytic possible. Without an “agree to disagree” attitude existing between interpreters and between a single interpreter’s discrete investigations, SRI must necessarily and summarily self-destruct.

While the term “ideological” is popularly taken as a pejorative, in SRI ideological criticism does not imply a self-supporting system automatically opposed to “external” influences. Rather, it implies a conscious and systematic approach to understanding the personal, social, and cultural proclivities of those involved with a text. Beginning with self-understanding, and moving as well to an understanding of the slants of other readers and authors throughout the internal and external textual worlds, the interpreter seeks to account as much as possible for unintended consequences in analysis.¹²⁹

The plea for such awareness is not based upon a naïve assumption regarding the attainability of objectivity.¹³⁰ “One’s social location generally makes one sensitive or insensitive to nuances in the text that are not fully spelled out.”¹³¹ “Groups find special portions of the Bible that function as paradigms for them, give prominence in analysis and interpretation to certain

¹²⁷ Robbins, *Exploring Texture*, 95.

¹²⁸ Robbins, *Tapestry*, 194.

¹²⁹ Robbins, *Exploring Texture*, 96; Robbins, *Tapestry*, 194.

¹³⁰ Robbins, *Tapestry*, 215.

¹³¹ Elliott, *What is Social-Scientific Criticism?*, 38.

textures rather than others in these texts and select a particular configuration of intellectual modes of discourse to interpret them.”¹³² The inability to achieve full objectivity does not, however, philosophically preclude one from pursuing the goal.

A discipline defines itself both by what it excludes (repulses) and by what it includes. But the self-definition process removes what is excluded (repulsed) from view so that it is not straightforwardly available for assessment, criticism, and analysis. Even in accepting mainstream avowals of neutral objectivity, critics have to learn to see what is repulsed by the disciplinarily imposed limits on methodology and areas of inquiry.¹³³

That is, the argument for working with ideological texture in interpretation is one of scholarly (if not of ethical) integrity, as readers tend to reject arguments leading to preformed conclusions and to accept approaches already regarded as amenable. As Joel Green so aptly notes, since human beings have a “propensity to find in the biblical materials a mirror for already-held views, including the contours of theological anthropology, might there yet be probing perspectives and nuance to which we may tune our ears?”¹³⁴

1.3.5.5 Sacred Texture. More than any of the other textures, sacred texture seems the least distinct as a textural approach within the analytic; indeed, Robbins admits that the best approach to this texture is through and by means of the other textures. It may be telling that Robbins did not include a discussion of sacred texture in the larger of his two major works devoted to an overview of SRI (*Tapestry*). And Gowler’s evaluation of this texture is also apropos, as he sees it as simply a distinct

¹³² Robbins, *Tapestry*, 215.

¹³³ Code, *What Can She Know*, 26.

¹³⁴ Green, *Body, Soul, and Human Life*, 15-16.

brand of ideological texture.¹³⁵ This texture is related to “a programmatic search for sacred aspects of a text, whether or not the text is scriptural.”¹³⁶ The “sacred” may include beings, communities, relationalities, and events;¹³⁷ the “aspects of a text” may be inclusive of all elements, whether reader, author, character, mode of discourse, or text itself.¹³⁸ Given that all the texts under consideration in this thesis are canonical, and that the primary agent under consideration is a self-proclaimed apostle of Christ, it may also be argued that the presence of sacred texture is the warp upon which the woof of all the other textures have been woven. Of course, the apostolic and canonical status just mentioned were not givens for Paul’s audience; rather, they are at the heart of the argument. Had there been no question regarding the sacred character of the man from Tarsus, no debate over the divine source and wisdom of his message, the tenor and content of the “Corinthian correspondence” would be quite different indeed.¹³⁹

1.4 Summary of SRI Application

The bodily self-presentations of Paul will be examined within the Corinthian correspondence using the afore-mentioned approaches: inner texture (both rhetorical and literary); intertexture (scribal-oral, social, historical, and cultural); social and cultural texture (specific, common, and final topics); ideological texture (location, discourse modes, spheres); sacred texture (community and commitment). Not every texture will be deemed appropriate to an evaluation of each text; as well, some texts

¹³⁵ Gowler, “Socio-Rhetorical Interpretation,” 195.

¹³⁶ Robbins, *Exploring Texture*, 120.

¹³⁷ deSilva, “Sociorhetorical Interpretation,” 111-114.

¹³⁸ Robbins, *Exploring Texture*, 130.

¹³⁹ Ehrensperger, *Paul and the Dynamics of Power*, 111-112.

may reveal contradictory voices when addressed through the use of varying textures. In standard philosophical and theological enquiries, “modes of reasoning which might be more appropriate to different circumstances, tend to be occluded, as does the possibility that a single problem might be amenable to more than one approach.”¹⁴⁰ The SRI approach used in this thesis is interdisciplinary, in that it consciously refuses to programmatically value one method over others. In Robbins’ words, the goal of SRI “is not ‘You are included on my terms,’ but ‘You are included on your own terms.’”¹⁴¹ Each observation, once appropriately gained through a chosen method, is valued equally to others gained through what are often viewed by other practitioners as opposing methods. This thesis will seek not only to maintain a consistently multivalent approach, but also to affirm heteroglossic meaning, without denying the presence of meaning itself.

¹⁴⁰ Code, *What Can She Know*, 24.

¹⁴¹ Robbins, *Invention of Christian Discourse*, 5.

CHAPTER TWO: LITERATURE REVIEW

In this chapter, I will review a decidedly limited number of texts. The amount of material available under a more general topic, such as “body in the New Testament” would be too large for the thesis to practically bear. Such a review would need to examine texts discussing gender, physiognomy, sexuality, resurrection, phenomenology, terminology, etc. Given the wide-ranging nature of the SRI analytic, it would also be an easy matter to expand this section to a length beyond practical value through a discussion of each critical genre (e.g., rhetorical, social-scientific, ideological). Thus, this review will be focused on an examination of those texts that directly deal with the issues of Paul’s physical body in relation to his leadership rhetoric.

2.1 Lexical and Referential Beginnings

Having identified this limitation of the review, I must now note that the first three texts to be reviewed do not bear directly on the distinctive claims of this thesis; however, they are important as texts that opened the discussion of what may now be termed New Testament somatic theology. As Joel Green has noted, the earlier studies in biblical anthropology had a strong focus on lexical studies, which focus has now been greatly diminished.

This shift is due in part to the inconclusive nature of the lexical evidence, itself a demonstration that the Old and New Testaments develop no technical vocabulary to denote human essences, but also to heightened sophistication in the study of language among biblical

scholars portended by James Barr's 1961 shot across the bow of the traditional 'word study.'¹

While the discussion has certainly and rightly moved beyond the referential concerns evidenced within these three earlier texts, they are examined here as being foundational to the historical course of the larger argument. They most particularly have served to define terms for all subsequent discussions. The works of Bultmann, Robinson, and Gundry will be reviewed in turn, with a more integrative evaluation provided at the end of these reviews.

2.1.1 *Bultmann* (Theology of the New Testament)

Schmithals has aptly summarized Rudolf Bultmann's existential and non-corporeal view of the body, noting that in Paul's writings and elsewhere throughout the Bible,

the expression 'flesh' usually means simply the creatureliness of man. Man is flesh and not spirit, he is creature and not creator. But being a creature does not necessarily mean being a sinner. How does it come about that 'flesh' can imperceptibly become a description of the human state of being a sinner? Certainly not because sin is primarily understood as physical-sexual conduct; this is to misunderstand both the biblical concept of flesh *and* the biblical concept of sin. We must start from the fact that 'flesh' describes the neutral sphere of what is natural and earthly, of what is at hand and is at man's disposal.²

Bultmann's view was quickly and widely accepted as a "conclusive treatment" of the matter, and as Gundry notes, Bultmann's position had become "so widely accepted that virtually all recent handbooks, dictionaries, and studies of Pauline theology [took]

¹ Green, *Body, Soul, and Human Life*, 14-15; cf. Schüssler Fiorenza, *Bread not Stone*, 123-124.

² Schmithals, *An Introduction to the Theology of Rudolf Bultmann*, 79. A quite lengthy recent argument for this σαρκ- destructiveness/σώμα-constructiveness approach to the terms may be found in Scornaienchi, *Sarx und Soma*.

it for granted with little or no felt need for argumentative justification.”³ So also does Green agree with this evaluation of Bultmann’s influence, stating that while early twentieth-century interpreters understood Pauline anthropology “in dichotomous (body-soul) or even trichotomous (body-soul-spirit) terms, the same could not be said by mid-century or subsequently. Credit for this transformation is due especially to the authority of Bultmann, whose reading dominated subsequent discussion.”⁴

Within Bultmann’s anthropology,⁵ the central concern is that of $\sigma\omega\mu\alpha$, which is used “in such a way that it could equally well be translated by ‘self’ as by body.”⁶ One cannot read his *Theology of the New Testament* “without realising that for him St. Paul’s teaching on the $\sigma\omega\mu\alpha$ (translated as the objective aspect of the self, rather than as the body) comes very near to disclosing the heart of the Christian gospel.”⁷ There can be no doubt that the two preceding commentators have in mind the passage in which Bultmann writes, “*Man is called soma in respect to his being able to make himself the object of his own action or to experience himself as the subject to whom something happens*” (*TNT*, 195). Reflecting back on this discussion, Bultmann later writes that this $\sigma\omega\mu\alpha$ is “a being who has a relationship to himself, is placed at his own disposal, and is responsible for his own existence” (*TNT*, 227).

To say, as Henderson does, that the Bultmannian Pauline $\sigma\omega\mu\alpha$ is “not only the body but *also* the self”⁸ seems an understatement at best. Bultmann’s

³ Gundry, *Sōma*, 5.

⁴ Green, *Body, Soul, and Human Life*, 5; cf. also Dahl, “Paul and the Church at Corinth,” 15.

⁵ As others have noted, Bultmann’s anthropology informs much of the work in his *Theology*; however, the pages I have especially in mind are vol. I, 191-193.

⁶ Fergusson, *Rudolf Bultmann*, 84.

⁷ Henderson, *Rudolf Bultmann*, 29.

⁸ Henderson, *Rudolf Bultmann*, 28.

understanding of $\sigma\hat{\omega}\mu\alpha$ involves a radical and total dematerializing of the referent, as he argues that Paul fundamentally represents *body, form, or shape* by terms other than $\sigma\hat{\omega}\mu\alpha$ (*TNT*, 192-193). Of instances where Paul clearly attributes physical “bodiness” to $\sigma\hat{\omega}\mu\alpha$, Bultmann states, “it would be an error in method to proceed from such passages as these to interpret the *soma*-concept that is characteristic of Paul and determines his fundamental discussions” (*TNT*, 202). Indeed, Bultmann notes that the conception of *soma* as [physical] *body* is a “naïve popular usage” (*TNT*, 193), and that in 1 Cor 15, where Paul comes closest to representing $\sigma\hat{\omega}\mu\alpha$ as a bodily form, he does so because he “lets himself be misled into adopting his opponents’ method of argumentation, and in so doing he uses the *soma*-concept in a way not characteristic of him elsewhere” (*TNT*, 192). Slightly later in this same section, Bultmann writes that Paul does not distinguish carefully between the possible senses of $\sigma\hat{\omega}\mu\alpha$ because his “capacity for abstract thinking is not a developed one” (*TNT*, 198). Bultmann’s position seems clear enough: $\sigma\hat{\omega}\mu\alpha$ is approximately equal to the human being who is self-discriminately aware of himself as one capable of relating to self and others through the exercise of will (*TNT*, esp. I. 195-197). Bultmann’s argument will be critiqued along with that of Robinson, following the review of Gundry’s book.

2.1.2 Robinson (The Body)

John A. T. Robinson’s investigation was seriously hampered by a word-thought fallacy regarding Paul’s anthropology. Stating first that Paul’s thought categories are fundamentally Hebrew rather than Greek (*The Body*, 11), Robinson claims that there is no true Hebrew term for “body” as בשר designates—along with body—both person and flesh (*The Body*, 12, 18-21). This supposed lack of

terminology is explained by Robinson along lines in opposition to Greek thought: Hebrews cared little for (or could not comprehend) the distinctions between form and matter, one and many, body and soul, part and whole (*The Body*, 13-16). Robinson even argued for $\sigma\omega\mu\alpha$ and $\sigma\acute{\alpha}\rho\chi$ as denoting human physical beings *en masse*, standing “as a being ‘in the world’ ... which joins all people, irrespective of individual differences, in life’s bundle together.” Robinson admits that Paul may use the plural $\sigma\acute{\omega}\mu\alpha\tau\alpha$ as a reflexive pronoun, but insists, “never does he do it to stress individuation” (*The Body*, 30).

In addition to its problematic nature as being based upon a logical fallacy,⁹ Robinson’s approach is overly-selective in its examination of texts. As Gundry notes, “the lack of a word in a language would not necessarily imply the lack of a concept. Moreover, in the OT we fall far short of possessing a complete vocabulary of ancient Hebrew. Even were these considerations not apropos, we should note that גויה [body, corpse] in the sense of the living human body, infrequent though it is, shows that the Hebrews *did* have a concept of the body as a discrete entity.”¹⁰ This approach to how a culture’s terminology either determines or reflects its conceptual understanding produced an interesting result in Robinson’s work. He clearly states that “this concept of the body [is] the key [not] only to the *unity* of the Apostle’s theology; it is also perhaps the most striking mark of its *distinctiveness*. For no other New Testament writer has the word $\sigma\omega\mu\alpha$ any doctrinal significance” (*The Body*, 9). He then claims that Paul’s thought categories must be drawn from Hebrew; however, because for Robinson $\sigma\omega\mu\alpha$ has no distinct foundation in Hebrew, he is forced to spend much of

⁹ Barr, *Semantics*, 37-39.

¹⁰ Gundry, *Sōma*, 118.

his book dealing instead with the Greek term σάρξ. In the end, Robinson's arguments about Pauline σῶμα could have been made without recourse to his philosophical positionings regarding Hebrew thought and culture. His interpretation ultimately sounds much like that of Bultmann. "*While σάρξ stands for man, in the solidarity of creation, in his distance from God, σῶμα stands for man, in the solidarity of creation, as made for God*" (*The Body*, 31, italics in original).

2.1.3 Gundry (Sōma in Biblical Theology)

Robert H. Gundry has argued against both Bultmann's and Robinson's interpretations of σῶμα. Aware that the holistic understanding of σῶμα had been quickly and pervasively accepted, Gundry proposed to examine the term's usage in ancient textual contexts rather than through the argumentations of secondary literature. Following an overview of extra-biblical literature, Gundry concludes "since context always makes clear that *sōma* always focuses attention on the physical, we would make a mistake to appeal to these extra-biblical passages in support of a holistic definition" (*Sōma*, 15). Gundry also finds that this context is determinative for a proper understanding of the LXX's use of σῶμα. Regardless of whether the term is a rendering of נֶפֶשׁ, גּוֹ, בֶּשֶׂר (often translated into English, respectively, as "soul," "back," and "flesh"), Gundry finds that their LXX rendering as "*sōma* refers to the physical body alone. And a mere look at [a LXX concordance] will immediately show that *sōma* translates בֶּשֶׂר only when the Hebrew word denotes the physical body alone" (*Sōma*, 23). As with extra-biblical literature, Gundry concludes that "the LXX offers no convincing support for a definition of *sōma* as the whole person" (*Sōma*, 23). Non-Pauline New Testament usage of the term does not appear to be distinct

from that of the LXX and extra-biblical literature. Gundry takes only a brief glance at the non-Pauline New Testament material; however, this brevity of attention seems justified, given that Gundry is countering Bultmann's argument, and that argument is based almost exclusively upon Pauline use.¹¹

Holistic definitions of the term $\sigma\omega\mu\alpha$ "commonly begin with Pauline passages where the word stands parallel to a personal pronoun or can be replaced by a personal pronoun" (*Sōma*, 29). But Gundry notes that the definition does not flow inexorably from the data: it is logically as likely that $\sigma\omega\mu\alpha$ would restrict the referent of the apposed pronoun, as it is that the pronoun would expand or otherwise modify the referent of $\sigma\omega\mu\alpha$ (*Sōma*, 29-33). A contextually aware reading of passages in which a $\sigma\omega\mu\alpha$ -pronoun interchange either occurs or is implied shows that "the alternation of the personal pronoun 'you' with *sōma* fails to enlarge the meaning of *sōma*. Instead, *sōma* restricts the reference of the pronoun to the physical side of believers" (*Sōma*, 76). Even when the Pauline argument allows or demands that the whole person be *implicated* in the actions of the $\sigma\omega\mu\alpha$, such implication does not warrant a redefinition of the term or a redirecting of its referent. For example, Paul's condemnation of sexual sin in Romans 1 certainly implicates the entire being of those who sin. "Since the *sōma* is part of the self, the dishonoring of it entails the dishonoring of the self. But *sōma* does not thereby become the whole self" (*Sōma*, 34).

Gundry affirms that Paul is no Hellenist in his anthropology, and that his conceptions are greatly in keeping with his Hebrew OT heritage; however, he also asserts that Old Testament anthropology was not monadic, even though it was unitary

¹¹ Green, *Body, Soul, and Human Life*, 4.

(*Sōma*, 83). Anthropological dualism is seen in the Hebrew Canon in that “the Hebrews did possess the concept of the human body, living as well as dead. For that concept they used (among other words) גויה and, above all, בִּשְׂרִי” (*Sōma*, 218). In other words, Gundry denies that Paul’s fully Hebraic rejection of a Hellenistic body-soul, good-evil dualism will leave him with no choice other than a Bultmannian or Robinsonian holism. “Paul’s recognition of the duality of man reflects the Jewish theology of his time and neither contradicts the OT nor denies the unity (but not monism) of man as a whole being” (*Sōma*, 83).

Gundry expresses surprise at Bultmann’s failure to notice as well the rabbinical evidence for anthropological duality (*Sōma*, 93). “R.H. Charles does not overstate the case by writing that ‘in all the remaining literature of this period there is only a dichotomy—either the spirit and body, or the soul and body’. All of this adds up to presumptive evidence in favor of a simply physical meaning for *sōma*” (*Sōma*, 107-108). Distinguishing of body from spirit, physical from immaterial, does not require a Hellenistic denigration of the physical body.

To be sure, most if not all of the Jewish writers and rabbis do not go the way of making the body the source and seat of sin and the soul a paragon of purity when not defiled by the body. For the rabbis, body and soul cooperate in sinning (*Sanhedrin*, 91*a*). And the one cannot lead a normal life without the other. Granted these qualifications, it remains true to say that an anthropological duality runs through the Jewish literature of the period. It is more than aspectual; it is partitive. (*Sōma*, 108)

Extra-biblical literature, LXX renderings of various Hebrew terms, rabbinical anthropology, and New Testament usage both Pauline and non-Pauline all point toward a physical signification for σῶμα. Greek anthropological dualism—while unacceptable within the biblical framework—

is not the only dualism available to Paul. Gundry finds no convincing evidence for a dematerialization of $\sigma\omega\mu\alpha$ within the literature of the New Testament.

He notes that the physical body

does indeed enable man to interact, even to unite, with entities outside himself. But at the loss of his individuality? No, *sōma* stands at the frontier between individuality and contact with other entities. As the ‘outer man’ it is both the boundary of the concrete being of the individual and his means of touching the material realities around him. Where Bultmann introverts the term, Robinson extroverts it. Neither one has observed its position on the frontier between individuality and solidarity rather than within one territory or the other. Better yet, *sōma* straddles the boundary. (*Sōma*, 222)

While Robinson understandably took issue with certain elements of Gundry’s study, he did recognize that it was “a sound and well-researched monograph ...

indispensable for future students of a (much worn) subject.” Robinson focused his review on what he perceived as the two limitations of Gundry’s work.

Methodologically, he took issue with Gundry’s lack of engagement with scholarship outside of “conservative protestant individualism,” positing that the argument would be stronger if it had taken account of “patristic, Roman Catholic, Eastern Orthodox, or even Anglican incarnational theology.” With respect to the argument itself, Robinson faults Gundry for his absolutist statements about the physical and individual nature of $\sigma\omega\mu\alpha$. “Here above all,” pleads Robinson, “one must insist on ‘both-and’ rather than ‘either-or.’”¹²

In a rather confusing (perhaps ‘both-and’?) move, Robinson praises Gundry’s work, but then argues that it requires correction precisely in view of that for which he appears to have afforded it his praise. He begins by affirming that Gundry’s text

¹² Robinson, “Review of *Sōma in Biblical Theology*,” 163, 164, 165.

“serves as a valuable corrective—especially to Bultmann and myself. Its stress throughout is on the ‘solely physical meaning’ of *sōma* ... as against a holistic definition in terms of the whole man and a non-dualistic anthropology.” But he follows up two paragraphs later by saying “It is this ‘consistent and exclusive’ ... use of *sōma* for the individual physical human body which in turn seems to me to demand a corrective. St. Paul was a creative genius—and his writings survive to write monographs about—precisely because one cannot thus confine his mind or his pen.”¹³ Robinson seems to base his position at least in part on our inability to pin Paul down: since Paul’s writing is so confused and full of ambiguity, he argues, we must also refuse to place clear and unambiguous limits on our understanding of his thought.¹⁴

Other reviewers also have been generally appreciative of Gundry’s work. Caroline Walker Bynum writes that Gundry’s “careful philological research ... which establishes that Paul in fact uses *soma* [body] to refer to a morally neutral physical body and not just to person, makes [the Bultmannian] position largely untenable.”¹⁵ Guy Greenfield states that Gundry’s book is “must reading for those seriously interested in authentic biblical theology rather than shallow ‘talking about the Bible’ out of an unbiblical docetism.”¹⁶ Even in the midst of general agreement, however, some scholars have expressed concern over what they perceive as Gundry’s “knee-jerk” reaction. One consistently stated concern (as *per* Robinson) is that Gundry leaves no room for a “both-and” understanding of *σῶμα* with regard to physical and existential reference. While Bultmann clearly overemphasizes the term’s existential

¹³ Robinson, “Review of *Sōma in Biblical Theology*,” 163.

¹⁴ Robinson, “Review of *Sōma in Biblical Theology*,” 165.

¹⁵ Bynum, *Resurrection of the Body*, 5.

¹⁶ Greenfield, “Review of *Sōma in Biblical Theology*,” 72.

possibilities, it may be that Gundry has insisted on a purely physical referent based as much on his preconceived theology as on a thoroughly objective investigation of the data.¹⁷ Of course, if Gundry is correct in his claim that *σῶμα* has a consistently individual physical referent, his “either-or” attitude is not a weakness but a strength.

2.1.4 *Summary of the Beginnings*

Both Bultmann and Robinson are forces to be reckoned with in terms of their anthropology; if for no other reason, one must consider the temporal priority of their arguments. Gundry’s treatment of the positions taken by Bultmann and Robinson is masterful, and Gundry’s discussion of lexical issues is worthwhile apart from its relation to the earlier scholars’ work. However, to ask “What is the referent of *σῶμα*?” or “What is it to be human?” is not the same as to ask “What is it for a human to be physical, gendered, and confronted with these facts in rhetorical situations and manners?” I raise these issues here, not to fault the Pauline anthropologies of Bultmann, Robinson, or Gundry, but merely to point out the apparent absence of such questions in their examinations. Each of these three has dealt more with lexical and referential definitions of *σῶμα* than with questions regarding how individual gendered bodily existence may determine and be determined by the Pauline rhetoric.

Bultmann believed Paul’s anthropology was formed within the influence of his Hellenistic milieu,¹⁸ while Robinson attributed it to Paul’s background as a

¹⁷ Doughty, “Review of *Sōma in Biblical Theology*,” 302-303; Dupertuis, “Review of *Sōma in Biblical Theology*,” 87; Harrington, “Review of *Sōma in Biblical Theology*,” 136-138.

¹⁸ Bultmann, *TNT*, I. 187-189.

“Hebrew of Hebrews.”¹⁹ Their positions converge, however, with regard to the *holistic signification* of Pauline somatic terminology. Of course, the *nature* of that holism differed from Robinson to Bultmann. For Bultmann, a being with self-awareness of personal relationalities existing by virtue of its own self-will is a *human being*: such a being is then termed $\sigma\omega\mu\alpha$.²⁰ On the other hand, Robinson viewed the biblical $\sigma\omega\mu\alpha$ as physical, in opposition to that which is spiritual or immaterial. Bultmann’s somatic anthropology focuses upon the existential questions of self- and inter-relationalities, but it does not address the rhetorical questions of physical and gendered life and limitations. Robinson’s slender volume does not raise the existential concerns present in Bultmann’s work: much of Robinson’s discussion is concerned purely with questions of linguistic reference.

The insistence of Robinson on the physicality of *sōma* is right. His limitation of the human personality to *sōma* as a result of adopting the holistic definition of *sōma* is wrong. The insistence of Bultmann that the human personality goes beyond physicality is right. His demotion of physicality to theological insignificance by use of the larger, holistic definition of *sōma* is wrong. Paul fully personalizes *sōma* as a necessary part of the human constitution and of authentic existence. However, he neither dematerializes *sōma* in theological usage nor makes it comprehend the total person. To do either would lay upon the term a burden heavier than it can bear.²¹

Even were $\sigma\omega\mu\alpha$ to have a purely physical referent, nevertheless this physical body still must exist *in relation to* other $\sigma\omega\mu\alpha\tau\alpha$ and to other items and institutions. That is, the most important issue for an understanding of $\sigma\omega\mu\alpha$, is not its physical referent but its experienced relationalities. As Green notes,

¹⁹ Robinson, *The Body*, 11-16.

²⁰ Bultmann, *TNT*, I. 209, 213; cf. Fergusson, *Rudolf Bultmann*, 84.

²¹ Gundry, *Sōma*, 244.

if the self is experienced as outer-directed, in terms of one's community, then relationality, freedom, status, suffering, marginality, and even clothing, are cast in another light. [Klaus] Berger's historical psychology urges reconsideration of all sorts of taken-for-granted categories, including, for example, Gundry's emphasis on physicality. In this case, it is not that Berger wants to deny the flesh and bones of human corporeality, but that this emphasis on body-as-physicality undermines what is for Berger the more basic category of embodied relationality endemic to a theological anthropology of the *sōma*.²²

2.2 The Move from Terminology to Rhetoric

As has been seen, Pauline anthropological and somatic scholarship up through the 1980s was mostly lexical and referential in its focus. A marked break in this state of affairs was the publication of Dale Martin's *The Corinthian Body*. In this work, Martin does indeed ask "What is it for a human to be physical, gendered, and confronted with these facts in rhetorical situations and manners?" This seminal text was followed by Karl Sandnes' *Belly and Body in the Pauline Epistles*, Michelle Lee's *Paul, the Stoics, and the Body of Christ*, and most recently by Wenhua Shi's *Paul's Message of the Cross as Body Language*.²³ Works by Yung Suk Kim and John Shackleford appeared during this time period as well. Contrary to the high expectations raised by their titles, these last two works have provided little of interest for the purposes of this thesis, but they will be reviewed here as befits recent additions to the field.²⁴ All six texts just listed will be reviewed in order, and followed by a summary evaluation and integration of their major thrusts as they pertain to this thesis.

²² Green, *Body, Soul, and Human Life*, 13.

²³ Martin, *Corinthian Body*; Sandnes, *Belly and Body*; Lee, *Stoics*; Shi, *Message*.

²⁴ Kim, *Christ's Body*; Shackleford, *Biblical Body Language*.

2.2.1 *Martin* (The Corinthian Body)

Martin argues that the Corinthian church was divided along status-group lines with regard to how they viewed the relative security of both the physical and political/ecclesial body. Those of higher status tended to view the body as impermeable, not subject to pollution or destruction from external sources, and constructed along hierarchical lines of authority and strength (*Corinthian Body*, esp. 116). Those of lower status tended to view the body as constantly imperilled, weak and subject to pollution from the outside. Those of higher status would view a disruption of proper (i.e., hierarchically appropriate) relationships as the danger against which one must guard (*Corinthian Body*, 40); those of lower status would view potential dangers as stemming from one's careless association with external uncleanness (*Corinthian Body*, inter alia, 153-159). This is the paradigm through which Martin has interpreted much of Paul's thought.

In Martin's reading of 1 Corinthians, those of higher status—in accordance with their view of the body as being secure and impermeable—are known as “the strong”; the lower status members of the church are called “the weak”—in recognition of their assumptions regarding the body's weakness against external sources of disruption and pollution (*Corinthian Body*, 58). Martin then argues that Paul is a member of the “weak” group, though he is not himself a lower-status individual.

The Strong operate by a logic of balance, with its relative lack of concern about pollution or invasion; Paul operates by a logic of invasion, with its anxieties about purity and firm boundaries. The theological and ethical disagreements between Paul and the Strong over issues related to eating and sex can be understood by sketching their respective assumptions about the body, its boundaries, and its susceptibility to pollution. (*Corinthian Body*, 163-164)

In other words, the apostle chooses to identify himself with those of lower status, because he identifies with their view of the body's permeability (*Corinthian Body*, xv-xvi).

In discussing Paul's view of the body, Martin does an admirable job of taking into account the larger Greco-Roman milieu. Sources are mined from a wide temporal field (from Aristotle to beyond the Pauline era), in recognition that a writer's thought is formed by his culture's general associations and underlying assumptions, as much as by any literature he may have read (*Corinthian Body*, xiii). Martin also extends his context culturally, looking beyond the "pure" Greco-Roman world to the Judaism of both Hellenistic and Palestinian forms. He does this in recognition of the subsuming nature of the Hellenistic world. Martin rightly points out that "Judaism [is] an ethnic subculture within the hegemonic culture of the Hellenistic Mediterranean. Any firm distinction between 'Greco-Roman' and 'Jewish' in this period is therefore historically misleading, even if, for some people, it is theologically important" (*Corinthian Body*, xiii-xiv).

Martin applies his theses regarding status-permeability distinctions to various texts and situations within 1 Corinthians: his chapter and section divisions identify such issues as tongue-speaking, prostitution, eating of idol meats, and the speech-prohibition and veiling of women. A number of reviewers have been altogether embracing of Martin's work, fairly gushing over what they see as a new approach to Pauline studies;²⁵ however, Martin's approach can also be faulted as being overly simplistic. His very clarity may belie a methodological weakness, as he seeks to

²⁵ Boyarin, "Review of *The Corinthian Body*," passim; Barclay, "Brilliant Study of the Body in Corinth," passim; Fredrickson, "Review of *The Corinthian Body*," passim.

source all the Corinthian divisions in one wellspring of socio-economic status. For example, Thomas Tobin has suggested that baptismal differences might be profitably examined as an alternative source of the Corinthian divisions,²⁶ and Robin Scroggs has pointed out that “changed experience within the community” might well change a person’s status, points that Martin does not address.²⁷ Herman Waetjen has noted that Martin’s hermeneutics of suspicion may itself have ironically become too strong of a bias. Martin hopes that Paul’s arguments against the Corinthians failed, and that their counter-arguments might now be used against “similar sociocultural realities that are demonically operative in our contemporary world.”²⁸ Of course, Martin’s argument regarding the text, apart from one’s (dis)approval of Martin’s ideological commitments, should be judged on its textually supportable merits.

My major concern with Martin’s argument stems from his opening thesis: he identifies Paul with the “weak.”²⁹ There is only one place in Paul’s letters where the term *δυνατοί* unambiguously has reference to a group rather than to a general condition. There (Rom 14:21 – 15:2), in a passage clearly related to issues of body permeability and pollution, Paul explicitly identifies himself with the “strong,” (*ἡμεῖς οἱ δυνατοὶ*) in clear distinction to the “weak.” In 1 Cor 1:26 Paul notes that not many of the Corinthians were formerly *δυνατοί*, but clarifies neither his own nor the Corinthians’ post-conversion relation to strength. In 2 Cor 12:10 Paul does define himself as weak; however, the weakness in view there is one of externally-imposed physical experience rather than of philosophical commitment, and he is also defined

²⁶ Tobin, “Review of *The Corinthian Body*,” 741.

²⁷ Scroggs, “Review of *The Corinthian Body*,” 386.

²⁸ Waetjen, “Review of *The Corinthian Body*,” 542-543.

²⁹ Martin, *Corinthian Body*, xv.

as being *simultaneously* δυνατός. In 2 Cor 13:9 Paul's self-avowed weakness is not presented as an incompatibility with strength, but as a source of strength and comfort for others. Paul's weakness there is a matter of his refusing to exercise punishing authority, rather than a matter of how he views the permeability of one's body.

Leaving aside for the moment any questions as to whether this strength-weakness dichotomy may be properly simplified to an issue of socio-economically informed permeability views, the bare identification of Paul with the "weak" is problematic. Martin does not address this obvious issue, instead assigning Paul to the category most fitting with Martin's negative evaluation of the apostle's philosophical positionings. This results in a necessity for Martin to explain Paul's "inconsistencies." While Daniel Boyarin³⁰ praises Martin's explanations of these apparent inconsistencies in the apostle's thought, Tobin argues that Paul's perspective on women, sexuality, and marriage is not internally inconsistent;³¹ rather, his presentation is both more positive and more complex than Martin's presentation would allow. Fredrickson agrees with Martin's views, saying he presents "a convincing case that those who have found Paul to be a champion of heterosexuality carried out in marriage have completely missed the apostle's antipathy to passion itself."³² But Scroggs wonders, "Does the real Paul get sacrificed to [Martin's] ideological perspective?" The book is certainly rich both in its investigation and in its suggestions: Martin covers so much ground that it would be surprising if all of his

³⁰ Boyarin, "Review of *The Corinthian Body*," 154.

³¹ Tobin, "Review of *The Corinthian Body*," 740.

³² Fredrickson, "Review of *The Corinthian Body*," 224.

claims were to prove supportable, and so this “intriguing, informative, and frustrating book [should be read] with care and caution.”³³

2.2.2 *Shackleford* (Biblical Body Language)

Shackleford’s text is intended as a study of the manner in which biblical references to body parts should be interpreted as communication of the biblical authors’ relationship to God. His argument regarding the importance of such language is naïve, however, as he says that such body references launch “a profound way of thinking that goes beyond human vocabularies” (*Biblical Body Language*, ix), and say “much more than any words can possibly convey” (*Biblical Body Language*, 59). He also evidences such a lack of awareness regarding critical questions of text and meaning that he can ask, “Why all the fuss? Why not simply accept the biblical texts as they stand and let it go at that?” (*Biblical Body Language*, 61). He calls more than once for what he terms a “literal translation” noting that, “in the absence of Hebrew and Greek proficiency, [such a translation] is more useful” (*Biblical Body Language*, 36). Shackleford’s lack of scholarly engagement (*Biblical Body Language*, 56), unexpected digressions (*Biblical Body Language*, 58-59, 100-101), his appeals to *Strong’s Hebrew Dictionary* as an authoritative source for defining Hebrew terms, and his repeated failure to offer support for his statements, makes it difficult for one to take his arguments seriously. A search of *ATLA*, the *Index to Periodical Literature*, *New Testament Abstracts*, and other databases has revealed no references to or published reviews of this book. A review herein has been necessitated by the

³³ Scroggs, “Review of *The Corinthian Body*,” 386.

historical placement of his publication, but this thesis will entertain no further engagement with Shackelford's work.

2.2.3 Sandnes (Belly and Body in the Pauline Epistle)

Sandnes' aim is to "elicit how Paul makes use of a common idiom in a particular literary and theological context" (Sandnes, *Belly and Body*, 7). That is, he wishes to demonstrate that Paul evidences a rhetoric of the human body throughout his letters,³⁴ and then to "see how [that rhetoric] works" (*Belly and Body*, 4). While it seems clear that the belly is "synonymous with living a life contrary to the gospel" (*Belly and Body*, 5), there have been conflicting interpretations of the nature of this contrary lifestyle. The belly has been seen as having reference to observance of Jewish dietary laws, to σάρξ, genitalia or circumcision, or to attempts at avoiding a martyr's death (*Belly and Body*, 7-11). These interpretations are evaluated by Sandnes in some detail (*Belly and Body*, 11). Such interpretations generally exegete explicit mentions of belly, food, or eating, and assume some opponent as being the recipient of Paul's vilification. Sandnes' approach is not so narrow, affirming that Paul's language about the belly "works within a set of presuppositions about the body" (*Belly and Body*, 14). "The belly is a key topic of [philosophical] discussions. It becomes a catchword for a lifestyle controlled by the desires, and is thus to be considered a *topos*" (*Belly and Body*, 57).

Sandnes demonstrates that Paul would have viewed the body as signifying the boundaries between Jew and pagan (*Belly and Body*, 24), and also as reflecting the "disposition of the soul." This same concept may be found in Philo, where Sandnes

³⁴ Barram, "Review of *Belly and Body*," 336; Fox, "Review of *Belly and Body*," 97; Sandnes, *Belly and Body*, 5.

finds that “Virtues and the structure of the body are . . . to be kept together. This is the reason why Philo quite consistently speaks of the desires as being located in the belly and the parts below it” (*Belly and Body*, 25, 110). While Paul does not appear necessarily to “buy into” ancient assumptions about physiognomy, “in some way the stomach was to him a codeword too, revealing an identity which endangered true faith in Christ” (*Belly and Body*, 34). In Aristotle, “eating, drinking and sex [frequently appear] as a ‘trinity’” (*Belly and Body*, 45),³⁵ demonstrating that belly enslavement “is a key-term for a lifestyle seeking instant gratification” (*Belly and Body*, 41); however, the belly is also used “as a symbol of selfishness, relatively independently of food and eating” (*Belly and Body*, 59). The moral philosophy leading up to Paul’s day generally presented the unrestrained belly as indicative of impiety, excess, and unrestrained passion (*Belly and Body*, 38, 52): in short, the belly was connected in both the philosophers’ writings and in the popular mind with a “hedonistic lifestyle” (*Belly and Body*, 77).

Sandnes understands the Jewish-Hellenistic texts generally to associate the belly with lack of fidelity to God (*Belly and Body*, 97-107) and with a lack “of concern for matters of the city or fellowship” (*Belly and Body*, 100). Philo in particular connects the belly with “forbidden forms of sexual intercourse” (*Belly and Body*, 131), and with paganism (*Belly and Body*, 132). The cure for the belly, as far as Philo is concerned, is “to embrace the Jewish faith and customs” (*Belly and Body*, 132). Sandnes has been faulted for spending so little time on an examination of the Old Testament material.³⁶ However, since “the ancient world cannot be divided into

³⁵ Cf. Isherwood, *Fat Jesus*, 37-38.

³⁶ Williams III, “Review of *Belly and Body*,” 170.

Judaism and Hellenism as two easily separated parts,” Paul’s belly and body rhetoric would have been formed more by the pervasive Greco-Roman milieu than by specific Hebrew texts (*Belly and Body*, 95).

Paul’s references to the mastery of the passions, then, “provide a framework which exhibits common ground with moral philosophy traditions of his time . . . ‘Serving the belly’ means a relapse into a lifestyle of the past, and is incompatible with being crucified with Christ. The belly represents a lifestyle against which believers must stand firm” (*Belly and Body*, 135). That is to say, “the body mattered in defining the identity of believers” (*Belly and Body*, 135). A life centred on the belly was a life of one more concerned with his own matters than with those of heavenly citizenship: it was a life of one who denied true friendship (*Belly and Body*, 163) and failed to properly worship Christ (*Belly and Body*, 164). The one whose “agenda is set by the desires of the belly” (*Belly and Body*, 175), is one whose kinship is with Satan and whose lifestyle is that of apostasy (*Belly and Body*, 179).

In 1 Corinthians, Sandnes reads Paul as concerning himself with the “unraveling of misconduct among his converts” (*Belly and Body*, 181) and especially with matters related to food and sex; therefore, it is “quite natural that this letter should be read anew in the light of the [philosophical] material on the belly-*topos*” (*Belly and Body*, 181). Though food *in itself* is a matter of no importance to Paul, he cautions for restraint in matters of the belly, doing so in light of his concern for the resurrection implications of sexual misconduct. “Paul knew all too well that if Christian freedom in food-matters was interpreted to imply freedom to attend all kinds of banquets, sex would naturally follow in its wake” (*Belly and Body*, 196). In demanding that believers master the belly, Paul also recognizes that passions of the

belly may lead to apostasy through idolatry. This is in keeping not only with the moral philosophers' association of banqueting with worship, but also with the Old Testament evidence (*Belly and Body*, 203-206).

A broad reading of Patristic literature through the sixth century clearly supports Sandnes' claim regarding the Pauline association of food and sex (*Belly and Body*, 217-262). As Sandnes notes, the general context in which the Pauline belly-dicta are discussed is quite uniform (*Belly and Body*, 218): the belly is not merely a byword for excess in food and drink, but a *topos* for all carnal appetites (*Belly and Body*, 262). One's mastery of the belly implies one's mastery of the body; one's mastery of the body defines one's identity through relationship to Christ.

2.2.4 Lee (Paul, the Stoics, and the Body of Christ)

As do both Martin and Sandnes, Lee also approaches the Pauline text from the view of the philosophers. While the former scholars range quite broadly in their investigations, Lee narrows her focus to an examination of the Stoics' use of body language and imagery in their teaching of social ethics,³⁷ and then applies this material to an exegesis of 1 Corinthians 12. Also in keeping with Sandnes' approach, Lee avoids what Samuel Sandmel has termed "parallelomania":³⁸ rather than pile up close verbal similarities between Paul and the Stoics, Lee is concerned with discerning the *function* of the latter's imagery and references (*Stoics*, 10), and then with suggesting how Paul may have "adapted these cultural resources for his own ends" (*Stoics*, 12). And even where body language may seem to differ in function,

³⁷ Lee, *Stoics*, 1, 9, 151; cf. Lieu, "Review of *Paul, the Stoics, and the Body of Christ*," 259; Thompson, "Review of *Paul, the Stoics, and the Body of Christ*," 155.

³⁸ Sandmel, "Parallelomania," 1.

Lee cautions against too quick a dismissal of Paul's dependence on such sources; "the point at which Paul departs from common usage may ultimately prove most helpful for comprehending his worldview" (*Stoics*, 16). For example, the "universal" Stoic body appears conceptually distinct from the exclusivist body of Christ; however, the Spirit or mind of Christ within the redeemed humanity of the Church may function as an analogue to the Stoic role of reason within universal humanity (*Stoics*, 13-17, 54-56). Paul's concern is with what it means to be a good person within the context of the Church (*Stoics*, 26); his concern is with "shaping the group's understanding of themselves" (*Stoics*, 19), in distinction from the world and the state (*Stoics*, 22).

The metaphor or analogy of the body was used to emphasize a particular group or individual's function (*Stoics*, 39-40), to warn against anti-hierarchical threats (*Stoics*, 40-41), or to distinguish between ruler and the ruled (*Stoics*, 41-42). It was also used to encourage *homonoia* or unity through stress on either the interdependence of functions within the body or the organic unity of the whole (*Stoics*, 42-45). Most importantly, the metaphor was used in keeping with the audience's awareness that "bodiness" is essential to the nature of all existing things (*Stoics*, 46-58). Various kinds of bodies exist: some comprise separate bodies within themselves, some comprise related parts that are not themselves bodies, others are deemed a body because they have a pervasive unifying element (*Stoics*, 49-50). "Perhaps the most important function of the spirit in Stoic cosmology was to unify the universe, specifically as a 'body'" (*Stoics*, 51), as this pervasive presence of the $\pi\nu\epsilon\delta\mu\alpha$ would result in a cohesiveness and a sympathetic agreement of each with every individual part of the whole (*Stoics*, 52-54).

A proper understanding of a body's unity is requisite to the virtuous life (*Stoics*, 59, 61, 63), "by making the person's identity as part of universal humanity the starting point for social ethics" (*Stoics*, 69). The ethical, virtuous life was not construed so much as a matter of "expected behaviors as of making the critical link between ontological identity and subsequent actions" (*Stoics*, 67). That is, the nature of each part in relation to the whole was to be recognized and acted upon, in order to reflect the unity of that whole body (*Stoics*, 74, 83, 96).

In keeping with the general Stoic teachings on unity and social ethics, Lee sees Paul's body language as a means of promoting unity within the church community and of clarifying its identity as that which belongs to and in Christ (*Stoics*, 7). The gifts are provided through each member for their role in affirming and strengthening the unity of the one body (*Stoics*, 125, 143). The role of status within the Pauline body also appears to be compatible with general Stoic teachings. Traditional racial and social status distinctions were deemphasized or reversed in each case (*Stoics*, 137), on the basis of understanding the "reality which produces this reversal" (*Stoics*, 147). Paul's use of the body metaphor is important, not because it brings into focus the existence of multiple and distinct members, but because the "Corinthians, as members of a new humanity, are a unified body, which entails certain ethical obligations" (*Stoics*, 151).

Just as the Stoic doctrine of social ethics was founded upon the unity of humanity and the common possession of νοῦς "mind" or πνεῦμα, so does Paul exhort his audience to Christian behaviour on the basis of bodily unity in Christ and the common receipt of the Spirit and wisdom (*Stoics*, 155). This wisdom is distinct from the wisdom found in the world, and thus the body of Christ is a body distinct

from the body of the world (*Stoics*, 157-160). The Corinthians' failures in living out Christian activity are a result of their failure to comprehend the nature and source of their unity as the body of Christ (*Stoics*, 166). Even Paul's exhortation to love one another finds a counterpart in Stoic teaching regarding the nature of the universe (*Stoics*, 181): love is "the highest way of developing relationships in an already unified humanity in the actual course of life" (*Stoics*, 168).

Members of the Pauline body are distinct from those of the Stoic body, resulting in an exclusive social ethic; the Pauline $\nu\omicron\delta\varsigma$ is also distinct from that of the Stoics. The new humanity, constituted a unified body of Christ by the pervasive presence of the $\pi\nu\epsilon\delta\mu\alpha$ of Christ, is the basis for Pauline ethics. This ethics involves use of spiritual gifts for the common good, practical expressions of love one toward the other, and a status-reversal mindset in which the great are those who are useful for the body of Christ (*Stoics*, 198-199).

Paul desires to instruct the Corinthian community so that they may truly grasp their corporate identity in Christ. What he seeks is not just a change in their external behavior, but a deep change in their way of thinking about themselves and each other. Paul believes that they need to comprehend their connectedness as members of unified humanity in order to behave rightly as a community. If they can grasp these things, they can become a community that loves and therefore exemplifies life as followers of the crucified Christ. (*Stoics*, 200)

2.2.5 *Kim* (Christ's Body in Corinth)

Kim's concern is clearly stated from the beginning of his work: "limiting the notion of the 'body of Christ' to language concerning 'belonging' ... leads to and supports a narrow, rigid, and closed conception of the community" (Kim, *Christ's Body*, 1), a community "that separates Christians from non-Christians" (*Christ's Body*, 35). He understands the boundary-marking use of Pauline body language to be

an “arrogant and exclusivist claim” that may lead to Holocaust, homophobia, and racism (*Christ’s Body*, 2). Beginning with this rhetorically inflammatory language, in the following chapters Kim examines whether Paul’s “body of Christ” language in 1 Corinthians may be interpreted as a metaphor for a “holistic religious and interreligious, intercultural” community (*Christ’s Body*, 8). Kim’s stated desire is self-admittedly based on experience as a “border” person longing for a community that is all-encompassing rather than excluding (*Christ’s Body*, 5). Whatever else may be said of this slender volume, it is narrowly focused, and clear in its intent.

Clarity of intent does not result in a strong argument, however: on multiple occasions this personal desire for diversity is stated or implied as the sole grounds for a theological or argumentative choice. For example, Kim doubts that Paul would support “love patriarchalism,” but gives no reason for this doubt (*Christ’s Body*, 16). Again without support from Pauline or other ancient texts, Kim says that “boundaries should blur and change to include everyone in the conception of the community and its practices” (*Christ’s Body*, 18). In regard to the 1 Cor 5 passage regarding “destruction of the flesh,” Kim judges Conzelmann’s wrathful excommunication interpretation to be totally unacceptable. Any unity “achieved through the expulsion of members” writes Kim, “is a forced unity, as practiced by the Roman world, and therefore *cannot* have been Paul’s meaning” (*Christ’s Body*, 66).

Alongside repeated pleas not to view the body of Christ as boundaried, Kim refers repeatedly to “community,” leaving the reader uncertain as to what community this might be that has no boundaries around it. For example, leading up to a plea that we should “live out the Christic body” (*Christ’s Body*, 71), Kim interprets the Pauline condemnation of sex with prostitutes as wholly a concern with being committed to

Christ. If there were any boundary issues in view, argues Kim, the result would be an unacceptable exclusion of the prostitute (*Christ's Body*, 66-67). But if the community is not defined by adherence to some doctrine or practice, in what sense may it be called a community? If there is no possibility of exclusion, in what sense does it require commitment and produce a unique sense of self? Indeed, Elizabeth Castelli points out that “a fundamental determinant of social formation [is] who is inside and who is outside the boundaries of the social group and social identity.”³⁹ Rohrbaugh is in agreement, judging that “groups are not only internally defined, but also defined externally by their relation to other groups. What a group is sometimes most clearly seen as is precisely the fact that it is not part of some other group.”⁴⁰ If “in Christ” does not define an existence within some bounded community, on what basis does Paul choose the term *in Christ*? And if “in Christ” is somehow a function of life engaged in by those who might with impunity reject any claim to Christ’s exclusivity, on what basis can Paul term this condition as being in *Christ*?

Though Kim does engage (and reject) a number of recognized scholars’ arguments, he does so all too briefly, so that his sometimes quite complex interlocutors appear more as simple foils. And at the few points where Kim explicitly deals with the Greek text, a lack of expertise is evident. For example, he appeals to the absence of the article as support for “body of Christ” becoming an ethical plea rather than a bounded identity (*Christ's Body*, 67). Indeed, his discussion of $\sigma\omega\mu\alpha$ $\chi\rho\iota\sigma\tau\omicron\upsilon$ addresses as a matter of importance for his thesis whether “its genitive construction [is] subjective or objective” (*Christ's Body*, 103). Given that $\sigma\omega\mu\alpha$ has

³⁹ Castelli, *Imitating Paul*, 97.

⁴⁰ Rohrbaugh, “Social Location of Thought,” 109.

nowhere been demonstrated (or even argued, to my knowledge) to be a verbal noun, Kim's categories are inappropriate. Kim states that, in 1 Cor 13, "all love words are verbs, not adjectives or nouns" (*Christ's Body*, 87); his accompanying translation (explicitly intended as a demonstration of these verbs) renders them each (and properly so) as a noun rather than as a verb (*Christ's Body*, 121). This book is disappointing on more than one level: it does not carefully engage with the Pauline text; it does not engage its interlocutors at any length before rejecting their positions; it does not deal with issues of the physical body. While I have reviewed Kim's text more thoroughly elsewhere, the aforementioned shortcomings will keep Kim's work from being further engaged within this thesis.⁴¹

2.2.6 *Shi* (Paul's Message of the Cross as Body Language)

Wenhua Shi's fine monograph became available as this thesis was well under weigh, and has been welcome as it is supportive of a number of points brought forward in my own examinations. Her work is thus included in this review not only as an addition to the recent literature, but also as an independent witness to certain claims made in this thesis regarding the inter-connections existing between status, power, gender, and rhetoric in the Greco-Roman world. Shi demonstrates that rhetoric was essential to the education of Greco-Roman males (*Message*, 12-13), and key to the building of the Greco-Roman state (*Message*, 118, 121). In this society, rhetorical training was

a necessary process through which upper-class men were 'made.' In the end, education (παιδεία) for both Greek and Roman gentlemen became a valuable form of capital investment. Greco-Roman rhetoric was an ongoing, life-long process and discipline in a society which

⁴¹ Christiansen, "Review of *Christ's Body in Corinth*," .

was seriously preoccupied with male socialization and also in which gender identity, social status and the self-esteem of men were all interconnected. (*Message*, 13)

Paul's confession of rhetorical inability may be seen as ὑπόκρισις, the rhetorically strategic playing of a part (*Message*, 123, 127, 154, 158, 169). The apostle's self-presentation leaves much to be desired from a classical rhetorical point of view, as he comes to the Corinthians in a fearful, weak, and trembling manner (*Message*, 126-142). His lack of rhetorical ability (strategic or real) would have been seen as both stemming from and clearly demonstrating a lack of masculinity (*Message*, 145-151); this lack would then result in a presumption that Paul possessed no authority or power (*Message*, 156). "A respectable man was supposed to be strong and if he was not then at least he should pretend to be so. To publicly acknowledge one's weakness in the context of masculinity was tantamount to admitting unconditional defeat even before the contest actually started" (*Message*, 167).

Shi also examines the semiotic values of suffering, concentrating on the act of "crucifixion as *summum supplicium* (the most cruel penalty)" (Shi, *Message*, 23). Crucifixion presumed the absence of any desirable status for the victim (*Message*, 10, 22-24); it separated him from any social context in which he could exercise power (*Message*, 9, 24); it removed from the crucified one all possibility of persuasive or defensive speech (*Message*, 31, 48). Death itself is not the issue, here, as crucifixion is contrasted to the "noble death" chosen by Socrates as a means of living with honour (*Message*, 53-55, 61, 64-66). Where Socrates' noble death and the shame of crucifixion converge, is in the fact of Jesus choosing his death as a noble sacrifice for those who have no honour of their own; and this message of divine wisdom deriving from worldly foolishness is the gospel that Paul proclaims (*Message*, 79-80). For

Paul, the cross was neither symbolic (*Message*, 52) nor peripheral: “the core of Paul’s message is the cross itself” (*Message*, 86). And the cross was not an ugly truth that Paul was content in confining to an event in the life of Jesus himself; rather, it also defines “the manner of [Paul’s] proclamation and delivery as well as his apostolic life. This is because, as far as Paul is concerned, the message he carried could hardly be separated from his manner of presentation and his *modus operandi* as Christ’s apostle” (*Message*, 1). Paul expects his life and preaching to be received in the same manner as was the crucifixion of Christ (*Message*, 34, 110): the μωρία and μανία “foolishness” and “madness” of the cross are the determining factors of the apostle’s person and activity of proclamation (*Message*, 98).

Paul’s presentation is counter-intuitive with regard to the power struggles taking place in Corinth (*Message*, 171); if his readers were to be won over, “they expected a certain quality from an orator or sophist, and Paul’s presentation simply fell short” (*Message*, 175). Of course, his very message was one of weakness: “the crucified Christ [is] Paul’s only focus” (*Message*, 161). Therefore, this lack of power was precisely the goal of his presentation (*Message*, 159). “For the sake of Christ, Paul was ready not only to be considered weak or foolish ... but to share Christ’s sufferings” (*Message*, 165). It is in such a context that Paul’s περιπτώσεις (hardship lists) ought to be read (*Message*, 187). Certain philosophers considered hardship to be morally indifferent, and even as stemming from the nature of the gods (*Message*, 195-199)—virtue lay not in an absence of sufferings but in the wise man’s rational choice to accept this part of nature with equanimity (*Message*, 191-194). Both Greeks and Jews understood such a courageous choice to be a mark of manliness (*Message*, 201-

207), while the absence of courage and acceptance in the face of suffering was “womanly” (*Message*, 203).

Paradoxically, if the sufferer suffered hardship, he could also lose social status (*Message*, 215). “Socio-politically, body scars or wounds could well be powerful and vivid signs and symbols of a man’s power, honour and glory. But the opposite was also true, because they might connote defeat, enslavement, submission and ultimately could become a person’s *στίγματα*” (*Message*, 217). To make a proper distinction between a person’s scars of honour and scars of shame was possible only with full context (*Message*, 219): One who was of low status could count on his sufferings being interpreted as marks of abasement; the scars of a high-status man would tend to enhance that status (*Message*, 219-223). Since Paul presented himself as socially and physically weak, his hardships (*περιστάσεις*) would serve to strengthen his audience’s view of that weakness (*Message*, 221, 223).

Paul’s self-proclaimed status as fool “subtly demolishes all wisdom that is humanly conceived” (*Message*, 234). He sets up an undeniably clear statement regarding his weaknesses (*Message*, 249) in a bid to invert the current social ethos regarding power and status (*Message*, 225-226). He affirms that God has chosen those of low status to be his own (*Message*, 232), and demonstrates even through his working for a living (*Message*, 238) that his status is quite low indeed. In the case of a true apostle of Christ, “any talk about true masculinity would be nothing more than a bad joke” (*Message*, 264). For the follower of Christ, weakness and low status is true strength and honour. “As far as Paul is concerned, the confession of his own personal weakness is not only meant to be, paradoxically, a powerful testimony to divine grace in his own life, but also an authentication of his apostleship” (*Message*, 264).

2.3 Summary of Literature Review

The debate between Bultmann, Robinson, and Gundry has defined the complexities of $\sigma\omega\mu\alpha$'s physical referent, while Martin and others have later pointed out the social and rhetorical importance of body language in general. Martin's work is invaluable as an entrée to the field, yet his tendency to subsume all questions under a socio-economic umbrella necessitates that the arguments in *TCB* be carefully weighed in light of other works. Sandnes' text is quite narrow, as it seeks to define the social setting of a circumscribed *topos*—that of “belly worship”—and concerns itself with only two biblical verses.⁴² Indeed, Barram states that “one may wonder initially how this narrow topic merits an entire monograph”; he locates this merit, however, in Sandnes' broad *applicability* to “studies of Paul's perspective on the human body and its relation to his theological and moral reflection.”⁴³ Lee's concern is for socio-political somatic issues,⁴⁴ for what one might term “corporate corporeity,” rather than for “individual corporeity,” though of course the two issues are separable only in theory and not in relational experience. Wenhua Shi in particular has demonstrated connections between the social rhetoric of body language and one's masculinity, though she focuses on her own definition of “body language” while mostly leaving aside the more obvious and general “Roman preoccupation with visual/bodily images.”⁴⁵ Shi has also noted, along with many other commentators, the proclamatory

⁴² Engberg-Pedersen, “Review of *Belly and Body*,” 373; Williams III, “Review of *Belly and Body*,” 170; Talbert, “Review of *Belly and Body*,” 491.

⁴³ Barram, “Review of *Belly and Body*,” 335, 338.

⁴⁴ Dunderberg, “Review of Paul, the Stoics, and the Body of Christ,” 227-228.

⁴⁵ Goodrich, “Review of *Paul's Message of the Cross*” 267.

connection existing specifically between Paul's sufferings and the shameful crucifixion of the all-powerful Christ.

While the preceding books evidence varied approaches and foci, the conception of body as boundary is a common theme. Martin argues that the Corinthian schisms arose between differing socio-economic status groups who held conflicting assumptions regarding the relative strength or permeability of both the physical and social body. A body with strong, impermeable boundaries was free from external danger and irritant; a weakly-boundaried body was in need of protection from external threat through the controlling of undesirable activity and associations. Sandnes sees the body and its use as distinguishing Jew from pagan, as well as being an indicator of one's general attitude toward God and godly matters. Improper use and display of the body results in a removal of the boundaries between that which is acceptable and that which is not, in terms of both religious and cultural associations. Lee's monograph understands Paul's Body of Christ references as language intended to convince the apostle's audience of their group's $\pi\nu\epsilon\delta\mu\alpha$ -empowered internal solidarity as well as of their externally-viewed uniqueness.⁴⁶ The body is their boundary, that which provides them with specific definition. Kim actively argues *against* a "body as boundary/distinction marker," positing that there is no "inside-outside" or boundary problem properly at stake in 1 Corinthians. Shi goes beyond Martin's work in demonstrating that a self-controlled, boundaried body is properly high-status and gendered masculine, while the body whose boundaries are subject to being penetrated or controlled is considered feminine and weak. Whether in a positive or negative manner, the boundaried body is a consistent concern.

⁴⁶ Bury, "Review of Paul, the Stoics, and the Body of Christ," 346.

There still remains a place for a monograph-length examination of Paul's gendered self-presentation in matters related to his own physical body. This thesis will avoid Sandnes' narrow concerns for a specific verbal *topos*, while also avoiding both Martin's and Lee's broader socio-political application of somatic themes to humanity in general or to the Body of Christ. A more consistent focus will be laid on the impact of gender upon author, text, and interpreter. While I am appreciative of and generally in agreement with Shi's recent work, and while I will certainly address the gendered implications of crucifixion, this thesis will focus specifically on the gendered somatic concerns of one man—the apostle Paul. This thesis will examine the Pauline Corinthian self-somatic rhetoric of masculinity and status with regard to claims of leadership and authority. I will demonstrate how Paul's explicit mention and implicit presentation of his own gender-determined body functions within the Corinthian correspondence to subvert his audience's (and our own) masculine expectations regarding divinely-sanctioned power and authority.

2.4 Organization of Chapters Three—Six

The chapters comprising the main body of this thesis will each examine a passage chosen from the Corinthian correspondence, on the basis of that passage's Pauline self-presentational rhetoric. Within each chapter, the passage will be examined in light of the various SRI textures, keeping in mind deSilva's point that in any SRI endeavour

it is imperative that the image of the tapestry (textures intertwined, braided, woven together) not be lost. An integrated interpretation must invite dialogue between the textures. If practised in this mutually-informing way, attention to the various textures will result in a finely nuanced reading of the text. Because the interpreter remains aware of

the many contexts in which one must read a text in order to arrive at a rich, full interpretation, the reading will not tend toward the reductionism of any single method (e.g. too narrow a focus on the lexical, the literary, the social, and so forth).⁴⁷

Thus, though it may be that certain of the biblical passages will not lend themselves to fruitful investigation through every textural approach, no attempt will be made to somehow “complete the assignment.” Nor will the individual textures be examined separately, as they do not appear discretely within the text; rather, the logic of each passage will be allowed to determine the angles of approach.

In Chapter Three, I will analyze the issues of Paul’s gendered bodily and rhetorical weakness in the midst of sacred authority from 1 Cor 1:17—2:5, focusing on 2:1-5. Chapter Four will examine Paul’s multiform weakness and the gender-specific effects this has on his community status in 2 Cor 11:16—12:11. Chapter Five will investigate 2 Cor 3:7-18 in light of Paul’s gender-nuanced self-comparison to Moses, using 1 Cor 11:2-16 as an intertextual key. A case for joining these two distinct passages in a single chapter’s investigation will be made *in situ*, though it may be noted here that the parallels of veiling, speaking, and shame found within each of these texts may demonstrate that both Paul and Moses would be understood by the Greco-Roman audience as feminized by veiling activities. The sixth and final chapter will briefly summarize the preceding chapters, clarify the goal of the thesis, and suggest further possible lines of inquiry into somatic Pauline scholarship.

⁴⁷ deSilva, “Hebrews 6:4-8 (1),” 30; Gowler, “Text, Culture, and Ideology,” 96-97, 105-106.

CHAPTER THREE: 1 CORINTHIANS 2:1-5

In Chapter One, I outlined my thesis regarding the leadership and authority implications of Paul's gendered self-presentation of his physical body and discussed my methodological approach, including SRI, feminist and gender critique, and the sociological notion of *habitus*. In Chapter Two, I reviewed the major works of recent literature dealing directly with Pauline somatic concerns, showing how discussion has shifted from a focus on lexical and referential matters to concerns regarding the social implications of the lived body. In this chapter I will apply my methodologies to 1 Cor 2:1-5, in order to test the claims laid out in the thesis regarding the gendered force of Paul's somatic self-presentation.

This chapter will demonstrate that in the Greco-Roman milieu, physical and moral weakness are conflated with rhetorical lack, and that all these inabilities are enmeshed with gendered expectations. The effective leader and rhetor was not merely a skilled person, but a strong and confident *man*. The broader context of 1:17—2:5 and the diction of 2:1-5 evidence Paul's conscious decision to avoid any connection with such strength, and instead to identify with the crucified Christ. The apostle's appeal to Christ as a pattern is not a claim to honour, however, since by his passive acceptance of domination and suffering, the crucified victim would be viewed as feminized, powerless, and unworthy to speak or lead. In the midst of his claims to apostolic authority and power, Paul's initial self-presentation in Corinth was one of physical weakness and lack of rhetorical skill, a presentation that would signal to his audience his lack of status both as a leader and as a man.

The interpenetrations of these themes make their discrete examination impractical. While the sections of this chapter retain in turn a focus on structure, weakness, and rhetoric, a certain porosity of boundaries will be in evidence in the discussion. The structure of the passage depends upon rhetorical turns even while the apostle appears to be rejecting rhetoric; Paul's physical weakness is enmeshed with his rhetorical lack; the physical and rhetorical inabilities are cothematized with moral or social weakness. The apostle's implicit call for *mimesis* (imitation) would presume a masculine subject worthy of emulation, but this gender positioning clashes with Paul's intentionally weak rhetorical and physical presentation. To deny the authority and leadership of Paul on the basis of his low status, would be tantamount to rejecting the crucified Christ himself.¹ To follow Paul in his weakness, fear, and trembling (ἀσθένεια, φόβος, τρόμος), is to follow Christ in his weakness and shame.

Not in spite of Paul's weakness of speech and body, not in any minimizing of his less-than-manly ἥθος, but on the basis of these inverted values, the Corinthians are called to imitate this one who proclaims the crucified Christ both through his words and his bodily presentation. The apostle's rhetorical and bodily weaknesses are intertwined, due to the physiognomic expectations of his Greco-Roman audience, and these expectations implicate Paul in a feminine self-presentation. He will be perceived by his audience as "less than a man"; yet, it is because of these self-admitted weaknesses that the apostle argues the Corinthians *should* follow and imitate him. This claim to sacred authority on the basis of a multifaceted weakness or inability serves to subvert the Corinthians' expectations regarding power and leadership.

¹ Hafemann, *Suffering and the Spirit*, 17-18.

3.1 Structure and Argument of the Passage

This section will make use of both inner textural and intertextural methods in order to demonstrate the structural and argumentative integrity of 1 Cor 2:1-5 within itself and with its surrounding text. It will also demonstrate that the passage's lexis, grammar, and external references all focus on the crucified Christ, and on Paul's determination that the weakness and shame of Christ's crucifixion would be reflected in the rhetorical use of his own attitude, body, and speech. Paul's own intertextural interpretation of his earlier visit to Corinth shows that not only his spoken message but also the bodily manner of his presentation reflect and emphasize the weakness of the one who sent him—the crucified Christ.

3.1.1 Structural Integrity

The unity of 1 Cor 1:10—4:21 is more or less unquestioned. Robinson notes that this is true “even in the literary analyses of Johannes Weiss and his followers”; and even Martinus De Boer, while arguing for a “dual occasion” in the writing of 1 Corinthians, affirms that the first four chapters of the letter should be read as integral.² The existence of a smaller and distinct argumentative section in 1:17/18—2:5 also receives strong support, while numerous commentators have treated 2:1-5 as a distinct rhetorical unit, relating it to the larger passage in either an illustrative or summarizing manner.³ On the basis of structure and key-word connections, one may say that 2:1-5

² Robinson, “Word and Power,” 69; De Boer, “The Composition of 1 Corinthians,” 229-231; cf. Welborn, “On the Discord in Corinth,” 85-90; Litfin, *St. Paul's Theology of Proclamation*; Schüssler Fiorenza, “Rhetorical Situation,” 392-393; Murphy-O'Connor, “Interpolations,” 81.

³ Ruef, *First Corinthians*, 15; Snyder, *First Corinthians*, 30-31; Murphy-O'Connor, *1 Corinthians*, 17; Horsley, *1 Corinthians*, 53; Peterson, *Der erste Brief*, 92; Talbert, *Reading Corinthians*, 4-5; Witherington, *Conflict and Community*, 124; Conzelmann, *First Corinthians*, 53-54; Zeller, *Der erste Brief*; Horsley, *1 Corinthians*; Trail, *An Exegetical Summary of 1 Corinthians 1—9*; Snyder, *First Corinthians*; Fascher, *Der Erste Brief*; Keener, *1—2 Corinthians*; Barrett, *First*

forms a close *inclusio* with 1:17.⁴ The repetition and linking of words and concepts is focused on “the power of the message of the cross, where the ‘wisdom of men’ in 2:5 corresponds to the ‘foolishness’ of 1:18.”⁵ Indeed, “this section is considered an example of how Paul identifies a correspondence of the cross with his own self and his arrival in Corinth.”⁶ That is, Paul’s arrival and visitation is presented as his obedient response to and demonstration of the divine sending, a response enacted in a manner calculated to bodily counter the specific shortcomings of the Corinthian audience as evidenced throughout 1:18-31.

There is little in the way of text-critical questions in this passage. The Byzantine reading of οὐ ... τοῦ εἰδέναι τι in 2:2 in place of the overwhelmingly-attested οὐ ... τι εἰδέναι results in no change of meaning (the substitution in Ψ of ἰδεῖν for εἰδέναι appears to be a simple copyist’s error). The variations of arrangement and of adding “human” (ἀνθρωπίνης) before “wisdom” in 2:4 do not affect overall meaning within the context. The replacement of ἐν ἀποδείξει “by a demonstration” with ἐν ἀποκαλύψει “by a disclosure” is supported only by the second corrector in D and seems unnecessarily obscure; the passage’s meaning,

Corinthians, 62; Hays, *First Corinthians*, 35; Morris, *First Corinthians*, 51; Carson, *Cross and Christian Ministry*, 33.

⁴ Litfin, *St. Paul’s Theology of Proclamation*, 174-209, esp. 204-205; Schnabel, *Der erste Brief*, 110-111; Fee, *First Corinthians*, 89-90; Stuhlmacher, “The Hermeneutical Significance of 1 Cor 2:6-16,” 333; Scroggs, “Paul: Σοφός and Πνευματικός,” 36; Schrage, *Der erste Brief I*, 223; Thiselton, *First Corinthians*, 204; Robinson, “Word and Power,” 69-70, 75-76; Collins, *First Corinthians*, 116, 117-118, n. 1; Soards, *1 Corinthians*, 52-53; Mihaila, *Paul-Apollos Relationship*, 17-24.

⁵ “zur δύναμις des Kreuzeslogos, wobei »Menschenweisheit« in 2,5 der »Torheit« von 1,18 entspricht” (Schrage, *Der erste Brief I*). Cf. Shi, *Message*, 87-110.

⁶ “Auch dieser Abschnitt ist am ehesten al *exemplum* anzusehen ... wobei Paulus die Entsprechung zum Kreuz diesmal an sich selbst und seinem Auftreten in Korinth exemplifiziert” (Schrage, *Der erste Brief I*, 222). Cf. Thiselton, *First Corinthians*, 204; Collins, *First Corinthians*, 117; Godet, *First Corinthians*, 123; Litfin, *St. Paul’s Theology of Proclamation*, 188-190, 204; Talbert, *Reading Corinthians*, 4-5; Soards, *1 Corinthians*, 52-53; Murphy-O’Connor, *1 Corinthians*, 17; Snyder, *First Corinthians*, 27; Pickett, *Cross in Corinth*, 74.

however, would not be radically altered by the change. Thiselton provides a helpful summary of arguments regarding the most oft-discussed of the text-critical issues—whether the text in 2:2 should read τὸ μυστήριον τοῦ θεοῦ (the mystery of God) or τὸ μαρτύριον τοῦ θεοῦ (the testimony of God)—and concludes that either of the terms would “emphasize that what is conveyed in Christian proclamation is *truth revealed by God, not human opinions*.”⁷ In other words, the outcome of the text-critical question has no impact on this thesis. Indeed, whether it is referred to as a message or as a mystery, the fact and significance of the crucified Christ uncontestedly remains the content of Paul’s proclamation both in word and in deed.

3.1.2 *Argumentative Integrity*

Inner textural and intertextural investigation will be used here to clarify the narrow focus of Paul’s argument within this passage. 1 Cor 1:17—2:5 displays Paul’s self-conscious understanding of himself as one who is above all else called to make a proclamation, as well as his assumptions regarding the nature of that proclamation’s content and form.⁸ Paul was sent not to baptize but to speak; his divine mission of arrival (ἐλθών) and staying (ἐγενόμεν) in Corinth was enacted and fulfilled specifically by and in his act of proclamation (καταγγέλλων). The nature and manner of Paul’s speech as described in 2:1-5 is not an incidental of the visit, but the intentional and somatic outworking of the self-definition of an apostle sent by the crucified Christ.⁹ So Erich Fascher sees the καταγγέλλων as a clarification of the

⁷ Thiselton, *First Corinthians*, 207-211.

⁸ Witherington, *Conflict and Community*, 121; Litfin, *St. Paul’s Theology of Proclamation*, 17, 151-153, 155, 236-241; Mitchell, *Reconciliation*, 54.

⁹ Godet, *First Corinthians*, 125; cf. Lim, *Sufferings of Christ*, 49-53, 63, passim; Ciampa and Rosner, *First Corinthians*, 114.

manner in which the entire visit took place, rather than only of the verbal

proclamation itself. He states that

ἐλθὼν πρὸς ὑμᾶς is not connected with ἦλθον as a Hebraic phrase ... but as a summarizing temporal participle. The following ἦλθον οὐ καθ' ὑπεροχὴν explains the ἐλθὼν content in more detail, while the more attached temporal καταγγέλλων refers to the purpose of this coming.... καταγγέλλω is a technical term in the language of mission and means 'to deliver a message.'¹⁰

While he was sent to proclaim and not to *do* certain activities, it is certainly true that to speak implicated Paul to *be* in a certain way. The καταγγέλλων of 1 Cor 2:1 “contrasts not only with persuasive *linguistic* styles, but more especially with the *self-presentation* and *self-prominence* associated with the ‘presence’ of the sophist.”¹¹ Paul’s speech and his actions were not separable elements of his visit, but each was leading to the same goal.

3.1.2.1 *The crucified Christ as message.* Paul might have identified the object of his knowledge in 2:2 simply as Ἰησοῦν Χριστὸν ἐσταυρωμένον “Jesus Christ crucified”; the expansion of this phrase by an interpolation of καὶ τοῦτον “indeed this one” prior to the participle has an intensifying effect with regard to the verbal state of the object. The phrasing also recalls the expansion in 1:18 (ὁ λόγος γὰρ ὁ τοῦ σταυροῦ “the word which is of the cross”) from the simpler form found in 1:17.¹² That is, 2:2 and 1:18 are grammatically redundant in the same manner— Paul could have written ὁ γὰρ λόγος τοῦ σταυροῦ “the word of the cross” in 1:18,

¹⁰ “ἐλθὼν πρὸς ὑμᾶς ist nicht mit ἦλθον als hebraisierende Redewendung zu verbinden ... sondern als Part. temporale zu fassen. Das folgende ἦλθον οὐ καθ' ὑπεροχὴν erläutert das ἐλθὼν inhaltlich näher, während das weiter angehängte temporale καταγγέλλων den Zweck dieses Kommens bezeichnet.... καταγγέλλω is Term. techn. der Missionsssprache und bedeutet: eine Botschaft überbringen” (Fascher, *Der Erste Brief*, 114).

¹¹ Thiselton, *First Corinthians*, 209.

¹² Shi, *Message*, 87-88.

but chose instead to emphasize the cruciform nature of the proclamation, just as in 2:2 he emphasizes the crucified nature of the one proclaimed.

3.1.2.2 *Paul's weakness as messenger.* The apostle's weakness, fear, and trembling (ἀσθένεια, φόβος, τρόμος) in 1 Cor 2:3 have been the subject of much debate. The source and nature of this complex has been variously identified: as symptoms of an illness (sometimes associated with his thorn in the flesh and with the indeterminate trouble mentioned in Gal 4:12-16); as an awareness of divine responsibility and accountability in the proclamatory task; as a conscious rejection of the pride and false self-assurance which comes from self-promoting Sophistic rhetorical tricks and play-acting as he preaches.¹³ In light of the thick appearance of rhetorical—even Sophistic—terminology, the last suggestion seems most appropriate.¹⁴ Note that I am not claiming that the apostle rejects all use of Sophistic rhetoric and persuasional techniques; rather, he rejects the popular approach to persuasion which promoted and depended upon self-aggrandizement.¹⁵ Paul determines not to present himself in the same manner as do the Sophists; indeed, he will not present himself at all, but Christ instead as the crucified one.

The precise phrase (ἐν ἀσθενείᾳ καὶ ἐν φόβῳ καὶ ἐν τρόμῳ πολλῶ) has not been found by interpreters elsewhere in the literature. Collins, Fee, and Timothy Savage each claim that the LXX is the source of the last two elements of the phrase, where they are understood as signifying the dread felt in the presence of God's

¹³ Thiselton, *First Corinthians*, 213-215; Keener, *1–2 Corinthians*, 35.

¹⁴ Schnabel, *Der erste Brief*, 159; Litfin, *St. Paul's Theology of Proclamation*, 205-206; Harrill, "Invective against Paul," 210; Harrill, *Slaves in the New Testament*, 53; Shi, *Message*, 123, 156.

¹⁵ Cf. Given, *Paul's True Rhetoric*.

majesty or opposing power, or in the presence of another powerful enemy.¹⁶ All three writers reference the LXX texts of Ex 15:16 and Isa 19:16 as support. As Fee has noted, the remaining LXX passages—including those cited by Collins and Savage (Deut 2:25; 11:25; Ps 2:11; 54:6; Jdt 2:28; 4 Macc 4:10)—evidence various causes of the emotional response, none of which are necessarily connected to God’s presence. What all these men appear to have missed, however, is the gendered aspect of each text. The Exodus passage is followed immediately by a song of victory over the vanquished Egyptians, sung not by Moses but by Miriam and all the other women; the Isaiah passage indicates that the Egyptians ἐν φόβῳ καὶ ἐν τρόμῳ are acting ὡς γυναικες “as women.” Jdt 15:2 could also be cited here, a passage which at first glance appears to show a response of general fear regarding a strong enemy; a closer reading, however, reveals that the men are reacting to a great man of war having been overcome by a woman.

Greco-Roman texts may also be posited as partial sources for the phrase. Two passages from Euripides reference the anguish experienced at the prospect of familial death: φόβῳ τρέμω “I tremble in fear” (*Ion*, 1451); τρομερὰν φρίκα / τρομερὰν φρέν’ ἔχω “my mind is trembling / trembling with fear” (*Phoen.*, 1285). Yet another such phrase (δεδιὼς καὶ τρέμων “frightened and trembling”) has reference to one’s expectation of being punished for past wrongs (Demosthenes, *Cor.*, 18.263). The lot of the entire earth, according to 1 En. 1:5, will be τρόμος καὶ φόβος μέγας “trembling and great fear.” While this may suggest a parallel to the phrase in 1 Corinthians 2, the broader context within 1 Enoch clarifies that those in view are ones

¹⁶ Collins, *First Corinthians*, 119; Fee, *First Corinthians*, 93-94; Savage, *Power through Weakness*, 73.

who disobey God's eternal commands. In summary, the last passage does reference fear of God, but cannot be easily applied to the apostle's affirmation of obedient proclamation; the fear of God does not appear to be present in the other texts.

Others have seen in Paul's willing admission of weak delivery and presence an implicit claim to apostolic solidarity with Moses (Ex 4:10), or with the prophet Jeremiah (Jer 1:6; 9:23).¹⁷ Hengel understands even the seemingly rhetorical terms in this passage to be rooted in the LXX text of Psalms, Isaiah, and Joel, as a Pauline claim to surpass the prophets.¹⁸ While one may hear an echo of the prophets here, any interpretation of this correspondence must still take into account the rhetorical consciousness and *habitus* of his *Hellenistic* audience. As well, the immediate context would seem to make any claim to authority based on historical figures at least a secondary concern. Indeed, as Keener points out, the apostle intends his weaknesses to be viewed by the audience as a negative,¹⁹ and this would not jibe well with an attempt to play off any positive connection with a prophetic authority figure.

In Phil 2:12 Paul tells his audience "Work out your own salvation," while in Eph 6:5, slaves are encouraged "Obey your earthly masters." In both instances, the manner or basis of action is to be "with fear and trembling" (μετὰ φόβου καὶ τρόμου). The Ephesians exhortation is a fairly unsurprising portion of a *Haustafel* (household code), but Susan Eastman has pointed out that the Philippians command follows the *Carmen Christi*. Of course, the physical anteriority of that text is hardly news; Eastman's contribution is to observe that the fear and trembling are a proper

¹⁷ Cf. Keener, *1–2 Corinthians*, 34-35; Thiselton, *First Corinthians*, 214.

¹⁸ Hengel and Schwemer, *Paul between Damascus and Antioch*, 91-95.

¹⁹ Keener, *1–2 Corinthians*, 35.

response to the theophany described in the hymn.²⁰ What Paul desires as the Philippians' response to Christ's incarnate suffering and subsequent exaltation may be seen as his own response in both 2 Cor 11:22-33 and 1 Cor 2:1-5. Eastman's article overall argues for the mimetic force of the hymn, adducing convincing examples of theatrical and rhetorical performance and participation throughout the passage.²¹ One might view this response of fear and trembling to be properly occasioned by the ultimate exaltation of the Christ. In light of the passage's focus on mimesis, however, there seems to be a more obvious connection from the hymn to the command. Instead of a fitting response to the ultimate exaltation of Christ, the φόβος καὶ τρόμος might better be seen as the proper re-enactment of Christ's cruciform incarnation. As Christ obtained his "salvation" through a humbling death, so also should his followers obtain their own (τὴν ἑαυτῶν) salvation. As Paul recites the *Carmen Christi* to induce the proper mimetic response from the Philippians, so in Corinth he lives out his own re-enactment of Christ's passion before his audience. Paul's call to *imitatio* is thus complex, as he asks the Corinthians to play a part based on his playing of a part that was played by Christ himself.

Paul's purpose for pointing out his weakness in 2:3 appears to be in providing a positive counterpart to the negative presentation of his κήρυγμα (proclamation) in 2:4; and this section not only suggests, but explicitly utilizes the terms and concerns of Greco-Roman rhetoric. The difficulty of locating identical and clearly analogous uses either in LXX, Greco-Roman, or New Testament literature suggests that the Pauline phrase should not be treated technically. While the precise source of Paul's

²⁰ Eastman, "Incarnation as Mimetic Participation," 19.

²¹ Eastman's examples are many, appearing regularly throughout the article, and the article is fairly short. For these reasons, no page references have been provided.

trepidation remains unclear,²² and even the possibility of rhetorical self-deprecation cannot be entirely ruled out,²³ the apostle's concern seems in general to be one of avoiding any appearance of pride or self-aggrandizement.

The tripling of the *καὶ ἐν* in 1 Cor 2:3 is grammatically unnecessary and likewise serves to highlight Paul's self-presented lack of ability. Nor should we ignore the negative mode of text surrounding the tripled preposition. Beyond the introductory phrase ending with the vocative *ἀδελφοί*, Paul's structure in 2:1-5 depends on negatives and adversatives; in this tripled prepositional phrase, however, there are only grammatically positive statements. Paul does not write, "neither in strength, nor confidence, nor steadiness"; rather, he presents his clearly negative *concepts* in an emphatically straightforward manner, thus intensifying their effect and making them a focus of the passage. Where the other statements have been presented obliquely, here the apostle boldly states that he is weak. Paul appears to care relatively little for being disapproved by the Corinthians, but does determine in advance that he will not be misunderstood.²⁴ His topic is clearly laid out as an exhortation that life is to be lived in light of the cross of Christ.

The apostle's self-affirmed weakness, fear, and trembling was not due to a fear of God, nor to a fear of his audience's disapproval; rather, it was an intentional (though not thereby necessarily hypocritical) presentation of a personal example to be followed by the Corinthians, as Paul was following the crucified Christ.²⁵ Though Fee states that Paul "does not glory in his weaknesses for their own sake, nor simply to

²² Fee, *First Corinthians*, 93, 94; Thiselton, *First Corinthians*, 214.

²³ Keener, *1–2 Corinthians*, 34.

²⁴ Litfin, *St. Paul's Theology of Proclamation*, 154.

²⁵ Dunn, "Pauline Letters," 283.

contrast himself to the sophists,” he goes on to say that Paul thereby reminds the Corinthians that “the real power does not lie in the person or presentation of the speaker, but in the work of the Spirit.”²⁶ If Fee’s point here is simply that the difference is to be found in the work of God’s Spirit, I will not disagree. Since the spirit of sophistic rhetoric was precisely persuasion on the basis of one’s own person and presentation, and since Fee explicitly contrasts the manner of Paul’s presentation to that of the sophists, his distinction is not entirely clear. Regardless of Fee’s lack of clarity here, he does agree that Paul’s display of fear in speaking would contrast sharply with the confident self-presentation of those orators who sought to advance themselves through a rhetorical presentation that was pleasing to their audience.²⁷

3.2 Weakness of the Apostle

This section will demonstrate that Paul’s weakness would have been understood as having both a moral and a gendered component. Ideological texture and social and cultural textural analysis will assist in demonstrating that Paul’s intentional self-identification with weakness would necessarily result in his being considered “not a real man,” with all the negative authority implications this involves. The conflation of weakness with shamefulness is consistently attested throughout both Greco-Roman literature and the Hebrew Testament, as is the identification of such shame and weakness with the feminine, rather than with slavishness or a supposed simple lack of societal influence. Indeed, not only does this complex identification find support in the various genres of ancient drama, philosophy, and rhetoric, it is also

²⁶ Fee, *First Corinthians*, 94.

²⁷ Keener, *1–2 Corinthians*, 35; Thiselton, *First Corinthians*, 213.

evidenced throughout the centuries even to our own day. Though the explicit assertion that the shape, strength, and gender of one's body and voice mirror or determine the shape of one's soul is some three centuries out of philosophical vogue, modern western society still *implicitly* argues for the social ranking of persons based on gender, body weight, and size.²⁸ Even more so, we must recognize the strength of such assumptions during Paul's day. Men were considered strong and honourable, while women were weak and unworthy of being followed; moreover, a (biological) man who gave evidence of his own weakness would be considered to be not a man after all.

3.2.1 *The Gendered Force of the Body*

Beginning with the work of Mary Douglas in the 1960s, and continuing on through Jerome Neyrey's writings in the 1970s to the works of Martin and Sandnes, much has been said regarding the metaphorical force of the body. These works, however, do not concern themselves directly with the body's gendered physical state.²⁹ Indeed, Fonow and Cook point out that, prior to the 1990s, not even feminist scholarship afforded any recognition to the social construction of the physical body.³⁰ As Robert A. Padgug notes, even Marxist critics tended to view sexuality as being a superstructure added to an economic foundation, and early feminists saw economics and sexuality as relatively autonomous bases existing side by side.³¹ Human sexuality and gender were assumed by all to be objectively constituted as bare facts or as

²⁸ Isherwood, *Fat Jesus*, 11-36, passim.

²⁹ Moxnes, "Body, Gender and Social Space," 165-166.

³⁰ Fonow and Cook, "Feminist Methodology," 2215-2216. Cf. Holmes, *Gender*, 3-6, 11; Kraemer, *Unreliable Witnesses*, 14-16.

³¹ Padgug, "Sexual Matters," 15.

biological givens. Later theorists, however, have demonstrated the interwoven nature of gender, human sexuality, and social reality.³²

3.2.1.1 Modern analyses of the body. Following the analyses of Erwin Straus and Maurice Merleau-Ponty, Drew Leder affirms that the fact of the body being “not a mere extrinsic machine but our living center from which radiates all existential possibilities is brought home with a vengeance in illness, suffering, and disability.”³³

Merleau-Ponty writes,

Our century has wiped out the dividing line between ‘body’ and ‘mind,’ and sees human life as through and through mental and corporeal, always based upon the body and always (even in its most carnal modes) interested in relations between persons. For many thinkers at the close of the nineteenth century, the body was a bit of matter, a network of mechanisms. The twentieth century has restored and deepened the notion of flesh, that is, of animate body.³⁴

On a more popular level, G. K. Chesterton’s words still ring true: “There are some people who state that the exterior, sex, or physique of another person is indifferent to them, that they care only for the communion of mind with mind; but these people need not detain us. There are some statements that no one ever thinks of believing, however often they are made.”³⁵

Bodies are a transforming force within the world, and these bodies always exist both as gendered and as located within socially-significant and socially-determined hierarchical structures.³⁶ The body is a visible indicator of the stance one takes in and toward the world; it is, in Jacques Sarano’s words, “the interpreter, the

³² Cf. Kraemer, *Unreliable Witnesses*, 14-16.

³³ Leder, “Medicine and Paradigms of Embodiment,” 34.

³⁴ Merleau-Ponty, “Man and Adversity,” 227.

³⁵ Chesterton, *The Defendant*, 92.

³⁶ Ryan, *Body as Symbol*, 12; Moxnes, “Body, Gender and Social Space,” 165; Malina, “Understanding New Testament Persons,” 49-52.

translator, the revealer, the catalyzer, the spokesman, the herald who proclaims.”³⁷

Likewise, Bakhtin states that a human act “is a potential text and can be understood (as a human act and not a physical action) only in the dialogic context of its time (as a rejoinder, as a semantic position, as a system of motives).”³⁸ That is, meaning is produced in and by means of the interstices of bodily human intention and the world, where social practice and the human body continuously co-modify each other.³⁹ For example, while every society may categorize its members as “men” and “women,” the characteristics, expectations, and roles symbolizing these cultural categories vary greatly by society, class, and social status.⁴⁰ Certainly it is true that the social distinctions between “man” and “woman” *appear* objective to members of a given society; however, this may be seen as evidence of the habitual thoroughness of social conditioning.⁴¹ Gender distinctions within a society always reflect a political element—rather than purely objective descriptions of difference, the stated or assumed distinctions are ideologically performative.⁴²

Bourdieu notes that a child’s sexual identity is formed at the same stage of life as is her sense of social and labour positioning.⁴³ Objective biological (especially anatomical) differences between the sexes are programmatically assigned to various functions within the community, in order to justify social scripts divided along gender

³⁷ Sarano, *The Meaning of the Body*, 117.

³⁸ Bakhtin, “Problem of the Text,” 107.

³⁹ Leder, *The Absent Body*, 152; cf. Turner, “Body in Western Society,” .

⁴⁰ Gleason, *Making Men*, xxvi-xxviii, 58; Foxhall, “Introduction,” 3-6; Gardner, “Sexing a Roman,” 136; Harlow, “In the Name of the Father,” 160-161; Gilmore, *Manhood in the Making*, 22-23; Padgug, “Sexual Matters,” 14; Eilberg-Schwartz, “Problem of the Body,” 49; Prosic, “Schizoid Coitus,” 49; Lakey, *Image and Glory of God*, 161; Hall, *Silent Language*, 43-44.

⁴¹ Alston, “Arms and the Man,” 220.

⁴² Cameron, *Feminism and Linguistic Theory*, 28-30; Gilmore, *Manhood in the Making*, 11-29.

⁴³ Bourdieu, *Outline of a Theory of Practice*, 93.

lines. The biological distinctions are conflated with the social distinctions (e.g., the upward movement of penile erection is implicated with male social ascendancy while the soft yieldingness of breasts is associated with a comforting and nurturing role). These same social structures are then defended by reference to the “objective” biological data which is now seen clearly to support the distinctions (e.g., Xenophon, *Oecon.*, 7.16-32). So transparent is the resultant *habitus*, so internalized do the social structurings become, that identical actions performed by socially distinct persons will be viewed discretely, and their value (re)interpreted in light of the agent’s gender.⁴⁴

Nor are these habitual understandings of gender limited to the uneducated or unaware masses. Coakley points out that even in C. G. Jung’s theory of sexual incorporation, the man’s integration with his female *anima* is viewed in a positive light, while the woman’s ostensible transformation into a full human being through integration with her male *animus* is “treated much more summarily (and indeed negatively).”⁴⁵ In the same manner, Aristotle claims in all seriousness that “[v]irtues and actions are nobler, when they proceed from those who are naturally worthier, for instance, from a man rather than from a woman” (*Rhet.*, 1.9.22 [LT]).

3.2.1.2 Greco-Roman physiognomy. Froma Zeitlin has demonstrated that, in Greek drama as well as in rhetorical presentation, the feminine was thematized as weakness and passivity, even more so than gender was signalled by external accoutrements such as clothing and hair-style. While dress may immediately appear to demonstrate the presence of the feminine, further observation will reveal that such

⁴⁴ Bourdieu, *Masculine Domination*, passim, esp. 7, 11, 33; cf. Isherwood, *Fat Jesus*, 27-29, 137-138; Parsons, *Feminism and Christian Ethics*, 43, 116; Jasper, *Because of Beauvoir*, 4-7, 27-28; Code, *Rhetorical Spaces*, 129-130, 172, 195-196, 227-228; Harlow, “In the Name of the Father,” 156.

⁴⁵ Coakley, *Powers and Submissions*, 96.

appearance may be deceiving; passivity and weakness, however, are sure indicators of the feminine, even if the stage persona of the (always male) actor was physically male. With few exceptions, “the role of representing the corporeal side of life in its helplessness and submission to constraints is primarily assigned to women.”⁴⁶ This identification of the feminine with bodily weakness cannot be brushed aside as “merely dramatic,” rather than “real,” for tragedy (and Greek drama in general) “is a species of recurrent masculine initiations . . . designed as an education for its male citizens in the democratic city.”⁴⁷ The dramatic arts constitute a “subtle societal manipulation and control” of what lessons are to be learned for “real life” beyond the theatre.⁴⁸

Seneca goes against the tide of ancient physiognomic assumptions when he denies that sickness or even ugliness were necessary indicators of moral lack. While he would not find Paul’s sickness *per se* problematic, however, he would be troubled by the apostle’s admission of fear. Indeed, Seneca’s lack of concern for bodily weakness or pain is predicated on his assumption that the weak and suffering person is facing all circumstances with unflagging courage. It is “in accordance with nature for a man to preserve an indomitable soul amid such distresses,” and the “brave unyielding endurance of torture” is that which allows an otherwise inglorious state to be valued as a place where the Supreme Good occurs (Seneca, *Ep. mor.*, 4.14; 66.1-6, 12, 22-23, 38-39; 71.17 [LT]). While it was recognized as being sometimes unavoidable for a man in this world (throughout, in speaking of particular goods or

⁴⁶ Zeitlin, “Playing the Other,” 71; Holmes, *Gender*, 8, 39-44; Kraemer, *Unreliable Witnesses*, 18-20.

⁴⁷ Zeitlin, “Playing the Other,” 66.

⁴⁸ Hawley, “Male Body,” 84. For a broader argument regarding the continuity between rhetoric and drama, see Scodel, “Drama and Rhetoric,” *passim*.

honour, the author uses *vir* rather than *homo*), any presentation of one's passivity in the face of hardship still served to provide a "not-too-covert feminization" of the sufferer.⁴⁹ In discussing the active role required of one who would be rightly admired, the lyric poet (*Simonides*, 579) states that "Virtue ... is not seen by the eyes of any mortals except the one who ... approaches the peak of manliness" (Τᾶν Αρετᾶν ... οὐδὲ πάντων βλεφάροισι θνητῶν / ἔσοπτος, ὧι μὴ ... ἴχρη τ' ἄκρον ἀνδρείας). Active struggle was laudable, while passive endurance and suffering were evidences of marked faults in one's character, attitudes universally thematized as feminine states of being in the world.

3.2.1.3 *Hebrew physiognomy*. The Hebrew Testament also evidences this conflation of bodily and moral states, as seen in a fair number of recent studies done on physical disabilities.⁵⁰ I will use Rebecca Raphael's work (*Biblical Corpora*) as representing a number of ways in which disability may be thematized by the Hebrew authors. It may be that "the speaker's disabling self-description ... calls out God's power. That is, bodily weakness becomes rhetorical power, with the purpose of leveraging God into action" (*Biblical Corpora*, 110-116). One's hurt or disability relates her to onlookers and enemies by separateness, while relating her to God through obvious dependence and expectation of divine attention. This is a fascinating deconstructive approach to disability language in the text, but it does not appear to be fruitful for understanding 1 Cor 2:1-5. The apostle does not use his weakness as a

⁴⁹ Shaw, "Body," 283, 296.

⁵⁰ E.g., Holden, *Forms of Deformity*, esp. 236-283, 326-355; Schipper, *Disability Studies and the Hebrew Bible*; Schipper, "Embodying Deuteronomistic Theology," passim; Hamori, "Divine Embodiment," passim; Isherwood, *Fat Jesus*, 79-82. In addition, though Mikeal Parson's work deals specifically with New Testament texts, he does raise awareness of the Jewish context of physiognomic studies (Parsons, *Body and Character*).

means of getting God's attention, but of getting the attention of the Corinthians. He is not using his weakness to shut out communication with his onlookers, but rather to engage them in conversation.

The textually presented disability may also function accusatorily, as evildoers are termed "blind," or "deaf" (*Biblical Corpora*, 119-122). The "Normal" is designated as the beautiful and capable, after which the holy God is designated as Normal; thus, one who is disabled or disfigured is thematized as unholy (*Biblical Corpora*, 132, *passim*). This cothematization of disability and unholiness may be traced all the way back to the Genesis account of Eden. The serpent is somatically disfigured (his legs are removed) and is cursed; the woman is somatically limited (by pain in childbirth) and is subjugated though not cursed; the man is neither cursed nor somatically damaged, the curse resting on that which is placed under his subjugation (the earth and its produce). In this way relative levels of disability and divine acceptability may be mirroring the perceived levels of "normality" regarding male and female engenderment.⁵¹ On the other hand, a divine representative may be identified in the Hebrew Bible with disabling terms ("blind," "deaf," "weak") as a condemnatory or hortatory note regarding willful divine inattention to the nation's plight (*Biblical Corpora*, 123-125). That is, God and his servants are presented "as though disabled," in order to bring despair to those who should realize they are calling upon one who will not or cannot help. Paul's Corinthian self-presentation certainly locates him as a disabled divine representative; his weakness is self-attributed, thematized as a mark of sacred authority, based on his connection with the weakness of the crucified Christ. The apostolic weakness, however, is thematized as God's

⁵¹ Raphael, *Biblical Corpora*, 54-63.

mark of *favour*, rather than as an expression of judgment on one who will not recognize God's power and authority.

Lastly, Raphael's examination of Job defines the righteous sufferer in terms of disability (*Biblical Corpora*, 81-107). While the weaknesses of Paul and of Job are alike in that both limitations become a locus of divine revelation, they are quite dissimilar in terms of divine relationship. Indeed, Job in his somatic disability cannot be presented as having the same relationship to God as does Paul. The Christian affirmation is that weakness is displayed in God become human, while the Hebrew affirmation is that the weakness of man is confronted by God become Book.⁵² Job's weakness is confronted by and contrasted to the overwhelming power of the Creator's normality, while Paul's weakness reflects the crucified weakness of God in Christ. Given that Paul's weakness is not certainly identified as a disability strictly defined (e.g., lameness, deafness, blindness), the specific findings of such studies will have limited applicability to any examination of 1 and 2 Corinthians.⁵³ The general attitude of unacceptance toward somatically-expressed weakness and limitation, however, does not appear to differ greatly from the Greco-Roman to the Hebrew milieu.

3.2.1.4 Persistence of the physiognomic principle. The conflation of physical and moral weakness was a commonplace throughout the Renaissance and after. Georges Vigarello writes that even a highly-honoured knight would fall "to the lowest level of public esteem" upon evidence of physical disability, since such weakness was

⁵² Hamori, "Divine Embodiment," 173-174, *passim*.

⁵³ The *σκόλοψ τῆ σαρκὶ* of 2 Cor 12:7 is an obvious exception, though there are some who would limit this disability to the difficulties of persecution or of social opposition to Paul's apostolic work (Woods, "Opposition," *passim*; McCant, "Paul's Thorn of Rejected Apostleship," *passim*; Murphy-O'Connor, *Paul: A Critical Life*, 321-322). The phrase will be discussed later.

outward evidence of a greater internal lack.⁵⁴ It was precisely during this period that the concept of an ontological distinction between the “interior” and “exterior” life began to arise within European culture. But Susan Bordo has argued that the “Cartesian shift” away from the assumption of a trustworthy inside-outside connection was in truth “an aggressive intellectual ‘flight from the feminine’ rather than (simply) the confident articulation of a positive new epistemological ideal.”⁵⁵ More generally, the Cartesian positing of the body as an extended obstruction to the non-extensible mind/self is understood by Leder as arising from Descartes’ desire to explain those situations where the lived body has in some way malfunctioned or failed to measure up to the socially-expected norm.⁵⁶ Even in a society’s apparent rejection of the physiognomic principle, one may discern the gendered forces of physiognomic signification.

Up into the eighteenth century, masculinity and femininity, femaleness and maleness were understood to be less the result of biological markers than they were the result of the playing out of carefully defined social scripts. These gender scripts performed within everyday society followed (or were followed by) the patterns evidenced on stage.⁵⁷ Life mirrors the stage, as the stage mirrors life. Both on the stage and in the marketplace, the one who was passive and weak was seen as feminine

⁵⁴ Vigarello, “Upward Training,” 149.

⁵⁵ Bordo, “The Cartesian Masculinization of Thought,” 441-443; cf. summary of Bordo’s argument in Code, *What Can She Know*, 51.

⁵⁶ Leder, *The Absent Body*, passim; Leder, “Medicine and Paradigms of Embodiment,” 32; Martin, *Corinthian Body*, esp. 3-21.

⁵⁷ Nye, “Locating Masculinity,” 1937, 1942.

and worthy of being a victim, while the active conqueror was judged to be masculine, a true man.⁵⁸

3.2.1.5 Gender and the physiognomic principle. The consistent cothematization of weakness with the feminine is clear within Greco-Roman sources, the Hebrew Testament, and later Greco-Roman influenced society. While one could attribute this simply to the strength of the *habitus*, it may be instructive to examine how such a conflation of seemingly disparate elements might operate. In his *Rhetoric of Motives*, Kenneth Burke introduces the concept of “unearned increments,” the power of suasion gained through ideational or imaginic language, apart from explicit argumentation.⁵⁹ For example, a speaker may explicitly yet unsuccessfully argue in favour of homeland and traditional values; should that same suasive attempt be coupled to an image of a home-cooked meal in a warm safe cabin, the argument will be won without additional explicit support. The mechanism is quite simple at its heart—the image and the argument are conflated, and thus all the implicit baggage of both are joined as well.

Examples of unearned incrementalism are ready to hand in each age, and not only in Burke’s racially- and class-divided United States. In the recent animated television series, “Family Guy,” Lois Griffin enters the mayoral race for the city of Quahog, basing her platform on a careful discussion of social and environmental issues. When it becomes obvious that the incumbent is likely to be re-elected by flattering his constituents, Lois is advised to forget the issues and “play to the crowd.” She then responds to every question by intoning the words “Nine ... Eleven,” thereby

⁵⁸ Zeitlin, “Playing the Other,” 63-64, 66-67, 69; cf. Milnor, *Gender*, 293-294.

⁵⁹ Burke, *Rhetoric*, 86-87.

winning the election.⁶⁰ Lest anyone judge this example to be merely silly, it should be noted that the series' Emmy Award-winning obvious genius is to exaggerate that which is culturally plausible. Moving from the present-day ridiculous to the ancient not-so-sublime, Quintilian provides us with similar instances of audiences being persuaded by means unconnected to more properly logical evidences and argumentation. One Marcus Aquilius was acquitted when the defending orator tore open Aquilius' cloak to reveal the man's battle-scarred torso. Jurors were moved by pity to free Servius Galba when he appeared before the jury leading his young children, carrying one of them in his arms. The child being carried was not his own, but borrowed from a friend. Lastly, the accused Phryne was released not by the superlative talents of her defender, but "by the sight of her lovely body, which she had further revealed by opening her dress" (Quintilian, *Inst.*, 2.15.7-9 [LT]).

While Burke's excellent discussion focuses upon positive incrementalism, it should be noted that an opposing image would have attached a correspondingly negative incremental value. The use of a male-gendered body as an incremental argument for social and familial power will also provide an unearned devaluation of female biology. That which is seen as not strong will correspondingly and implicitly earn the title of that which is not male. Thus, in the Corinthians' eyes, the passive apostle's identification with Christ does not so much divinitize Paul's standing, but rather brings into focus a recognition of the crucified Christ's feminized status.

⁶⁰ McFarlane, "It takes a village idiot, and I married one," broadcast on *Family Guy* (May 13, 2007).

3.2.2 *Paul's Weakness and Persuasive Power*

While Paul's specific form of weakness in 1 Cor 2:1-5 is not certain, and could have reference to either lack of ability in speech or to physical disability or illness, the two interpretations are not mutually exclusive. Either kind of weakness would be seen by Paul's audience as implying a feminine character and therefore a low status. Paul's response to his opponent's apparent appeal to gender norms "constitutes a rejection of certain traditional standards of masculinity. This rejection is not complete ... however, he seems to be attacking the tendency to equate masculinity (and therefore leadership ability) with outward demonstrations of dominance and power."⁶¹ This Pauline rejection of power becomes problematic as he then defines his persuasiveness as being of the spirit and of power (πνεύματος καὶ δυνάμεως)—a formulation which is then signified in 2:5 as the power of God (δύναμις θεοῦ).

It is this persuasive power that the apostle offers as the πίστις (proof) supporting his ἀπόδειξις (demonstration). So much is clear and not the subject of debate. But there is debate regarding the specific nature of the δύναμις θεοῦ. Fee notes that the power may refer to apostolic signs and wonders but concludes that it more likely refers specifically to the Corinthians' conversion, "with its concomitant gift of the Spirit, which was probably evidenced by spiritual gifts, especially tongues."⁶² Horsley likewise identifies the power as "dramatic manifestations of the Spirit ... that accompanied the initial changes in the Corinthians' lives as they responded to [Paul's] mission."⁶³ Soards writes that "in, through, and despite Paul's

⁶¹ Larson, "Paul's Masculinity," 94-95.

⁶² Fee, *First Corinthians*, 95; so also Witherington, *Conflict and Community*, 124; Ciampa and Rosner, *First Corinthians*, 118.

⁶³ Horsley, *1 Corinthians*, 54.

weakness God's power was at work in his ministry. The contrast of Paul's weakness and God's powerful, sustaining grace reveals that the power and the results of that power are property and achievements of God alone."⁶⁴ It is not clear whether Soards envisions the power as God's grace *toward* Paul, or *through* Paul to the Corinthians; however, it does seem evident that he understands the power to be some sort of supernatural manifestation. Murphy-O'Connor locates the power not in any manifestation of spiritual gifting at conversion, but in the bare fact "that some Corinthians responded to the 'call.'"⁶⁵ Schnabel holds to this same position, stating that "Paul is not thinking of 'signs' in the sense of wondrous miracles, as 1:22 makes clear. The 'evidence of the Spirit's power' is the fact that in Corinth Jews and Gentiles have converted to faith in the crucified and risen Jesus Christ."⁶⁶ Grosheide likewise writes that Paul manifested the Spirit and power not in his preaching itself, but in "the miracles of God which demonstrated the truth of the proclamation of the gospel ... Yea, the very existence of the Gentile church itself."⁶⁷

Whether the ἀπόδειξις is understood as stemming from evidence of spiritual gifting (either of the apostle or of the Corinthians), miraculous life-change, or the bare event of conversion, the commentators appear united in seeing the demonstration as taking place *in spite of* or, at most, simply in the arena of the apostle's weakness.⁶⁸ But as explicated in 1 Cor 1:18-31, and argued throughout this thesis, weakness is not

⁶⁴ Soards, *1 Corinthians*, 54.

⁶⁵ Murphy-O'Connor, *1 Corinthians*, 17.

⁶⁶ "An 'Zeichen' im Sinn von Wunder denkt Paulus nicht, wie 1,22 deutlich macht. Der 'Beweis der Macht des Geistes' ist die Tatsache, das sich in Korinth Juden und Heiden zum Glauben an den gekreuzigten und auferstandenen Jesus Christus bekehrt haben" (Schnabel, *Der erste Brief*, 156).

⁶⁷ Grosheide, *First Corinthians*, 61-62.

⁶⁸ Soards, *1 Corinthians*, 54; Fee, *First Corinthians*, 94; Keener, *1—2 Corinthians*, 35.

seen by Paul as being inimical to or even separated from the power of God in Christ. The Spirit and power of God was demonstrated to the Corinthians not *in spite* of Paul's weakness, but *by means* of that very weakness.⁶⁹ Paul's displayed and affirmed lack of rhetorical and bodily competence was not a barrier to be overcome by the cross of Christ, but the very image of that cross made visible and audible to those with whom Paul had to do. His resolution, in Thiselton's words, was "to provide a *transparent window onto the cross: not to parade himself.*"⁷⁰

But this does not go quite far enough. Paul is not somehow absent as the people gaze upon Christ, but the very one by and in whom Christ is seen.⁷¹ Rather than a transparent window, the apostle becomes a quite substantial mirror in which all the weakness of the crucified Christ may be reflected. Paul does not disappear in the sense of becoming unseen; rather, he *dys*-appears in the sense of becoming seen in an unexpected or unacceptable manner. This distinction from the body's *dis*-appearance to its *dys*-appearance, is discussed in depth in Drew Leder's wonderful investigation of the Cartesian shift in somatic perception and evaluation (Leder, *The Absent Body*). There is, Leder argues, either a non-experience of the body being lived as it should, or an experience of the lived body as it should not be. One does not normally experience the well-functioning and unimpaired body as such. The properly-functioning and unimpaired body is, in Heideggerian terms, a "'ready-to-hand' tool [which] withdraws insofar as it functions unproblematically" (83). The body that is not encountering resistance from within or without, either fades into the background of one's awareness or becomes the unconscious "orientational center in relation to which

⁶⁹ Lim, *Sufferings of Christ*, 123-157, esp. 157.

⁷⁰ Thiselton, *First Corinthians*, 212.

⁷¹ Wire, "Reconciled to Glory," 265.

everything else takes its place” (22). In such ordinary and non-problematic situations, the body “*dis*-appears.” The body which is either in pain or experiencing error of some other sort—Heidegger’s “present-at-hand” tool—is the body which becomes thematized, and insists on one’s conscious focus. It is in the moments of bodily malfunction, that one experiences “*to* [the] body not simply *from* it” (83-84). The body as experienced by the Other, rather than by one’s self, will also demand one’s conscious attention. The body thematized in the categories, experiences, and expectations of the Other is the Sartrean “being-as-object”; one’s experience is not of the body as a “being-for-itself,” but as an object distorted, impeded by that which is outside (93). Within the thematizations of the malfunctioning or perceptually-distorted body, the body “*dys*-appears.” Leder’s concerns are primarily with (non)experience of one’s own body, but the concepts are immediately applicable to the social situation, as well, as commentary on how and why the Corinthians are perceiving the body of the apostle.

At the very least, Paul’s weakness would raise doubt concerning his ability to lead, for even if Paul’s ἄσθένεια was primarily physical, it cannot be said to have been *merely* physical: ultimately, it was a mark of “low social status, a lack of honor, or simply a weak claim to apostolic authority ... [for] social status was somatically expressed.”⁷² The marks of weakness Paul presents are not honourable wounds gained in battle, though it may be claimed that he attempts a resignification by associating them with apostolic service for and unity with Christ. This resignification is complicated, however, since the apostle’s union is with one who is himself the victim of a most degrading and shameful form of execution. Thus, Paul’s weakness would

⁷² Glancy, *Corporal Knowledge*, 44-46.

ultimately be perceived as more shameful than ever, unless the Corinthians were able to comprehend that this Paul-Jesus weakness is the very δύνναμις θεοῦ.

3.2.3 *Crucifixion and the Gendered Body*

It is true that the crucifixion of Jesus—and the weakness of Paul which flowed from it—would be a difficult sell within the Greco-Roman world.⁷³ But, in accepting the Lordship of Jesus, had not the Corinthians already become willing followers of the one who suffered a despicable death? Early Christians affirmed that God did not differentiate between persons on the basis of social status, and such affirmations certainly implicated human actions in keeping with a non-status community. (Cf. e.g., Jas 2:1-7; 5:1-6; 1 Cor 11:22; Col 3:11; 4:1; Eph 6:5-9; Luke 20:45-21:4; Mark 12:38-44). Here and elsewhere the honouring of the poor and powerless clearly evidences an expectation of status-reversal or status-levelling. Actions did not always follow the implication, however, and Christians remained painfully aware of status distinctions and requirements.⁷⁴ Glancy writes at length of the fact and cause of this failure to follow through:

In the Roman empire social identity was a kind of bodily knowledge, a knowledge that affected an individual's experience of being in their world and shaped his or her interactions with other people. In shaping their communities, Christians did not subject this knowledge to critique. I have argued that no clean line divides the body as mind from the mind that reasons. I would argue, moreover, that everyday moral knowing and moral distinctions are also mired in the body as mind. The result is that, despite lessons that were occasionally taken from the body of Jesus or the body of Paul, Christian communities were far

⁷³ Glancy, *Corporal Knowledge*, 48; Olbricht and Eriksson, "Rhetoric, Ethic, and Moral Persuasion: Introduction," 3-4.

⁷⁴ Hogan, *No Longer Male and Female*, 12-13, 202.

more likely to reproduce than challenge social distinctions, distinctions that often carried moral connotations.⁷⁵

That is, not even baptism would wash away one's "bodily knowledge of social location ... or dissolve the durable and visible effects of bodily habitus."⁷⁶ In the following sections, intertextual, ideological, and social and cultural textual approaches will be used to demonstrate the gendered nature of cruciform weakness, shame, and servility.

3.2.3.1 Crucifixion, shame, and gender. From the days of Aristotle to Paul, and even on to the Renaissance there was a stable core of rhetorical and physiognomic expectations, with a consistent assumption that the shape of one's exterior life was a reliable guide to the interior.⁷⁷ In setting out his own expectations of masculinity, Clement of Alexandria was able directly to quote Zeno, the change of religion and the passing of half a millennium affording no obstacle to his argument (*Paid.* 3.11.74).⁷⁸ The physical strength, and even the size of the body, was viewed as an indicator of one's inner quality, intrinsic value, and relation to the divine. Patrizia Magli notes that not only facial expressions, but also one's colouring, vocal tones, and gender were understood as indicators of one's moral character.⁷⁹ Jean-Claude Schmitt similarly concludes that the Romans conflated "excellence of mind and nobility of outward form, to be seen and judged by [society]."⁸⁰ Plutarch (*Thes.*, 36.2; *Rom.*, 7.3-

⁷⁵ Glancy, *Corporal Knowledge*, 11-12.

⁷⁶ Glancy, *Corporal Knowledge*, 63; cf. Pickett, *Cross in Corinth*, 98-99.

⁷⁷ Bordo, "The Cartesian Masculinization of Thought," 444.

⁷⁸ Gleason, *Making Men*, 71-72.

⁷⁹ Magli, "The Face and the Soul," passim; also noted in Larson, "Paul's Masculinity," 90.

⁸⁰ Schmitt, "The Ethics of Gesture," 131; Bremmer, "Non-Verbal Communication in Antiquity," passim.

4) mentions the size and physical appearance of Theseus, Romulus, and Remus as being clear demonstrations of both their moral strength and their divine connections. Such is also the case in Isocrates' encomium for Evagorus (*Evag.*, 22), where the deceased king's physical beauty and bodily strength are presented alongside his valorous deeds and wisdom as equal proofs of his high moral character.

As Brent D. Shaw has shown, the ability to control, to cause pain, to speak boldly, and to act aggressively were thematized as masculine and good. On the other hand, "[s]ilence, passivity, submissiveness, openness, suffering ... were castigated as weak, womanish, slavish, and therefore morally bad."⁸¹ Kraemer repeatedly makes this same point, stating that woman/the feminine was viewed as "passive, embodied, emotive, and un/insufficiently controlled."⁸² Of course, crucifixion would implicate the victim in the "morally bad" structures, even if the victim were to be both willing and undeserving. Ross Kraemer suggests that the Church's consistent presentation of Jesus' *intentional* suffering may have been an attempt to counteract the feminizing aspects of his passion.⁸³ But unlike the "honourable death" of Socrates, Christ's death would be understood by a Greco-Roman audience as an empty and foolish event, since crucifixion within the Greco-Roman milieu removed the victim from any possibility of masculine status, power, and defensive or persuasive speech.⁸⁴ As Martin Hengel has shown, Roman crucifixion was a punishment designed for utterly

⁸¹ Shaw, "Body," 279.

⁸² Kraemer, *Unreliable Witnesses*, 6-7, 42-45, 135-136, 164-171, 237-240, 263; Gleason, *Making Men*, 64-65, 163-164.

⁸³ Kraemer, *Unreliable Witnesses*, 271.

⁸⁴ Hengel, *Crucifixion*, 90; Shi, *Message*, 9-10, 22-24, 31, 48, 53-55, 61; Welborn, *Paul, the Fool of Christ*, 132-134.

degrading and humiliating the one publicly hung upon the cross.⁸⁵ In addition to the obvious pain, this punishment involved a public removal of social status, a denial of the victim's humanity.⁸⁶ By identifying with the crucified Christ, the apostle claimed for himself and his followers a share in the degraded and humiliated state which was the goal of crucifixion.⁸⁷

Crucifixion's despicable associations in the Greco-Roman milieu were evident as well among the Jews, as David Chapman has shown, involving as it did a public display of defeat and shame (Chapman, *Ancient Jewish and Christian Perceptions of Crucifixion*, 46, 69-70). His investigations suggest that the various acts referred to by the term "crucifixion" were understood by many Jews as incontrovertible evidence of a victim's guilt (212, *passim*). As evidenced through early Christian apologetics, Jewish perceptions implicated the victim of crucifixion in brigandage, blasphemy, cursing, and shame (223-253). While some such deaths were resignified as honourable acts, those particular victims were usually presented as having courageously fought against unjust persecution (70-94, 214). Onlookers might be moved to human pity by the crucifixion of a "non-combatant," but such a death would still be perceived as shameful. In spite of a limited number of traditions that made a positive interpretation of sacrificial death possible (e.g., the righteous martyr, the binding of Isaac), the basic Jewish reaction to crucifixion still would be to view the victim as having been shamed (253-262).

⁸⁵ Hengel, *Crucifixion*, 46-63, 87.

⁸⁶ Solevåg, "Perpetua and Felicitas," 274; referencing Castelli, *Martyrdom and Memory*, 40, 41, 108.

⁸⁷ Malina and Rohrbaugh, *Social-Science Commentary on the Synoptic Gospels*, 214-218.

Through the weakness of his body “Paul claims a corporal knowledge that unites him with Jesus. Paul does not try to represent this corporal knowledge as glorious ... Nonetheless, because his experiences of physical abuse unite him with Jesus, Paul presents his abject body as evidence of his authority.”⁸⁸ While the preceding quote is directly referencing 2 Cor 11:23-25, the principle may be applied to other less violent and (to us) less obvious events of shame, such as those presented by Paul in his initial visit to Corinth. It may be noted that, while we do not have certainty regarding the precise nature of Paul’s ἀσθένεια mentioned in 2:1-5, it is improbable that his initial visit to Corinth would have concluded without his audience becoming aware of his physical scars.⁸⁹ The shame involved in corporal violation should not be separated entirely from our interpretation of the present passage.

What is more, in denying to its victim all possibility of marking off his own social boundaries, crucifixion removed from him his masculinity.⁹⁰ Greco-Roman notions of masculinity were rooted in concepts of boundaries and power-relations, affirming that “a ‘real’ man does not cede power or control to another, as slaves and women do.”⁹¹ Halvor Moxnes notes at length that the similarities evident between the acts of punishment (floggings, whippings, crucifixion) and of sexual penetration were a single language

inscribed upon male bodies in Roman culture ... From a position higher up in the hierarchy, a man could penetrate the boundaries of someone lower down, be it a woman, a child, a man of lower status and in particular a slave, male or female. This penetration could both be sexual and in the forms of beatings. The similarity between these

⁸⁸ Glancy, *Corporal Knowledge*, 27.

⁸⁹ Fee, *First Corinthians*, 93; Horsley, *1 Corinthians*, 54.

⁹⁰ Shi, *Message*, 47-48; cf. Malina, *NT World*, 50-53.

⁹¹ Larson, “Paul’s Masculinity,” 91; Sawyer, *God, Gender and the Bible*, 30-35.

two acts, which we might consider to be of a different character, lay in the fact that they were both expressions of power-relations between a free man and a subject.⁹²

The crucified one was helpless and exposed, and “it would be a blatant mockery to speak about honour, worth and a host of other social values, morals and virtues. Because his ‘*body* language’ clearly testified that he no longer possessed or was capable of any of them!”⁹³ Whatever implications hold for those who have been brutally subjugated in the Greco-Roman world, must be held as true for Christ: it must be recognized that, in his crucifixion, Christ was “subjected to the power-relations of hierarchical domination.”⁹⁴ Paul’s claim of identity with Christ’s crucified weakness was thus fraught with danger. The apostle was setting himself up to be viewed by his Greco-Roman male audience not only as a fool, but as a weak and feminine fool.

3.2.3.2 *Crucifixion, slavery, and gender.* While Paul’s humiliated self-presentation is sometimes read in light of his being a δοῦλος, one must realize that Greco-Roman slavery itself was viewed in a gendered manner. It is not enough to say that a weak person is slavish, or that the brave is free, for slave and free were gendered categories, rather than otherwise distinct classes.⁹⁵ A charge of slavishness was in fact a charge not against one’s class but against one’s manhood,⁹⁶ for the very characteristics desirable in a slave were those despised in real men (cf. Pliny, *Nat.*,

⁹² Moxnes, “Body, Gender and Social Space,” 177-178; cf. Shi, *Message*, 219-220.

⁹³ Shi, *Message*, 48.

⁹⁴ Moxnes, “Body, Gender and Social Space,” 178.

⁹⁵ Harrill, “Invective against Paul,” 191-192, 207-208, 212-213; Harrill, *Manumission*, 47-48; Harrill, *Slaves in the New Testament*, 3; Glancy, *Slavery in Early Christianity*, 9, 12, 21-24, 29, 38, 49-53.

⁹⁶ Glancy, *Slavery in Early Christianity*, 152-153; Harrill, *Slaves in the New Testament*, 56.

32.47.135; Suetonius, *Aug.*, 68).⁹⁷ A slave was valued as such precisely on his perceived lack of masculine characteristics: he was to be beardless, soft, weak, obedient and penetrable, just as a woman.⁹⁸ This emasculated status is seen even in slaves being referred to as “boy” (*puer*, *παῖς*), regardless of their age,⁹⁹ terminology familiar to all Americans as part of their own racially-fractured society.¹⁰⁰ And, lest one would too quickly understand “boy” as a masculine term, it must be remembered that the boy was set apart from the man in that he was, no less than a woman, available and able to be penetrated. The aforementioned unmasculine characteristics would not necessarily be objectively present, of course (e.g., slaves worked as bodyguards, blacksmiths, and field-hands),¹⁰¹ but the physiognomic somatic and attitudinal distinctions between slave and free functioned to separate legitimate males from all others.¹⁰² “‘Slave’ and ‘woman’ were not merely ... antonyms that served to define the concept ‘man,’ [they] were also variant terms for the internal ‘others’ that posed a perpetual threat to masculine identity.”¹⁰³ Being beaten or otherwise humiliated was not ultimately about the distinction between slave and free, but about

⁹⁷ Harrill, *Slaves in the New Testament*, 33, 36, 47-49, 129-131; Shi, *Message*, 203.

⁹⁸ Shi, *Message*, 182-186; Glancy, *Slavery in Early Christianity*, 24, 28-29, 49-70, 85, 138-142; Van Weese, “Brief History of Tears,” 16-19; Gleason, *Making Men*, 73-75, 112-116; Montserrat, “Experiencing the Male Body,” 158-159; Alston, “Arms and the Man,” 207, 211; Fischler, “Imperial Cult,” 169, 179; Pierce, “Ideals of Masculinity,” 133.

⁹⁹ Glancy, *Slavery in Early Christianity*, 24.

¹⁰⁰ Cf. King, “Birmingham Jail,” *passim*.

¹⁰¹ Shi, *Message*, 183-184.

¹⁰² Harrill, “Invective against Paul,” 191-192, 207-208; Harrill, *Slaves in the New Testament*, 38-39, 40-43; Gleason, *Making Men*, xxviii, 160-161.

¹⁰³ Moore and Anderson, “Masculinity in 4 Maccabees,” 262.

gender. While slaves and women may each be struck or sexually penetrated, real men cannot be so treated: they are the “unpenetrable penetrators.”¹⁰⁴

While it is often stated that crucifixion was for slaves, it must be noted that this extreme torture was not only for slaves but also for foreigners, for bandits, even freedmen and—in the unusual case of fugitives or deserters—the occasional free man.¹⁰⁵ In other words, the distinction was not between slave and free, but between man and not man. Masculinity is conflated with active self-control and domination of others as well as with rhetorical skill (Livy, *Hist.*, 1.41.3, 1.58.8, 2.38.5, 25.6.19-22; Cicero, *Mil.*, 30.82; Seneca, *Tro.*, 214; *Lucil.*, 2.2; Sallust, *Bell. Cat.*, 40.3, 44.5; Ovid, *Metam.*, 2.17).¹⁰⁶ Failure in any of these “protocols of masculinity”¹⁰⁷ defines one as sexually weak, as feminine, as not a real man (Suetonius, *Cal.*, 52; *Nero*, 29, 51; Sophocles, *Ant.*, 484-485, 525).¹⁰⁸ One becomes a woman on account of what is done to her, one becomes a man by what he does,¹⁰⁹ for neither anatomy nor even “sexual

¹⁰⁴ Montserrat, “Experiencing the Male Body,” 157; Ehrensperger, *Paul and the Dynamics of Power*, 115; Williams, “Perpetua’s Gender,” 60-61, 67-71.

¹⁰⁵ Cook, *Crucifixion*, 51-158, 282, 307, 350-370, 372-374, 423.

¹⁰⁶ Barton, *Roman Honor*, 6, 38-43, 281-282.

¹⁰⁷ Solevåg, *Birthing Salvation*, 220.

¹⁰⁸ Cartledge, “Machismo,” 54-56, 60-61, 63; Fisher, “Violence, Masculinity and the Law,” 77, 83; Solevåg, *Birthing Salvation*, 106-110, 224-230, 252; Harrill, “Invective against Paul,” 191, 204, 209; Harrill, *Slaves in the New Testament*, 45-49, 56; Gleason, *Making Men*, 135; Gleason, “By Whose Gender Standards,” 327; Foxhall, “Introduction,” 4; Foxhall, “Introduction,” 2-3; Foxhall, “Natural Sex,” 65-70; Van Weese, “Brief History of Tears,” 33-34, 42-43; Marshall, “Sex and Paternity,” 105-107; Roy, “Masculinity of the Hellenistic King,” 113-117; Montserrat, “Experiencing the Male Body,” 153; Fischler, “Imperial Cult,” 165, 169; Harries, “Cube and the Square,” 191-192; Alston, “Arms and the Man,” 205, 215; Fox, “Constrained Man,” 6-7; Winkler, *Constraints of Desire*, 45-70; Osborne, “Sculpted Men,” 24-26, 41; Sommerstein, “Rape and Young Manhood,” 109-111; Pierce, “Ideals of Masculinity,” 136-138, 145; Moore and Anderson, “Masculinity in 4 Maccabees,” 249-250, 255-257, 264, 272; Clines, “Paul, the Invisible Man,” 182; duBois, “Ancient Masculinities,” 321; Shi, *Message*, 69-71, 112-152, 170, 175-180, 263; Ehrensperger, *Paul and the Dynamics of Power*, 98, 102-103, 180-183, 186, 191, 197-200; Aspegren, *Male Woman*, 95-98, 161; Robbins, “A Male Reads a Feminist Reading,” 216-217; Eagleton, *Literary Theory*, 27-28; Lopez, “Before Your very Eyes,” 156, 160-161; Osiek and Pouya, “Constructions of Gender,” 47-48, 52-53; Russell, “Emasculation of Antony,” 126-127, 130-131; Ivarsson, “Vice Lists and Deviant Masculinity,” 165-166, 177-178.

¹⁰⁹ Barton, *Roman Honor*, 282-283.

orientation” were recognized as reliable indicators of masculinity.¹¹⁰ The physiognomic expectations of body and voice were considered more reliable indicators of manhood and thus of high moral character.¹¹¹ Because masculinity was equated with one’s dominance over others, “there was no assumption that all [biological] males must be masculine ... masculinity was a matter of perception.”¹¹²

In addition to being biologically male, “one must give out the appropriate signals and play the expected gender role.”¹¹³ A failure to play the part would be convincing evidence that one lacked masculinity. In particular, the humiliating penetrability of one’s boundaries (including but not limited to any perceived deviance from the non-passive sexual norm) made one not a man.¹¹⁴ Crucifixion would be understood as a prime example of just such penetration, as the act was a public display not of pain but of gendered humiliation and shame. Masculinity and crucifixion were alike a bodily system of signification regarding social expressions of power and domination.¹¹⁵ The crucified one was demonstrated by his “passivity, his submissiveness, his stripping and whipping, his role as plaything in the rough hands of the soldiers, his ‘strung-up nakedness’ ... penetration, and abject helplessness on the cross” to be not a real man.¹¹⁶

¹¹⁰ Hawley, “Male Body,” 92-94, 98; Pierce, “Ideals of Masculinity,” 133, 135.

¹¹¹ Gleason, *Making Men*, 8.

¹¹² Larson, “Paul’s Masculinity,” 86-88.

¹¹³ Gardner, “Sexing a Roman,” 147; Alston, “Arms and the Man,” 211.

¹¹⁴ Solevåg, *Birthing Salvation*, 220-221; Ivarsson, “Vice Lists and Deviant Masculinity,” 176, 179-181; Frilingos, “Wearing It Well,” 335-338; Pierce, “Ideals of Masculinity,” 141; Walters, “Putting Male Sexual Deviants on Show,” 150-151; Cartledge, “Machismo,” 56-57; Fisher, “Violence, Masculinity and the Law,” 79, 84; Montserrat, “Experiencing the Male Body,” 155-157; Alston, “Arms and the Man,” 208-209, 213, 218-219.

¹¹⁵ Shi, *Message*, 24-25, 41-51, 81-82, 85-86, 147; Solevåg, *Birthing Salvation*, 237-238.

¹¹⁶ Moore, “O Man, Who Art Thou,” 11; Gleason, “By Whose Gender Standards,” *passim*.

Crucifixion removed one's masculinity, or rather demonstrated its absence by shaming the victim through an implicit confession of weakness and inability to protect his own boundaries.¹¹⁷ Crucifixion demonstrated by its own successful completion the weakness and therefore the guilt of the victim.¹¹⁸ It is thus unsurprising that women are not associated with the act, since their anatomy itself makes any further demonstration of their gender unnecessary. Women were typically made to watch others be crucified, rather than to undergo crucifixion themselves (Josephus, *Ant.*, 12.256; 13.380; Plato, *Gorg.*, 473B-D).¹¹⁹ Women *were* recorded as having been crucified, but so infrequently that the occurrences were noted.¹²⁰ At least two of these recorded instances were spoken of as “bestial atrocities,” without the approval of the Romans.¹²¹ Mass crucifixions in times of siege presumably included women along with the male warriors; Josephus notes, however, that such acts were due to the tired soldiers being filled with uncontrolled hatred, rage, and boredom (Josephus, *J.W.*, 5.449-451).¹²² Rabbinic literature also makes limited reference to the possibility of women being crucified, but debates whether it was ever actually done. In one instance, the victims are termed “witches,” and thus perhaps not thought of as women; in other instances, the suspension of the women is performed post-mortem (cf. *Sanhedrin*, 6.4, 8; *Semahot*, 2.11).¹²³ Overall, while the crucifixion of women was a possibility, this particular torture seems to have been associated with male victims—

¹¹⁷ Barton, *Roman Honor*, 136-158, 249; Shi, *Message*, 47-48.

¹¹⁸ Shi, *Message*, 36-37, 39-41.

¹¹⁹ Shi, *Message*, 76; Cook, *Crucifixion*, 237-238, 271.

¹²⁰ Cook, *Crucifixion*, 123, 131, 203-204, 216, 269, 428.

¹²¹ Cook, *Crucifixion*, 256-257.

¹²² Cook, *Crucifixion*, 197-198.

¹²³ Cook, *Crucifixion*, 324-325.

those whose anatomy required social gender clarification by a distinguishing between those who could be made to submit and those who subjected others to submission.

Subjected or conquered peoples are represented on coins, statuary, and architecture as women,¹²⁴ and this same connection may be seen textually in the Jewish cothematization of Gentiles with the *μαλακός* or *mollis* (effeminate male).¹²⁵ Children, barbarians, slaves, eunuchs, the infirm, and women were all contrasted to men: they are as a group subsumed under the category “not man.”¹²⁶ Ultimately, physiognomic and rhetorical traits were categorized as male and female, rather than as slave and free, noble and base. The honourable, free, forceful, and virtuous were conceptualized as male, while their culturally disagreeable counterparts were recognized as elements of femaleness.¹²⁷ Even rhetoric that was out of step with approved Greco-Roman style was not termed “foreign,” but feminine.¹²⁸

Servility itself was not seen on its own in opposition to freedom, but was categorized as female (*Rhetorica ad Herennium*, 3.12.22).¹²⁹ The *vir/ἀνὴρ* (as distinct from *homo/ἄνθρωπος*) is associated with power, and the opposing social category was not the socially powerless slave but the ontologically powerless woman.¹³⁰ When the mother of the Maccabees withstood the angry pagan ruler with

¹²⁴ Lopez, “Before Your very Eyes,” 117-149, 154; Penner and Vander Stichele, “Script(ur)ing Gender in Acts,” 235, 237-238, 246.

¹²⁵ Ivarsson, “Vice Lists and Deviant Masculinity,” 176.

¹²⁶ Van Weese, “Brief History of Tears,” 44-45; Harries, “Cube and the Square,” 185, 194; Moore and Anderson, “Masculinity in 4 Maccabees,” 250, 263; Harrill, “Invective against Paul,” 199, 204; Harrill, *Slaves in the New Testament*, 37, 43; Glancy, *Slavery in Early Christianity*, 147; Gleason, *Making Men*, 89-91, 119; Quintilian, *Inst.* 11.3.19; Cicero, *Tusc.* 2.55.

¹²⁷ Ivarsson, “A Man has to Do What a Man has to Do,” 185, 187.

¹²⁸ Gleason, *Making Men*, 108-109, 115-116, 120.

¹²⁹ Gleason, *Making Men*, 29-30, 34-36, 54, 59, 61-66, 105, passim; Shi, *Message*, 203.

¹³⁰ Alston, “Arms and the Man,” 206-207; Shi, *Message*, 168, 202-203; cf. Boyarin, “Review of *The Corinthian Body*,” 154.

her own self-control, she was termed “manly” rather than “free” since, while a slave may be cowardly, fear and cowardice are at heart not slavish but feminine.¹³¹ When Antigonus pled for mercy, submitting to Sosius’ rule, Sosius did not shame the vanquished general with slavish terms, but laughingly referred to him as “Antigona” (Josephus, *J.W.*, 1.353, 357).¹³²

To be a man required mastery of self and of others,¹³³ and since slaves by definition did not possess these virtues, they could not truly be men.¹³⁴ The right to penetrate and not be penetrated (whether sexually or violently), the right to claim paternity, the right to respond to a challenge—all these were denied to the slave.¹³⁵ Slaves existed “outside the game of honor,” living among but not counted with the men of the land, deriving their honour as did women from the man to whom they belonged.¹³⁶ Having no honour of their own meant that slaves would functionally resemble women, never men.¹³⁷

The equation of passive endurance with some kind of nobility or high status would seem to the Corinthians more than unlikely, even a “moral oxymoron,”¹³⁸ and therefore not a likely basis for their imitation of the apostle. The difficult goal of forming a (crucified) Christian identity would require a reconstruction of “gender

¹³¹ Moore and Anderson, “Masculinity in 4 Maccabees,” 265-272; Cartledge, “Machismo,” 64; Harrill, *Manumission*, 22; cf. Plato, *Apol.* 35A-B.

¹³² Barton, *Roman Honor*, 144.

¹³³ Fox, “Constrained Man,” 15.

¹³⁴ Glancy, *Slavery in Early Christianity*, 25, 35; Harrill, *Slaves in the New Testament*, 35-37, 3943, 45, 69, 146.

¹³⁵ Glancy, *Slavery in Early Christianity*, 9, 12, 21-24, 49-53, 93; Fisher, “Violence, Masculinity and the Law,” 70-72, 82.

¹³⁶ Glancy, *Slavery in Early Christianity*, 27, 71-73, 78, 85, 96; Malina, *NT World*, 49; Harrill, *Slaves in the New Testament*, 87.

¹³⁷ Glancy, *Slavery in Early Christianity*, 41.

¹³⁸ Larson, “Paul’s Masculinity,” 96; Shaw, “Body,” 279.

roles and the structure of social space.”¹³⁹ This goal was pursued in later Christianity by a recasting of passivity and suffering as a mirror of Christ in his sacrificial meekness.¹⁴⁰ At one point in her excellent study of early Christian martyrdom, Glancy notes the change in thematization based upon the cross of Christ, quoting from the abolitionist novel, *Uncle Tom’s Cabin*: “But of old, there was One whose suffering changed an instrument of torture, degradation and shame, into a symbol of glory, honor, and immortal life.”¹⁴¹ In Solevåg’s treatment of *Perpetua and Felicitas*, she notes the distinct evaluations given each of the women’s trials. While Perpetua is said to become a man in her battles, Felicitas remains a woman throughout. And it is the latter whose sufferings are explicitly related to those of Christ. Though slavery is a backdrop for her experience, the sufferings of Felicitas are noted as being “quite typical for a woman,” and her weaknesses as “genuinely feminine.”¹⁴² While it may be true that the story serves socially to resignify martyrdom and to undermine long-standing masculine ideals,¹⁴³ it must be noted that still the sufferings of Christ are associated most directly with the persistently passive feminine.¹⁴⁴ Shaw has also demonstrated that such a change in thematization occurs during the period of martyrdom, perhaps having greatly to do with the Christians’ resignification of persecution as wounds gained honourably in battle against the forces of evil.

¹³⁹ Moxnes, “Body, Gender and Social Space,” 180; Castelli, *Martyrdom and Memory*, 61-67.

¹⁴⁰ Shaw, “Body,” 299.

¹⁴¹ Glancy, *Corporal Knowledge*, 61; quoting Stowe, *Uncle Tom’s Cabin*, 382; cf. Hogan, “Paul and Women,” 236; Frilingos, “Wearing It Well,” 346.

¹⁴² Solevåg, “Perpetua and Felicitas,” 230-235.

¹⁴³ Solevåg, “Perpetua and Felicitas,” 234-235, 245; Weigel, “Exemplum and Sacrifice,” 190, 200; Formisano, “Perpetua’s Prisons,” 340-341.

¹⁴⁴ Solevåg, “Perpetua and Felicitas,” 239-241, 251-252, 256; Böhme, “Conquest of the Real by the Imaginary,” 226.

However, while this unexpected “cross to crown” transformation is a concept to be reckoned with in studies of later Christianity, up through Paul’s day passive endurance was seen as a masculine trait only in instances of socially-accepted honour challenges, such as athletic contests, gladiatorial games, and torture by enemy rulers (a distinction to be discussed later in this study).¹⁴⁵

3.2.3.3 *Crucifixion as the power of God.* Paul’s presentation of the matter might be contrasted with that of later Christians by analogy (admittedly anachronistic) to the differences in the visual theologies of Roman Catholic and Protestant groups. The latter’s images of the cross are almost always clean—the body is gone, no blood adheres to the wood, the nails are absent; the former’s crucifixes are inhabited by a dead or dying Christ, with all the marks of torture and shame in clear view. This last seems to be consonant with Paul’s presentation in 2:1-5. While the ultimate Pauline affirmation is that of an empty grave, it is equally that of an inhabited cross. Robinson has said it well: “though Christ did not remain dead, but is alive, he remains—as the risen Christ—the crucified one.”¹⁴⁶ Though unattributed, Schnabel’s later statement may well be dependent upon Robinson: he notes that Paul’s use of the perfect participle “underscores the fact that the risen and exalted Christ remains crucified.”¹⁴⁷

Though recent investigations into verbal aspect have resulted in deep modifications to older grammarians’ work, this general view regarding the Greek perfect has remained quite intact. In Buist Fanning’s presentation, ἐσταυρωμένον represents a punctual achievement whose occurrence as a perfect participle denotes

¹⁴⁵ Shaw, “Body,” 293-294; cf. Perkins, *Suffering Self*, 19-40, esp. 24-25, 39; Castelli, *Martyrdom and Memory*, 34-36, 41, 48-49, 61; Weigel, “Exemplum and Sacrifice,” 182-183.

¹⁴⁶ Robinson, “Word and Power,” 71.

¹⁴⁷ “... unterstreicht, dass der auferstandene und erhöhte Christus der Gekreuzigte bleibt” (Schnabel, *Der erste Brief*, 154).

“the *completion* of that action and a *state* or condition which is its consequence, with the emphasis usually on the continuing state.”¹⁴⁸ This emphasis on the resultant state “comes through especially in instances of passive participles.”¹⁴⁹ Porter notes that the aorist participle is used “when an event is seen as preceding another action, or as already complete,” and later says that the use of perfect participles is in general accord with the aorist usage except that its “stative aspect is more complex.”¹⁵⁰ Though Porter’s discussion of the perfect is not as thoroughgoing as that of Fanning, he seems also to affirm an emphasis on a resultant state. Kenneth L. McKay (whose text takes the arguments of both Porter and Fanning into account) writes that the perfect “expresses the state or condition of the subject of the verb, as a result of an action . . . but most often with comparatively little reference to the action itself.”¹⁵¹ This tense “applies the state principle of the perfect aspect” to nearly any verbal presentation,¹⁵² and a writer’s use of the participial form does not greatly modify the verb’s aspectual qualities.¹⁵³ Paul’s use of ἐσταυρωμένον defines the subject of the message as other than one who *was* crucified or who *is being* crucified. In addition to Blass-DeBrunner, one may also see Burton, who briefly notes that the perfect participle does not refer to the past action alone, but to both “the past action and the resulting state or only to the resulting state.”¹⁵⁴

¹⁴⁸ Fanning, *Verbal Aspect*, 128-162.

¹⁴⁹ Fanning, *Verbal Aspect*, 416.

¹⁵⁰ Porter, *Idioms*, 188-190.

¹⁵¹ McKay, *New Syntax*, 31.

¹⁵² McKay, *New Syntax*, 49.

¹⁵³ McKay, *New Syntax*, 60.

¹⁵⁴ Blass and DeBrunner, *Greek Grammar*, §342; Burton, *Syntax of the Moods and Tenses in New Testament Greek*, §154. Cf. Robinson, “Word and Power,” 71.

The grave was unable to hold Christ, and he decisively overcame it, even as Paul later argues in the closing chapters of this letter. But Christ's overcoming of the grave was possible only because the cross *did* hold him in shame to the end. As Schnabel affirms that, while "the death of Jesus has no meaning apart from the resurrection of Jesus, still the meaning of the cross is not thereby rendered obsolete."¹⁵⁵ Pickett goes so far as to say that, while the crucifixion and resurrection are mutually implicative, in 1 Cor 1—14 Paul focuses on the former without reference to the latter at all.¹⁵⁶ It is not that the resurrection is unimportant, but that this glorious event did not in any way erase or diminish the terrible completeness of his death. The point of Paul's proclamation is not the historical facticity or specific manner of Christ's death, it is "more a heuristic (learning) device."¹⁵⁷ There is no indication in these passages of any fundamental flaw in the Corinthians' Christology, but only in their recognition of how it should be pragmatically applied.¹⁵⁸ What is stressed here is the persistent nature of the crucified state both in the post-resurrection existence of Christ and in the present life of the believer. The perfect's focus on the remaining effects of a completed action serve well in portraying the complex truth that the act of crucifixion was complete, but still remained as an effective and applicable reality at the time of Paul's proclamation to the Corinthians.

Regardless of *Paul's* recognition of and commitment to this persistent nature and ruling force of the crucifixion, his self-presentation as a man worthy of being

¹⁵⁵ "Der Tod Jesu hat ohne die Auferweckung Jesu keine Bedeutung, aber die Bedeutung des Kreuzes wird dadurch nicht überholt" (Schnabel, *Der erste Brief*, 154).

¹⁵⁶ Pickett, *Cross in Corinth*, 108; cf. Robbins, *Invention of Christian Discourse*, 207-211.

¹⁵⁷ Snyder, *First Corinthians*, 32.

¹⁵⁸ Litfin, *St. Paul's Theology of Proclamation*, 181-182; Pickett, *Cross in Corinth*, 31, 58-59, 87, 105.

followed demands a radical shift in the *Corinthians*' expectations regarding social structuring. According to Martin, this restructuring would be along class ideological lines. Paul views the body as weak—permeable and in danger from outside pollutants—while Paul's Corinthian opponents hold to a higher-class “strong” ideology, which views the body as hierarchically ordered and relatively impervious to the effect of outside pollutants. This difference in ideologies (in Martin's opinion) accounts for the variance between Paul's approaches and those of his opponents with regard to community relationships.¹⁵⁹ As discussed in Chapter Two, however, Martin's claim fails to convince when viewed in light of the particularities of 2:1-5. Here, Paul's self-avowal of ἀσθένεια is not made with regard to his views on avoiding the dangers of pollution; rather, he claims that he is weak in terms of self-presentation and rhetorical skills. Moreover, this weakness does not appear to be viewed as a disqualification by the apostle, but rather as the basis of his claim to spiritual power and authority.

Bruce Malina judges that the ability to resymbolize his society *within the existing structure* is Paul's unique strength as a prophetic leader. Malina views Paul as able to “articulate the problems faced by the group ... set out a culturally plausible and realistic solution ... fend off possible objections, and thus to win commitment or emotional anchorage from group members to the new sets of symbols that he presents.”¹⁶⁰ But here the apostle demands of his audience a radical change of symbols regarding character, honour, and authority, *without* offering any corresponding “culturally plausible” change in their surrounding norms and

¹⁵⁹ Martin, *Corinthian Body*, xv.

¹⁶⁰ Malina, *Christian Origins*, 134.

legitimizing practices. This discrepancy between the cultural values of agent and audience results in a masculine honour challenge-riposte event.¹⁶¹ The challenge itself is clear in 2:1-5, but in this one-sided epistolary text there is no explicit riposte. That is, we have Paul's word to the Corinthians but no direct evidence of their response. Moreover, this challenge is unexpectedly situated, for the honour that Paul lays out for them to accept or challenge is a claim to weakness, rather than to strength. Such a strange claim to honour this was—Paul's challenge amounted to a demand that they do, indeed, "leave the playing field." How can one make a counter-challenge to such a claim of "superior inferiority"?

If they wish to avoid being placed under Paul's authority, the Corinthians could claim to be still weaker (and thus more honourable) than Paul. As Clarke has shown, such a claim would be unlikely given the Corinthians' overwhelming concern with status and strength, both in their own lives and in the lives of those to whom they gave allegiance.¹⁶² The only riposte remaining to the Corinthians would be a rejection of Paul's cothematization of weakness and honour. Such a rejection, however, would also imply their rejection of Christ himself, after whose crucifixion the apostle had modelled his manner of both proclamation and presence.

It is in Paul's weakness of person and presentation that the nature of the cross was clearly demonstrated.¹⁶³ The parallel structure of 1 Cor 2:2 and 2:5 indicates not merely that the crucifixion of Christ is the realm within which the power of God operates, but that he is, specifically as the crucified one, the very power of God

¹⁶¹ Shi, *Message*, 149.

¹⁶² Clarke, *Secular and Christian Leadership in Corinth*, 112-116.

¹⁶³ Mitchell, "Corinthian Correspondence," 33; Snyder, *First Corinthians*, 30-31.

himself. If Paul had proclaimed a message with excellence of speech and wisdom, the Corinthians' faith would have come to rest on human wisdom; had he pointed to miracles, their faith might then rest upon signs and wonders. He provides neither the wisdom of rhetoric nor the sign of miracles, but only the spoken account and lived display of the crucified Christ. To bring the Corinthians to a place of confidence in the shame and weakness of Christ, Paul must verbally and somatically display his own corresponding weakness and shame.¹⁶⁴ It is upon that method and message, which is itself the power of God, that the Corinthians' faith must rest.

3.3 Rhetoric of the Apostle

This section will show, through inner textural, intertextural, ideological, and social and cultural textural analysis, that Paul's audience would share in the Greco-Roman gendered rhetorical expectations regarding leadership. Rhetorical ability was conflated with physical and moral strength and goodness, and each of these had gendered implications. The Corinthians desired a strong and capable man, one who conformed to their cultural expectations of rhetorical skill, in order that they might properly follow him. They admired and desired for themselves and their leaders physical beauty, eloquence, confidence, and power—the very kind of things of which their apostle was claiming to be bereft.¹⁶⁵ In contrast, Paul presented himself and his message as a mirror of Christ's crucified weakness. This manner of presentation would be found wanting and result in a rejection of Paul's *πάθος*, *λόγος*, and

¹⁶⁴ Pickett, *Cross in Corinth*, 65; Ciampa and Rosner, *First Corinthians*, 115; Badiou, *Saint Paul*, 51-54.

¹⁶⁵ Litfin, *St. Paul's Theology of Proclamation*, 82; Pickett, *Cross in Corinth*, 184, 191; Crafton, *Agency*, 40.

ἥθως—a rejection both of the message and of the one who had proved himself in speech to be less than a man.

3.3.1 Paul's Greco-Roman Habitus

E. Earle Ellis warns that to understand Paul “it would seem to be proper to give priority to that milieu to which he appeals and to which he presumably belongs In interpreting Pauline concepts it is not the categories of a second-century Hellenistic Gnosticism (however easily they may be read back), but the categories of first-century rabbinic/apocalyptic Judaism which demand first claim upon the critical historian’s mind.”¹⁶⁶ While Ellis’ concern is admirable, however, his choice of interpretive categories seems questionable. As Martin and others have asserted, “[a]ny firm distinction between ‘Greco-Roman’ and ‘Jewish’ in this period is . . . historically misleading.”¹⁶⁷ Jewish backgrounds were subsumed under and greatly shaped by the broader Greco-Roman social structures, especially outside of Palestine itself.¹⁶⁸ Indeed, one insisting on a *non*-Greco-Roman background (e.g., Hebrew Testament, rabbinic apocalypticism) must bear the onus of explaining how Paul’s audience would have been instructed to ignore their own cultural tradition, and interpret his words in light of a specific counter-subculture.¹⁶⁹ The 1 Corinthians 1—4 collocation of terms may be located within the Greco-Roman tradition, and Paul’s general Hellenistic audience would be more likely to be acquainted with this

¹⁶⁶ Ellis, *Paul and His Recent Interpreters*, 30-31.

¹⁶⁷ Martin, *Corinthian Body*, xiv; cf. Hengel, *Hellenization*, 1-6, 53, passim; Lim, *Sufferings of Christ*, 14; Ehrensperger, *Paul and the Dynamics of Power*, 8-9; Glancy, *Slavery in Early Christianity*, 6; Harrill, *Slaves in the New Testament*, 2.

¹⁶⁸ Lyall, *Slaves, Citizens, Sons*, 239-249.

¹⁶⁹ Robbins, “Rhetoric and Culture,” passim.

background for the terms.¹⁷⁰ Rather than in a Judaism artificially insulated from its socio-political surroundings, Paul's words should be read as located within the larger Greco-Roman milieu.¹⁷¹

There do remain questions regarding whether the general culture should be interpreted more in light of Greek or of Roman traditions; however, in terms of rhetoric, older Greek expectations appear to have ruled the day. While there undoubtedly had been numerous political and cultural changes between the fifth century BCE and Paul's day, the core value and concepts of rhetoric had been settled quite early.¹⁷² In fact, so stable was rhetoric's core, that Robert Wardy can trace rhetoric's near-total and unbroken political and cultural domination of the West "down to at least the beginning of the nineteenth century."¹⁷³ Roman writers and theoreticians were unable to produce in it any lasting change, and even Cicero may be seen as having not departed from earlier rhetoric so much as having reaffirmed the value of the Greek tradition.¹⁷⁴ In light of this stability over time and empire, it matters not whether one views Paul's Corinthian audience as being Greek at heart or Roman:¹⁷⁵ the rhetorical assumptions and demands would have been much the same.

One might recall Judge's comment that the "historian of the ancient world ... could hardly exaggerate the importance of rhetoric in shaping antiquity's own

¹⁷⁰ Litfin, *St. Paul's Theology of Proclamation*, 172-173; Winter, *After Paul Left Corinth*.

¹⁷¹ Cf. Witherington, *Paul Quest*, 53-73; Bruce, "New Testament and Classical Studies," 232; Økland, *Women in Their Place*, 22, 30, 39, 75-77; Lakey, *Image and Glory of God*, 97.

¹⁷² Shi, *Message*, 144.

¹⁷³ Wardy, *Birth of Rhetoric*, 108.

¹⁷⁴ Litfin, *St. Paul's Theology of Proclamation*, 87, 91.

¹⁷⁵ Litfin, *St. Paul's Theology of Proclamation*, 142, 146; Winter, *After Paul Left Corinth*, 7-14, 21, 27.

understanding of itself.”¹⁷⁶ Litfin has also noted the long tradition of the importance of eloquent speech for the people of Corinth in the first century AD.

The practice of eloquence was not something which merely existed during Paul’s day; it was pervasive in Greece and had been for centuries. It was a prime ingredient in the cultural heritage which defined Hellenism and gave the Greek mind its shape. There can be no question of anachronism or establishing channels of influence. The reach of rhetoric was all but inescapable during the life of Paul, city to town to village.¹⁷⁷

The literary, numismatic, architectural, and archaeological evidence strongly favours the view that the Corinthians of Paul’s time had fully embraced the Greco-Roman *habitus*, not least in respect to their rhetorical expectations.¹⁷⁸

If we are to be serious in our attempt to make sense of Paul’s writings, we must take seriously the apostle’s attempt to make sense to the Corinthians, who would be both knowledgeable and expectant regarding persuasive speech.¹⁷⁹ As Scroggs has noted, any interpretation of Paul’s writing runs into difficulties immediately when it does not acknowledge that he “writes and preaches in terms of his audience.”¹⁸⁰ Edwin Judge is in agreement, warning that “[w]hile the classical scholars of a century or two ago certainly committed absurdities in trying to identify [the New Testament] with the classical tradition and the *religionsgeschichtliche Schule* of this century took it too close to Hellenistic ideas, the fact remains that it was written in Greek, if not *by*

¹⁷⁶ Judge, “Paul’s Boasting,” 42. For a brief recent discussion of what might be termed “rhetoric” in biblical studies, cf. Lampe, “Rhetorical Analysis,” *passim*.

¹⁷⁷ Litfin, *St. Paul’s Theology of Proclamation*, 13-14; cf. 125, 143.

¹⁷⁸ Winter, *After Paul Left Corinth*, 5; Lakey, *Image and Glory of God*, 71; Winter, “Enigma,” esp. 50, 62.

¹⁷⁹ Peterson, *Eloquence*, 60; cf. Litfin, *St. Paul’s Theology of Proclamation*, 130-131, 189, 244-245.

¹⁸⁰ Scroggs, “Paul: Σοφός and Πνευματικός,” 34.

rhetorically literate Greeks at least partially *for* them.”¹⁸¹ Regardless of the apostle’s own background, it must be noted that his audience “lived and moved perceptively in the Hellenistic world of the first century, a world in which rhetoric and oratory were common features of daily life.”¹⁸² While the apostle may not share in all the assumptions of his audience, he will have been cognizant of the strength of their expectations.¹⁸³

Nor would it be necessary for Paul to have been formally trained in Greco-Roman rhetoric, in order for him to be competent in meeting these expectations. As Dale Patrick and Allen Scult note, the use of rhetoric “is no more dependent on one’s acquaintance with classical texts on the subject, than is one’s use of stylistic devices.”¹⁸⁴ Rhetoric did not prescribe an arbitrary set of rules which were then demanded to be treated as of good effect; rather, it set out to discover what worked, and systematized these discoveries for memorization and use.¹⁸⁵ Whatever the specifics of Paul’s upbringing, he could not have avoided at least a practical awareness and competence in the elements of Greco-Roman rhetoric.¹⁸⁶

¹⁸¹ Judge, “Paul’s Boasting,” 46.

¹⁸² Litfin, *St. Paul’s Theology of Proclamation*, 138-139; also Peterson, *Eloquence*, 65-66; Bassler, “Paul and His Letters,” 378-380.

¹⁸³ Pickett, *Cross in Corinth*, 30, 32-33.

¹⁸⁴ Patrick and Scult, *Rhetoric and Biblical Interpretation*, 13; Guerin, Labor, *et al*, *Handbook of Critical Approaches to Literature*, 321; cf. Eco, *Limits of Interpretation*, 51.

¹⁸⁵ Kennedy, “Historical Survey of Rhetoric,” 7; Kennedy, *The Art of Persuasion in Greece*, 35; Clark, *Rhetoric in Greco-Roman Education*, 68; Brownstein, “Aristotle and the Rhetorical Process,” 25; Forbes, “Paul and Rhetorical Comparison,” 135; Harrill, *Slaves in the New Testament*, 99-100; Gleason, *Making Men*, xxvi.

¹⁸⁶ Peterson, *Eloquence*, 13; Litfin, *St. Paul’s Theology of Proclamation*, 140; Judge, “Paul’s Boasting,” 40; Anderson, *Ancient Rhetorical Theory and Paul*, 290-291; Schüssler Fiorenza, “Rhetorical Situation,” 386; Lampe, “Rhetorical Analysis,” 18-19; Forbes, “Ancient Rhetoric,” 148, 160; Given, *Paul’s True Rhetoric*, 1-3, *passim*.

Note that this thesis does not put forward a claim for Paul's technical mastery of classical rhetoric, which claim is at the heart of disagreements between Ben Witherington (following Kennedy and Betz) on one side and Stanley Porter *et al* on the other.¹⁸⁷ Porter argues that Paul would not have been familiar with the standard rhetorical categories and terminology, and that, therefore, formal rhetorical analysis of Paul's letters produce no certain results. Robbins argues that Classical macro-rhetorical categories are not appropriate to the investigation of Pauline texts, because this literature does not presuppose the use and efficacy of "the law court, political assembly, and civil ceremony" integral to the forensic, deliberative, and epideictic forms of Greco-Roman rhetoric.¹⁸⁸ Watson recognizes that classical categories do not easily apply to large structures (even narrational) within the New Testament text, but only to relatively small pericopes.¹⁸⁹ Nevertheless, there are numerous *functional* correspondences existing between formal rhetoric and Paul's writing, and the trajectories suggested by these functional correspondences may prove useful for interpreting the apostle's argumentation.¹⁹⁰ Both sides agree that Paul's writings may be illuminated by our investigation of "micro-rhetoric" (*inclusia*, chiasm, etc). My reading depends not on Paul's explicit training or technical mastery of classical macro-rhetorical structures, but on his practical mastery of the habitual expectations shared with his audience. Neither audience nor author would require formal training

¹⁸⁷ Cf. e.g., Porter and Dyer, "Oral Texts," 326-328, 332-336, 340-341; Classen, *Rhetorical Criticism of the New Testament*, 6, 24.

¹⁸⁸ Robbins, *Invention of Christian Discourse*, 1-3, 14-16; Given, *Paul's True Rhetoric*, 2-4, *passim*.

¹⁸⁹ Watson, "Rhetorical Criticism," 171, 173.

¹⁹⁰ Porter, "Paul of Tarsus and His Letters," esp. 562-568; Shi, *Message*, 114, 155, 173; cf. Neyrey, "Social Location," 140-152; Robbins, *Invention of Christian Discourse*, 1-3, 14, 16, 90-97, 110-112, 488, 516-517; Watson, "Rhetorical Criticism," 173.

or even consciousness of technique in order to appreciate the presence or absence of a set of skills admired for their political impact.¹⁹¹

3.3.2 *Paul's Λόγος, Πάθος, and ἦθος*

To exercise any political—that is to say, social—power within the Greco-Roman world, one had to speak well, for “the power to speak well is taken as the surest index of a sound understanding, and discourse which is true and lawful and just is the outward image of a true and faithful soul” (Isocrates, *Antid.*, 255). The logographer is quite explicit in his praise of eloquence, saying that it is

the one endowment of our nature which singles us out from among all living creatures, and that by using this advantage we have risen above them in all other respects as well [... that] often the wise fail and the foolish succeed, whereas beautiful and artistic speech is never allotted to ordinary men [... that] whether men have been liberally educated from their earliest years is not to be determined by their courage or their wealth or such advantages, but is made manifest most of all by their speech, and that this has proved itself to be the surest sign of culture in every one of us, and that those who are skilled in speech are not only men of power in their own cities but are also held in honor in other states. (Isocrates, *Paneg.*, 48-49)¹⁹²

Within such a culture, one's initial visit and speech to a city would largely determine whether his leadership and authority could be recognized. The initial speech given by a Sophist in a city was specifically formed with a view toward demonstrating his δύναμις λόγου and winning a following of wisdom-seeking pupils.¹⁹³

Winter has pointed out numerous parallels evident between the Corinthians' party-spirit and the ζῆλος of the Sophists' μαθηταί.¹⁹⁴ Thiselton notes that Paul's

¹⁹¹ Watson, “Rhetorical Criticism,” 169, 173; Harrill, *Slaves in the New Testament*, 97, 162.

¹⁹² Cf. Wardy, *Birth of Rhetoric*, 38; Clarke, *Secular and Christian Leadership in Corinth*, 36-39.

¹⁹³ Ciampa and Rosner, *First Corinthians*, 112.

¹⁹⁴ Winter, *After Paul Left Corinth*, 41-43.

argument in 1:12-17 is with the Corinthians who are seeking “to acquire enhanced status by claiming some special connection with a major, esteemed figure.”¹⁹⁵ Winter has argued that such figures were esteemed specifically for their ability in rhetoric,¹⁹⁶ an argument that is also supported by Litfin, Witherington, and Andrew D. Clarke.¹⁹⁷ Regardless of the contents of a spoken presentation, a speaker’s self-assurance and lack of timidity, confidence of speech and bearing, as well as strong bodily presence, were expected by the audience.¹⁹⁸ Cicero, indeed, asserts that delivery “is the dominant factor in oratory; without delivery the best speaker cannot be of any account at all, and a moderate speaker with a trained delivery can often outdo the best of them” (Cicero, *De or.*, 3.56.213 [LT]). Wardy reminds us that the rhetorical act was a spectacle, an “exhibition, even exhibitionism.”¹⁹⁹ Failure to provide such marks of excellence would result in a speaker’s disgrace, while success guaranteed a large, loyal, and lucrative following of pupils.²⁰⁰

These pupils would then imitate the orator’s speech form which was termed the ἐπίδειξις.²⁰¹ The successful orator could be identified as the one who is “ἐπιδεικνύμενος ... τὴν ἑαυτοῦ σοφίαν [persuasive ... regarding his own wisdom] before his audience.”²⁰² The ἀπο- prefixed term used by Paul also carries

¹⁹⁵ Thiselton, *First Corinthians*, 123-147, esp. 140, 145. Here, Thiselton explicitly references Clarke, *Secular and Christian Leadership in Corinth*, 92-93.

¹⁹⁶ Winter, *After Paul Left Corinth*, 40-43.

¹⁹⁷ Litfin, *St. Paul’s Theology of Proclamation*, 160-163, 203-204; Witherington, *Conflict and Community*, 100; Clarke, *Secular and Christian Leadership in Corinth*, 94.

¹⁹⁸ Litfin, *St. Paul’s Theology of Proclamation*, 209.

¹⁹⁹ Wardy, *Birth of Rhetoric*, 125.

²⁰⁰ Winter, *After Paul Left Corinth*, 36-38.

²⁰¹ Litfin, *St. Paul’s Theology of Proclamation*, 38-39.

²⁰² Litfin, *St. Paul’s Theology of Proclamation*, 59.

the same meaning of “rhetorical or logical demonstration or transparent proof.”²⁰³ The substantive does not appear in the NT, and the verbal form with its rhetorical sense only in Acts 18:28 (Heb 6:17?). The term ἀποδείκνυμι is used in a rhetorical sense in Acts 2:22, 25:7 and 2 Thess 2:4, as well as in 4 Macc 1:8, 3:19, 16:2, Esth 13:3. Given its collocation here with πίστις, λόγος, σοφία, and δύναμις, it is reasonable to read the term as functionally equivalent to ἐπίδειξις.²⁰⁴

The ἀπόδειξις of the Spirit’s power is not contrasted to or added to the manifold weakness of the preacher, but is instead identified with and joined to it. Paul does not show himself weak and then demonstrate God’s power, he does not speak in foolish words and then proclaim divine wisdom; rather, just as the power of God has been shown in the crucifixion of Christ, so the power and wisdom of God in Christ is demonstrated in and by that very weakness and foolishness that Paul proclaims and lives. In preaching the message “of a crucified Messiah ... [Paul’s] own weaknesses served as a further visible demonstration of the same message.”²⁰⁵ While the apostolic ἀπόδειξις is seen in 2:1 and 2:4 as a denial of persuasive and wise speech, in 2:1 and 2:3 it is introduced through an affirmation of the apostolic ἀσθένεια, φόβος, and τρόμος.²⁰⁶ There is no miracle performed to distract the Corinthians from their apostle’s lack of attractiveness—no power to divert their gaze from his weakness, trembling, and fear. To see Paul’s weakness is to see reflected the earlier and more perfect weakness, trembling, and fear displayed in the crucifixion of Christ.

²⁰³ Thiselton, *First Corinthians*, 220; Ciampa and Rosner, *First Corinthians*, 117.

²⁰⁴ Cf. Collins, *First Corinthians*, 120; Mitchell, *Reconciliation*, 58 n. 72.

²⁰⁵ Fee, *First Corinthians*, 93.

²⁰⁶ Cf. Litfin, *St. Paul’s Theology of Proclamation*, 204-205.

Persuasive demonstration required rhetorical ἀρετή (excellence), and the force which enabled the rhetor to display such ἀρετή was the power of the word (δύναμις λόγου). Quintilian (*Inst.*, 2.15.2-4) takes pains to identify the rhetorical power (*vim*) of which he is speaking precisely with the Greek term δύναμις (power). In his first Tarsic Discourse (*Or.*, 33.3), Dio Chrysostom writes a warning concerning such power in the assembly, as its misuse may deceive the audience into ignoring the facts of the matter at hand. Wardy summarizes the evidence well: “To speak well was *ipso facto* to wield political power; the power to persuade in the Assembly was the alpha and omega of political success.”²⁰⁷ This force of λόγος, this eloquence, was understood as having an inextricable connection both to power and to the possession of wisdom. Indeed, it was said that the “opposite of being eloquent (ῥητορικός) is to be powerless (ἀδύνατος).”²⁰⁸ According to Aristides, “the title of wise and the ability to speak well are attributes of the same man” (Aristides, *Defence*, 391 [LT]). And Isocrates notes that while praiseworthy deeds are at hand to be noted by all, “the ability to make proper use of them at the appropriate time, to conceive the right sentiments about them in each instance, and to set them forth in finished phrase, is the peculiar gift of the wise” (Isocrates, *Paneg.*, 9 [LT]). For the ancients, truly effective speech presupposed the speaker’s wisdom regarding his content and the means by which that content might be best conveyed.²⁰⁹

²⁰⁷ Wardy, *Birth of Rhetoric*, 38; cf. Litfin, *St. Paul’s Theology of Proclamation*, 37, 40-42, 118; Witherington, *Conflict and Community*, 125.

²⁰⁸ Litfin, *St. Paul’s Theology of Proclamation*, 58; cf. Pickett, *Cross in Corinth*, 53-54.

²⁰⁹ Cf. Litfin, *St. Paul’s Theology of Proclamation*, 45, 64-65, 69, 120, 122.

The orator's demonstration of δύναμις λόγου was accomplished by, or rested upon, the orator's persuasive presentation of πίστεις or "proofs."²¹⁰ Collins notes that the context of 1 Cor 2:1-5 is clearly rhetorical and that πίστις here is

a technical rhetorical term. Used to designate a rhetorical demonstration, it is the Greek equivalent of Quintilian's *probatio*, 'proof.' In 2:1-5 Paul is dealing with rhetoric and shows his knowledge not only of rhetorical skills but also of classical rhetorical terms.... This represents a singular use of *pistis* in 1 Corinthians, but 'faith in God's power' would likewise be an unusual expression for Paul.²¹¹

In contrast, Ellingworth and Hatton warn that translators "should avoid using a word for 'proof' ... which suggests a logical or mathematical demonstration which has nothing to do with faith."²¹² Their warning, however, begs the question, since a presumption is made for equating the term "πίστις" with the term "faith," and then using the popular English meaning to determine the semantic range of the Greek term. As Thiselton has cautioned, the contextual demands of the surrounding rhetorical terms should shape our understanding of πίστις as it appears here.²¹³

The persuasiveness of an orator's πίστεις depended on his use of λόγος, πάθος, and ἦθος (force of speech/eloquence, emotional appeal, and moral character).²¹⁴ Paul has explicitly rejected the first of the three means in 2:1 and 2:4; and, though it may be argued that he makes use of the second through an appeal to positively compelling emotions connected with mentioning the death of Christ, his focus on Christ's dishonourable manner of death would seem at least to negatively balance out those persuasive emotions. This leaves only Paul's ἦθος (his personal

²¹⁰ Eriksson, *Traditions as Rhetorical Proof*, 33-39.

²¹¹ Collins, *First Corinthians*, 121.

²¹² Ellingworth and Hatton, *Translator's Handbook*, 41.

²¹³ Thiselton, *First Corinthians*, 219-222.

²¹⁴ Litfin, *St. Paul's Theology of Proclamation*, 80-81; cf. 78.

character) to which he can appeal for his persuasion, but neither does he use his own character as a typically persuasive proof.²¹⁵ Paul has seemingly rejected the persuasive use of ἦθος; he thus “cannot thereby ‘prove’ the credibility of his ambassadorial office or persuade the audience of the trustworthiness of his own person through the excitement of their passions.”²¹⁶

Brian Peterson has identified the controlling rhetorical *stasis* in 1 Cor 1—4 as that of *constitutio coniecturalis*, or “jurisdiction.”²¹⁷ That is, he understands Paul as rejecting the Corinthian’s legal and relational right to pass judgment on his lack of rhetorical skill. Since they do not belong to Paul (or to Apollos or to Cephas) as disciples, but all belong to Christ, the Corinthians simply have no standing to make such a pronouncement. While jurisdictional matters are certainly foregrounded in 1:10-17, however, Peterson also acknowledges that there may be multiple *stases* present within any speech or argument.²¹⁸ Watson agrees, demonstrating that the *stasis* of a passage is determined not by the overall genre but (and this is most true in the case of a letter) by what the speaker wishes most immediately to prove.²¹⁹

Given the structures of 2:1-5 as discussed above, the *stasis* here would seem rather to be one of definition (*constitutio definitiva*) rather than of jurisdiction.²²⁰ Instead of denying or avoiding the charge of being an unacceptable orator, Paul

²¹⁵ Witherington, *Conflict and Community*, 124-125.

²¹⁶ “Paulus beschreibt sich als Redner, der auf ἦθος und auf πάθος verzichtet. Er kann und will die Glaubwürdigkeit seiner Botschaft nicht dadurch ‘beweisen’, dass er die Vertrauenswürdigkeit seiner eigenen Person herausstreicht, oder dass er die Zuhörer durch die Erregung von Leidenschaften überredet” (Schnabel, *Der erste Brief*, 155).

²¹⁷ Peterson, *Eloquence*, 145-147.

²¹⁸ For a brief recent discussion of the imprecision and overlap that exists among the rhetorical *genres*, cf. Forbes, “Ancient Rhetoric,” 144-148.

²¹⁹ Watson, “Rhetorical Criticism,” 173; Peterson, *Eloquence*, 144, 32-33.

²²⁰ Peterson, *Eloquence*, 34.

admits to it. Indeed, the tripled prepositional phrase in 1 Cor 2:3 calls attention to the apostle's lack of oratorical skill.²²¹ Paul's self-description is "the exact opposite of the ideal rhetorician and the sophist: φόβος and τρόμος are the opposite of παρρησία and θάρσος, properties that belong to the ideal image of the sage and rhetorician."²²² Dieter Zeller judges that all the appearances of ἐν in 1 Cor 2:3-5, regardless of their use in positive or negative phrases, demonstrate Paul's rejection of the major rhetorical values in both his appearance and speech. "In v. 3-5, the modal ἐν accumulates, it focuses on the manner in which activity and speech, the ideal of the orator—confident frankness (παρρησία), courage (θάρσος), force of speech (δύναμις) and persuasion (πείθω)—is discontinued."²²³ Having admitted his lack of ability, Paul then disputes the nature of its significance, challenging his audience to see these very weaknesses as a persuasive demonstration of God's power. As Thiselton and Witherington both affirm, Paul does reject the Corinthians' right of judgment, but not the right of judgment *an sich*; rather it is judgment "by the same criteria by which popular orators and teachers were judged."²²⁴ The apostle denies that he can be judged in terms of the status expectations connected with Sophistic rhetorical persuasiveness.

²²¹ Witherington, *Conflict and Community*, 123-124.

²²² "Paulus beschreibt sein Auftreten als das genaue Gegenteil des idealen Rhetors und der Sophisten: 'φόβος und τρόμος sind das Gegenteil von παρρησία und θάρσος, Eigenschaften, die zum Idealbild des Weisen und Rhetors gehören.'" (Schnabel, *Der erste Brief*, 155).

²²³ "In V. 3-5 häuft sich das modale ἐν; es geht um das Wie des Auftretens und Redens, das vom Ideal des Rhetors—zuversichtlicher Freimut (παρρησία), Unterschrockenheit (θάρσος), Wortgewalt (δύναμις) und Überzeugungskraft (πείθω)—abgesetzt wird" (Zeller, *Der erste Brief*, 124-125).

²²⁴ Thiselton, *First Corinthians*, 18; quoting Witherington, *Conflict and Community*, 47; cf. Pickett, *Cross in Corinth*, 185-187.

3.3.3 *Paul's Proclamation and Persuasion*

Litfin understands Paul as disavowing the entire Greco-Roman rhetorical approach on the very grounds that persuasion is its goal. Persuasion of the audience was the orator's *raison d'être*,²²⁵ but since Paul is no orator, he is unconcerned with persuasion. And this, according to Litfin, was precisely what the Corinthians did not understand: Paul's manner of preaching was foreign to them, since it was conspicuously lacking in any persuasive appeal.²²⁶ Any attempt to manipulate πάθος for the purpose of strengthening πίστις in the audience—whether by σημεῖα (sign) or σοφία (wisdom)—would be an “emptying the cross of its power,” as it did not allow the Spirit to “have the last word” in convincing hearers of the truth.²²⁷ In short, Litfin argues that Paul is a herald (κῆρυξ) rather than a rhetor. Schnabel appears to agree, stating in this context that for the κῆρυξ “the criteria and principles of rhetorical eloquence are irrelevant.”²²⁸ Even the terms used to identify Paul's speech (κηρύσσω, εὐαγγέλλεσθαι, καταγγέλλω, μαρτυρέω), claims Litfin, imply bare and authoritative statement without the giving of rationale.²²⁹ As a herald, Paul's work is limited to the “placarding” of Jesus Christ—the unadorned presentation of truth before the audience's eyes.

But Litfin's argument does not appear to fully recognize the relationship between proclamation and persuasion. Michael F. Bird has helpfully noted in this regard that persuasive oratory was not understood by the ancients as inimical to

²²⁵ Kennedy, *The Art of Persuasion in Greece*, 78.

²²⁶ Litfin, *St. Paul's Theology of Proclamation*, 171, 195.

²²⁷ Litfin, *St. Paul's Theology of Proclamation*, 199-200, 206-208, 249.

²²⁸ “[καταγγέλλω] ist eine nicht-rhetorische Vokabel. Für den κῆρυξ sind die Kriterien und Prinzipien rhetorischer Eloquenz irrelevant” (Schnabel, *Der erste Brief*, 152).

²²⁹ Litfin, *St. Paul's Theology of Proclamation*, 191-192, 195-196, 199, 207-208, 212, 247.

heraldry, for “many orators such as Aristides, Alcibiades, and Epictetus regarded themselves as ‘heralds’ (*kēruux*) of the gods, of mysteries, or of various philosophies.” Bird’s conclusion is that the “word of the cross and worldly wisdom were antithetical only in content, not necessarily in form.”²³⁰ While Paul does seem to avoid the Greco-Roman rhetor’s confidence in self-presentation, he also makes use of great rhetorical skill in effecting a decision on the part of his audience. It is most telling that Litfin himself goes on to note that Paul’s goal was to change the Corinthians’ point of view from a mortal and fleshly concern with present-day evaluations to the eternal and spiritual perspective of God himself.²³¹ How is such a goal to be defined, if not as rhetoric—as *persuasion*?²³²

Paul’s initial self-presentation to the Corinthians was not lacking in persuasive appeal *per se*, but only those persuasive techniques based on the speaker’s self-proclaimed honour and wisdom. In Fee’s words, it lacked “the kind of persuasion found among the sophists and rhetoricians, where the power lay in the person and his delivery.”²³³ On the other hand, the apostle’s writings do evidence a consistent concern for careful argumentation, and it is certain that persuasion did play some part in Paul’s delivery. As Thiselton says, Paul’s self-presentation and proclamation, while certainly a perlocutionary event, is also (perhaps primarily) an *illocutionary* speech act.²³⁴ In this respect, Paul’s approach is in accord with the assumptions of those rhetors he may otherwise seem to reject. In addition to Thiselton’s data, Bird also

²³⁰ Bird, “Reassessing,” 377.

²³¹ Litfin, *St. Paul’s Theology of Proclamation*, 153, 174-178.

²³² Clines, “Paul, the Invisible Man,” 188; Litfin, *St. Paul’s Theology of Proclamation*, 153, 174-178.

²³³ Fee, *First Corinthians*, 94; Watson, “Rhetorical Criticism,” 173-175.

²³⁴ Thiselton, *First Corinthians*, 146; Bassler, “Paul and His Letters,” 375-376.

provides a partial list of such rhetorical and argumentative devices: though he does not greatly elaborate on the uses, the sheer number serves to convince of the apostle's persuasive attempts.²³⁵

Winter cites evidence from both Philo and Epictetus that the overshadowing of an otherwise weak message by means of a powerful method of persuasion was allowed by some orators.²³⁶ The rhetoricians (Aristotle, *Rhet.*, 1.9.40; 2.13.16; 3.17.5; Isocrates, *De pace*, 36-37; Cicero, *De or.*, 2.82.335) considered a speaker's recounting of a (well-known?) character's laudatory lifestyle to be an excellent proof and method of persuasion for the audience to imitate the speaker's own ἠθος.²³⁷ An orator could "impersonate" the one he represented, thus borrowing on the character and status of the latter à la Burke's unearned incrementalism (Quintilian, *Inst.*, 3.8.49-52).²³⁸ Thus, as Christ's representative, Paul might well depend upon the ἠθος of Christ to effect his persuasive appeal. Indeed, this is precisely what the apostle does in both his verbal and bodily presentation to the Corinthians: he imitates the crucified Christ. But in setting the crucified Christ before them, only a weakness and plainness of presentation would suffice to ensure that the audience would not be distracted from the subject of the presentation itself. Only a weak proclaimer could guarantee that the proclamation would not be overshadowed or misunderstood. As Schrage writes, "One cannot speak about the crucifixion with brilliant rhetorical elegance, not only for

²³⁵ Thiselton, *First Corinthians*, 208; Bird, "Reassessing," 378-379.

²³⁶ Winter, *Philo and Paul among the Sophists*, 188.

²³⁷ Mitchell, *Reconciliation*, 39-46.

²³⁸ Cf. Kraus, "Ethos as a Technical Means of Persuasion," 76-78.

reasons of good taste, but also because the focus must be upon the preaching and not the preacher.”²³⁹

The problem here is not a passive lack of πίστις (proof), where the speaker has to persuade in spite of an unacceptable personal ἦθος; rather, Paul is intentionally attempting to construct his persuasion *by means of* the dishonoured character which he shares with Christ.²⁴⁰ For Paul, the result of any attempt at presenting the cross as a place of honour would be an emptying of the cross’ power; this he does not do, but instead acknowledges—indeed, he insists—that the cross is a shameful, weak, and fearful place. In associating and identifying himself with the crucified victim, the apostle retains no place of honour, no status or worth, no virtue by which he might convincingly claim the socially-accepted right to be heard and followed. Paul does not present himself as a brilliant and attractive herald of a foolish event, but as a persuasive speaker whose very character and activity are fitting to the foolishness of his message. It is not just ὁ σταυρὸς that is presented as μωρία, but ὁ λόγος τοῦ σταυροῦ (the *message* of the cross).²⁴¹ “Not merely a rhetorical device, his ‘weakness’ and ‘suffering’ were rooted in his identification with Christ and with the disreputable popular movement in which he became a leading apostle.”²⁴² He insists that he will know only this weakness among the Corinthians, and that in this weakness they must follow him.

²³⁹ “Vom Gekreuzigten kann man nicht mit brillierender rhetorischer Eleganz sprechen, nicht nur aus Geschmacksgründen, sondern weil alle Konzentration dem Verkündigten und nicht dem Verkündiger zu gelten hat” (Schrage, *Der erste Brief I*, 225); so also Schnabel, *Der erste Brief*, 154.

²⁴⁰ Pickett, *Cross in Corinth*, 74-84, 192-194; Kraftchick, “Death in Us,” 166, 170-175; Hay, “Shaping of Theology,” 141.

²⁴¹ Litfin, *St. Paul’s Theology of Proclamation*, 197-198.

²⁴² Horsley, *1 Corinthians*, 54; Pickett, *Cross in Corinth*, 158-159, 179-182.

While Martin argues that Paul apocalyptically *inverts* status-expectations within the community, and Lee claims that the apostle calls for a *rejection* of status claims, both are clear that these changes are predicated on an identity formed in Christ.²⁴³ While successful rhetoric requires style, clarity, and appropriateness,²⁴⁴ Paul has seemingly abandoned style. But he does so in order to preserve an appropriateness of speech. The manner of an orator's speech and somatic presentation was expected to be appropriate to his subject matter (Quintilian, *Inst.*, 11.3.61, 134, 153-154; Aristotle, *Rhet.*, 3.1.1—4.4),²⁴⁵ and in Paul's case, the subject was the crucified Christ. The challenge laid down by Paul is for the Corinthians to acknowledge his life of weakness as a mark of authority, and the weakness of his appearance and speech must be recognized as appropriate to his goal of proclaiming the crucified Christ.²⁴⁶

The orator's manner of speech should "depict the speaker's character" (Cicero, *De or.*, 2.43.184 [LT]). The acceptable orator—either through a gift of nature or by virtue of practice—must be in possession of certain abilities, including "the ready tongue, the ringing tones, strong lungs, vigour, suitable build and shape of the face and body as a whole" (*De or.*, 1.25.114 [LT]). And, while Crassus admits to his companions that he may "turn pale at the outset of a speech, and quake in every limb and in all [his] soul" (*De or.*, 1.26.121 [LT]), this trembling is presented as a result of the speaker fearing he might fail in his performance. That is, the trembling of an orator "of the first rank" arises from his fear that he may fail to exhibit superior skill (*De or.*, 1.27.122-125 [LT]). Catulus admits to this same trepidation when he says "[I]

²⁴³ Martin, *Corinthian Body*, 59-61; Lee, *Stoics*, 199-200.

²⁴⁴ Olbricht, "Delivery and Memory," *passim*.

²⁴⁵ Cf. Kennedy, *The Art of Persuasion in Greece*, 104, 107; Shi, *Message*, 115-116.

²⁴⁶ Witherington, *Conflict and Community*, 124; Shi, *Message*, 87-89, 93, 116.

should of course be sorry to speak before an audience of clowns, but far more reluctant to do so in this present company, for I had rather have my discourse misunderstood than disapproved” (*De or.*, 2.6.25 [LT]).

Paul’s admission of weakness in speech does not evidence an avoidance of rhetoric, but an insistence on the rhetorical principle that one’s manner of presentation ought to be intimately connected with the *content* of one’s πίστις. Rhetoric simply did not allow for one’s speech to be viewed apart from one’s body and character, for they are viewed as two sides of the same coin. Quintilian acknowledges (*Inst.*, 3.8.13 [LT]) that good arguments should perhaps be recognized regardless of their source, but insists that one who “would have all men trust his judgment as to what is expedient and honourable, should both possess and be regarded as possessing ... excellence of character,” and that this character should be the embodiment of a speaker’s advice. Isocrates agrees (*Antid.*, 278) that a man’s character speaks louder than any words he may pronounce.²⁴⁷ And, while Cicero hints that an orator might possibly succeed by presenting an attractive character not in accord with his true being, still he insists that persuasion is best attained through the example of a speaker’s moral character (*De or.*, 1.19.87). Aristotle is in agreement (*Rhet.*, 1.2.4), judging “moral character to be the most important” (κυριωτάτην ἔχει πίστιν τὸ ἦθος) among the three types of rhetorical proof in persuasive speech.

3.3.4 Gender and Persuasive Rhetoric

A speaker’s moral character cannot here be understood in the narrow modern sense of the term, for it would have included the physiognomic elements of bearing,

²⁴⁷ Cf. Plutarch, *Mor.* 544D-F; Kennedy, *The Art of Persuasion in Greece*, 37, 90-92, 135-137, 292-293.

physical strength, and confident appearance, as well as the social expectations regarding dominance and self-control (Cicero, *De or.*, 1.58.251).²⁴⁸ As Maria Wyke has demonstrated, the public orator stood as an example of the masculine-gendered society, and as one who must, notwithstanding his biological maleness, constantly be engaged in “corporeal surveillance” against gender troubles.²⁴⁹ So also Larson says any man “who aspired to a position of leadership in the first-century Roman world would have been subject to an almost continuous evaluation of his virility by his auditors and rivals. The sophists of Roman Corinth, in particular, were noted for their arrogance and intense rivalries.”²⁵⁰

Sexuality is an expression of the rhetorical demands placed upon both the gendered and social body, with gender being foundational to a conception of the social structure. Evaluation of male sexuality was conflated with rhetorical ability, so that perceived deficiencies in one area would be assumed to demonstrate deficiencies in the other. Cicero instructed that a successful orator should “use gestures in such a way as to avoid excess; he will maintain an erect and lofty carriage ... There should be no effeminate (*mollitia*) bending of the neck, no twiddling of the fingers ... He will control himself by the pose of his whole frame, and the vigorous and manly (*virili*) attitude of the body” (Cicero, *Ep. Brut.*, 18.59. Cf. also Seneca, *Contr.*, 2.Pref.1).

Because rhetorical performance—including one’s choice of word order—was

²⁴⁸ Barton, *Roman Honor*, 56-58.

²⁴⁹ Wyke, “Introduction: Parchments of Gender,” 6-9; cf. Gleason, *Making Men*, xxii, 57-58, 78-81, 99-101, 143, 159; Castelli, *Martyrdom and Memory*, 65; Shi, *Message*, 145-147; Harrill, *Slaves in the New Testament*, 79; Harrill, “Invective against Paul,” 204; Hawley, “Male Body,” 91; Moore and Anderson, “Masculinity in 4 Maccabees,” 250; Barton, *Roman Honor*, 13, 35, 66, 84, 212, 214-215, 241-242, 271.

²⁵⁰ Larson, “Paul’s Masculinity,” 87; cf. Holmes, *Gender*, 24-25; Kraemer, *Unreliable Witnesses*, 271-272; Jones, *Playing the Man*.

understood as gender performance, even the rhetoric of Cicero himself was attacked with suggestions of him being “turgid and puffy ... flabby and pithless ... feeble and emasculate” (Tacitus, *Dial.*, 18.4-5 [LT]).

This connection of virility with rhetoric ran in both directions, so that Cicero’s habits of dress and family relations could also be attacked as less than manly, thereby providing a reason to reject his speech (Cassius, *Hist.*, 46.18.1-3). It is not that the orator’s sexuality narrowly defined was necessarily being seriously questioned; rather, the culture cothematized masculinity, authority, and rhetorical skill to the extent that they were viewed as nearly the same thing. A would-be detractor need not demonstrate a lack in a speaker’s style, if he could instead cast aspersions on his virility. Since rhetorical skills were indicators and tools of masculinity and virility, the effect would be the same, since one weakness implies the other.²⁵¹ So also Glancy notes that somatic techniques and presentations—including those of oratory—“were presented as natural insignia of character that should be cultivated from youth. The stories read into bodies were moral tales predicated on the subject’s social status, wealth, and gender.”²⁵²

This signifiatory aspect of gendered somatic existence and expression is also noted by Aline Rousselle. “There were no such things as bodies in general: in this domain, as in every other in the Roman Empire, we must take into account juridical (as well as social) status, freedom, citizenship, family status (whether or not enjoyed with full rights), membership of the orders and, finally, degrees of honor (to which

²⁵¹ Larson, “Paul’s Masculinity,” 87, 91; Holmes, *Gender*, 6.

²⁵² Glancy, *Corporal Knowledge*, 13.

there was a sexual dimension).”²⁵³ Quintilian expects that the orator will avoid all appearance of servility or of any overwhelming emotion such as fear (Quintilian, *Inst.*, 1.11.1-12, 15-18), and that he will have a flawless control of appearance, vocalics and gestural expression corresponding to authority, strength, and manliness (*Inst.*, 11.3.10, 19, 137, 146).²⁵⁴ While Quintilian defines rhetoric as “the technique of speaking well” (*bene dicendi scientia*), he identifies the *rhetor* as “a good man who speaks skilfully” (*vir bonus dicendi peritus*), and that of these two elements the foremost in importance is that he be *vir bonus* (*Inst.*, 2.15.34; 12.1.1-3). While Quintilian goes on to discuss what is in the nature of the good, it is obvious throughout his writings that it is not the good human (*hominus bonus*), but the good man (*vir bonus*) who may speak; it is only to the *vir* that the quality of *bonus* may be attributed. The masculinity of the orator is of such overwhelming importance that it is presumed, never debated, within the haze of the Greco-Roman *habitus*.

While the Greco-Roman audience thus demanded an orator’s display of masculinity through masterful rhetorical appeals, such a demand ironically placed their own masculinity in jeopardy. Rhetoric is gendered no less than any other social act: to dominate in speech is masculine, and to lose is feminizing.²⁵⁵ For a speaker to prove his manhood, he had to overcome not only his opponent in the debate but also his audience. And the audience was not predisposed to granting a rhetor his victory, as their subjugation to his moral superiority demonstrated them to be feminine in his

²⁵³ Rousselle, “Personal Status,” 301-302.

²⁵⁴ Cf. Barton, *Roman Honor*, 56-58.

²⁵⁵ Shi, *Message*, 16-17.

presence.²⁵⁶ In Wardy's words, "whatever the sex of our bodies, the gender of our souls in the grip of masterful persuasion is feminine."²⁵⁷

Seneca (*Ep. mor.*, 114.1-4, 8) states that a man's speech is "just like his life." The womanish man may be identified by his effeminate gait, but his effeminacy is also evidenced by his loose speech and careless ordering of words and phrases. A weak or unmodulated voice, one controlled by emotion or circumstances, rather than by the strength of the orator, is identified by Quintilian as being a mark of "eunuchs, women, and invalids" (*Inst.*, 11.3.19 [LT]). Even the improper position and movement of an orator's feet or fingers might serve to alert the audience to his effeminacy (*Inst.*, 11.3.92-124, 128; Chrysostom, *Or.*, 33.52).²⁵⁸ In a manner not easily reconciled with our present-day sensibilities, hair, voice, and gender were all cothematized.²⁵⁹ The effeminate man is recognized, says Seneca (*Ep. mor.*, 114.20-21; cf. 66.25), no less by his style of speech than by the manner in which he plucks his beard smooth and grows his hair long.

Aristides is in agreement (*Defence*, 392): in speaking of persuasive moral character, he approvingly quotes the proverb, "a man is like his speech" (τοιοῦτον εἶναι καὶ τὸν λόγον,) but to this he appends his own evaluation, "and the converse is true as well" (καὶ πάλιν τὸ ἕτερον ὡσαύτως). He states that a proper orator must speak with assurance (ἀσφαλέως), without stumbling, and with dignity (*Defence*, 389-390). Quintilian's ideal orator would "reveal both confidence and

²⁵⁶ Ivarsson, "Vice Lists and Deviant Masculinity," 181; Clines, "Paul, the Invisible Man," 186; Gleason, *Making Men*, xxiii, 117-118, 125-126, 143.

²⁵⁷ Wardy, *Birth of Rhetoric*, 139-140.

²⁵⁸ Gleason, *Making Men*, 68, 79-80, 82-84, 106-108, 126-127.

²⁵⁹ Gleason, *Making Men*, 112-113.

firmness” in all aspects of his presentation if he is to be perceived as possessing authority (*Inst.*, 11.3.155 [LT]). In light of the self-confidence needed to pull off such a drama, a fearful or reticent orator would be a moral oxymoron.²⁶⁰ Isocrates also affirmed that a rhetor’s self-assurance—his careful and conscious presentation of his character—could produce success even in the absence of training and technical mastery, (*Antid.*, 189-190) while lack of this boldness would result in failure even with great training (*Paneg.*, 192). Indeed, Isocrates openly admitted to being handicapped in this regard (*Phil.*, 81; *Panath.*, 9-10; *Ep.*, 8.7), for which reason he did not enter the rhetorical arena in person but remained a logographer and a writer of letters.

Rather than displaying assurance and boldness in his preaching, Paul readily affirms his weakness as a rhetor, and admits to weakness, fear, and trembling.²⁶¹ While Isocrates also admits to his weakness as a rhetor, his situation nonetheless is not analogous to that of Paul. On the basis of his weakness, Isocrates assiduously avoided the marketplace, while Paul proclaims his message in public; while Isocrates argues that his weakness in speech is overshadowed by his superior skill and understanding of human and political affairs, Paul presents his weakness of speech as a means of foolishly displaying a crucified Christ. Paul does not placard Christ, and then leave the rostrum without persuasion: he persuades the Corinthians by an upside-down logic to accept the necessity of following the embodied example of an apostle who by his weakness is identified with the even weaker crucified Christ.²⁶²

²⁶⁰ Litfin, *St. Paul’s Theology of Proclamation*, 61, 97, 108.

²⁶¹ Godet, *First Corinthians*, 127.

²⁶² Pickett, *Cross in Corinth*, 211.

It may be informative here to compare the apostle's self-evaluation with that of Moses in Exodus 4. There Moses declares that he is not sufficient (LXX ἰκανός) as a divine representative since he is not rhetorically adept, while in 2 Corinthians 3 the apostle declares that in Christ he is indeed ἰκανός for the task of ministry. If we are prepared to view the Corinthian correspondence as unified in at least its authorial self-presentation, it is reasonable to see 1 Cor 2:1-5 as affirming this same sufficiency, though the term is not present. Paul's sufficiency is affirmed on the very basis which Moses used to deny that he was ἰκανός. However one parses their precise relationship, it is clear that there exist great differences between the apostle from Tarsus and the Lawgiver at Sinai. For Paul, the weakness of the messenger is not a reason to avoid speech, but a proof that both message and messenger are appropriate and sufficient for the task at hand.²⁶³

Any difficulty we may have with so closely associating rhetorical failure with physical beatings will be due to our failure in understanding that the horror of a public whipping or beating was not merely the physical pain, but the morally and socially demeaning aspect of the act.²⁶⁴ Groups as diverse as Talmudists, orators, and modern grammar-school children recognize that a public shaming is like being beaten bloody, and that "humiliation is worse than physical pain" (*Sotah*, 8B; *Baba Mesia*, 58B; Demosthenes, *Con.*, 54.2, 43). Even the undoubtedly painful act of crucifixion is presented in the New Testament to be an event not of pain, but of shame (Heb. 12:12).²⁶⁵ Since the apostle has clearly conflated his rhetorical and bodily weakness

²⁶³ Hafemann, *Paul*, 39-47, 107-108.

²⁶⁴ Glancy, *Corporal Knowledge*, 57; cf. Jewett, "Honor and Shame," 263.

²⁶⁵ Cook, *Crucifixion*, 418-423.

with the cruciform life, the Corinthians' attitude toward Paul's authority and power must entail a concurrent acceptance or rejection of the crucified Christ himself. As Peter Lampe says, Paul "emphasizes that in the present the *crucified* Christ is central, and, correspondingly, Christians in the present are conformed to this crucified Lord."²⁶⁶ Paul is not just one rhetor to be compared to another in terms of attractiveness and skill, but one who has been sent to persuasively display the crucified Christ. It is this sacred texture, this identity of Paul as representative (in both a legal and exemplary sense) of divinity, that makes the Corinthians' response so crucial. To live with Paul is to die with Christ, while to reject the trembling apostle would be to pass on by the cross.

3.4 Chapter Summary

Greco-Roman rhetoric includes requirements both of gender and of strength, while gender implies claims of status along with both the ability and right to lead. Rhetoric is thematized in terms of status; gender is conflated with status claims and expectations; physical ability and strength are thematized as both gender and right to speak. These convolutions and interpenetrations of Greco-Roman somatic logic (*habitus*) with regard to rhetoric, gender, strength, and status make a discrete treatment of any of their elements difficult at best. Hence, the sections of this chapter have evidenced porous boundaries, with a blending of arguments more in keeping with the complex and gendered implications of Paul's deceptively simple self-presentation of weakness, trembling, and fear.

²⁶⁶ Lampe, "Paul's Concept of a Spiritual Body," 105.

Christ's sending was realized in Paul's arrival; the resting of the Corinthians' faith upon the power of God is to be found in the non-emptying of the cross of Christ; the apostle's not baptizing and his preaching apart from clever words are illustrated by his lowly attitude which is a demonstration of the Spirit's power. The apostle's decision in 1 Cor 2:2 to know only the crucified Christ stands parallel to his intention in 2:5 for the Corinthians' faith to rest upon God's power. As Paul has determined that his proclamatory activity will mirror Christ, so is he determined that his audience should mirror himself. Though his goal of producing lowly men is hardly consonant with Greco-Roman ideals, Paul's method does at this point conform to good rhetorical rules: the rhetors' goal was "to convey an image of themselves as well as to define the rhetorical problem and situation in such a way that both 'fit' to each other so that the audience/reader will be moved to their standpoint by participating in their construction of the world."²⁶⁷ The apostle's determination to live and speak in a crucified manner is not focused inwardly, but outwardly to his people: his life is such, that those who hear and see it may, in imitating his paradoxically authoritative example, also found their lives upon the crucified Christ.²⁶⁸ As Christ is and remains the crucified one, so does the apostle conduct his life and present his proclamation in a manner consistent with the weakness of crucifixion. As Paul's λόγοι take the shape of his rhetorical content,²⁶⁹ so does his life and bodily presentation take on the shape of his words.

²⁶⁷ Schüssler Fiorenza, "Rhetorical Situation," 388.

²⁶⁸ Pickett, *Cross in Corinth*, 23-24, 62.

²⁶⁹ Litfin, *St. Paul's Theology of Proclamation*, 219.

The apostle's ἦθος, though clear to be seen, would not readily lend itself to imitation, since the “communal beliefs and values of the audience” were not in accord with his own.²⁷⁰ The Corinthian audience would be looking to follow a leader who conformed to their cultural expectations, “a Sophist, or at least . . . a rhetorically adept philosophical teacher.”²⁷¹ If the apostle's call for *mimesis* is to be successful, the Corinthians' values clearly must be altered. This is a question not of a surface relationship with the apostle, but of *identity*—who the Corinthians chose to follow in large part dictated who they would be. As Halvor Moxnes writes, “the main question in early Christianities is not ‘What shall we do?’ but ‘Who shall we become?’”²⁷² What is at stake is not whether the Corinthians will *like* Paul, but whether they will *be like* him.²⁷³ Lim has summarized this well, using the language and approach of narrative criticism, saying that “the story of Jesus and Paul's self-presentation are congruent with each other, with the latter being a specific embodiment of the former. Paul presents this to the Corinthians in order to shape them in their embodiment of the story of Jesus, both through his theological reflections and his own life.”²⁷⁴

The following two chapters will not seek to again demonstrate what has been already shown in this chapter. That is, the Greco-Roman cothematizations of gender, status, strength, and rhetoric will hereafter be assumed and referenced, with the bulk of discussion being given over to an examination of the particular expression of these

²⁷⁰ Crafton, *Agency*, 38.

²⁷¹ Witherington, *Conflict and Community*, 348.

²⁷² Moxnes, “Body, Gender and Social Space,” 168. The questions are a reference to those posed by Meeks, *Moral World*, 11-17.

²⁷³ Meeks, *Moral World*, 11-14; Moxnes, “Body, Gender and Social Space,” 168.

²⁷⁴ Lim, *Sufferings of Christ*, 24, 196, passim; Given, “On His Majesty's Secret Service,” 202, 211; Olbricht, “Foundations of Ethos,” 147, 150-151, 158-159.

culturally-convoluted interpenetrating relationships as they appear in 2 Cor 11:16—
12:11 and 2 Cor 3:7-18.

CHAPTER FOUR: 2 CORINTHIANS 11:16—12:11

In Chapter Three, I engaged in an examination of 1 Cor 2:1-5, in order to support the claims of the thesis regarding weakness, rhetoric, gender, and shame. In this present chapter I will examine the argumentative flow of 2 Corinthians 10—13, and also demonstrate that 11:16—12:11 may reasonably be treated as a distinct unit of discourse. Following this demonstration, I will apply the SRI methodologies to 11:16—12:11, in order to support further the claim laid out in the thesis, that Paul subverts his audience's expectations regarding authority and leadership by self-presenting his somatic existence and experiences in a feminized, weak, and humiliated light. The chapter will show that the apostle's rhetorical goal is to clearly present his own multifaceted weakness, and to issue a call for the Corinthians' adoption of that weakness as a model to be imitated. His shameful and feminine state is first argued by means of a complex *Peristasenkatalog*. This hardship list is then illustrated by three short narratives which progressively remove all doubts as to the seriousness of Paul's claims to both weakness and power, feminine humiliation and the socially inverted power of the crucified Christ.

4.1 Structure of the Passage

This section will make use of inner textural and intertextural methods in order to demonstrate the general argumentative flow of 2 Corinthians 10—13, as well as the logical setting of 2 Cor 11:16—12:11 within those chapters. The repetitive grammar and lexis of the passage, along with the ironic tone of Paul's tripartite fool's boast, suggest that the apostle's focus is on defining the relationship of weakness and

humiliation to proper boasting and to the weakness and strength of Christ as seen within Paul's own life.

Though it is not my intention to argue the relative merits of literary unity or the many partition theories for 2 Corinthians as a whole, the presence of the debate should be noted. From Semler on, conjectures have been made regarding a complex of two or (many) more sources for the canonical text;¹ however, even though there has been a broad long-standing acceptance of the historical disintegrity of 2 Corinthians as a whole, the unity of 10:1—13:10 has remained quite unquestioned.² Even Bultmann, whom no-one could accuse of excessive caution in his conjectural emendations, affirms this unity. He comments that in 11:7-15 Paul himself inserts a defence against his accusers, prior to fully “mak[ing] use of his right to a hearing.”³

Recent years have resurfaced arguments for the historical unity of 2 Corinthians, based on an appreciation of the complex interrelationalities of the text.⁴ Long reads the entire letter as a single apologetic speech, with chapters 10—13 as the *refutatio*; hence, far from being a stylistic difficulty, Paul's change in tone from irenic to polemic is to be expected.⁵ James Dunn rejects partition approaches to 2

¹ For overviews of partition conjectures, cf. Long, *Ancient Rhetoric*, 1-14; Fung, “Spiritual Warfare in 2 Corinthians 10—13,” 8-21; Harris, *Second Corinthians*, 29-51, 661-662; Witherington, *Conflict and Community*, 328-333; Spencer, *Paul's Literary Style*, 72-75; Roetzel, “2 Corinthians,” 436-443.

² Akin, “Triumphalism,” 120; Plummer, *Second Epistle*, 269-270; Bernard, “Second Corinthians,” 19; Kistemaker, *2 Corinthians*, 14-15, 327; Furnish, *II Corinthians*, 44-48, 454; Murphy-O'Connor, *Paul: A Critical Life*, 254-256; Witherington, *Conflict and Community*, 429; Olbricht, “Foundations of Ethos,” 156.

³ Bultmann, *The Second Letter to the Corinthians*, 181, 205.

⁴ For an overview of the state of discussion, cf. esp. Long, *Ancient Rhetoric*. Similar presentations may be found, e.g., in Amador, “Re-Reading 2 Corinthians,” *passim*; Young and Ford, *Meaning and Truth*, 27-32; Carson, *From Triumphalism to Maturity*, 10-16; Jung, “Paul's Missional Use of Scripture,” 204-207; Wanamaker, “By the Power of God,” 202; Shi, *Message*, 173; Wire, “Reconciled to Glory,” 262, 266, 274.

⁵ Long, “Forensic Rhetoric,” iv, *passim*.

Corinthians, not because he sees a cohesive unity in the letter, but because speculative reconstructions and the affirmation of hypothetical redactors create more puzzles than they solve. Dunn thus encourages a reading of 2 Corinthians as a unified whole, regardless of the many historical uncertainties surrounding the text's composition.⁶ Whatever historical connections may be assumed between the first nine and the final four chapters of 2 Corinthians, the question presently at hand is the argumentative flow of the latter, and the place of 11:16—12:11 within this flow. The following sections will demonstrate the argumentative integrity of chapters 10—13, the tripartite structure of the fool's speech, and the centrality of both masculine boasting and feminine weakness within Paul's self-presentation.

4.1.1 *Structure of Chapters 10—13*

In addition to their introductory/conclusory feel, chapters 10 and 13 share numerous themes and words, forming a sort of bracket around 11 and 12. Neither this general structure, nor the existence of the so-called "fool's speech," seem to be a matter of debate.⁷ Certain commentators appear unconcerned to note any flow of argument in these chapters, contenting themselves with atomistic, unconnected verse-by-verse exposition.⁸ Hughes is perhaps the clearest recent example of such an approach, as he divides the 85 verses into 62 sections with a total lack of taxonomy.⁹ Many commentators identify the fool's speech as beginning at 11:1,¹⁰ but a closer

⁶ Dunn, *Beginning from Jerusalem*, 834-838.

⁷ Lambrecht, *Second Corinthians*, 158-159; Murphy-O'Connor, *Theology*, 99-125.

⁸ E.g., Bernard, "Second Corinthians," ; Meyer, *Handbook to Corinthians*; Plummer, *Second Epistle*.

⁹ Hughes, *Second Corinthians*.

¹⁰ Cf. Matera, *II Corinthians*, 237; Murphy-O'Connor, *Theology*; possibly Plummer, *Second Epistle*.

look is warranted.¹¹ Paul's plea in 11:16 "again I say, let no-one consider me a fool" (λέγω πάλιν, μή τις με δόξη ἄφρονα εἶναι), while not a grammatical repetition, certainly harks back to the "I wish you would put up a bit with my foolishness" (ὄφελον ἀνείχεσθέ μου μικρόν τι ἀφροσύνης) of 11:1, while 11:2-15 are a continuation of the argument of 10:12-18.¹² Harris acknowledges the resumptive nature of 11:16 (though he sees the digression as beginning with 11:7); Kruse views the initial verses of chapter 11 as "foreshadow[ing] the fool's speech," rather than as its inception; and Martin notes the resumption, providing a discussion of various possible logical movements from 11:1 to 11:16.¹³ Even Hughes, with his seeming lack of concern for larger structural patterns, notes that 11:16 "resumes the theme that was introduced at the beginning of this chapter."¹⁴

Spencer—though admittedly without explicit argumentation—takes 11:16—12:13 as a distinct unit on the basis of literary style.¹⁵ Making use of a Burkean "dramatistic analysis," Crafton divides 2 Corinthians 10—13 into four sections: in 10:1-11 Paul sets the stage through a definition of terms and establishment of his rhetorical *ethos* and *pathos*; in 10:12—11:15 the apostle as agent levels a comparative attack on his opponents as counter-agents; in 11:16—12:13 Paul replaces the agent orientation with that of his apostolic agency by means of ironic parody; in 12:14—13:13 the apostle applies the earlier established (but now more fully-understood)

¹¹ Cf. Long, "Forensic Rhetoric," 277, 279-280.

¹² Roberts, "Weak Enough to Lead," 146; Lambrecht, *Second Corinthians*, 187-188; cf. Kruse, *2 Corinthians*, 182, 190; Matera, *II Corinthians*, 246; Garland, *2 Corinthians*, 417, 487; Furnish, *II Corinthians*, 502, 511.

¹³ Harris, *Second Corinthians*, 777, 779; Kruse, *2 Corinthians*, 182; Martin, *2 Corinthians*, 360-362.

¹⁴ Hughes, *Second Corinthians*, 396.

¹⁵ Spencer, *Paul's Literary Style*.

ethos and *pathos* to the Corinthians' present need to accept his authority during his impending visitation.¹⁶ The unique presence of the foolishness (ἄφροσύνη) word-group in 11:1—12:11 should be noted as an argument for grouping these verses together; however, it must also be noted that the words are absent from 11:2-15.¹⁷ One might posit a dual beginning for the speech, but it seems easier to treat 11:16 as the true terminus *a quo*, with 11:1 as an advance rhetorical warning or even as a bit of a “false start.”

There is also a lack of agreement regarding the proper end of the section;¹⁸ however, this disagreement may not necessarily extend to discussions of the end of the fool's speech itself. 12:11-13 may be viewed as a transitional section, not entirely contained within the boasting.¹⁹ Furnish writes that 12:11-13 “constitute an epilogue to the ‘fool's speech’ ... offering a justification for the foolish boasting [Paul] allowed himself to do in it.” He continues,

particularly in v. 11 we have an epidiorthosis (subsequent justification; BDF §495[3]) which corresponds to the prodiorthosis (advance justification) contained in the much lengthier prologue to the speech (11:1-21*a*, especially vv. 1-4, 16-20). At the same time, a transition is made to the last major section of the Letter Body (12:14—13:10).²⁰

¹⁶ Crafton, *Agency*, 118.

¹⁷ Martin, *2 Corinthians*, 357; Roberts, “Weak Enough to Lead,” 178; Zmijewski, *Der Stil*, 216. Elsewhere in the broader Pauline canon the terms are found only at 1 Cor 15:36; Rom 2:20; Eph 5:17.

¹⁸ Cf. Matera, *II Corinthians*, 237-238.

¹⁹ Roberts, “Weak Enough to Lead,” 254; Witherington, *Conflict and Community*, 466; Kruse, *2 Corinthians*, 208; Furnish, *II Corinthians*, 554; Akin, “Triumphalism,” 122, referencing Austing, “The Theme-Line of Second Corinthians,” 150-151.

²⁰ Furnish, *II Corinthians*, 554.

Garland argues for the section extending through 12:13, but his comments identify verses 11-13 as a “final justification” for the boasting, rather than as a portion of the fool’s speech itself.²¹

Matera connects 12:11 with the preceding discussion, and notes that the verse is “clearly retrospective and indicates that there will be no more boasting.”²² Barrett likewise posits a break at 12:11 and summarizes the point of the verse as “[t]here will be no more boasting.”²³ Hughes refers to verse 11 as a summation of the preceding speech, while Kruse—at least implicitly noting a distinction between these verses and the fool’s speech proper—writes that here, “Paul, at the end of his extended boasting, is conscious that it has been an exercise in foolishness.” Even Plummer, who makes no concerted effort to indicate the flow of argument, still notes that there is, at 12:11, “a pause in the flow of impassioned language.”²⁴

While there is no unanimity regarding the precise termini *ad quem* and *a quo* of the fool’s speech, and while numerous patterns may be discerned within these final four chapters of 2 Corinthians, the chiasmic structure of 10:1—13:10 is worthy of note. The following chart broadly illustrates how 11:16—12:11 (**E-F-E'**) functions as the central point of interest. This same chiasmic structure is evidenced in the use of boasting terminology (*καυχάομαι/καύχησις* and *τολμάω*). These terms appear in the introductory and conclusory sections (**A, A'**), as well as in the central sections (**E-F-E'**), but are absent from the intervening materials (**B-D** and **D'-B'**).

²¹ Garland, *2 Corinthians*, 422, 528; cf. Murphy-O'Connor, *Theology*, 122; Kistemaker, *2 Corinthians*, 421.

²² Matera, *II Corinthians*, 287.

²³ Barrett, *Second Corinthians*, 319.

²⁴ Hughes, *Second Corinthians*, 454; Kruse, *2 Corinthians*, 208; Plummer, *Second Epistle*, 357.

- A** (10:1-11) Paul's claim to power in a defence against accusations of weakness and disparity between his letters and bodily presence. *[Terminology present]*
- B** (10:12-18) Paul defines proper limits of boasting. *[Terminology absent]*
- C** (11:1-12) Paul's parental relationship to the Corinthians, with remarks regarding burdens and trickery *[Terminology absent]*.
- D** (11:13-15) False apostles' masquerading actions will receive what they deserve *[Terminology absent]*.
- E** (11:16-21a) Paul is forced into his boasting; Paul is "ashamed" of his weakness *[Terminology present]*.
- F** (11:21b—12:9a) Paul's boast *[Terminology present]*.
- E'** (12:9b-11) Paul was forced into his boasting; Paul is pleased with weakness *[Terminology present]*.
- D'** (12:12-13) Paul has not taken what he deserves in light of his apostolic ministry *[Terminology absent]*.
- C'** (12:14-18) Paul's parental relationship to the Corinthians, with remarks regarding burdens and trickery *[Terminology absent]*.
- B'** (12:19-21) Paul reveals purpose of his boasting *[Terminology absent]*.
- A'** (13:1-10) Paul's claim to power in an explanation of disparity between his letters and bodily presence *[Terminology present]*.

As well, one might note that 10:1—11:15 exhibits an inverse relationship to 11:16—12:11. Paul begins with a confident assurance that he is able to powerfully demolish strongholds with an ability not of this world (10:1-11); he continues with a clear and insulting comparison of his ministry with that of the false apostles (10:12—11:15). The inverted section begins with a comparison, but one that is apparently self-derogatory (11:16-29); it goes on to aver a lack of strength related to an experience not of this world, and to give an avowed assurance of Paul being so weak that he had

to *escape* from a beleaguered stronghold (11:30—12:11). While this chiasmic structure would divide the text differently than the earlier proposal, still 11:16—12:11 is seen as a distinct unit responding to that which precedes it.

In **E** (11:16-21a), Paul makes clear that he is going to engage in boasting, and that he is being driven to such activity by the prior boasting of the “many ... fools.” The content of his boasting, however, is only implied at the end of these verses, where the apostle (ironically, as later becomes evident) admits he is ashamed (κατὰ ἰσχυρίαν) of his own weakness. In **E'** (12:9b-11), Paul reiterates that his boasting was forced upon him by the Corinthians' improper response to the “super-apostles”; the content of Paul's boast is made clear, as he admits to being pleased (εὐδοκῶ) with his weakness. While the ἀσθένεια word-group is well represented throughout 1 Corinthians, it first appears in 2 Corinthians only at 10:10 as a reported claim against Paul's authority. The terms are then absent until 11:21, after which they appear throughout **E-F-E'**. This pattern has been noted by Zmijewski, who writes that ἀσθενεῖν “ultimately reminds one of the ‘generic indictment’ of 10.10’s ἡ παρουσία τοῦ σώματος ἀσθενήσ; but it also points to the following statements, where the words ἀσθενεῖν and ἀσθένεια function as a catchphrase.”²⁵ **E** and **E'** (11:16; 12:11) contain the apostle's only direct references to himself as a fool (ἄφρων) within his letters, though in **F** (12:6) Paul does affirm that he is *not* a fool if his boasting remains within proper boundaries. Less direct self-referencing, using the related adjective ἀφροσύνη, appears only within **E** (11:17, 21a) and at the “false start” of **A** (11:1). The term ἡδέως occurs in the sections bracketing **F**, as well: Paul

²⁵ “... schließlich erinnert an die ‘gegenrische Anklage’ von 10,10: ἡ παρουσία τοῦ σώματος ἀσθενήσ; es weist aber zugleich auf die nachfolgenden Ausführungen hin, wo den Vokabeln ἀσθενεῖν und ἀσθένεια eine Leitwortfunktion zukommt” (Zmijewski, *Der Stil*, 216).

notes in 11:19 that the Corinthians *gladly* put up with boasting fools, while in 12:9b he affirms that he will *gladly* boast (foolishly) in weakness. The remaining Pauline occurrence of the adverb is in 12:15, where Paul is willing to “*gladly* spend and be spent” for the Corinthians’ benefit. The noun occurs at Titus 3:3, in a setting not remotely connected to the present discussion. It is clear that **E** and **E’** bracket the fool’s speech, serving respectively as the immediate introduction to and review or evaluation of his boast (**F**).

One should not suppose these sections to have such simple and non-porous boundaries, of course; there are overlapping structures to be noted, as well. The “I was too weak” of 11:21 is clearly an ironic granting of the opponents’ charges mentioned in 10:1.²⁶ (Lambrecht does not so connect the phrase, inexplicably stating that this is the first time in 10—13 Paul mentions his own weakness, explaining that “weak” means something quite different to Paul than to the Corinthians. Of course, the apostle certainly does *evaluate* weakness differently than does his audience, but this does not seem to be Lambrecht’s point.²⁷) In 11:16 (**E**) Paul hopes that no-one (μή τις) will consider him to be less than he properly is; in 12:6 (**F**) he hopes that no-one will consider him more than befits him—there is no balancing phrase found in **E’**. The intervening occurrences of the personal τις form a wonderful “bridge” between the two thoughts. Beginning in 11:20 with a five-fold εἴ τις (if anyone), Paul ironically bemoans that he is inferior to his opponents; he foolishly claims in 11:21 to be equal in daring to anyone (ὅν τις); then, on the heels of multiple affirmations of

²⁶ Bultmann, *The Second Letter to the Corinthians*, 217-218; Garland, *2 Corinthians*, 489; Furnish, *II Corinthians*, 512; Hughes, *Second Corinthians*, 401; Bernard, “Second Corinthians,” 105; Plummer, *Second Epistle*, 317; Matera, *II Corinthians*, 258.

²⁷ Lambrecht, *Second Corinthians*, 190.

superiority, at 11:29 the apostle claims a solidarity with anyone (τίς) who is weak or has been brought low (ἀσθενεῖ ... σκανδαλίζεται). Of course, his solidarity is implied as being superior to that experienced by others, but is also overtly defined as weakness itself.²⁸ Even the structured use of pronouns here draws the argument from questions of inferiority through claims of superiority to a redefinition of what is true strength and a proper focus of boasting.

4.1.2 *Structure of the Fool's Speech*

The fool's speech may be divided into three portions (11:21b-29; 11:30-33; 12:1-9a), which are themselves further divisible into complex structures. I have here taken the infinitival καυχᾶσθαι statements (11:30; 12:1) as introducing new material, rather than as concluding that which precedes; the alternative does not seem to me to greatly change the meaning or flow of the passage. One might take 12:1-6 and 12:7-9a as separate portions, as well; however, the change from καυχᾶσθαι δεῖ "one must boast" (11:30; 12:1) to θελήσω καυχῆσασθαι "I wish to boast" (12:6), along with the absence of change in setting leads me to keep 12:1-9a as a single unit.²⁹ Witherington treats verses 31-33 as a continuation of the preceding "humiliating experience" list; while Kruse similarly states that the Aretas story "supplements the list of trials of which [Paul] has already boasted," he also notes that 30-33 have a distinctly different feel and aim than the preceding list ending in 11:29.³⁰

Repetition of terms (κἀγώ, ἐν, κινδύνοις, πολλάκις, [οὐκ] οἶδα, [μή] τις, varied numeric markers and sequences of adverbs) tie concatenations of phrases

²⁸ Shi, *Message*, 258-260.

²⁹ Cf. Kistemaker, *2 Corinthians*, 383-384; Matera, *II Corinthians*, 259-286.

³⁰ Witherington, *Conflict and Community*, 458; Kruse, *2 Corinthians*, 198.

together, while setting others apart. The apostle is in high style here, and commentators are quite justified in spending time noting the grammatical and logical groupings. Without any diminishing of appreciation for the beauty and rhetorical mastery of the passage, however, it must be noted that the argumentative goal still may be fairly simple.³¹ Paul's letters were certainly rhetorically *effective*, and we should not be concerned with overstepping the limits of his writing ability, by our looking for carefully constructed patterns and arguments. Paul's opponents claimed that his letters were strong while his bodily presence was weak (2 Cor 10:10), and this would seem ample evidence of Paul's rhetorical ability in other pieces of written communication, "unless we are being taken in by another ironical figure on Paul's part." Judge notes here that the rhetorical effectiveness of the letters may have been due in part to the ability of Paul's *lectors*—an ability that may have largely surpassed that of the apostle himself in terms of intonation and facial expression. Still, the oral presentation's perceived strength would not be able greatly to outstrip the written form of argument being followed by the lectors.

And it is this argument which is of importance to the present thesis. At this point, I offer a greatly condensed paraphrase to indicate the flow of argument. "*I dare to say that I am superior, because I suffer more than anyone else, and even share in others' humiliations. My boast is this: I am so weak that I run from my enemies. Though I could speak of my own strengths, my boast is this: Christ's strength resides*

³¹ Judge, "Paul's Boasting," 37.

in my weaknesses.” (An intermediate-length paraphrase has been footnoted, with verse references to aid in following the presentation).³²

4.2 Paul’s Inoffensive Boasting (Delivery)

This section will use intertextual and inner textural methods to note the “inner feel” of Paul’s boast in light of the rhetoricians’ proscriptions and prescriptions regarding self-praise. It will also use ideological textural and social and cultural textural methods to demonstrate the inoffensiveness of Paul’s delivery, by examining the social rationale and force behind both the rhetoricians’ texts and Paul’s own boast. It will be seen that there was nothing in Paul’s *delivery* to drive away his audience, or to provide his opponents with further weapons to be used against him. Use of irony and self-deprecation, the felt need to respond to an honour-challenge, all these methods are socially and morally acceptable for the apostle’s use. What will remain to be examined after this section is the *content* of Paul’s boast, how the apostle’s recounted experiences and mode of self-presentation would have been viewed by his Corinthian audience as feminizing and shameful. An otherwise skillful delivery made by one who is not *vir bonus* becomes a gender-sensitive and offensive act; thus, any

³² *I am a fool to say this, but I can boast as well as anyone (11:21). My social and religious standing are equal to theirs (22), and—I’m crazy to say this—I am a greater servant of Christ than they (23a), for I have experienced more hardship and humiliation than any others (24-27). What is more, I am continually worried about all the churches, to the point where I share in the effects of their weakness and humiliations (28-29).*

Since I have to boast, I will boast of my weak circumstances (30). God knows that I am not lying about this (31): I have experienced a humiliating escape from my enemies (32-33).

Since I have to boast, even though it is not profitable, I will go on about visions and revelations of the Lord (12:1). I could boast about the kind of man who has heavenly experiences able to be evaluated only by God, but about myself I will only boast of weaknesses (2-5), since I don’t want anyone thinking more highly of me than is proper, even if the boast is true (6). In fact, along with great revelations, God gave me a weakness so that I wouldn’t think highly of myself (7). I asked the Lord to remove it, but he told me ‘My grace is enough: power is perfected in weakness,’ so I will boast of my weaknesses in order to have Christ’s strength rest on me (8-9a).

conclusions reached regarding Paul's delivery may be subverted by his somatic self-presentation.

In a speech deriding the upcoming generation's luxuriousness, laziness, and (most especially) their effeminacy, the Elder Seneca repeats the words of Cato as though they were a divine oracle: "The orator is a good man who speaks well" (*Orator est ... vir bonus dicendi peritus*) (Seneca, *Contr.*, 1.Pref.9-10; also noted by Quintilian, *Inst.*, 12.1.1). Even should one decide that Paul's boasting *delivery* falls squarely within the boundaries of Plutarchian inoffensive self-praise, the question will still remain as to whether he should be allowed to speak at all. Proper speaking demanded not only a certain mode, but also a certain kind of man. As Aristotle said, "since the object of Rhetoric is judgement ... it is not only necessary to consider how to make the speech itself demonstrative and convincing, but also that the speaker should show himself to be of a certain character."³³ Paul was judged by some to be lacking in personal presence during his public speaking, and he appears to be at least ironically self-accepting of such a judgment (e.g., 2 Cor 10:10; 11:6); in addition, however, the actions and experiences he recounts in 2 Cor 11:16—12:11 may demonstrate that, far from being *bonus*, he is not at all truly *vir*.

Marshall McLuhan's now-famous dictum—"the medium is the message"³⁴—would seem applicable to form as well, and thus it is clear that any thoroughgoing separation of Paul's boast (content) from his boasting (delivery) within the fool's speech would be artificial.

One of the tenets of all literary criticism, including the historical critical variety, is that form and content are intertwined and must be

³³ Aristotle, *Rhet.* II.i.2-4; cf. Anderson, *Essays on Roman Satire*, xiv.

³⁴ McLuhan, *Understanding Media*, 7.

investigated interdependently. This also conforms with the emphasis in ancient rhetorical handbooks and works of literary criticism on τὸ πρέπον (Latin *decorum*), ‘what is appropriate.’ Each of the species of rhetoric deals with particular issues, questions or ends, and there are material topics appropriate to each.³⁵

Agreement with McLuhan and Mitchell notwithstanding, such a separation will be made here temporarily, if for no other reason than in hope of keeping the discussion to portions of a manageable size. The present section will focus on Greco-Roman concerns for socially- and morally-acceptable self-praise. It will later be seen that, while Paul’s situation seems to afford him room to boast inoffensively, his self-identification with a shamefully low status may remove his right to so speak.

Paul’s repeated apparent embarrassment and apologies for his boasting is evidence enough that the activity was not without social difficulty. This *pace* Judge, who—perhaps in the grip of argumentative fervour—seems to overly simplify the matter, reading all Paul’s expressed concerns as being dissimulative: “The important thing to grasp is that at this level of society self-admiration, including of course its deceptive aesthetic refinements, was absolutely *de rigueur*. As Paul himself complains, he was despised for *not* indulging in it (II Cor. xi: 20-1).”³⁶

Aristotle appears to have limited the distastefulness of boasting to one who spoke untruthfully of himself (Aristotle, *Eth. nic.*, 4.2), though he did not simply equate untruthful self-presentation with boasting. He also notes the presence of a self-depreciating man (ὁ εἰρων) though he considers the boastful man (ὁ ἀλαζών) to be worse (Aristotle, *Eth. nic.*, 4.17). It should perhaps be noted here that Aristotle may not have entirely viewed truthfulness as a prerequisite to good speech, since he seems

³⁵ Mitchell, *Reconciliation*, 13-14; cf. Harrill, *Slaves in the New Testament*, 18-21, 157-158.

³⁶ Judge, “Paul’s Boasting,” 47; cf. Barton, *Roman Honor*, 231-232.

to assume the inevitable winning-out of truth and justice, as long as falsehood and injustice are not provided with unfair advantages through an inordinate imbalance in the opposing speakers' abilities of presentation (Aristotle, *Rhet.*, 1.1.12).

Nevertheless, later rhetoricians clearly required truthfulness *and more* for proper rhetoric, and especially for matters of self-praise. Mitchell has provided a convincing demonstration that Paul's audience would have been aware of such requirements regarding the giving of self-praise. Judge also concluded that Paul himself was "beyond doubt ... in practice at least, familiar with the rhetorical fashions of the time."³⁷

One need not assume explicit knowledge of the rhetoricians' arguments in order to affirm an audience's consciousness of such prescriptions. "The habitus, the durably installed generative principle of regulated improvisations, produces practices which tend to reproduce the regularities immanent in the objective conditions of the production of their generative principle, while adjusting to the demands inscribed as objective potentialities in the situation, as defined by the cognitive and motivating structures making up the habitus."³⁸ Alternatively, the mechanism may be thought of in terms of ideology, which "creates and affirms subjects; these subjects continue to work 'all by themselves' to reaffirm the ideology which has constituted them ... [hiding] its own tracks, so to speak, making it impossible for subjects constituted by it to think outside its categories."³⁹

³⁷ Mitchell, "Patristic Perspective," passim; Judge, "Paul's Boasting," 40; Harrill, *Slaves in the New Testament*, 97, 162; Shi, *Message*, 152.

³⁸ Bourdieu, *Outline of a Theory of Practice*, 78; cf. Langer, *Merleau-Ponty*, 32.

³⁹ Polaski, *Paul and the Discourse of Power*, 40.

It was not enough to speak what was correct about one's self—one must also have the correct intention and attitude, for speaking in praise of one's self was a precarious act.⁴⁰ Indeed, Plutarch notes that—while many people nevertheless do so—speaking of one's own importance or ability should be scorned by all (Plutarch, *Mor.*, 539B). And Plutarch's examples make clear that the offensive nature of the act is not mitigated merely by virtue of the self-praise being true: the greatest poets, musicians, statesmen, and generals are alike subject to the strictures of public modesty of expression (Plutarch, *Mor.*, 539B-F). Even Paul's own words in 12:5-6 highlight the insufficiency of truth as a basis for boasting. Though the apostle insists that a true account of his paradisiacal experiences would not constitute inappropriate (foolish) boasting, he nevertheless distances himself from a direct personal identification with such an account, since it may have the undesired effect of seeming a self-aggrandizement.

Plutarch points out that **(a)**⁴¹ self-praise is justified when a recognition of the speaker's character creates a sense of solidarity with an audience of similar strengths (Plutarch, *Mor.*, 542B-C), and **(b)** results in them being persuaded toward good action (Plutarch, *Mor.*, 539E-F, 544D-F) or away from undesirable actions and attitudes (Plutarch, *Mor.*, 544F—545D). Though it is considered shameful to use one's high status as a means of lowering that of another, self-praise is allowable **(c)** for defending one's reputation against an attack (Plutarch, *Mor.*, 540B-F, 541E, 545D—546B), as well as **(d)** for demonstrating that a particular strength compensates for an admitted weakness (Plutarch, *Mor.*, 541F—542A). Plutarch also notes that **(e)** a man forced to

⁴⁰ Gleason, *Making Men*, 8-9, 13-14, 149-150.

⁴¹ These alphabetic designations will be used throughout the present section to indicate which of Plutarch's criteria are being dealt with in a given argument.

self-praise (ἀναγκασθέντας ἐπαινεῖν) would do well **(f)** to ascribe part of the honour either to chance or to God (Plutarch, *Mor.*, 542E—543A). A speaker who **(g)** feels he may be thought of too highly may minimize his self-presentation through acknowledgment either of a lesser strength or of an inconsequential weakness (Plutarch, *Mor.*, 543A—544C). The source of one’s improper boasting, says Plutarch, is a too-high opinion of one’s own importance or wisdom (Plutarch, *Mor.*, 546B—547A-C), and the best guard against such a propensity is **(h)** an awareness of whether there is “some great advantage to our hearers or ourselves” (Plutarch, *Mor.*, 547D-F).

It does seem that the apostle’s self-praise is justified as a response to a personal attack **(c)**, and as a means of drawing the Corinthians away from what he views as a corrupting influence **(b)**.⁴² So Duane Watson reads Paul’s boasting as a defensive claim to superiority over the itinerant preachers who had accepted the Corinthian patronage he had earlier refused.⁴³ Since his opponents are self-identified⁴⁴ as apostles of Christ, Paul is able to engage them as equals **(c)** (*Paul’s Boasting*, 263), regardless of their possibly higher class status within broader society (*Paul’s Boasting*, 261). Though Paul’s riposte indirectly addresses underlying issues of doctrine and practice by “reject[ing] the dominant culture’s criteria for honor” (*Paul’s Boasting*, 275), the opponents’ challenge is not directly related to doctrine; rather, it is an encroachment into the apostle’s social sphere **(c, e)** (*Paul’s Boasting*, 262). So Carson: “Paul faces intruders whose fundamental aim is to call his authority into

⁴² Olson, “Confidence Expressions,” 231.

⁴³ While the following parenthetical page references are to Watson, “Paul’s Boasting,” cf. also Watson, “Paul and Boasting,” 81.

⁴⁴ Cf. Bultmann, *The Second Letter to the Corinthians*, 215.

question, while magnifying their own.”⁴⁵ Regarding Paul’s letters as a whole, rather than specifically in reference to 2 Cor 10—13, Clarke writes, “Paul’s letters were responses and instructions to communities where social forces, and not just theological or ideological ones, were at work. [One must take ...] into account how particular individuals or groups either provoked or may have responded to [Paul’s] ideas.”⁴⁶ Barnett also acknowledges the two issues, though he joins both immediate and ultimate dangers into a single statement, writing that the Corinthian church “is perilously close to rejecting [Paul] in favor of other teachers who claimed to be superior but whose doctrines are capable of corrupting the church.”⁴⁷

Having been accused of evidencing an incongruent reality and appearance, Paul turns that very accusation upon his opponents. They are “the deceivers and pretenders ... confiscating another’s rights ... deal[ing] in the realm of superficialities ... not what they seem to be.”⁴⁸ Nor should the seriousness of such a “turf war” be minimized: Neyrey demonstrates that one who outwardly appears acceptable, yet is inwardly unclean, is subject to thematization as a witch, thus threatening the very life of the community.⁴⁹ In this light, Paul’s attack on the “super-apostles” may be seen as a counter-accusation of uncleanness against those who claimed him to be one thing behind the mask of a letter, while quite another face to face (**b, c, h**).

⁴⁵ Carson, *From Triumphalism to Maturity*, 17.

⁴⁶ Clarke, *A Pauline Theology of Church Leadership*, 15, 184; cf. Lambrecht, “Paul’s Foolish Discourse,” 409; Young and Ford, *Meaning and Truth*, 212; Amador, “Re-Reading 2 Corinthians,” 291.

⁴⁷ Barnett, *Second Corinthians*, 529.

⁴⁸ Crafton, *Agency*, 124.

⁴⁹ Neyrey, “Clean/Unclean,” 98; Neyrey, “Witchcraft Accusations,” passim; Lampe, “Can Words Be Violent,” 223.

Watson reads Paul's inclusion of praise for the Corinthians and his affirmation of God's grace as ways in which the apostle moderates his boasting (**f**) (*Paul's Boasting*, 272-273); while personal hardships are listed not only as a moderating factor (**f**) but also to encourage a movement toward the good (**b**) by "surpris[ing] the Corinthians that what they devalue is what Paul and God value: weakness" (*Paul's Boasting*, 273). The apostle's presentation of less than exemplary experiences and attitudes (even when quite obviously sarcastic, as in 11:21) may also be viewed as a form of self-deprecation (**g**). Self-deprecation was among the most effective of moderations against offensive speaking, since it was considered to be both better than and the converse of the boast. Aristotle notes that those who publicly understate their own ability or honour "seem of a more refined character, for we feel that the motive underlying this form of insincerity is not gain but dislike of ostentation" (Aristotle, *Eth. nic.*, 4.2-3, 14, 17 [LT]).

Paul was not able to boast easily against his opponents on their own terms; if he were unable to demonstrate superior rhetorical and social skills, he would fail; on the other hand, if he were to succeed in demonstrating his superiority, he would be doing so at the risk of using a method offensive in terms of both social and rhetorical conventions.⁵⁰ Thus, he first refuses to boast at all, though this refusal itself turns out to be a sarcastic comparison. Paul shows admirable ironic powers in 11:11, worthy of an Elijah or Isaiah. While his "even if I am nothing" (εἰ καὶ οὐδέν εἰμι) appears at first glance to be self-effacing ("I know I'm not all that great"), the second glance reveals a stinging insult. Regardless of how low an evaluation Paul might receive, he hints that the "super apostles" are even less. In effect, the apostle says "I won't

⁵⁰ Watson, "Paul and Boasting," 85.

compare myself with people who aren't worth being compared to!"⁵¹ Paul's extended use of sarcastic irony in the passage was subject to a fatal misreading, for the Corinthians might feel the apostle had drawn the battle-lines against *them*.⁵² The apostle is therefore careful to "intersperse his sarcastic remarks among the more profound and fundamental attacks upon the super-apostles. Never does one audience-directed sarcastic remark follow directly upon another, and where two appear in close proximity to one another they are separated by a negative reference to the rival apostles."⁵³

The alternating use throughout the passage of 'I-you' caring exhortation and 'I-they' antithetical comparison serves to alienate Paul's rivals even while it strengthens a sense of solidarity with the Corinthians **(a)**. Even Paul's use of a *Peristasenkatalog* in his antithetical comparisons suggests he is attempting to reassert authority over his audience.⁵⁴ Of course, such a dual move—if successful—has the side benefit of driving a wedge directly between the Corinthians and the super-apostles.⁵⁵ And this divisiveness is not of Paul's own choosing, since he has been forced to respond to the super-apostles' prior exclusion of his own authority **(e)** (2 Cor 11:12, 16, 18, 21). As Harris points, even the $\kappa\alpha\lambda\gamma\omega$ "I also" of 11:16 implies that the boasting is not at Paul's initiation: others have begun the action, and he is merely responding in kind.⁵⁶ Paul is not arguing for his place of authority on the basis of

⁵¹ cf. Watson, "Paul and Boasting," 84.

⁵² Hays, *First Corinthians*, 40.

⁵³ Crafton, *Agency*, 114.

⁵⁴ Witherington, *Conflict and Community*, 452.

⁵⁵ Crafton, *Agency*, 121, 126; Wanamaker, "By the Power of God," 213-216.

⁵⁶ Lampe, "Can Words Be Violent," 234-237; Harvey, *Renewal through Suffering*, 107; Harris, *Second Corinthians*, 779-780.

power; rather, by means of his apostolic ἥθος, he is persuading for the Corinthians' changed perception of the world.⁵⁷ The apostle desires his audience to see him, the super-apostles, Christ, and their own selves in a strange new light—this is not a simple transference of the Corinthians' allegiance, but a kind of conversion. In Green's words, conversion produces much the same effect as a Gestalt shift: "what was previously seen as a duck is now seen as a rabbit, so conversion signals not simply the introduction of new ideas into an old imaginative framework, but a transformed imaginative framework within which what was previously inconceivable is now matter-of-fact."⁵⁸ This great advantage for the audience is ample justification for Paul's radical response and boast **(b, h)**.

4.3 Paul's Offensive Boast (Content)

This section will examine the *content* of Paul's tripartite boast, to demonstrate its gendered social force. Wright is representative in his approach to the material, in that he "lumps together" the experiences related by Paul within this passage, reading each and every one of the "civic appointments, honours and triumphs, the multiple 'achievements' of his apostleship," as equally shaming as his "beatings, imprisonments, stoning, shipwrecks, constant danger, deprivation, anxiety."⁵⁹ This approach, however, ignores the varying levels of ambiguity attached to the social status of each of Paul's "accomplishments."⁶⁰

⁵⁷ Crafton, *Agency*, 38.

⁵⁸ Green, *Body, Soul, and Human Life*, 128, cf. 118; cf. Nguyen, *Christian Identity in Corinth*, 202-203, 210, 217-218.

⁵⁹ Wright, *The Resurrection of the Son of God*, 308; cf. Kelhoffer, "Suffering as Defense," 141-142.

⁶⁰ Cf. Glancy, "Boasting," 119-120.

In order better to discuss these social distinctions, the *Peristasenkatalog* of 11:21b-29 will be divided into the categories of status-attitude, circumstance, and imposition. Paul's account of his escape from Damascus (11:30-33) will be evaluated as a discrete unit, as well as in its relation to the preceding and following passages. Finally, there will be an evaluation of the interplay between Paul's somatic presentation of his trip to Paradise and his resulting "thorn in the flesh" (σκόλοψ τῆ σαρκί) (12:1-9). At question in all these examinations is whether Paul's self-presentation evidences an honourable manly body, or a shameful feminized one. If the latter, regardless of what might otherwise be taken as evidence that he is one *dicendi peritus*, his boasting is invalidated on the basis of his being neither *vir* nor *bonus*.

Peter Lampe has noted Cato's pronouncement, "*Orator est ... vir bonus dicendi peritus*," twice rendering the quote as having no gender specificity. He writes that "rhetoric is the art of orating well as a good *person*," and that the masterful speaker "needs to be a good *human being* as well."⁶¹ Cato, however, does not predicate goodness of *homo* but of *vir*, not of a member of humanity but of a *man*. The modern writer is certainly encouraged to evidence a sensibility toward non-exclusionary terms in his or her own work; in this instance, however, gender-inclusive language is not true to the expectations of the Greco-Roman text and audience. As Gleason points out, "The ancient world was not a gender-neutral place."⁶²

Though a full argument regarding gender expectations has already been presented, the general force deserves repetition here. Aristotle can claim in all seriousness that "[v]irtues and actions are nobler, when they proceed from those who

⁶¹ Lampe, "Quintilian's Psychological Insights," 183 (italics added for emphasis).

⁶² Gleason, *Making Men*, xiv.

are naturally worthier, for instance, from a man rather than from a woman” (Aristotle, *Rhet.*, 1.9.22 [LT]). Quintilian argues that the ideal orator will be “*vir bonus dicendi peritus*,” and that of these two elements the foremost in importance is that he be *vir bonus* (Quintilian, *Inst.*, 12.1.1-3). While Quintilian goes on to discuss what is in the nature of the good, it is obvious throughout his writings that it is not *hominus bonus*, but *vir bonus* who may speak; it is only to the *vir* that the quality of *bonus* may be attributed. The maleness of the orator is of such overwhelming importance that it is not debated, but ignored within the haze of the Greco-Roman *habitus*. In addition, because “masculinity was all but identified with social and political dominance, there was no assumption that all [biological] males must be masculine Elite men of the day were constantly concerned with the maintenance of their masculinity, because it both displayed and justified their positions of power.”⁶³ In the words of Giulia Sissa, “*Virtus* has to be *virilis*.”⁶⁴

In his discourses on virtue, Dio Chrysostom notes that one’s reaction to hardship is a testimony to ἀρετή, and that one must possess not only bravery and wisdom but also purity of motive. However, it is made clear that the subject in view is not simply a good and noble human, but “the well-born man” (ὁ ἀνὴρ ὁ γενναῖος) (Chrysostom, *Or.*, 8.15), or “a good man” (ἀνὴρ ἀγαθός) (Chrysostom, *Or.*, 69.1). While Plutarch does offer a work in praise of ἀρετή in women (Plutarch, *Mor.*, “Bravery of Women”), there are difficulties with taking his words at face value. There is but a single such essay in the midst of fifteen volumes of the *Moralia*, and the passage begins with an explicit recognition that not all share his view. Moreover,

⁶³ Larson, “Paul’s Masculinity,” 86-88; cf. Roetzel, “Language of War,” 88.

⁶⁴ Sissa, “Socrate’s Passion,” 252-253.

within the essay (Plutarch, *Mor.*, 252.D) there appears a narrative contrast of the manly ruler with one who is ἀγεννὲς καὶ γυναικῶδες “without nobility and womanly.” It is not my goal here to argue whether Plutarch’s presentation of women is disingenuous; it is worthy of note, however, that even within such a text the linguistically-encoded cultural identification of honour and nobility with maleness is so strong that it cannot be avoided.

Nor should one think that such cothematization of gender and social power is confined to antiquity. Numerous high-level civil court cases have pointed out the contemporary social construction of masculinity: what it means “to be a man” is still determined not by biology but by social expectations.⁶⁵ Specifically—whether in contemporary culture, or in Paul’s Greco-Roman *milieu*—a man is “not a ‘real’ man ... when other men [successfully] challenge his masculinity.”⁶⁶

4.3.1 Paul’s Peristasenkatalog

This section will use inner texture, intertexture, and social and cultural texture to examine the complex self-presentation of the apostle. The obvious weakness and low status, the servile and feminized body implied by Paul’s imprisonments, stoning, and beatings are mixed with other elements in the same *Peristasenkatalog*. Certain of these elements are positive social indicators of strength, while others are either neutral or ambiguous in their somatic referencing. The close proximity of these varied elements within a single socio-textual form results in an uncomfortable tension for the audience. The social expectations raised by means of a *Peristasenkatalog* are denied,

⁶⁵ Smith and Kimmel, “Hidden Discourse,” esp. 1837, 1838, 1841.

⁶⁶ Smith and Kimmel, “Hidden Discourse,” 1845.

leaving the audience with the question as to whether Paul indeed holds to ideological values compatible with their own.

The textual ordering of events and experiences in Paul's *Peristasenkatalog* is complex,⁶⁷ and the logic of their textual placement is not clear. For example, one might read the contents of vv. 24-25 (beatings, stoning, shipwreck experiences) as being subsumed directly under ἐν θανάτοις πολλάκις "frequently in danger of death,"⁶⁸ and then join that heading with the preceding ἐν φυλακαῖς περισσοτέρως, ἐν πληγαῖς ὑπερβαλλόντως "more often in prisons, more surpassing in blows." However, the grammatical construction of ἐν κόποις περισσοτέρως "more often in labours" is the same as that of the prisons-beatings-deaths clauses, and the meaning of the resultant division is unclear. One might take all four ἐν clauses together grammatically, but it is not at all evident how the term κόπος could be illustrated by imprisonments, etc. Because of this complexity, Lambrecht wonders whether the list might not be entirely spontaneous, though he explicitly notes its "remarkable ... stylistic composition." He is followed in this opinion by Hughes and Bernard who also question the passage's conscious constructedness.⁶⁹ In contrast, note Plummer's opinion that "there is very little, if anything, that has the appearance of being said on the spur of the moment On the contrary, it seems to have been rather carefully prepared and arranged, and even the exact wording of the clauses to have been in some cases thought out."⁷⁰

⁶⁷ Harris, *Second Corinthians*, 789-792; Best, *Second Corinthians*, 112.

⁶⁸ Harris, *Second Corinthians*, 789; Belleville, *2 Corinthians*, 289-290; Roberts, "Weak Enough to Lead," 228.

⁶⁹ Lambrecht, *Second Corinthians*, 195-197; Hughes, *Second Corinthians*, 407-414; Bernard, "Second Corinthians," 104-107.

⁷⁰ Plummer, *Second Epistle*, 318.

Whether the apostle has painstakingly arranged the elements of his list or poured out his pain in a careless rush, for heuristic purposes the elements have here been categorized thematically rather than grammatically. *Paul's concerned attitudes and status* are the subject of the elements illustrating his relationship to his churches and opponents; *Paul's circumstantial sufferings* depict the hardships undergone by the apostle in his more general capacity of a traveler in a harsh world; *Paul's imposed sufferings* are those experiences which more directly flow from the demands of his apostolic activities. Each of these categories will be further defined, and their subsumed experiences evaluated in light of their gendered somatic implications of placing Paul's feminizing admissions within a larger framework of high status claims.

The "sufferer" of a Greco-Roman *Peristasenkatalog* could come from a number of distinct social groups: humanity in general, various national groups, gladiators, notable individuals (Augustus, Philip of Macedon), and the Stoic or Cynic sage. As Andrews points out, however, a Stoic list of experiences would better be termed an *Adiaphorakatalog* than a *Peristasenkatalog*, since its focus is on the sufferer's indifference to both hardship and boon, rather than on the eventual overcoming of hardships.⁷¹

Furnish does not identify any single background, but mentions parallels with hardships encountered by a "noble man ... particular deprivations associated with a craftsman's lot ... Cynic and Stoic lists of hardships," and the *res gestae* (lists of accomplishments).⁷² Martin looks to the sages, the emperors, and to the heroes for a

⁷¹ Andrews, "Too Weak not to Lead," 264; cf. Hodgson, "Paul and Tribulation Lists," 67-68.

⁷² Furnish, *II Corinthians*, 518.

form, stating that Paul's presentation is indebted to all such models.⁷³ Adamopoulo notes, however, that the sage as "metaphor for moral fortitude does not seem to have had the same degree of intellectual impact upon Greek philosophy, as did the archetypical icon of the warrior's endurance."⁷⁴ Robert Hodgson has suggested a background of the mythological labours of Hercules for 2 Cor 11:23-29, claiming that the Herculean apotheosis is paralleled by Paul's affirmation of the "transcendental origin of his office and gospel."⁷⁵ Along with Christian Wolff, Witherington opts for a background of the Augustan *res gestae*, rather than that of the Stoics or Cynics.⁷⁶ Fitzgerald notes that the catalogue may include certain classes of disenfranchised persons (e.g., orphans and wanderers).⁷⁷ Schrage's suggestion of Jewish apocalyptic as a model for the catalogue does not seem to have gained a strong following, but should be noted here along with Hodgson's caution against too easily positing a Jewish background separated from Paul's larger Greco-Roman setting.⁷⁸ Burrow mentions the suffering of the prophets as a pattern, but provides neither argumentation nor application.⁷⁹

4.3.1.1 Paul's concerned attitude and status. In this category belong the apostle's opening affirmations of his heritage and standing as Hebrew, Israelite, and descendant of Abraham (Ἑβραῖος, Ἰσραηλίτης, σπέρμα Ἀβραάμ) (11:22). Also

⁷³ Martin, *2 Corinthians*, 368.

⁷⁴ Adamopoulo, "Endurance," 10.

⁷⁵ Hodgson, "Paul and Tribulation Lists," 80.

⁷⁶ Wolff, *Der zweite Brief*, 229; Witherington, *Conflict and Community*, 452.

⁷⁷ Fitzgerald, *Cracks in an Earthen Vessel*, 3, 47-49; cf. Neyrey, "Social Location," 151-152.

⁷⁸ Hodgson, "Paul and Tribulation Lists," 62-80, passim; Lim, *Sufferings of Christ*, 6-7.

⁷⁹ Burrow, "Pauline Autobiography," 166-167, 181. A short overview of *Peristasenkatalog* studies may be found in Shi, *Message*, 15-17.

included are Paul's statements of care and concern for the churches. While the ethnic elements do not appear to have an obvious gendered force, it will be shown that Paul's concern may be taken as an admission of his feminine weakness.

Some commentators have argued for hard and fast distinctions between the three terms (Ἑβραῖος, Ἰσραηλίτης, σπέρμα Ἀβραάμ), with regard to their social, racial, and religious implications.⁸⁰ Others have stated or implied that the terms should be understood as more-or-less synonymous; while there may be discernable differences, these are not central for Paul while writing his claims.⁸¹ Bultmann, in his characteristic thoroughness, takes some time to recognize and list distinctions, but then states that a "differentiation is scarcely intended."⁸² It should also be noted that a number of commentators, even while making detailed distinctions between the terms, recognize that Paul's intent may be summed up in the concept of "breeding" or "genealogical credentials," and that they all together stress the apostle's "Jewishness."⁸³

Notwithstanding all the questions surrounding the specific force and distinctions of those three terms, it is clear that Paul here claims a status at least as

⁸⁰ Harris, *Second Corinthians*, 794-796; Matera, *II Corinthians*, 263-264; Barrett, *Second Corinthians*, 293-294; Barnett, *Second Corinthians*, 536-538; Stegman, *Second Corinthians*, 254-255; Lambrecht, *Second Corinthians*, 190; Murphy-O'Connor, *Theology*, 115; Kistemaker, *2 Corinthians*, 385-387; Kruse, *2 Corinthians*, 193-195; Plummer, *Second Epistle*, 319-320; Bernard, "Second Corinthians," 105; Harvey, *Renewal through Suffering*, 101.

⁸¹ Lim, *Sufferings of Christ*, 173; Pfitzner, *Strength in Weakness*, 167; Hughes, *Second Corinthians*, 403-405; Keener, *1-2 Corinthians*, 233; Best, *Second Corinthians*, 111-112; Forbes, "Comparison," 19.

⁸² Bultmann, *The Second Letter to the Corinthians*, 214; so also Furnish, *II Corinthians*, 514; cf. Martin, *2 Corinthians*, 373-374.

⁸³ Duling, "2 Corinthians 11:22," passim; Thrall, *2 Corinthians*, 723-30; Garland, *2 Corinthians*, 493-495; Belleville, *2 Corinthians*, 288; Murphy-O'Connor, *Theology*, 115; Nguyen, *Christian Identity in Corinth*, 201-202.

high (κἀγώ) as that of his opponents;⁸⁴ moreover, there does not appear to be any doubt that Paul, the Corinthians, and the opponents would all view such claims to be honourable. Whether the opponents would agree that Paul had a right to claim such a status is a separate issue. That the point is being made may be taken as *prima facie* evidence that such status was in dispute; however, this dispute is not germane to the present investigation. The apostle's fourth affirmation (11:23) is that he is greater (ὑπέρ) than his opponents in his role as a servant of Christ (διάκονος Χριστοῦ). And this claim may be viewed as a beginning of the catalogue's ambiguities, since the role of διάκονος is humble though its accompanying personal and intimate connection with Christ may paradoxically imply a position of honour. Nguyen argues that the διάκονος Χριστοῦ phrase should be seen in connection with the ἀπόστολος Χριστοῦ "apostle of Christ" of 11:13, and the Χριστοῦ εἶναι "to belong to Christ" of 10:7b.⁸⁵

Also included in this category should be Paul's statement at the conclusion of the list (11:28-30) regarding his care for πασῶν τῶν ἐκκλησιῶν "all the churches." Most commentators, along with Bultmann, would affirm that the phrase "naturally refers to Paul's concern for his own communities,"⁸⁶ though a minority feel that the phrase should not be limited to Pauline communities.⁸⁷ While there does not appear to

⁸⁴ Harris, *Second Corinthians*, 793, 797; Kruse, *2 Corinthians*, 193; Barnett, *Second Corinthians*, 536; Pfitzner, *Strength in Weakness*, 167; Lambrecht, *Second Corinthians*, 190; Kelhoffer, "Suffering as Defense," 136.

⁸⁵ Nguyen, *Christian Identity in Corinth*, 200.

⁸⁶ Bultmann, *The Second Letter to the Corinthians*, 217; Barnett, *Second Corinthians*, 548; Barrett, *Second Corinthians*, 300-302; Best, *Second Corinthians*, 113; Garland, *2 Corinthians*, 501-504; Hughes, *Second Corinthians*, 414-417; Murphy-O'Connor, *Theology*, 116; Furnish, *II Corinthians*, 519; Pfitzner, *Strength in Weakness*, 170-171; Stegman, *Second Corinthians*, 258; possibly Thrall, *2 Corinthians*, 749-753.

⁸⁷ Carson, *From Triumphalism to Maturity*, 123; Kistemaker, *2 Corinthians*, 393-394; Plummer, *Second Epistle*, 330.

be any objective means of settling the debate, still Paul's attitude of pastoral responsibility and caring leadership seems obvious.⁸⁸ Empathy—the expression of care for another's welfare or condition—has long been perceived along with most other “soft” attitudes and actions, as a feminine and thus devalued trait.⁸⁹ Paul's voicing of such a remorseful expression as *κατὰ ἀτιμίαν λέγω, ὡς ὅτι ἡμεῖς ἠσθενήκομεν* “to my shame, I say that I was so weak” (2 Cor 11:21) would also weaken any claim he held to high status, since concern and remorse in the Greco-Roman world were expressed by women, slaves, and ruled subjects.⁹⁰ Thus, there is an ambiguity present in Paul's stated concern. His claim vicariously to suffer weakness and burning along with others in his churches seems to be a status claim, inasmuch as the experience is one of a leader for those under his care. However, one might also read these closing claims as being consonant with the emotional state of a woman and with the duties of a servant. As such, these clauses may be viewed as a repetition of the *διάκονος* theme, forming a pair of ironically humble status “book ends” around this Pauline *Peristasenkatalog*.

4.3.1.2 Paul's circumstantial sufferings. To this category belong those sufferings and weakness of the apostle which are presented as results of poor circumstance or as more-or-less expected sufferings during a Greco-Roman life—especially one involving frequent travel.⁹¹ While it is true that, as each of Paul's

⁸⁸ Matera, *II Corinthians*, 269-271; Belleville, *2 Corinthians*, 294; Kruse, *2 Corinthians*, 197.

⁸⁹ Code, *Rhetorical Spaces*, 126-130, 191-192, 214-220; Barton, *Roman Honor*, 111-112.

⁹⁰ Fulkerson, *No Regrets*; cf. Pickett, *Cross in Corinth*, 195.

⁹¹ Harris, *Second Corinthians*, 804-810; Thrall, *2 Corinthians*, 743; Barrett, *Second Corinthians*, 298-299; Garland, *2 Corinthians*, 499; Belleville, *2 Corinthians*, 291-293; Kistemaker, *2 Corinthians*, 391; Plummer, *Second Epistle*, 326; Bernard, “Second Corinthians,” 106; Furnish, *II Corinthians*, 516-517; Barnett, *Second Corinthians*, 540, 544-545; Pfitzner, *Strength in Weakness*, 169; Shi, *Message*, 257.

sufferings are presented, “the δῖάκονος Χριστοῦ ἐγενόμην is always in view,”⁹² it must nevertheless be recognized that many of these experiences were not peculiar to any particular type of person. Rivers, robbers, hunger and thirst would make no distinction among those who travelled, nor is Paul’s experience of shipwreck dependent on his apostolic position. The relationship of such sufferings to his apostolic calling is distinct from that which exists between his calling and the beatings willfully imposed upon him.

If these difficulties are not peculiar to one in Paul’s apostolic position, however, one may ask why Paul includes them in his list. If the inclusion is for the purpose of following a model (whether a royal/heroic *res gestae* or a sage’s utter disdain for hardship) it must be noted that the spin put on such hardships by the apostle is socially distinct. One might view Paul’s experiences generally in light of their requiring him to exhibit courage in the face of adversity. Such an attitude generally receives praise from both Seneca and Quintilian (Seneca, *Ep. mor.*, 66.1-6, 12, 22-23, 38-39; 71.17; Quintilian, *Inst.*, 12.1.16-17). However, such courage is textually defined as that found within the *soldier*, rather than that evidenced by a dominated sufferer who accepts and passively endures his own weakness and inability (Quintilian, *Inst.*, 12.1.28).

We may assume that Paul’s audience would be aware of an upside-down presentation of a boasted social status. His use of a model even remotely similar to the *res gestae* would make clear Paul’s self-presentation of weakness. “You know the strength of Heracles, the disdain for pain shown by the sage, the indomitable character

⁹² Bultmann, *The Second Letter to the Corinthians*, 216; cf. Martin, *2 Corinthians*, 378; Harris, *Second Corinthians*, 798.

of Augustus? Well, I am nothing at all like any of those men!” Both Paul and Augustus are presented as rightfully asserting authority based on their sacrifices for the good of their people. But Paul “boasts in his weaknesses and his apparent defeats, while Augustus does the reverse.”⁹³

Martin sees the major distinction between Paul and the Stoic as whether the experiences are a “totally human experience [or have] a divine purpose.”⁹⁴ Nguyen points out, however, that the philosophers also recognized the divine activity involved in suffering. The distinction was that the philosophers saw suffering as revealing the man, while Paul saw suffering as revealing God in the man’s weakness.⁹⁵ Harris writes that Paul’s focus is “not on any stoical indifference to suffering or even patient endurance of affliction.” The difference seems so great that Harris rejects any modelled background to the list, declaring that the apostle is “simply ‘outboasting the boasters.’”⁹⁶ Regardless of whether one reads the *διάκονος* of the preceding category in terms of humility or of privileged position, the unresolved daily (*καθ’ ἡμέραν*) pressure and concern (*ἡ ἐπίστασις ... ἡ μέριμνα*) to which Paul admits places him well outside the expected attitude and circumstances of both the Greco-Roman sage and the conquering hero or king.

If Paul’s presentation of circumstantial hardship does not fit the argumentative force of his historical models, and if he explicitly identifies his presentation as foolish, then it seems reasonable to assume that the list is ironic or even parodic at some level. Paul’s use of parody is affirmed by most, though there are a few commentators who

⁹³ Witherington, *Conflict and Community*, 452.

⁹⁴ Martin, *2 Corinthians*, 368.

⁹⁵ Nguyen, *Christian Identity in Corinth*, 214.

⁹⁶ Harris, *Second Corinthians*, 798.

deny it. Crafton's entire monograph is based on the idea that Paul extensively parodies his opponents' self-aggrandizing presentations.⁹⁷ In relation to Paul's use of the Augustan *res gestae*, Travis concludes he is "parodying the rhetorical style ... [It] is a carefully calculated *reductio ad absurdum* of the whole Graeco-Roman attitude to boasting."⁹⁸ Barnett identifies parodic imitation as Paul's approach in the *Peristaseis* catalogue.⁹⁹ Murphy-O'Connor and others have also noted the parodic quality as a key for interpretation.¹⁰⁰ Still other writers, while not using the term, imply a recognition of parody through their description of Paul's approach.¹⁰¹

Alternatively, the catalogue may be understood as Paul's parody not of the *res gestae*, but of his opponents' claims—a dramatic ridiculing of their inappropriateness. In this way, Paul's own rhetoric is distanced from normal censure. So Crafton writes that Paul "ridicules himself and his [parodically assumed] role as agent and boasts extensively of the wrong things in order to parody other agents and their pride. He makes fun of the [opponent-agents'] insistence upon comparison by comparing himself only as a fool. In so doing, he is joining in a game of fools already in progress."¹⁰² Still another approach is championed by Welborn, who reads Paul's catalogue as "modeled upon the exploits of the *miles gloriosus*, a stock character of

⁹⁷ Crafton, *Agency*, 115-116, passim.

⁹⁸ Travis, "Paul's Boasting," 529-530.

⁹⁹ Barnett, *Second Corinthians*, 528, 542.

¹⁰⁰ 107-108, 115; Murphy-O'Connor, *Theology*; cf. Roberts, "Weak Enough to Lead," 230; Forbes, "Comparison," 16-18; Long, "Forensic Rhetoric," 278-279; Carson, *From Triumphalism to Maturity*, 116-117, 128; Wright, *The Resurrection of the Son of God*, 308; Lim, *Sufferings of Christ*, 175-177; Stegman, *Second Corinthians*, 260; Pfitzner, *Strength in Weakness*, 166.

¹⁰¹ Nguyen, *Christian Identity in Corinth*, 202-203; Martin, *2 Corinthians*, 368; Best, *Second Corinthians*, 112.

¹⁰² Crafton, *Agency*, 110; cf. Loubser, "A New Look," 514.

comedy and mime.”¹⁰³ Such approaches are clearly possible, but the question would remain whether the boastings of the opponents or of the *miles gloriosus* (braggart soldier) were themselves modelled after the *res gestae*. If so, Paul’s boasting would still be a parody of the more basic form.

Garland weighs in against the parodic approach, saying that Paul’s speech “begins ... with a straightforward statement,” and “the comparatives in 11:23 ... do not sound as if he is engaged in parody.”¹⁰⁴ Matera rejects the approach on the grounds that Paul’s tone is “far too serious and somber,” and that Paul cannot be parodying an emperor’s accomplishments because the apostle refers to “specific occasions [when] he suffered.”¹⁰⁵ Of course, parody implies neither fictivity nor frivolity; thus, these interpretive positions appear lacking. Thrall recognizes that Paul views his sufferings as a serious matter—as a reflection of Christ’s death. Since Thrall also believes that parody requires a mocking and derisive treatment of an otherwise serious genre, she cautions against seeing parody as appearing *consistently* in the *Peristasenkatalog*.¹⁰⁶ Thrall’s definition of parody is not universally agreed upon: the general view seems to be that parody is an intentional (mis)use of a pre-existing model, without regard to the author’s *personal* estimation of the included elements. I will agree with Hamerton-Kelly’s more discriminating treatment here; he points out that Paul’s derision is directed, not toward the sufferings themselves, but toward the “invidious comparisons” being made by and against his opponents.¹⁰⁷

¹⁰³ Welborn, “The Runaway Paul,” 143-151.

¹⁰⁴ Garland, *2 Corinthians*, 491.

¹⁰⁵ Matera, *II Corinthians*, 262, 267.

¹⁰⁶ Thrall, *2 Corinthians*, 757-758.

¹⁰⁷ Hamerton-Kelly, “Girardian Interpretation of Paul,” 75-76.

Whatever questions may remain regarding Paul's use of parody *proper*, it should be noted that the presence of *irony* in the text is unquestioned. Even Harris, who explicitly (and without offering any argumentative support) rejects the presence of any Pauline parody throughout the passage, states that in 2 Cor 10—13 “irony is a frequently used weapon in Paul's arsenal.”¹⁰⁸

4.3.1.3 *Paul's imposed sufferings*. In this final category of the *Peristasenkatalog* belong those experiences which have intentionally been placed upon the apostle. Unlike the dangers of hunger and thirst, shipwreck, flooding rivers, and other climatic extremes, these events involve the imposition of another's will in imprisonment, stoning, and beatings. That which must be made clear and the commentators do *not* address are the social and gendered implications of the apostle's experience—that his imprisonments, stoning, and beatings would be viewed as evidences of his servility and even of his femininity.

The commentators are consistent in their care to distinguish between the physical and legal elements of Roman and Jewish beatings; they also note that, even though a Roman citizen ought not to have been subjected to the rods, Paul's experience was not unique.¹⁰⁹ Possible reasons for Paul being unable or unwilling to avoid the beatings have been addressed. Thrall, for example, argues that Paul's

¹⁰⁸ Harris, *Second Corinthians*, 783, 798; cf. Duling, “2 Corinthians 11:22,” 819, 828; Reumann, “St. Paul's Use of Irony,” 144; Olson, “Confidence Expressions,” 234; Spencer, “Wise Fool,” *passim*; Stansbury, “Corinthian Honor,” 437; Given, “On His Majesty's Secret Service,” 212; Martin, “Veiled Exhortations,” 258; Wanamaker, “By the Power of God,” 204.

¹⁰⁹ Thrall, *2 Corinthians*, 736-742; Harris, *Second Corinthians*, 801-804; Martin, *2 Corinthians*, 376-377; Kruse, *2 Corinthians*, 195-196; Hughes, *Second Corinthians*, 409-410; Barrett, *Second Corinthians*, 296-297; Garland, *2 Corinthians*, 496-499; Kistemaker, *2 Corinthians*, 389-390; Plummer, *Second Epistle*, 323-325; Furnish, *II Corinthians*, 515-516; Bultmann, *The Second Letter to the Corinthians*, 216; Barnett, *Second Corinthians*, 542-543; Keener, *I—2 Corinthians*, 234; Matera, *II Corinthians*, 267; Carson, *From Triumphalism to Maturity*, 118-120; Bernard, “Second Corinthians,” 106; Pfitzner, *Strength in Weakness*, 168; Stegman, *Second Corinthians*, 256.

submission to the Jewish authorities in flogging demonstrates his insistence upon remaining fully a Jew,¹¹⁰ and also suggests that Paul may have refused to contest the Roman beatings in order to demonstrate solidarity with those who had no social status to oppose such indignities.¹¹¹ Writers have noted the strength and intestinal fortitude of one who would—or even *could*—continue with his mission after being so badly injured so many times.¹¹² There are dissenting opinions on this matter. Best cautions that we should not give Paul more than his due, as there are numerous individuals even today who suffer great pain and indignities for various causes.¹¹³ Plummer, on the other end of the spectrum, concludes that Paul’s claim to being ἐν θανάτοις πολλάκις may be explained by the apostle’s “frail and sensitive” nature—he was not robust and so felt that he might die.¹¹⁴

Keener states that “it was considered terrible for Roman citizens to be beaten,”¹¹⁵ while Carson judges that “the shame of these public beatings was matched only by the agony they inflicted.”¹¹⁶ Other than these two statements, I have found only passing references in the commentaries to the indignity of Paul’s circumstances. In no case is the nature of the shame explicated.¹¹⁷ The (not always observed) proscription against flogging a free man was intended to remove from real men the

¹¹⁰ Thrall, *2 Corinthians*, 737-738; cf. Barrett, *Second Corinthians*, 297; Garland, *2 Corinthians*, 497; Stegman, *Second Corinthians*, 256.

¹¹¹ Thrall, *2 Corinthians*, 741-742; Harris, *Second Corinthians*, 803-804.

¹¹² Garland, *2 Corinthians*, 495-496, 501; Matera, *II Corinthians*, 279; Harris, *Second Corinthians*, 800; Carson, *From Triumphalism to Maturity*, 118; Hughes, *Second Corinthians*, 407; Kistemaker, *2 Corinthians*, 389.

¹¹³ Best, *Second Corinthians*, 114.

¹¹⁴ Plummer, *Second Epistle*, 324.

¹¹⁵ Keener, *1–2 Corinthians*, 234.

¹¹⁶ Carson, *From Triumphalism to Maturity*, 120, also 117-118.

¹¹⁷ Cf. Martin, *2 Corinthians*, 376; Barnett, *Second Corinthians*, 543; Garland, *2 Corinthians*, 498; Kistemaker, *2 Corinthians*, 391-392; Kruse, *2 Corinthians*, 196.

threat of being forced into a verbal or attitudinal confession of ultimate weakness: it was to keep a man from being portrayed as not a man.¹¹⁸

While commentators have pointed to Paul's scars as a visible proof of his virtue and virility, Glancy has ably argued that a connection between the apostle and the enduring warrior is not self-obvious. For his Greco-Roman audience, the significance of Paul's scarred body was contingent upon the circumstances in which those scars were obtained (Glancy, *Boasting*, 100). War wounds were displayed as a badge of honour, an argument for one's high status and unquestionable masculinity (*Boasting*, 103-106). Such a statement, however, must be qualified, for such a badge worn on one's back was read as cowardice (*Boasting*, 106-107).¹¹⁹ When even the scar of a sword across the back was seen as dishonourable, how much more would one's whipped back be perceived as proof of shame writ large and clear?

The existence of slave "gallows humour" within the Greco-Roman theatre may be read as evidence for some breadth in the thematization of beatings. The slave character *boasts* of his marks—beatings and even the possibility of future crucifixion are self-presented as honourable and enviable battle-scars. As Glancy points out, however, it is of controlling importance that this presentation is *comic*. The warrior-actor who boasts on stage will invite admiring applause, while the slave-actor making the same boast will be greeted by jeers. Though the slave character is quite serious in his assumed role, the audience is brought to laughter through the obvious disjunct existing between the slave's bravado and the audience's knowledge that the slave's

¹¹⁸ Barton, *Roman Honor*, 136-158, esp. 146-148.

¹¹⁹ Cf. Shi, *Message*, 218, 225.

marks make foolish and unacceptable the self-evaluation he affirms on the basis of those very marks (*Boasting*, 113-114).

Paul's boast of being beaten might be viewed in light of the sage's hardships, rather than in light of the warrior's battles. And Fitzgerald's work is rightly referenced by all who examine this position.¹²⁰ Shi has, however, summarized his argument and capably demonstrated that its application to a Pauline *Peristasenkatalog* is largely unwarranted. A major problem for a Pauline application is that the apostle's concern is with affirming weakness, rather than with demonstrating his ability to withstand or ignore hardship. While the sage sought to redefine what could be thematized as honourable or virtuous, Paul accepts that his experiences *are* shameful and *then* boasts in them.¹²¹ In any case, the sage's hardship approach would not greatly change the evaluation Paul's audience made of his imposed sufferings. This is in part due to the common root of both the military and philosophic expressions of courage. Adamopoulos has argued convincingly that, while the concept of bravery and endurance was early on placed into the sphere of philosophy, it had been birthed in the battlefield. When it was displaced, the concept did not lose its militaristic overtones. When the sage's moral endurance was presented in military terms, the language was not merely illustrative—it “served to dramatically highlight the heroic and masculine nature of the sage's moral struggle and combat.” Paul's endurance, then, would implicate him in manly courage, but only if the language used of him was

¹²⁰ Fitzgerald, *Cracks in an Earthen Vessel*.

¹²¹ Shi, *Message*, 210-216; cf. Kraftchick, “Death in Us,” 166, 170-175.

militaristic, and in the *Peristasenkatalog* of 2 Corinthians 11, the language is demilitarized.¹²²

The marks left by whips and rods “are not *prima facie* the wounds of a soldier, cicatrices ennobling a warrior’s breast. They are, typically, markings of a servile body, insignia of humiliation and submission.”¹²³ Hardship and its resultant markings could bear mute witness either to a noble soul or to a low and contemptible character: in light of this ambiguity, it is crucial for one to recognize “the semiotic distinction between a breast pierced by a sword and a back welted by a whip.”¹²⁴ In interpreting Paul’s scars, the controlling issue is power—Paul’s scars “instantiate relationships of power, of legal status (freeborn, freed, or enslaved), of domination and submission, of honor and shame, and of gender.”¹²⁵ Indeed, Roetzel notes that Paul’s language would be both comprehensible and powerful to the Corinthians, many of whom “wore on their enslaved bodies marks of ownership that made them human and disposable capital.”¹²⁶

Scott Andrews demonstrates that, even while beatings might not be capable of valorization, imprisonment *could* be thematized as honourable. After all, even a hero could be held as a prisoner of war, and a philosopher could be held incommunicado for his chastisement of a ruler’s unjust acts. Such honour, however, may be ascribed only to the man who endured such suffering without the loss of strength or dignity. Paul, however, presents the result of his imprisonments as weakness rather than as

¹²² Adamopoulo, “Endurance,” 20, 23, 25-28.

¹²³ Glancy, “Boasting,” 99.

¹²⁴ Glancy, “Boasting,” 99, 101, 122; Roetzel, “Language of War,” 92-93.

¹²⁵ Glancy, “Boasting,” 101, 123-124.

¹²⁶ Roetzel, “Language of War,” 87.

victory. The apostle is not a high-status Stoic enduring the vicissitudes of fortune with equanimity, but a beaten man broken by sufferings beyond measure. He survives, but as one with a low-status “position of dishonour.”¹²⁷ Paul’s self-presentation of endurance would certainly draw attention to his manliness, but not with entirely positive results. Adamopoulo summarizes:

unlike the much-enduring and courageous sage, [Paul] experiences ‘weakness ... much fear and trembling’ (ἐν ἀσθενείᾳ καὶ ἐν φόβῳ καὶ ἐν τρόμῳ πολλῷ) in moments of danger or pressure. (*1 Cor.* 2.3) In Greco-Roman times this would be a remarkable confession for a male. It is in effect a shameful admission, in which he portrays his character in a thoroughly ‘weak’ posture.¹²⁸

That Paul was whipped was sufficient proof of one great fact—he was whippable.¹²⁹ The imposition of another’s will upon a man was considered “inherently degrading,” a “servile liability,” and inconsistent with true masculinity.¹³⁰ The physiognomic principle is clearly applicable here: just as the absence of corporal beauty implied a corresponding moral lack, so did a beating imply a corresponding moral and social weakness or passivity. The man unable to protect himself against a beating or whipping was no different than one incapable of resisting rape. The sexually penetrable body and the body beaten were alike viewed as proof of the individual’s dishonourable state and lack of masculinity.¹³¹ As Moxnes has noted, “penetration could both be sexual and in the form of beatings. The similarity between these two acts, which we might consider to be of a different character, lay in the fact

¹²⁷ Andrews, “Too Weak not to Lead,” 265-266, 276.

¹²⁸ Adamopoulo, “Endurance,” 275, cf. 285.

¹²⁹ Cf. Shi, *Message*; Montserrat, “Experiencing the Male Body,” 160.

¹³⁰ Shi, *Message*, 220, 247-248, 252-253.

¹³¹ Glancy, “Boasting,” 108-109, 111-112, 129, 133-134; Glancy, *Corporal Knowledge*, 56-57; Ivarsson, “Vice Lists and Deviant Masculinity,” 179-183.

that ... sexual penetration and beatings were expressions of a common language [of power-relations].”¹³² This conflation of violence and sex may be seen in Greco-Roman plays (*Ach.*, 271-276; *Av.*, 1253-1256; *Eccl.*, 939-940, 1015-1020), though it may be hidden by the translators’ use of euphemisms, and even the use of Latin glosses for an offending Greek term in Greek-English lexicons. One might note, in this regard, that such expressiveness has not been lost to the modern world. In U.S. English, for example, humiliating beatings may be prefaced with the threat “I’m going to fuck you up,” while sexual intercourse may be referenced by terms such as “hit,” “pound,” and “bang.”¹³³

Kar Yong Lim also maintains that one must distinguish carefully between various types of wounding in evaluating the scarred Greco-Roman body. With admirable clarity, Lim writes that being “subjected to the power of another man to undergo a whipping is a state that diminished any claim to manliness, and any inability to resist a whipping testified to the dishonour of the person whipped.”¹³⁴ Lim goes on to argue that stoning should be located within that same Greco-Roman category of shaming punishments, citing numerous texts as proof (Aristophanes, *Acharnians* 285-289; Aeschines, *Against Timarchus* 163; Josephus, *Jewish Antiquities* 4.202; Philo, *On the Special Laws* 3.51, *On the Life of Moses* 2.202, 218). As Isocrates points out (*Loch.*, 1-2), an injury or insult given to the $\sigma\omega\mu\alpha$ is of greater and more basic concern to the social fabric than any other type of injury.

¹³² Moxnes, “Body, Gender and Social Space,” 177-178.

¹³³ Cameron, *Feminism and Linguistic Theory*, 80-81.

¹³⁴ Lim, *Sufferings of Christ*, 178.

Jennifer Larson has also addressed the connection between bodily integrity and masculinity. Not only was a “true man” required to be forceful and authoritative in his speech, but also in his avoiding every appearance of passivity and lack of control in both sexual and social practice. Larson’s summation is worth recording, as she notes that Paul’s letters to the Corinthians proclaimed

that his bodily integrity, a prerequisite of masculine dignity as well as social and political status, had been violated on numerous occasions. The connection between gender and an individual’s lack of control over his or her person was summed up by Clement of Alexandria (*Paed.* 3.19.2): ‘to do (τὸ δοῦν) is the mark of the man; to suffer (τὸ πάσχειν) is the mark of the woman.’¹³⁵

Moschus showed the strength of this passive-suffering/femininity connection when he made a pun on his rival’s name. It was hinted that the Roman name Passienus sounded a bit like the Greek πάσχειν: this clearly contrived suggestion was enough to impugn Passienus’ masculinity, and thus his right to be heard (Seneca, *Contr.*, 10.Pref.10-11).¹³⁶

Wardy has pointed out that the repugnance certain ancients felt toward the effeminate or soft man (μαλακός) was based on precisely this demand for men to be on guard against lack of mastery and control. “The insuperable objection to such pleasure is just that it is passive. Callicles, who yearns to be a man among men through his active *dynamis*, cannot possibly accept such an inversion of value.”¹³⁷ That Paul himself refers disparagingly to the μαλακοί (1 Cor 6:9) is not proof against the possibility of softness being inferred from his actions. The immediate

¹³⁵ Larson, “Paul’s Masculinity,” 88-94; Kraemer, *Unreliable Witnesses*, 36-37; Williams, “Perpetua’s Gender,” 75-76; Bal, “Perpetual Contest,” 146; Ivarsson, “Vice Lists and Deviant Masculinity,” 165-166. 177-178; cf. Euripides, *Bacch.* 800-801.

¹³⁶ Gleason, *Making Men*, 4.

¹³⁷ Wardy, *Birth of Rhetoric*, 81-82.

context of the reference makes explicit Paul's concern with specific sexual activity, rather than with broader social relations; as well, the fact that Paul and his audience would view softness as unfavourable fits well within his self-presentation as one who is despised and weak and (ironically) therefore to be followed.

Moxnes has shown that, quite apart from their anatomical sex, women and slaves were both presumptively presented as feminine, while those who publicly exhibited mastery and courage were thematized as manly. Even the very virtues of self-control and courage are gendered as male, while servility and passivity are gendered as female.¹³⁸ This thematization is not new to Paul's day, as noted by Satlow. "As early as Aristotle, the lack of self-mastery was a sign of weakness, a characteristic that was soon gendered as feminine. In both Greek and Roman society, 'gender hierarchy lies close to the heart of the discourse of self-mastery. Life is war, and masculinity has to be achieved and constantly fought for. Men are always in danger of succumbing to softness, described as forms of femaleness or servility.'" For both Gentile and the Jew, "manhood was an acquired status that was always at risk, and was thus consistently a focus of anxiety."¹³⁹

Woman was viewed as a defective man, or even as a monstrous deviation from the norm of a masculine character (*Gen. an.*, 775a.11-17, 767b.6-15; *Tim.*, 41D-42D; *Resp.*, 455C-D, 540C).¹⁴⁰ Though various Greco-Roman writers affirmed the theoretical equality of men and women, they also concluded without any sense of

¹³⁸ Moxnes, "Body, Gender and Social Space," 172; cf. Pomeroy, *Goddesses*, 182-183; Holmes, *Gender*, 29-34; Adamopoulo, "Endurance," 14, 17, 267-268; cf. Roetzel, "Language of War," 93-94.

¹³⁹ Satlow, "'Try to Be a Man,'" 262; Foxhall, "Introduction," 2, 4-5; Gleason, *Making Men*, 133-134.

¹⁴⁰ Clark, "Old Adam," 170; Aspegren, *Male Woman*, 21-22; Montserrat, "Experiencing the Male Body," 153; Harrill, *Manumission*, 11-15, *passim*; Gleason, *Making Men*, 39.

contradiction that “males are preferable at everything, unless they have become effeminate” (Clement, *Strom.*, 4.8, 19; Aristotle, *Poet.*, 1454a.16-23; Philo, *QE*, 1.8).¹⁴¹ Down into the 17th century the feminine nature was *philosophically* viewed as the essence of slavery, and thus in need of being ruled (one may debate whether such a view of woman is *popularly* held even today). It is true that the rational self was sometimes presented as being theoretically without gender, but it is also worth noting that this ungendered self was assumed to exist in a state pragmatically unattainable by women.¹⁴² For a woman to become truly virtuous, she must give up womanhood and take on masculinity, just as women today who take a powerful stance are seen as being manly, as “wearing the trousers.”¹⁴³ There was no true “self” granted to woman; to achieve a praiseworthy status, she must “become manly in her way of thinking. She [would be] praised but at the expense of her sex.”¹⁴⁴

The linguistic cothematization within biblical and post-biblical texts of weak and shameful ideals with the feminine has been noted as “reinforc[ing] women as the epitome of negative qualities, while even [women’s] positive qualities engender a certain ambiguity.”¹⁴⁵ Nor is such value-laden gendering of language limited to the Greco-Roman milieu: it is quite evident even in present-day English. Code’s summary of the issue is worth noting here at length.

¹⁴¹ Harrill, *Manumission*, 50-66; Aspegren, *Male Woman*, 67-68, 97; Sigismund-Nielsen, “Vibia Perpetua,” 115-116.

¹⁴² Coakley, *Powers and Submissions*, 90-94.

¹⁴³ Alston, “Arms and the Man,” 221.

¹⁴⁴ Aspegren, *Male Woman*, 93-94, 99, 114, 124-126; Foxhall, “Introduction,” 3, 5; Gleason, *Making Men*, 13; Barton, *Roman Honor*, 41; Williams, “Perpetua’s Gender,” 77; Sigismund-Nielsen, “Vibia Perpetua,” 117; Bal, “Perpetual Contest,” 136, 147; Sissa, “Socrate’s Passion,” 251-252.

¹⁴⁵ Lieu, “Literary Strategies of Personification,” 74; Ivarsson, “Vice Lists and Deviant Masculinity,” 168-170.

Lexical evidence that female inferiority is linguistically encoded—in diminutives (poetess), in valuational asymmetries (‘spinster’ is less positive than ‘bachelor’), in varied adjectival assignments (soft, fragile versus hard, tough), and in the tendency even of politically claimed titles (Ms.) to acquire a pejorative connotation—demonstrates how the semantic dimension of a language can mirror a social sex/gender system.¹⁴⁶

Even when “neutral” terms and presentations are produced, ostensibly in order to include women on an equal basis with men, these terms quickly become limited in use only to women. For example, “chairperson” is seldom used of a male CEO or “spokesperson” of a male communication representative. Rather than “chairman” and “spokesman” being used as before for both men and women, we now have these terms reserved for men, and “-person” is reserved for women.¹⁴⁷ Of course, the result has been a devaluation of the suffix constructed to offset the devaluation of the feminine.¹⁴⁸ Deborah Cameron has also shown that feminine words are considered more insulting than their masculine counterparts. For example, calling someone a “prick” may produce mild displeasure or even admittance laughter; terming one a “cunt” will be taken as an unqualified attack.¹⁴⁹

It may be argued that women are also presented in antiquity as models of endurance and patient suffering, and this cannot be denied. Mere endurance, however, is not manly—the endurance must be joined to courage if it is to be removed entirely from the feminine sphere.¹⁵⁰ For courage to be evidenced, adversity must be met while “standing erect . . . as distinct from female *patientia*” which might be exhibited

¹⁴⁶ Code, *What Can She Know*, 59-60; cf. Bourdieu, *Masculine Domination*.

¹⁴⁷ Cameron, *Feminism and Linguistic Theory*, 89.

¹⁴⁸ Cameron, *Feminism and Linguistic Theory*, 68-71, 155-156; Parsons, *Feminism and Christian Ethics*, 43.

¹⁴⁹ Cameron, *Feminism and Linguistic Theory*, esp. 76-78, 155-156.

¹⁵⁰ Shi, *Message*, 202; Sissa, “Socrate’s Passion,” 246-248.

in the crouching or prone position of childbirth, or the bent-over position of one who receives a beating. Even in the post-Pauline period of martyrdom, when women are presented as laudable examples of courage, the writers “presuppose that [these] women are transgressing their ordinary gender roles.” A brave woman was quite simply understood to be “going beyond her gender.”¹⁵¹ The attitude may be illustrated through the humorous vignette regarding Artemesias, a female ship-captain in Xerxes’ fleet. During the battle at Salamis, Artemesias accidentally sinks one of her own fleet when she flees in terror. The Great King, supposing from a distance that she had purposely scuttled an enemy ship, is reported as saying (Herodotus, *Hist.*, 8.88.3) “My men have become women, my women men” (οἱ μὲν ἄνδρες γεγόνασί μοι γυναῖκες, αἱ δὲ γυναῖκες ἄνδρες).

Paul’s imposed sufferings clearly implicate him in the weakness and shame of a servile and feminine body. The cothematization of sexual violation and beating violation within Greco-Roman culture only serves to heighten the lack of honour with which he would be viewed. Of course, as with all of Paul’s self-presentations, he desires to be seen in the same light as his Lord (e.g., 2 Cor 10:1; 13:3-4). While Soongkook Jung is commenting directly on 2 Cor 2:14-17, his observations are informing his argument regarding Paul’s self-understanding throughout the Corinthian correspondence. He notes that “Paul implies that his duty as the apostle of Christ is none other than to accept the slave-like role, and to offer the sacrifice of

¹⁵¹ Marjanen, “Male Women Martyrs,” 239, 246-247; Glancy, “Boasting,” 125-126; Adamopoulos, “Endurance,” 67-69.

‘death after the procession,’ which symbolizes the ‘weakness,’ ‘suffering,’ and ‘shame’ of his mission activities.”¹⁵²

This desire and acceptance must be taken seriously through a juxtaposing of Paul’s beatings with the crucifixion of Christ. The social impact of crucifixion did not differ radically from that of beatings, in that they were alike “a means to ultimately disgrace the victim ... a degrading and disgusting matter.” The crucifixion process might well involve “sexual humiliation and assault,” including forced stripping, public nakedness, spontaneous erections, the forced display of the victim’s genitals and involuntary defecation. Since convicted victims lost control over their own somatic boundaries, the humiliations imposed upon them were limited only by the soldiers’ will to bring about shame.¹⁵³ Successful control over one’s own body, and over any encroachments others might attempt upon it, was the ultimate evidence of masculinity.¹⁵⁴ Yet Jesus clearly did not exercise control over his own somatic boundaries. Indeed, as Maude Gleason points out, “[t]he *only* thing that the Gospel narratives tell us about Jesus’ body is that it was thus violated.”¹⁵⁵

Gunnar Samuelsson has argued that the ἀνασκολοπίζειν, (ἀνα)σταυροῦν word-groups do not unambiguously reference the ancient act/event popularly associated with “crucifixion,” but refer more broadly to acts of enforced bodily suspension, with or without nailing, on or from any number of upright surfaces.¹⁵⁶ Though John Granger Cook rejects Samuelsson’s claim of ultimate ambiguity in the

¹⁵² Jung, “Paul’s Missional Use of Scripture,” 226.

¹⁵³ Adams, “Crucifixion in the Ancient World,” 111-112, 118-119, 121; Cook, *Crucifixion*, 452.

¹⁵⁴ Glancy, *Corporal Knowledge*, 98.

¹⁵⁵ Gleason, “By Whose Gender Standards,” 326.

¹⁵⁶ Samuelsson, *Crucifixion*, 17, 21, 26-30.

referents of these word-groups, he still agrees that they refer to a number of distinct acts.¹⁵⁷ In light of these studies, one may be justified in asking whether the term “crucifixion” should be replaced or supplemented by a term such as “suspension,” and whether an editing of articles and glosses throughout Greco-Roman lexica is in order.¹⁵⁸ Our understanding of the brutalities and socialized punishment associated with Jesus’ execution, however, are not derived directly from the terminology. Our understanding arises from more explicit statements regarding flogging, nail and spear penetrations, spitting, buffeting, and insults. Regardless of what may be our ignorance of some particulars of Jesus’ suspension, Samuelsson’s study does not raise serious questions about its association with horror, weakness, and shame.¹⁵⁹

Suffering was capable of valorization within the Greco-Roman milieu: both the soldier and the sage might demonstrate their manly endurance through a steadfast overcoming of all forms of adversity. And even women or slaves might give evidence of manly courage, if only they did not act as slaves or as women in hardship’s face. Paul’s imposed sufferings—imprisonments, stoning, beatings—are not presented as proof of such virtue. Paul’s marks are simply found in the wrong location upon his body, and are obtained under the wrong circumstances, to ever be understood as badges of honour. As was true with the shameful death of his crucified Lord, so also it was true of the apostle’s sufferings: there was no strength or honour to be found, but only feminine weakness and servile shame.

¹⁵⁷ Cook, *Crucifixion*, 5, 101, 417-418, 448, 451, passim.

¹⁵⁸ Samuelsson, *Crucifixion*, 257-260, 303-304, passim.

¹⁵⁹ Samuelsson, *Crucifixion*, 309-310.

4.3.2 Paul's Damascus Descent

This section will use inner texture, intertexture, and sacred texture to demonstrate that Paul's account of his escape from Damascus would have shown him to be weak and lacking manly courage. While his audience could have misunderstood the apostle's claims up to this point, his oath and subsequent narrative removed all ambiguity from the presentation.¹⁶⁰ Paul's account of his escape from Damascus is intended to remove from his audience's minds all question regarding his masculine honour and courage—it is a simple and unambiguous claim to weakness and shame.¹⁶¹ As well, the oath argues for a certain connection with the divine, as he is able to call on God as a “witness for the defence.” But this one who is self-presented as a holy man, is also self-revealed as receiving no obvious help in a time of great distress. Paul is weak, and not only in regard to the present conflict with the Corinthian opponents; his weakness extends back to the beginning of his ministry, and informs his dealings with his enemies as well as with his congregations.

There is a question of whether the first boasting announcement and its accompanying oath is anaphoric or cataphoric, with commentators weighing in on either side of the debate. Martin, Bultmann, Barnett, Keener, Furnish, Best, and Andrews read the statements as referring back to the events related in the *Peristaseskatalog*.¹⁶² Kruse, Carson, Kistemaker, Belleville, Harris, Hughes, Bernard, and Garland all read them as looking forward to either the Damascus account or to

¹⁶⁰ Andrews, “Too Weak not to Lead,” 274; Travis, “Paul’s Boasting,” 530.

¹⁶¹ Shi, *Message*, 249, 264.

¹⁶² Martin, *2 Corinthians*, 383, 384; Bultmann, *The Second Letter to the Corinthians*, 218; Barnett, *Second Corinthians*, 552; Keener, *1–2 Corinthians*, 235; Furnish, *II Corinthians*, 521; Best, *Second Corinthians*, 115; Andrews, “Too Weak not to Lead,” 272.

both Paul's escape and his Paradise/σκόλοψ narrative.¹⁶³ Plummer and Barrett apply Paul's affirmation both backward and forward, while Matera does not believe one can make a determination.¹⁶⁴

There does exist a major difficulty with applying the announcement to 11:22-29. As demonstrated above, the elements of the *Peristasenkatalog* exhibit a mixed relationship to weakness. Paul's pedigree implies a strong social standing; his circumstantial hardships may argue for a weakness no greater than that shared by any traveller; the apostle's identity as a διάκονος and as one who is weighed down by the burdens of his congregation are ambiguous in their status claims. It would be a gross misstatement for Paul to affirm his preceding list as a clear demonstration of his weakness.

A cataphoric reference avoids the difficulty, as long as the Damascus account may be understood as illustrating Paul's weakness or low status. Bultmann fails to see any such connection of 11:32-33 either to the boasting affirmation or to the oath, judging that the Damascus escape is reported "in chronicle fashion, not in any apologetic-polemic tone. And [it] is hardly intended to confirm ... that Paul will only boast of his 'weakness.'"¹⁶⁵ Bultmann then literally removes the difficulty of the Damascus account by suggesting interpolation or corruption. It must be noted that such a move is purely a conjectural emendation—there is no manuscript or quotation basis for the change. This would be an emendation motivated by a perceived failure of

¹⁶³ Kruse, *2 Corinthians*, 198; Carson, *From Triumphalism to Maturity*, 126; Kistemaker, *2 Corinthians*, 397; Belleville, *2 Corinthians*, 295; Harris, *Second Corinthians*, 816; Hughes, *Second Corinthians*, 419-420; Bernard, "Second Corinthians," 107-108; Garland, *2 Corinthians*, 504.

¹⁶⁴ Plummer, *Second Epistle*, 331-332; Barrett, *Second Corinthians*, 303; Matera, *II Corinthians*, 271-272.

¹⁶⁵ Bultmann, *The Second Letter to the Corinthians*, 218.

argument or rhetoric, rather than of grammar. Köstenberger's caution is noteworthy here: "The mere fact that a passage is difficult to understand [in our own day] does not mean that the original audience considered the same passage 'obscure' or 'difficult.'"¹⁶⁶ Moreover, it is difficult to see why a scribe would have inserted the account at this point in the text, if it did not fit rhetorically.¹⁶⁷ The question is not *whether* the account relates to the oath and affirmation, but *how* it so relates.

With the boasting affirmation in 11:30, Paul has raised the stakes. By *καυχᾶσθαι* ... *τὰ τῆς ἀσθενείας μου* "to boast of the things related to my weakness" he does not intend merely a reference to the fact of weakness but to those things by which his weakness may be clearly demonstrated.¹⁶⁸ What has gone before may be unclear in this regard; what will now be said is without ambiguity, and the apostle adds here a divine oath. Carson says that oaths are used to increase the speaker's credibility,¹⁶⁹ but the Queen's words may also be pertinent, here: "The lady doth protest too much, methinks."¹⁷⁰ The rhetors have noted the danger afforded by the swearing of oaths: it is "hardly suitable to the serious-minded, unless when it is essential; and Seneca wittily said that this is the duty of witnesses, not advocates" (Seneca, *Suas.*, frag. 2 [LT]). The danger should be obvious: to state a truth plainly is to quietly assume belief on the part of the audience, while to affirm the statement on oath is to invite investigation or incredulity.

¹⁶⁶ Köstenberger, "Gender Passages in the NT," 260.

¹⁶⁷ Bernard, "Second Corinthians," 108; Plummer, *Second Epistle*, 332; Harris, *Second Corinthians*, 820; cf. Thrall, *2 Corinthians*, 763; Hughes, *Second Corinthians*, 420-421.

¹⁶⁸ Harris, *Second Corinthians*, 817-818; Stegman, *Second Corinthians*, 260.

¹⁶⁹ Carson, *From Triumphalism to Maturity*, 126.

¹⁷⁰ *Ham.* Act 3, sc. 2, l. 230, where the Jacobean "protest" is closer to our "attest" than "object."

That Paul here invokes the oath implies the serious or even desperate nature of his rhetorical move. Kistemaker and Shi each suggest that Paul's oath was necessitated by the unlikelihood that his audience would have believed he could actually be boasting of weakness. Without the oath, they would be left trying to figure out what he really meant. Alternatively, Stegman locates Paul's need for an oath in the "audacious" nature of two upcoming claims: first, that even a governor was provoked by the apostle's work and, second, that Paul had been taken up to Paradise. Roberts sees the "abutting of the mad statement with the solemn oath" as producing a comic effect, even alongside the seriousness of the apostle's intent.¹⁷¹ Garland understands the oath as a rhetorical marker, informing the audience of Paul's impending use of irony,¹⁷² while Harris rejects any such understanding, claiming that the oath is too serious to be merely a rhetorical trope.¹⁷³ Regardless of the precise motivation for the oath at this point, it seems clear that Paul intends his following narrative to be read as having divine approval and authority—an ironic expectation in light of the fact that he will soon deny having any ability to speak, whether it be his own words or those of God.

In light of the clear appeal to weakness found in 11:30-31, it seems difficult to take Paul's Damascus account as placing him in a positive light. Any kind of strength, wisdom, or honour being shown in the Damascus escape would be contextually anti-climactic at best and contradictory at worst. Nevertheless, an honourable and strength-displaying background for Paul's account has been suggested, in light of the spies'

¹⁷¹ Shi, *Message*, 261-262; Kistemaker, *2 Corinthians*, 397; Stegman, *Second Corinthians*, 260; Roberts, "Weak Enough to Lead," 236, fn 256.

¹⁷² Garland, *2 Corinthians*, 504.

¹⁷³ Harris, *Second Corinthians*, 818-819.

escape from Jericho in Joshua 2. Garland even suggests a parallel to David's escape from Saul, as Michal lowered her husband through the window (*1 Sam.* 19).¹⁷⁴ Such a retreat from danger is placed alongside Paul's threat in 2 Cor 10:2-6, as an indication that the one who escaped from the city will later successfully besiege it.¹⁷⁵ The Jericho-Damascus connection is weakened, however, by the fact that Paul's later display of strength is not against the city from which he escaped. The Hebrew spies ran away from a fight in order to gain a later advantage in the war (tactical retreat is not in itself a dishonourable move); however, Paul's retreat is not followed by his later return to Damascus. Andrews recognizes this difficulty, but asserts that Paul's later assault on Corinth is the display of strength to balance out the earlier retreat.¹⁷⁶ While the martial imagery of 10:3-6 should be considered in examining Paul's escape from Damascus, Andrews' suggestion is not convincing, especially given that Paul's later "resurgence" is not directed against either the same city and enemy nor the same *kind* of enemy or opposition. As well, the general tenor of the entire passage seems to reflect Paul's admission of weakness, rather than a defence of his strength.

Some have argued more generally that Paul's escape merely demonstrated an ability to thwart the ethnarch's plans. God has acted mightily on Paul's behalf, granting him safety in the midst of danger.¹⁷⁷ Such a move, however, would still not place Paul in a manly light.¹⁷⁸ A slave might flee his master's whip, or a warrior hide from enemy forces, but neither would be considered to have won victory or honour

¹⁷⁴ Furnish, *II Corinthians*, 523; Keener, *1—2 Corinthians*, 235; Garland, *2 Corinthians*, 506-507.

¹⁷⁵ Garland, *2 Corinthians*, 506-507.

¹⁷⁶ Andrews, "Too Weak not to Lead," 272, fn 41.

¹⁷⁷ Matera, *II Corinthians*, 273; Lambrecht, *Second Corinthians*, 193, 198.

¹⁷⁸ Harvey, *Renewal through Suffering*, 102.

through their actions. Barrett considers the differences from Acts 9 to 2 Cor 11 as instructive in this regard.

Acts provides at this point the first example of the way in which God delivers Paul out of the hand of his enemies. He is God's chosen vessel, and God will always see him through his adventures; he triumphantly thwarts the plots of the Jews. In 2 Corinthians however we have an outstanding example of the humiliation and weakness to which Paul is exposed. To say that Luke writes in terms of a *theologia gloriae*, Paul of a *theologia crucis* ... is a generalization unfair to Luke; but it throws some light on Paul.¹⁷⁹

As with the distinction earlier noted between bare endurance and dignified courage, it is clear that there is a difference from one escaping unscathed to one's emerging from the fight with honour. Even should one affirm the presence of God's strength in this narrative, still this would not remove the fact of Paul's weakness.

There are numerous difficulties confronting the expositor regarding just who was after Paul and why,¹⁸⁰ but the issue of the apostle's weakness is not greatly affected by the debates. The majority of commentators read Paul's Damascus account as a clear illustration of his humiliation and weakness.¹⁸¹ A quite common approach is to see Paul's escape as a parody of the *corona muralis*—the crown given to the first warrior to scale the wall of a besieged city. Wright's words are representative:

His crowning achievement is a wonderful parody of the *corona muralis*, the highest Roman military honour, gained through being the first besieger to climb over the wall of a city. When he, Paul, was

¹⁷⁹ Barrett, *Second Corinthians*, 304.

¹⁸⁰ For a thorough overview, cf. Thrall, *2 Corinthians*, 763-771.

¹⁸¹ Loubser, "A New Look," 515-516; Lim, *Sufferings of Christ*, 174; Harris, *Second Corinthians*, 816, 820; Martin, *2 Corinthians*, 387; Murphy-O'Connor, *Theology*, 117; Hughes, *Second Corinthians*, 422; Kruse, *2 Corinthians*, 198-199; Pfitzner, *Strength in Weakness*, 172; Carson, *From Triumphalism to Maturity*, 127; Best, *Second Corinthians*, 115; Garland, *2 Corinthians*, 504-506; Burrow, "Pauline Autobiography," 162-163.

himself under threat in Damascus, he was the first one over the wall—let down in a basket and running away (11.30-33).¹⁸²

Rather than take the city by climbing in over the wall from the outside, Paul affirms on oath that he escaped the siege, by getting out and down the wall.

Both Harris and Thrall argue that this connection is not as clear as some have assumed, though it may nevertheless have been intended. At least one concern is that while the Roman custom was to give a crown to the *first* soldier over the wall, there is no note of Paul being *first* to escape.¹⁸³ While he is not convinced of the *corona muralis* connection, Harris still notes the memorable context of the event. Paul is found running away from the city at night alone, in contrast to the manner in which he approached the city some days earlier to threaten the followers of the Way.¹⁸⁴ Such a connection is *historically* undeniable; however, given that Paul's Corinthian audience does not have access to Luke's account, it is questionable whether the connection is intended.

Whatever the background against which Paul's weakness is to be seen, the weakness itself is clear. Paul is here "a coward who neither faces trouble nor endures the difficult circumstances [... but] admits that he lacks the virtue manifested by courage (ἀνδρεία or *fortitudo*) in times of danger."¹⁸⁵ The apostle is an anti-warrior, a womanly man who runs from battle, one who wears with pride the proof that there

¹⁸² Wright, *The Resurrection of the Son of God*, 308; cf. Harris, *Second Corinthians*, 816, 820; Martin, *2 Corinthians*, 384-385; Murphy-O'Connor, *Theology*, 117; Pfitzner, *Strength in Weakness*, 173; Keener, *1-2 Corinthians*, 235; Carson, *From Triumphalism to Maturity*, 128; Garland, *2 Corinthians*, 506.

¹⁸³ Harris, *Second Corinthians*, 824; Thrall, *2 Corinthians*, 765.

¹⁸⁴ Harris, *Second Corinthians*, 826; Hughes, *Second Corinthians*, 422; Carson, *From Triumphalism to Maturity*, 127-128; Plummer, *Second Epistle*, 335.

¹⁸⁵ Andrews, "Too Weak not to Lead," 272-273cf. Roetzel, "Language of War," 93-94; Lim, *Sufferings of Christ*, 182.

is no obstacle which he has overcome. This is not to deny that Paul's circumstances were "objectively" difficult and dangerous; rather, that his escaping from these very real dangers was subjectively and socially perceived as a demonstration of less than manly qualities.¹⁸⁶ Nor is this to deny the appropriateness of our contemporary view of courage as allowing one to judiciously run from a fight that one cannot win; rather, it is to note the difference in social expectations of manliness from our time to that of Paul and his immediate audience.

The textual juxtaposition of a descent and ascent have been noted by a number of writers, though Thrall is not convinced the dual motif has been clearly indicated or intended.¹⁸⁷ Paul goes down to escape the hands of men, and then is taken up into the hands of the Lord; the descent is one of weakness, while the ascent would immediately be heard as a claim to strength and status. This account looks backward to Paul's warning concerning the tearing down of strongholds, and forward to his ascent into Paradise. Looking in both directions, it is clear that Paul's descent at Damascus evidences his humiliation and weakness, conditions that must somehow be reconciled with his following claim to ecstatic experience and apostolic authority. How does a feminized and servile apostle tear down a stronghold? By presenting himself in weakness; by providing evidence that such a condition is in keeping with the meekness of Christ; by demanding that those under siege become weak as well.

¹⁸⁶ Shi, *Message*, 262-263.

¹⁸⁷ Harris, *Second Corinthians*, 821; Martin, *2 Corinthians*, 384; Hughes, *Second Corinthians*, 422; Keener, *1—2 Corinthians*, 235; Barnett, *Second Corinthians*, 552; Thrall, *2 Corinthians*, 764.

4.3.3 *Paul's Narrative of Ascent*

The next two sections (4.3.3.1 and 4.3.3.2) will examine Paul's ecstatic experience and the concomitant piercing of his flesh. The examination will make use of inner texture, intertexture, sacred texture, and social and cultural texture to demonstrate Paul's self-presented status as a shamed and feminized man who is, at the same time and by virtue of the same circumstances, a divinely-empowered recipient of the knowledge and power of Christ. The generic socio-textual expectations of both the ascent and healing narratives lead the audience to view their narrator as possessing divine connections and revelatory authority. The structuring of Paul's specific narratives destroys those expectations even as they are set up. The narrator at first has nothing of worth to say; when he is able to provide a record of revelation, it turns out to be a direct and thorough disappointment in terms of both literary form and personal expectations. Paul's suffering implicates him in the sufferings of Christ; his weakness is endured and boasted in as the very form of Christ's strength.

The overall relationship between 11:30-33 and 12:1-10 seems without difficulty, as Paul continues his well-established theme of boasting.¹⁸⁸ In the preceding narrative Paul recounted his *descent* to escape from the hands of man; here he tells of an *ascent* to God.¹⁸⁹ This parallel is strengthened by the apostle's repeated deferral to God's evaluation. When Paul speaks of the descent, he appeals to God's knowledge of his truthfulness; in speaking of his ascent he appeals to God's

¹⁸⁸ Lambrecht, *Second Corinthians*, 204; Barrett, *Second Corinthians*, 306.

¹⁸⁹ Harris, *Second Corinthians*, 820-821; Keener, *1-2 Corinthians*, 235; Black, *Paul, Apostle of Weakness*, 145; Lincoln, "Paul the Visionary," 218.

knowledge of the nature of the event.¹⁹⁰ It is also clear that 12:1-10 divides into two units, the first of which recounts Paul's ascent to Paradise and the second his receipt of the σκόλοψ. What must be examined is the relationship of these units one to the other. Stegman and others judge that the σκόλοψ unit is "the climax of Paul's boast," and that it is the purpose for his ascent narrative.¹⁹¹ Thrall approaches the material from a slightly different angle, stating that Paul recounts his ascent "as an example of his determination to boast of his weakness." That is, Paul narrates what should be taken as a claim of strength, in order to obviously reject such an approach; and even the particular strength he narrates is chosen on the basis of its association with a terrible weakness.¹⁹²

Plummer views the revelations as being independent of the σκόλοψ account, judging that "it would be more true to say that the σκόλοψ is an appendix to the ἀποκαλύψεις than that the ἀποκαλύψεις are a preface to the σκόλοψ." The difficulty Plummer sees with combining the two narratives into a single context, is that such an approach does not do justice to the "glory" and "brighter colours" of the rapture, and leaves "no break in the catalogue of τὰ τῆς ἀσθενείας μου." He does not appear to stick by his own position, however, for he later makes explicit mention of the clear causal connection between the two paragraphs.¹⁹³ Moreover, Plummer's argument relies on a false dichotomy: the ascent account may well be a presentation

¹⁹⁰ Cf. Furnish, *II Corinthians*, 525.

¹⁹¹ Wallace, *Snatched into Paradise*, 235 (where it is likened to the innermost doll of a nested Russian Matryoshka set); Stegman, *Second Corinthians*, 270; Matera, *II Corinthians*, 276, 282; Pfitzner, *Strength in Weakness*, 174, 181; Hughes, *Second Corinthians*, 429, 441; Barnett, *Second Corinthians*, 555, 563; Carson, *From Triumphalism to Maturity*, 143-144; Harris, *Second Corinthians*, 827; Goulder, "Visions and Revelations," 308; Lincoln, "Paul the Visionary," 210.

¹⁹² Thrall, *2 Corinthians*, 772-773, 806; Aernie, *Is Paul also among the Prophets*, 234-237.

¹⁹³ Plummer, *Second Epistle*, 340, 347.

of strength, and yet still function within the larger argument to display Paul's weaknesses. Rather than being an element in an "unbroken catalogue" of hardships the ascent may be viewed as a problematic event, one that must be explained or deconstructed if the apostle's consistent weakness is to be affirmed.

4.3.3.1 Paul's heavenly journey. Accounts of mystical or ecstatic journeys were quite common in the ANE and Greco-Roman milieu,¹⁹⁴ and it has been suggested that Paul mentions his ecstatic experience because his opponents had claimed either that he had none, or that their experiences were weightier than his own.¹⁹⁵ This is not to argue necessarily for any true parallel between Paul's narrative and, say, Merkavah mysticism; rather, it is simply to be noted that accounts of heavenly journeys were not unexpected within the world of Paul's audience. Barrett states that "the striking thing is not that Paul should have experienced such a rapture but that he should go back fourteen years to find an example, and then depreciate its significance." While some have conjectured that Paul's strange chronological approach was due to his lack of more recent examples, it seems more likely that the apostle chose this particular event due to its direct connection with the σκόλοψ and with the beginning of his ministry. As Furnish notes, such chronological markers might be used simply to indicate the importance of a particular event in the narrative. Barnett has also suggested that Paul's choice of a long-past experience may be in

¹⁹⁴ Gooder, *Only the Third Heaven*, 11-17, 165, passim; Barrett, *Second Corinthians*, 309-311; Belleville, *2 Corinthians*, 302; Kruse, *2 Corinthians*, 202; Lincoln, "Paul the Visionary," 217; Price, "Punished in Paradise," 34-35.

¹⁹⁵ Plummer, *Second Epistle*, 338; Kistemaker, *2 Corinthians*, 405; Stegman, *Second Corinthians*, 265; Belleville, *2 Corinthians*, 299; Best, *Second Corinthians*, 116; Carson, *From Triumphalism to Maturity*, 134, 143; Keener, *1-2 Corinthians*, 237(?); Barnett, *Second Corinthians*, 556; Pfitzner, *Strength in Weakness*, 174; Hughes, *Second Corinthians*, 428; Murphy-O'Connor, *Theology*, 117-118; Thrall, *2 Corinthians*, 772-773; Martin, *2 Corinthians*, 397; Harris, *Second Corinthians*, 827, 832-833; Black, *Paul, Apostle of Weakness*, 188; Lincoln, "Paul the Visionary," 207-208; Baird, "Visions, Revelation, and Ministry," 653; Price, "Punished in Paradise," 33-34.

order to ridicule his opponents, who are self-elated by their boasting of up-to-date revelations.¹⁹⁶

Paul may have used the plural (ὄπτασίαι and ἀποκαλύψεις) simply to mark the next topic, “the theme of visions and revelations.” Alternatively, Martin believes that Paul’s intention was to provide the audience with multiple accounts of his divine experience, but that he simply couldn’t force himself to continue. Still others have seen here support for Paul’s “third heaven” and “paradise” visits as two distinct events.¹⁹⁷ In the end, any firm judgment as to whether Paul had multiple other such experiences would appear to be conjecture beyond the limits of the passage.¹⁹⁸ However, given both the ironic undertone of the larger passage, and the obvious connection between Paul’s ascent and σκόλωψ narratives, perhaps we should read Paul both as having intended and having *successfully provided* two accounts of divine revelation.¹⁹⁹ The first revelation was one of a heavenly ascent, and of it Paul refrains from speaking; the second is Christ’s words regarding weakness, of which the apostle will gladly continue to boast, and in light of which he will continue to live.

Though associations of honour and strength are obligatory in accounts of those who partook in ecstatic experiences, all such claims are absent from Paul’s ascent narrative. Not only does he refuse to provide evidence of glory and revelation from

¹⁹⁶ Barrett, *Second Corinthians*, 310; cf. Furnish, *II Corinthians*, 545; Harris, *Second Corinthians*, 837; Baird, “Visions, Revelation, and Ministry,” 660; Barnett, *Second Corinthians*, 561. Its proximity to his initial calling may also be a partial reason for Paul’s inclusion of the Damascus escape (cf. Carson, *From Triumphalism to Maturity*, 136-137). The suggestion that Paul used temporal distancing to indicate the fictional nature of his account seems not worthy of long discussion (cf. Lambrecht, *Second Corinthians*, 201).

¹⁹⁷ Bultmann, *The Second Letter to the Corinthians*, 219; Furnish, *II Corinthians*, 524; Martin, *2 Corinthians*, 397; Lincoln, “Paul the Visionary,” 204; Plummer, *Second Epistle*, 347.

¹⁹⁸ Garland, *2 Corinthians*, 512; Stegman, *Second Corinthians*, 265.

¹⁹⁹ Cf. Marguerat, “2 Corinthiens 10—13,” 513.

his ascent, but even deflects any unintended cachet from the event by avoiding an admitted or direct identification with the man who was taken up.²⁰⁰ In introducing his account of the heavenly ascent, the apostle speaks “as if there were two Pauls, one about whom he could glory, and another about whom he would not do so.”²⁰¹ While Kistemaker surprisingly states that Paul “often uses the third person singular pronoun as a substitute for the first and second persons singular,” he provides no documentation on the matter.²⁰² Such a claim does not appear to be supportable from the text of the GNT; indeed, Bultmann notes that Paul nowhere else speaks of himself in the third person.²⁰³ It has been suggested that Paul spoke as “the other” due to the sense of unreality or personal displacement experienced by those who encounter the divine realm.²⁰⁴ Some have attributed Paul’s manner to a formal style of modesty, an unwillingness to make public that which is a private matter.²⁰⁵ Somewhat in the same vein, it has been noted that Paul was aware of having done nothing of his own accord, will, or power in being taken up—he was the passive recipient of a divine act and favour—and thus felt himself unable to be credited or even named in his narration of the event.²⁰⁶ Stegman is more specific in this regard, saying that Paul, in using the

²⁰⁰ In addition to her lengthy discussion of the many differences between Paul’s narrative and a representative sample of ascent texts, Gooder provides a nice summary of the material in chart form (Gooder, *Only the Third Heaven*, 156-157, 189). Collins discusses the legitimating function of such accounts (Collins, “Traveling Up and Away,” 145-160).

²⁰¹ Plummer, *Second Epistle*, 346.

²⁰² Kistemaker, *2 Corinthians*, 407.

²⁰³ Bultmann, *The Second Letter to the Corinthians*, 219.

²⁰⁴ Lambrecht, *Second Corinthians*, 200; Plummer, *Second Epistle*, 346; Wallace, *Snatched into Paradise*, 264-265.

²⁰⁵ Stegman, *Second Corinthians*, 266; Hughes, *2 Corinthians: Power in Weakness*, 429-230.

²⁰⁶ Bultmann, *The Second Letter to the Corinthians*, 219; Furnish, *II Corinthians*, 545; Kruse, *2 Corinthians*, 201, 204-205.

third person, allows the Lord to be the active party in the transaction.²⁰⁷ Stegman's claim, however, misses the point: first, the passive verb in this passage already carries this burden; second, a third person in narrative is well able to carry an active role.

Belleville provides a nice summary of the views regarding Paul's use of the third person, but opts in the end for saying that "Paul is already a reluctant competitor. To boast of ecstatic experiences in a personal way may just have been beyond him." In the interests of completeness, an edited version of Belleville's list is provided here. She writes that Paul's use is

symptomatic of his aversion to boasting ... avoids suggesting that he was special ... reflects the sense of self-transcendence that such experiences seem to entail; he didn't allocate much importance to [the experience] ... will speak only of things that show weakness ... is distancing his apostolic self from the self in which he has been forced to boast ... is the only way he can look at the experience with any kind of detachment.²⁰⁸

Of course, precise knowledge of Paul's inner queasiness is beyond our reach, but a recognition of Paul's rhetorical effect might be profitable here. He carries on a sort of acknowledged fiction, by which he asserts the facticity of the event without connecting himself to any of its positive effects. "There is *a man* who is a visionary, and this man is in fact Paul; but Paul would rather be thought of as the weak man, who has nothing to boast of but his weakness."²⁰⁹ Even in the midst of boasting, Paul can in this way refuse to boast.

²⁰⁷ Stegman, *Second Corinthians*, 268.

²⁰⁸ Belleville, *2 Corinthians*, 301.

²⁰⁹ Barrett, *Second Corinthians*, 307 (cf. Barnett, *Second Corinthians*, 564-565; Carson, *From Triumphalism to Maturity*, 136, 142; Martin, *2 Corinthians*, 391; Baird, "Visions, Revelation, and Ministry," 653-654; Bultmann, *The Second Letter to the Corinthians*, 219; Lambrecht, *Second Corinthians*, 204-205).

Paul's repeated disavowal of knowledge regarding his somatic state when taken up is subject to the arguments just rehearsed. In addition, some have suggested that the apostle's εἴτε ... οὐκ οἶδα, εἴτε ... οὐκ οἶδα "whether [this] or [that] I don't know" highlights "the strangeness of the event, for which not Paul but God alone is answerable."²¹⁰ Hughes and Kruse read Paul's wonderings as proof that he believed *corporeal* heavenly ascent to be possible,²¹¹ while Barrett reckons that Paul is here affirming the possibility of *incorporeal* existence.²¹² Others have argued for Paul's true ignorance regarding his bodily (dis-)connection with his ecstatic journey. They deny that the question of whether such travel required or was prohibited by somatic existence was present to the apostle's mind.²¹³ It is difficult to know whether Best intends to be taken seriously, when he says at least we know Paul was alone, since "otherwise anyone who had been with him would have been able to tell him whether his body left earth or not!"²¹⁴ Still others suggest that the whole matter is one of indifference to Paul.²¹⁵ We cannot know whether he had an opinion on the matter, for he simply does not deign to enter the conversation.

²¹⁰ Bultmann, *The Second Letter to the Corinthians*, 221; Garland, *2 Corinthians*, 517; Matera, *II Corinthians*, 281-282; Hughes, *Second Corinthians*, 440; Best, *Second Corinthians*, 118; Martin, *2 Corinthians*, 398-399; Black, *Paul, Apostle of Weakness*, 148; Tabor, *Things Unutterable*, 114.

²¹¹ Hughes, *Second Corinthians*, 431; Kruse, *2 Corinthians*, 202-203.

²¹² Barrett, *Second Corinthians*, 308. He goes on to say, however, that such a question is not relevant to Paul's argument (cf. Bultmann, *TNT*, I. 202; Harris, *Second Corinthians*, 839-840; Dunn, *I Corinthians*, 215-216).

²¹³ Lambrecht, *Second Corinthians*, 201; Furnish, *II Corinthians*, 545; Garland, *2 Corinthians*, 513; Tabor, *Things Unutterable*, 120-121.

²¹⁴ Best, *Second Corinthians*, 117; cf. Plummer, *Second Epistle*, 342.

²¹⁵ Furnish, *II Corinthians*, 525; Garland, *2 Corinthians*, 513; Matera, *II Corinthians*, 279; Carson, *From Triumphalism to Maturity*, 138.

Barrett suggests that Paul was “deliberately refraining from expressing [any particular] view” on the value of the body with regard to religious experience.²¹⁶ However, unless the apostle truly viewed the body as insignificant (and this seems an untenable reading, given the tenor of the Corinthian correspondence as a whole), such an avoidance of the subject would not serve his purposes. Matera says that Paul’s intention “is not to leave the question open, so that what he says will be acceptable to all factions, but to highlight his ignorance and God’s knowledge.”²¹⁷ Of course, this position must assume that Paul *was* ignorant on the matter, and such an assumption is not arguable beyond the limits of this text. It seems best to affirm what we can: Paul avoids speaking of the body precisely at that point where the account would grant him somatic honour. At that point he deflects, refusing to identify an honourable body with himself. There may indeed be additional forces active behind Paul’s deflection; however, we may speak with some certainty at least of the effect such a deflection has upon the reader.

Paul claims to have heard “unutterable words which are not allowed for a man to speak” (ἄρρητα ῥήματα ἃ οὐκ ἐξὸν ἀνθρώπῳ λαλῆσαι), but whether the disallowance is due to divine interdiction or due to intrinsic human incapacity is not clear from the text.²¹⁸ With regard to this question, Kistemaker first states that Paul was not “sworn to secrecy,” merely incapable of humanly communicating the heavenly sights and sounds; confusingly, he then goes on to say that Paul *was* divinely prohibited from relating his experience.²¹⁹ That Paul does *not* speak of what

²¹⁶ Barrett, *Second Corinthians*, 308.

²¹⁷ Matera, *II Corinthians*, 279.

²¹⁸ Plummer, *Second Epistle*, 345; cf. Harris, *Second Corinthians*, 843-844.

²¹⁹ Kistemaker, *2 Corinthians*, 410; also Stegman, *Second Corinthians*, 268.

he saw and heard in Paradise is clear, as is also the fact that he was in some manner kept from so speaking. Garland says simply that “Paul offers no explanation of why he must remain silent. If he gave any more hints, he would have broken the prohibition.”²²⁰ Bultmann’s evaluation of the question is worthy of note:

The meaning cannot be that Paul wants to forestall all malicious distortion of his revelations, but merely that he will not impress the Corinthians with advantages which could bribe them. They should see him exactly as one who is ταπεινός and ἀσθενής [humble and weak], and recognize him as such; only in this way can they truly perceive the character of ζωή hidden beneath the mask of death (4:4ff). His pneumatic experiences do not concern them at all (5:13), any more than does his speaking in tongues.²²¹

It cannot be merely that Paul is avoiding an over-valuation of his revelations; if this were his only concern, Paul could have avoided the danger entirely by not speaking of his paradisiacal trip at all.

His reticence should be read not only in light of his heavenly ascent account, but also in light of the σκόλοψ narrative. The apostle’s refusal or failure to speak in 12:1-6 is properly heard only in counterpoint to his surprising willingness to speak in 12:7-10. The apostle is not attempting to avoid evaluation, but to ensure the correct criteria are used in that evaluation. “Paul has had visions and revelations, but he is not permitted to disclose their contents, with one exception: the time when he prayed especially hard to be released from a particular ‘thorn in the flesh’, and was given the answer ‘No.’”²²² Wan notes that a reluctance to provide details of the heavenly journey itself may be in keeping with the Jewish approach to such events, as opposed

²²⁰ Garland, *2 Corinthians*, 516 Carson, *From Triumphalism to Maturity*, 141.

²²¹ Bultmann, *The Second Letter to the Corinthians*, 223.

²²² Wright, *The Resurrection of the Son of God*, 308; Barrett, *Second Corinthians*, 312; Badiou, *Saint Paul*, 51.

to the “blow-by-blow description” expected in more Greco-Roman accounts. The *result* of the journey, however, was still expected to be given attention.²²³ The only message which is related to the Corinthians regarding Paul’s ascent is this final result: it is his receipt of the σκόλοψ, while of glory, honour, and status Paul does not speak. He reveals only that which demonstrates his weakness, suffering, and shame.²²⁴ The importance of his failure to speak will be more directly addressed in the upcoming discussion of the σκόλοψ.

4.3.3.2 *Paul’s σκόλοψ τῆ σαρκί.* Regardless of the syntactical difficulties in the verse, there is no doubt that Paul presents the σκόλοψ as being imposed to counter any self-exaltational tendencies stemming from his revelations. Even (perhaps intentionally?) the grammatically troubling repetition of ἵνα μὴ ὑπεραίρωμαι “so that I might not become exalted” serves to clarify the fact of this connection.²²⁵ It should be noted that the ἵνα μὴ ὑπεραίρωμαι of 12:7 is logically parallel to the μή τις εἰς ἐμὲ λογίσηται ὑπὲρ ... “lest anyone consider me as more than ...” of 12:6. Just as Paul’s restraint in speaking keeps the Corinthians from having an inflated view of him, so does the imposition of the σκόλοψ ensure he retains a non-inflated view of himself. And this dual focus on avoiding a high evaluation of the apostle makes clear that his heavenly ascent account would *normally* have been taken as an evidence of strength. Some have suggested that Paul’s arrival in the third heaven should be read as having left the fourth through seventh higher realms unpenetrated.²²⁶ Such an

²²³ Wan, “Charismatic Exegesis,” 65.

²²⁴ Aernie, *Is Paul also among the Prophets*, 236-239; Black, *Paul, Apostle of Weakness*, 131, passim.

²²⁵ Cf. Barrett, *Second Corinthians*, 313; Garland, *2 Corinthians*, 518-519.

²²⁶ For a rehearsal of this position (ultimately rejected by the commentator), cf. Plummer, *Second Epistle*, 343-344.

interpretation would certainly argue for a relative weakness in the apostle; however, the text demonstrates that Paul's ascent would have been seen as strength, and this is the reason for the *σκόλοψ*—to deflate any possible pneumatic boast.

Paul's suffering and weakness resulting from the *σκόλοψ* have been understood in numerous ways, generally as a chronic physical malady, or either human or demonic opposition to Paul's apostolic ministry.²²⁷ The older interpretations of the *σκόλοψ* as representing Paul's struggle with lust, doubt, remorse, or too robust a conscience will not be examined here. Many of the commentators mention such approaches, but only to summarily reject them as misdirected and outdated. Lambrecht provides a succinct overview of the suggestions adduced for the identification of the *σκόλοψ*, ultimately agreeing with Hughes, Bultmann, and others, who judge that we are incapable of determining the nature of Paul's suffering or opposition.²²⁸ Plummer concludes that "in all the renderings, it is the idea of acuteness that seems to be primary," but that we cannot decide between the options with any certainty. Bultmann adds that the interpreter's inability is to be viewed without concern. "The ἵνα με κολαφίζῃ ('to beat me') seems to indicate that the suffering was painful. For the rest, it is not to be diagnosed. The diagnosis is irrelevant to the context . . ."²²⁹ Garland concludes that our present inability to determine the precise nature of the *σκόλοψ* is fortunate: its very ambiguity allows for

²²⁷ Bultmann, *The Second Letter to the Corinthians*, 224; Hughes, *Second Corinthians*, 119; Thrall, *2 Corinthians*, 808-813.

²²⁸ Lambrecht, *Second Corinthians*, 205; Hughes, *Second Corinthians*, 442; Barrett, *Second Corinthians*, 314; Kistemaker, *2 Corinthians*, 416-418; Stegman, *Second Corinthians*, 270-271; Matera, *II Corinthians*, 283-284; Kruse, *2 Corinthians*, 206; Barnett, *Second Corinthians*, 570; Harris, *Second Corinthians*, 857-859; Woods, "Opposition," 44; Baird, "Visions, Revelation, and Ministry," 659-660.

²²⁹ Plummer, *Second Epistle*, 348-350; Garland, *2 Corinthians*, 521; Martin, *2 Corinthians*, 412-416; Bultmann, *The Second Letter to the Corinthians*, 225.

an otherwise foreclosed breadth of application.²³⁰ What Garland does not address is how an application becomes acceptable on the basis of the removal of originally-available information which might invalidate the application.

The denotational referent of the *σκόλωψ* is a matter of debate, as well, being translated either “thorn” or “stake.” Far from being a matter of purely personal diction, these terms are based on both diachronic linguistic concerns and understandings of the broader context. From early times, the Greek term could denote a stake used for torture or execution, and even be used in reference to the cross,²³¹ though Bernard argues that this Classical meaning of “stake” was replaced in Hellenistic Greek by the idea of “thorn.”²³² Harris admits that “Classical Greek usage might suggest ‘stake’ as Paul’s meaning, but Septuagintal usage should here be regarded as regulative. In its four LXX uses *σκόλωψ* never means ‘stake.’”²³³ Harris provides no argument for why the LXX use should be privileged for Paul’s Greco-Roman audience; nor does he (literarily speaking) seem even to blink at having only four occurrences of the term construct a ruling pattern. Ezek 28:24 pairs the term with “thorns” (*ἄκανθα*), while the broad context of Hos 2:8 fits the idea of plant growth as well. Thus, for these two uses, “thorn” seems undeniable. However, in Num 33:55 the term is paired with the militarily-suggestive “arrow” or “javelin” (*βολίδες*): this context would be better fit by “stake” than by “thorn.” The MT text underlying the LXX is not in question here, as no-one is arguing for Paul’s argument on the basis of

²³⁰ Garland, *2 Corinthians*, 521.

²³¹ Samuelsson, *Crucifixion*, 451, passim.

²³² Cf. Barrett, *Second Corinthians*, 315; Garland, *2 Corinthians*, 519; Hughes, *Second Corinthians*, 447; Bernard, “Second Corinthians,” 110-111.

²³³ Harris, *Second Corinthians*, 853-854.

the Hebrew terminology. In Sir 43:19, the winter icicles being compared to σκόλοψ is not at all certain to be read as “thorn,” as any glance at icicles will suggest. The other two uses adduced by Harris are from second- and third-century texts. Gerhard Delling’s rehearsal of the texts provides a different picture, however: the meaning of “stake” does not at all disappear in the Hellenistic period. Indeed, there are even uses of σκόλοψ in reference to the crucifixion of Jesus.²³⁴ Samuelsson provides evidence throughout his thesis for such a use of σκόλοψ and ἀνασκολοπίζειν.²³⁵

It is difficult to know how to respond to Kruse’s assertion that the mere collocation of σκόλοψ with σάρξ argues for the idea of a thorn, rather than a stake.²³⁶ While a thorn certainly does fulfill its painful or hindering function in the presence of flesh, the same may be said of a stake. Thrall claims that Paul could not have had a stake in mind, as it “seems to produce too exaggerated a picture. Whatever its precise reference, the σκόλοψ cannot indicate a circumstance by which Paul was totally and permanently incapacitated. The image of impalement would be out of place.” Martin likewise rejects the idea of a stake, because “suggesting that Paul was helplessly impaled on a stake ... rather overlooks the power he felt was working in him.”²³⁷ Such arguments beg the question, assuming that Paul is *not* at times totally incapacitated. That the impalement idiom need not require such a state to be unremitting seems obvious enough to go without support. As far as such an image being inappropriate to either the flesh or to Paul’s situation, it must be noted that a thorn would seem to present his weakness as a mere inconvenience alongside Christ’s

²³⁴ *TDNT* (Grand Rapids, MI: Eerdmans, 1971), s.v. “σκόλοψ”.

²³⁵ Samuelsson, *Crucifixion*, passim.

²³⁶ Kruse, *2 Corinthians*, 205.

²³⁷ Thrall, *2 Corinthians*, 807; Martin, *2 Corinthians*, 412.

power. Bernard explicitly states such in his treatment; for him, Paul's σκόλοψ is a thorn, rather than a stake; "thus, Paul's experience should be looked upon as more of an irritant than as extreme pain."²³⁸ (Of course, this distinction does not take into account the length and dangerous nature of some thorns. To term a thorn an "irritant" may speak more to the experience of the speaker than to the character of thorns.) An impaled body, on the other hand, raises to consciousness the very cross and suffering of the one whose power *and* weakness the apostle claims to share.²³⁹ Carson's comment is worth recording at length here:

this thorn was something substantial, not some minor irritation. An apostle who could willingly put up with the sufferings and deprivations listed in 1 [*sic*] Corinthians 11 would not beseech the Lord so strenuously and repeatedly for the removal of some minor problem that could easily be borne. Paul's thorn was something very painful or extraordinarily embarrassing, and perhaps both.²⁴⁰

It is clear that there is more involved here than irritation or inconvenience. Paul's description of his σκόλοψ-related experience as κολαφίζειν is instructive, as the verb implies humiliation, violence, distress, and ill-treatment.²⁴¹ Some have cautioned against seeing the short list in 12:10 (ἀσθενείαι, ὕβρεις, ἀνάγκαι, διωγμοί, στενοχωρίαί) ["weaknesses, shameful mistreatments, distresses, persecutions, difficulties"] as "a concretization of the thorn."²⁴² As Bultmann has observed, however, it is obvious that all these terms are presented "on the same

²³⁸ Bernard, "Second Corinthians," 110-111.

²³⁹ Wallace, *Snatched into Paradise*, 270-271; Park, "Paul's σκόλοψ τῆ σαρκί," *passim*.

²⁴⁰ Carson, *From Triumphalism to Maturity*, 144; cf. Black, *Paul, Apostle of Weakness*, 192.

²⁴¹ Garland, *2 Corinthians*, 522; Furnish, *II Corinthians*, 529; Bruce, *1 & 2 Corinthians*, 248; Kistemaker, *2 Corinthians*, 416; Belleville, *2 Corinthians*, 306; Harris, *Second Corinthians*, 856; Wallace, *Snatched into Paradise*, 273.

²⁴² Lambrecht, *Second Corinthians*, 204; cf. Black, *Paul, Apostle of Weakness*, 158.

footing.²⁴³ There must be a close connection between these elements: if not, why should the apostle conclude his account of the σκόλοψ with this miniature *Peristasenkatalog*? Perhaps the short list functions as a conclusory remark for 11:22—12:9 as a whole; perhaps it is a summation of 12:1-9 in particular, yet using terms reminiscent of the larger passage. Either way, it seems reasonable to read Paul's comment as affirming a cothematizing of the σκόλοψ with his degrading experiences.

Of interest to me, however, is not merely the objective form of the suffering (physical ailment, human or demonic opposition), or even the physical referent of the term (stake, spike, thorn, splinter). What has been ignored in the discussion is quite literally the shape of the σκόλοψ. Presumably the apostle could have made use of any number of terms here (e.g., κακία/evil, φόρτιον/burden, βάρος/oppressive weight, θλίψις/tribulation, πρόσκομμα/obstacle). Of course, one might object that certain such terms would carry connotations undesirable to Paul, but that is precisely the issue: choice implies meaning, and Paul did make a choice. He chose a term denoting a penetrating item which causes a painful mark. These ideas of pain, penetration, and somatic marking have all been matters of at least implicit concern in the *Peristasenkatalog*. And, as has been noted, the term σκόλοψ was sometimes used in reference to crucifixion.²⁴⁴ While the thorn's identity and precise manner of functioning may remain in question, the identity of Paul does not. Painfully penetrated against his stated will, kept in a state of silence, left with a persistent scar within or upon his flesh, Paul is doubly marked. He bears the mark of ownership and

²⁴³ Bultmann, *The Second Letter to the Corinthians*, 225.

²⁴⁴ Plummer, *Second Epistle*, 349.

submission to his crucified Lord, and these marks at the same time demonstrate him to be not a man.

That Paul is not delivered from his suffering is problematic for his physiognomically-informed audience.²⁴⁵ The problem is only exaggerated by the contrast of the apostle's non-healing with his supposed receipt of divine favour, for it was assumed "that the true messengers of the divine were those persons who could display the presence of the god by working magic and speaking divine wisdom."²⁴⁶ Paul returns from Paradise unable to speak the divine words and unable even to heal himself. Garland summarizes the connections and unexpected distinctions well:

He does not say how he was transported because he does not know.... He does not visit a series of heavens. He is not let in on secrets that he can then disclose to others or put in a book to be sealed for a later time. The meaning of what he sees and hears is not interpreted by an angelic tour guide. In the aftermath what he gets instead is an angel from Satan who plagues him with a thorn that leads him to a deeper understanding of his ministry. Paul sets the stage for some angelic vision and comes back with the image of an angel of Satan. The vision of heaven rouses adversaries from hell.²⁴⁷

Even the threefold repetition of request for relief may have put Paul's audience in mind of more "successful" miracle stories. As Furnish points out, it was "at least ... possible that Paul was familiar with the threefold petition for assistance sometimes found in Hellenistic accounts of divine healings."²⁴⁸ Barrett believes the three-fold request signifies "earnest and repeated prayer."²⁴⁹ Thrall takes a more rhetorical approach, writing that "with the complexive aorist *παρεκάλεσα*, the *τρίς*

²⁴⁵ The physiognomic argument will not be further rehearsed here, as it has been already dealt with at some length within the thesis.

²⁴⁶ Crafton, *Agency*, 57.

²⁴⁷ Garland, *2 Corinthians*, 515.

²⁴⁸ Furnish, *II Corinthians*, 529.

²⁴⁹ Barrett, *Second Corinthians*, 316; Best, *Second Corinthians*, 119.

sums up the threefold prayer as a ‘rounded-off’ event.”²⁵⁰ Harris concludes it might be best simply to take Paul’s τρίς as a report that he prayed three times and then was told to stop.²⁵¹ The simplicity of Harris’ position is attractive, but this approach does leave open the question as to why Paul would mention the number at all. Still others have seen here an allusion to Christ’s prayers in Gethsemane.²⁵² Such a reading, however, would not militate against a parodic interpretation; one would merely be pushed back into the Gospel accounts to ask why the writers recorded Christ as praying three times to have the cup removed.

It does indeed appear that Paul has fashioned his account along parodic lines. While Thrall does not reject out of hand the possibility that Paul had such healing stories in mind, both she and Barrett reject reading the passage along the lines of a parody of such stories on the basis of Paul’s serious and intentional approach.²⁵³ A serious intent, however, is not inimical to parody or sarcasm. The parody appears plausible, as it fits within the flow of Paul’s overall presentation. As Furnish notes, healing accounts frequently make use of παρακαλεῖν “to beg/plead” just as in this verse.²⁵⁴ Where the petitioners would have their entreaties granted and the gods be credited with powerful healings, Paul’s request is denied and the Lord gives to him a persistent bodily weakness. It is with such an inversion of expectations that the apostle presents his case for being viewed as one who is strong for the tearing down

²⁵⁰ Thrall, *2 Corinthians*, 819.

²⁵¹ Harris, *Second Corinthians*, 860-861.

²⁵² Plummer, *Second Epistle*, 353; Stegman, *Second Corinthians*, 271; Bernard, “Second Corinthians,” 111; Hughes, *Second Corinthians*, 449-450; Barnett, *Second Corinthians*, 571; Martin, *2 Corinthians*, 417.

²⁵³ Thrall, *2 Corinthians*, 776-778, 820; Barrett, *Second Corinthians*, 317-318; also Garland, *2 Corinthians*, 511.

²⁵⁴ Furnish, *II Corinthians*, 529.

of strongholds. In addition to the issue of seriousness, Harris questions the parodic interpretation on the basis of the narratives' historical integrity. If Paul's narratives of heavenly ascent and non-healing are historically accurate, then they cannot really be parodic, regardless of surface appearances.²⁵⁵ But this objection confuses parody with fiction, and mistakenly denies the possibility that the responsible reporting of an actual event may co-exist with authorial intentionality or shaping. So Lincoln, who notes Paul's ironic literary approach, by which "in order to boast about revelations he selects from his many experiences a visionary experience which involved that which could not be revealed to any one else,"²⁵⁶ and Baird who also recognizes the possibility of Paul's authorial shaping of "an actual experience."²⁵⁷

Keener summarizes well, when he says of Paul's narrative, "the only specific revelation he articulates invites Paul to embrace his weakness."²⁵⁸ Carson notes the same idea: "About his greatest revelations, he speaks only with circumspection, if at all; about his weaknesses, he speaks directly and without bashfulness. In short, even by retelling this painful experience, he is exemplifying the lessons he learned by it."²⁵⁹ It seems clear that Paul also treats the thorn as a counter-measure against others' possible exaltation of his experience. While he had no choice in the receipt of the *σκόλοψ*, it was entirely within his power not to speak of it to others; the inclusion of the *σκόλοψ* in his account must be seen as integral to the apostle's goal of being

²⁵⁵ Harris, *Second Corinthians*, 827-828; also Wallace, *Snatched into Paradise*, 274-275.

²⁵⁶ Lincoln, "Paul the Visionary," 216.

²⁵⁷ Baird, "Visions, Revelation, and Ministry," 658-659.

²⁵⁸ Keener, *1-2 Corinthians*, 237, 240.

²⁵⁹ Carson, *From Triumphalism to Maturity*, 147.

recognized as weak and servile. In addition, the penetrating and flesh-marking nature of the *σκόλοψ* may intimate even the feminized state of the overpowered man.

Some writers have implied that Paul was to overcome his weakness by the power of the Lord; the Lord's gift was strength or power, while the weakness was an accompanying difficulty causing him more fully to rely on that strength.²⁶⁰ Murphy-O'Connor understands Paul as being unwillingly reconciled to an unchosen lifestyle of unavoidable suffering which is "accepted as necessary consequence ... of the ministry entrusted to him."²⁶¹ Similarly, Kruse writes that Paul's delight is not actually in the weakness (though this is what the apostle says); rather, he enjoys the "power of Christ that rests on him in these weaknesses."²⁶² But the apostle's summation seems to *identify* the weakness with the strength. The strength is not that which overcomes what God will not remove; rather, the weakness which remains by God's design is in *itself* the strength which he provides.²⁶³ Many hold that the Lord's power is granted to Paul on the occasions and locations of his weakness.²⁶⁴ Such a statement seems vague, and it is difficult to discern just what is meant by "occasion," "location," and "sphere." Martin is more specific, as he sees Paul receiving power when he *admits* to being weak.²⁶⁵ O'Collins is also clear in his presentation:

Paul's words both in 2 Cor 12:9f. and elsewhere indicate the *simultaneity* of weakness and power. When he was with the

²⁶⁰ Garland, *2 Corinthians*, 523-525; Plummer, *Second Epistle*, 354; Barrett, *Second Corinthians*, 317; Bultmann, *The Second Letter to the Corinthians*, 229-230.

²⁶¹ Murphy-O'Connor, *Theology*, 120-121.

²⁶² Kruse, *2 Corinthians*, 207.

²⁶³ Cf. Belleville, *2 Corinthians*, 309-311.

²⁶⁴ Carson, *From Triumphalism to Maturity*, 150; Black, *Paul, Apostle of Weakness*, 156; Harris, *Second Corinthians*, 864; cf. Matera, *II Corinthians*, 286; Thrall, *2 Corinthians*, 828-831; Barnett, *Second Corinthians*, 577; Hughes, *Second Corinthians*, 452.

²⁶⁵ Martin, *2 Corinthians*, 390.

Corinthians ‘in weakness and in much fear and trembling’ his ‘message’ was characterized by ‘the Spirit and power’ (1 Cor 2:3f.). As his statements stand, Paul simply asserts the coincidence of weakness and power, not that one element occurs as a pre-condition to the other. The psychological trend in interpretation can distract us from the Christological setting in which Paul sees his ministry. Far more important than any moral education he undergoes is the fact that his apostolic activity involves participation in the weakness and power of Calvary and Easter.”²⁶⁶

As is true of other commentators, Lambrecht is loath to leave Paul truly weak, claiming that the apostle has shied away from a fuller account of his obvious strengths for the simple reason that Paul is made uneasy by boasting. He states that “it would be wrong ... to eliminate every nuance of Paul’s faithful, active endurance and in this sense a kind of God-given success.” Lambrecht goes on to note that a “paradox mentions only the antithesis and does not offer a complete presentation of the case. A paradox is never absolute. Weakness is not strength. The paradox ought to lead to reflection; by reflection the discerning listener or reader should find the solution.” Lambrecht then offers that solution, that “it is Paul himself who in Christ and through Christ proves also to be humanly strong notwithstanding his weakness.”²⁶⁷

While the inclination to defend the courage and effectiveness of the apostle is understandable, such a position fails to take into consideration the full import of Paul’s argument as it intersects with the demands of narrative. The construction of a narrative is not by any means an objective exercise; rather it is “an act of rhetorical criticism.” By his choice of words, style, and orderings, Paul presents himself as the one who “knows” the story—even when the audience may already know the “true events.” He does not leave the interpretation of his life open for his audience to co-

²⁶⁶ O’Collins, “Power Made Perfect,” 536; cf. Baird, “Visions, Revelation, and Ministry,” 661-662; Wallace, *Snatched into Paradise*, 247-248, 268, 283-284; Grindheim, *Crux of Election*, 102.

²⁶⁷ Lambrecht, *Second Corinthians*, 207-208.

opt, but retains control over his own self-presentation.²⁶⁸ Elision, rearrangement, foregrounding, minimizing of events, expectations, or relationships are critical moves in rhetoric, even when the “true” state of affairs is not secret to the audience. The rhetor’s reinterpretation of a situation may be rejected or accepted: the issue is not one of “what actually happened,” but of “what one will accept.” The “authenticating voice” in the narrative belongs to Paul, and not to some historically-omniscient interpreter. This voice “not only relates the events ... but in reporting them validates the way or ways in which it understands and wishes its audience to understand them.”²⁶⁹ If the apostle has indeed within his text foreclosed all consideration of strength and endurance, we do violence to his rhetoric by re-inserting these items in the name of “historical accuracy.” If we choose to affirm that the divine “paradox” of 12:10 is subject to a solution, we do so only through weakening the impact of that divine revelation by which Paul has chosen to close out his self-revelatory account.

Moreover, such a treatment must assume the actual presence of a paradox, and this is not obviously the case here.²⁷⁰ As has been argued in Chapter Three, it is not *in spite of* weakness that Christ’s strength is displayed; rather, in direct contradiction to Lambrecht’s pronouncement, a particular kind of weakness *is* the divine strength. Murphy-O’Connor states that Paul’s power “is that of the cross of Christ ... which a minister may nullify by failing to live in imitation of Christ.”²⁷¹ When Paul states that weakness is power, he does not mean that the weak will be sheltered from harm by the power of God, nor that the weak will have their weakness replaced by power;

²⁶⁸ Polaski, *Paul and the Discourse of Power*, 57, 71, 112.

²⁶⁹ Greenfield, “The Authenticating Voice in *Beowulf*,” 99.

²⁷⁰ Cf. Bernard, “Second Corinthians,” 112.

²⁷¹ Murphy-O’Connor, *Theology*, 121.

rather, he means that the unrelieved weaknesses “which continue to characterize his life as an apostle—of which the Corinthians are very much aware and from which he neither seeks nor expects relief—represent the effective working of the power of the crucified Christ in his ministry.”²⁷² The apostle’s unique “inversion of the criteria for praise” neither avoids nor minimizes the shamefulness of his experience. By this self-presentation, Paul foregrounds his weakness as evidence for his place of leadership. Just as Christ’s own power comes from the weakness and shame of crucifixion, so also do Paul’s insults and beatings both demonstrate and result in the power of Christ within his life.²⁷³

Note that what initially seems to be a positive section is bracketed by a humiliating escape and a debilitating σκόλοψ.²⁷⁴ And the identity of the divinely blessed “man in Christ” is initially ambiguous; it is only when the experiences become clearly humiliating that Paul’s identity is explicitly admitted. Even the ascent experience itself is presented in an ambiguous manner, as the narrative appears to parody apocalyptic journey expectations. Paul’s presentation of his heavenly experience is a marvel of rhetorical deflection. Though he is provided with great revelation, Paul is not allowed a voice—he cannot speak that which he hears or sees. Furthermore, when the σκόλοψ is imposed, the apostle’s voice is silenced once again, for he is not allowed to continue speaking his plea for relief. He is told to be content with weakness, as this is the place where strength resides.

²⁷² Furnish, *II Corinthians*, 551-552; O’Collins, “Power Made Perfect,” 532-533.

²⁷³ Grindheim, *Crux of Election*, 100-101; cf. Thrall, *2 Corinthians*, 831; DiCicco, *Paul’s Use of Ethos*, 242-243.

²⁷⁴ Lincoln, “Paul the Visionary,” 218.

4.4 The Offence of Sufferings

The next section will make use of intertextual, social and cultural, and ideological analysis in order further to explain and tie together various themes that have been addressed within the discussion of 2 Cor 11:16—12:11. These themes are those of imposed sufferings, feminization, and the removal of speech. Pain and suffering result in a shaming of the sufferer, as well as the removal of the sufferer's ability to communicate and to shape her world. An abjection of one's ability or right to speak also results in a shaming or humiliation of the one being silenced. These experiences of humiliation, silencing, and barring from the shaping of one's own social experience have been historically associated with women. Women are silent and thus silence is feminine; patient suffering is expected of women and so one who is made to endure unresolved suffering is viewed as a woman; the shaping of one's social status is denied to women and thus one without active self-determination must be other than a true man.

Judith Perkins has examined Greco-Roman attitudes toward the suffering self, and speaks at length of *constancy*, which was the

moral center of the Greek novel ... a valorization of duration through time, of changelessness in the face of events The protagonists pass through all their tribulations and troubles and emerge, as Bakhtin saw, the same: they passed through suffering but bore no mark that they had experienced it.²⁷⁵

This same attitude is noted by Reardon, who points out the novel's claim in the final chapter to erase all effects of the preceding hardships. Suffering there may have been, but it has been overcome and no-one is the worse for wear.²⁷⁶ This self "exempt from

²⁷⁵ Perkins, *Suffering Self*, 76-77.

²⁷⁶ Reardon, "Chariton," 311, 330-331.

the experience of pain and suffering” was not merely the subject of a radically new literary genre; rather, the romance novel was reflecting a broader social ideology, one also evidenced by the philosophers of the day.²⁷⁷ Strength to endure suffering was certainly common to Paul, the Stoics, and the heroine of Greek romance; freedom from the enduring mark of suffering, however, was not. Greco-Roman society early on engaged in a discussion regarding personal suffering, but only after it felt the influence of Christian martyr literature did the “discourse of the second century [produce] a new conception of human subjecthood ... the subject as sufferer ... the construction of a subject centered on pain and suffering.”²⁷⁸ The apostle does not present himself so much as having victoriously endured, as to be continually existing in weakness. His end is not the philosophic disdain of physical—and thus unreal—scars, nor the public vindication of a Leucippe or Callirhoe untainted by their past contact with adversity. It is, rather, the paradoxically proud admission of shame and suffering by one who has been penetrated and overcome.

Elaine Scarry has noted that unresolved suffering results in a “shattering of language,” an inability of the sufferer to communicate his or her experience of self and the external world to others. As a non-referential state of consciousness, suffering denies the otherwise intrinsic human capacity “to move out beyond the boundaries of his or her own body into the external, sharable world.”²⁷⁹ A practical recognition of this lack of speaking ability is even evidenced in the medical community by their reliance on prefabricated charts and rubrics for measuring and identifying pain. The

²⁷⁷ Perkins, *Suffering Self*, 78-103.

²⁷⁸ Perkins, *Suffering Self*, 173-192; cf. p. 16, Chapter 2 of this thesis.

²⁷⁹ Scarry, *Body in Pain*, 5.

sufferer need not speak, but only affirm or deny what is spoken by another.²⁸⁰ This inability or denial of communication is itself a source of suffering and shame, and thus the incommunicability of suffering increases that very experience which already has been denied a voice. The cothematization of the feminine with shame and the inability to speak will also be foregrounded in the next chapter's discussion of women's veiling and silence.

Especially when the experience of pain and suffering is caused by others, there comes about first a confusion, and then denial, of the sufferer's body and voice.²⁸¹ As Langer writes (following Merleau-Ponty), "Thought, subjectivity, body and world are ... mutually implicative; they form a single comprehensive system in which each term can be designated as 'inside' or 'outside' ... 'the world is wholly inside and I am wholly outside myself.'"²⁸² One's voice and society find common ground in the body, and the interdependence of these may be broken by suffering.²⁸³ Green has aptly summarized this interdependence, stating that recent research in "cognitive science has underscored the fallacy of Descartes' notion of the mind, free to engage in its own operations ... Language, dispositions, beliefs, behavior, feelings, experience—these do not belong to the world of the ethereal but are embodied."²⁸⁴ It is ironically telling that Paul seeks to interpret his and the Corinthians' world through his own body's suffering, and does so by a complex presentation of his inability, unworthiness, and

²⁸⁰ Melzack and Wall, *The Challenge of Pain*, 56-63.

²⁸¹ Scarry, *Body in Pain*, 35, also 19-20, 27, 45-51; cf. Glancy, *Slavery in Early Christianity*, 34.

²⁸² Langer, *Merleau-Ponty*, 123.

²⁸³ Kleinman, "Everything That Really Matters," passim.

²⁸⁴ Green, *Body, Soul, and Human Life*, 107.

refusal to speak—except of that which itself tends to deny him a voice that can be heard or an identity that will be honoured.

Feminist and linguistic scholar Deborah Cameron has noted the importance of interlocutionary speech acts to the positing of self or personhood. Cameron begins by stating that language is a socially-constrained system of signs—the language used by individuals and groups *signifies* objects and relations in the world. This much is not a surprising claim; the implication noted by Cameron, however, is that language is both a reflection of and an entrance into a society's structures of power, whether those be of definition, relation, or of domination.²⁸⁵ A denial of access to the language-forms which regulate the power-bearing structures of a society is tantamount to a denial of one's access to power.²⁸⁶ Access to these language-forms first of all requires that one be provided space as a first-person interlocutor, rather than a second-person addressee or a third-person discursive object within the world.²⁸⁷

The feminine has consistently been excluded from knowledge, philosophy, discourse, academics, and dominance: all areas of life which would grant access to effecting change are denied to women.²⁸⁸ For example, “[w]omen—and other ‘others’—are *produced* as ‘objects of knowledge-as-control’ by ‘S-knows-that-p’ epistemologies and by the philosophies of science/social science that they inform.”²⁸⁹ This exclusion has included—indeed, been made possible by—exclusion from the right of utterance for, in J. Cheryl Exum's memorable words, “speech confers

²⁸⁵ Cameron, *Feminism and Linguistic Theory*, 13-27.

²⁸⁶ Cameron, *Feminism and Linguistic Theory*, 146-153.

²⁸⁷ Cameron, *Feminism and Linguistic Theory*, 119.

²⁸⁸ Cameron, *Feminism and Linguistic Theory*, 57-58.

²⁸⁹ Code, *Rhetorical Spaces*, 44, 23-57.

autonomy.”²⁹⁰ The disallowance of speech is the quintessential condition of the feminine in both antiquity and modernity.²⁹¹ So, it is not surprising that, at its heart, the feminist enterprise is about speaking—having a voice, being heard, being able to name and to tell stories—it is about entering the world of discourse.²⁹² But over the past many centuries, women’s activities and voices have been co-opted by male interpreters, and understood in terms of their “otherness.” The feminist goal is for women to be viewed as subjects and not objects, as ones who have the power of utterance, rather than as the objects of male judgment and gaze.²⁹³

Ricoeur’s intention within *Oneself as Another* is to examine the existing relations between the self and one’s self-designation as subject, between one’s self and one’s identity, and those between one’s self *for* one’s self and one’s self *for* or *as another* within the dialogic operations of the world (*Oneself*, 1-4). My intention here is to approach merely the one implication of his broad study, in keeping with the preceding discussion of Cameron. Ricoeur affirms that interlocutions—speech acts or utterances directed to another, rather than self-directed language—require a prior acceptance of the speaker as a self-identified person. That is to say, one who utters an interlocution must be an “I” addressing a “thou,” rather than being a third-person referent of an observer, a “reflecting subject” rather than an “objective person” (*Oneself*, 40-55). From this observation it flows that one who is denied the power, right, or opportunity of interlocution is thereby denied the right of self-identification

²⁹⁰ Exum, “Murder They Wrote,” 60.

²⁹¹ Cameron, *Feminism and Linguistic Theory*, 154; Isherwood, *Fat Jesus*, 26-28.

²⁹² Chopp, *Power to Speak*, 1-9, 24-30, passim; Guerin, Labor, *et al*, *Handbook of Critical Approaches to Literature*, 197.

²⁹³ Jasper, *Because of Beauvoir*, 73-158.

and self-determination beyond the limits and other-determined contents of the world (*Oneself*, 27-33). The one denied interlocutionary space may be viewed as a person in the sense of “a living human body” but not in the sense of one possessing moral consciousness and selfhood (*Oneself*, 34-39, 169). One’s identity is created and maintained through the acceptance of one’s speech by an audience;²⁹⁴ rejection of one’s speech is a “radical abandonment by the other [resulting in a] disappearance of the self.”²⁹⁵ The removal or abjection of one’s voice serves to remove one’s personhood, for without the speech act there exists at best a limited impact upon one’s world (*Oneself*, 56-112),²⁹⁶ no possibility of dialogic exchange as a “subject capable of designating itself in signifying the world” (*Oneself*, 113). And this removal of another’s utterance and “power-to-act” involves lack of respect for that one, resulting in humiliation (*Oneself*, 220).

More than any other social disappointment, Paul’s unresolved suffering would lead his audience to question his identity and function within their world. For just as one’s body is experienced as an “alien presence” in the grip of chronic suffering, so does the chronic sufferer become alien to the social body in which he or she resides.²⁹⁷ In relation to that suffering, they would seek “an attribution of meaning ... ‘congruent with their [culture’s] explanatory model.’”²⁹⁸ When sense is made of suffering through a narrative representation of experience (e.g., a medical or psychological diagnosis), the once-deconstructed world and voice may be

²⁹⁴ Barton, *Roman Honor*, 15-16.

²⁹⁵ Barton, *Roman Honor*, 254, quoting Wurmser, *Mask of Shame*, 63.

²⁹⁶ Cf. Code, *Rhetorical Spaces*, passim; Glancy, *Slavery in Early Christianity*, 9; Barton, *Roman Honor*, 159, 179, 291-292, 133-135.

²⁹⁷ King, “Chronic Pain,” 280; cf. Leder, *The Absent Body*, 74-76, passim.

²⁹⁸ King, “Chronic Pain,” 270-271.

reconstructed. Just as a word or sentence is not chosen for any intrinsic value, but for its participation in the larger narrative,²⁹⁹ so is Paul's body not presented for itself, but for what he desired as the proper expression of the world. And his suffering heightened the expressive function of his body, for in suffering, "the experience of the body is degraded into a representation of the body."³⁰⁰ Drew Leder presents a marvellous argument regarding this experiential value of the suffering body: the following quotes may serve as a summary of his book.

While in one sense the body is the most abiding and inescapable presence in our lives, it is also essentially characterized by absence. That is, one's own body is rarely the thematic object of experience [...] Insofar as the body tends to disappear when functioning unproblematically, it often seizes our attention most strongly at times of dysfunction; we then experience the body as the very *absence* of a desired or ordinary state, and as a force that stands opposed to the self [...] Yet when the body is rendered opaque through loss of function, we become aware of its alien presence [...] At moments of breakdown, I experience *to* my body, not simply *from* it. My body demands a direct and focal thematization.³⁰¹

Paul's weakness, sickness, and suffering unmade the Corinthians' world. His reconstruction of the world—not by means of medicine but by means of Christ's crucifixion and resurrection—gave a name to what was once unthinkable. And once it had been named, this Pauline cruciform life became a model which Paul calls his audience to imitate.

Elizabeth Castelli has examined the manner in which readings of Pauline *imitatio* texts have ignored the situational, rhetorical aspects of Paul's discourse of

²⁹⁹ Bakhtin, "The Problem of Speech Genres," 81.

³⁰⁰ Sarano, *The Meaning of the Body*, 87.

³⁰¹ Leder, *The Absent Body*, 1, 4, 82, 84-85.

power.³⁰² Paul engages in an ongoing struggle, rather than in the expression of a settled contract.³⁰³ This struggle is not one in which Paul is attempting to do coercive violence to his audience's will. Rhetorical persuasion does not partake in such violence, else it ceases to be persuasion, and becomes a show to unconvincingly cover the threat of force. Nor, on the other hand, is persuasion purely a free enterprise of disinterested logics being weighed in a pressureless vacuum. Power relations are located in discourse, controlling not so much what is said as "what *may be said*; control [... that ...] more often operates in a positive mode, by making certain questions possible and their answers sensible, by encouraging the disciplines and institutions which in turn sustain the discourse, and by failing to generate the questions for which the discourse has no answers."³⁰⁴

Nevertheless, Paul's rhetoric does seek to construct, rather than merely describe, the contours of apostolic orthodoxy. Paul is not merely pointing out to the Corinthians their failure in following what is agreed-upon truth; he is arguing that they have failed in properly defining what is truth. He *then* demands that they follow the dictates of their new understanding. Speaker and audience cooperate (possibly unawares) in arriving at conclusions. Using the "language of the audience ... the rhetor leads the audience to a new world of meaning, to a reconstituted language-world ... to an 'aha!' experience, to the perception that the proposal of the rhetor makes sense in one's own *ethos*, even though world-view and *ethos* will be altered

³⁰² Castelli, *Imitating Paul*. Castelli's theory is narrowly applied to passages dealing quite explicitly with *mimesis*; thus, I have not referenced the later portions of her book.

³⁰³ Cf. Foucault, *Discipline and Punish*, 26.

³⁰⁴ Polaski, *Paul and the Discourse of Power*, 37; cf. Forbes, "Ancient Rhetoric," 158-159.

through this acceptance.”³⁰⁵ Through a careful framing of the discussion, the speaker forecloses otherwise possible manners of social existence for the audience. As Wardy concludes, “in the last analysis, we who are persuaded are all more or less willing victims of persuasion.”³⁰⁶

The act of mimesis was capable of various structurings. In certain Hippocratic texts, the hierarchical relationship of copy to model was unclear—the important matter was the corresponding nature of, for example, κόσμος and ἄνθρωπος; however, in poetics as well as Platonic philosophy, the copy was held to be distinct from its model, and the former was doomed by its derivative nature to fail in the mimetic attempt.³⁰⁷ Regardless of the possibility for ultimate imitation, it is clear that ancient mimesis was based upon the affirmation of sameness as harmonious good, and difference as discordant evil.³⁰⁸ The closer one got to sameness, the greater the good, assuming only that the exemplar was in itself good. On just such an affirmation was Greco-Roman *paideia* founded: those teachers who were ethically superior served as desirable exemplars for students’ mimesis.³⁰⁹ Of course, as Ehrensperger has demonstrated, the good exemplar was gendered—the one of whom mimesis is demanded is not the good person, but the good *man*.³¹⁰

The apostle’s call for mimesis is read by Castelli as a discourse of power in which the compliant audience will become evidence in support of the emerging social

³⁰⁵ Crafton, *Agency*, 43.

³⁰⁶ Wardy, *Birth of Rhetoric*, 37.

³⁰⁷ Castelli, *Imitating Paul*, 16, 62-71

³⁰⁸ Castelli, *Imitating Paul*, 81, 86.

³⁰⁹ Castelli, *Imitating Paul*, 81-85.

³¹⁰ Ehrensperger, *Paul and the Dynamics of Power*, esp. 138, 145-146.

formation.³¹¹ Polaski has taken a similar tack with regard to Paul's argumentation, noting that power "is at work in the world described by the Pauline texts, and once one defines the means to look for it, one discovers that power is everywhere."³¹² For Crafton, all of 2 Corinthians is "the struggle of a leader to define and establish the proper relation to a congregation."³¹³ N.T. Wright sees both of the canonical Corinthian letters as being "all about resurrection."³¹⁴ While each of these claims may be supportable, one should keep in mind the old proverb, "To a man with a hammer, everything looks like a nail." Once one believes that the interpretive key (e.g., power) is firmly in hand, each text may be "discovered" to yield fully and only to that very key. Notwithstanding the danger of judging one's own method to be *sine qua non*, each methodical key ought to be used wherever useful; indeed, this affirmation lies at the very heart of the SRI analytic.

Without denying the depth of Castelli's (and others') insights regarding the inescapably ideological nature of Paul's argumentation, still her view does not appear to do full justice to the text. Paul is not calling for a simple imitation of himself, nor is he in the fullest sense engaged in a discourse of power. Paul's earlier appeals argued that the manner in which God had used him made him a legitimate leader and role model. Because the Corinthians rejected his way of viewing authority and power, Paul here does not present himself as an agent but as an *agency*. As a result, the

³¹¹ Castelli, *Imitating Paul*, 15, 53-57.

³¹² Polaski, *Paul and the Discourse of Power*, 48.

³¹³ Crafton, *Agency*, 12.

³¹⁴ Wright, *The Resurrection of the Son of God*, 298.

imitatio to which the apostle calls the Corinthians is not of himself; rather, he gives to them a call for conformity to the crucified Christ.³¹⁵

4.5 Chapter Summary

Paul began his fool's speech by affirming an equal status with his opponents, yet quickly moved to a presentation of his shaming, feminizing beatings; he then affirmed he has survived attack by violent enemies, but admits his escape was cowardly. At this point Paul says he will be moving on to another category—visions and revelations—that should demonstrate his high status and blessed bodily state. But as the narrative proceeds, he suggests that the experience may not be related to his own body, or even to any body at all. In a move reminiscent of his self-presentation in 1 Cor 2:1-5, he reveals that he cannot speak of the revelations he received. And above it all, he insists that his paradisiacal experience has resulted in a weakness imposed by God through a satanic agency, a weakness which is defined in terms of painful penetration and repeated bodily blows. And Paul did not accept the blows and penetration with masculine composure and philosophic lack of concern, but rather begged the Lord to take the stake away. As with regard to Paul's running from his enemies at Damascus, this is not to deny that Paul's circumstances were "objectively" difficult and dangerous; rather, that his escaping from these very real dangers was subjectively and socially perceived as a demonstration of less than manly qualities.

To be certain, the σκόλοψ may be read as an echo of Christ's own crucifixion, the scourging of Jesus may be compared to the κολαφίζειν experienced by Paul, and even the apostle's thrice-repeated plea for relief might be read as

³¹⁵ Cf. Eastman, "Incarnation as Mimetic Participation," passim; Crafton, *Agency*, 135.

mirroring the Lord's own prayer at Gethsemane. Surely such connections could be read as an argument for divine status and strength; once again, however, Paul explicitly self-identifies with the *weakness* of Christ, effectively disallowing a move to interpret the apostle's sufferings as simple evidences of strength or honour.

The apostle's self-presentation of beatings at the beginning of the fool's speech (11:23-24) goes even further toward demonstrating his lack of acceptable status. Not only do his somatic markings prove him to be weak and servile, they also cast him in a feminine light. Able to be stripped, bent over, approached from behind, and physically overwhelmed, Paul would be seen as no better—as no other—than a woman or a slave. And the conclusion of the fool's speech returns to this idea of beatings. The earlier-mentioned beatings were given at the hands of Jews and Romans; these last-mentioned buffetings are received from a satanic agent at the direction of the Lord himself. And the stakes are raised at the end for, while the possibility of penetration was implied throughout the accounts, Paul's receipt of the *σκόλοψ* certainly brings such a theme into the open. Paul is not a shining example of the Greco-Roman or the Jewish man, but a shamed and servile, weak and feminized follower of the one who in weakness hung upon the cross.

Chapter Two dealt, *inter alia*, with Paul's weakness and inability to speak, noting a strong connection of these (self-imposed?) states with the crucifixion of Christ. Chapter Three has also noted Paul's self-reported lack of speech power, and has discussed its feminizing implications for Paul's humiliation. While the earlier discussion focused greatly upon the apostle's self-determination to mirror his humiliated Lord, Chapter Three has furthered the argument by examining those experiences and sufferings not directly under the apostle's control. Indeed, the

penetrating shame and pain is inflicted upon Paul not only by Jews and Romans alike, but also by the hand of the Lord himself. The cothematization of weakness, the feminine, and silence was demonstrated in the previous chapter; the present chapter has provided further evidence for this same social interpenetration of concepts. Chapter Four will examine 2 Cor 3:7-18 in light of the similar language and explicitly stated themes of speech, weakness, and shame as found in 1 Cor 11:2-16. The 1 Corinthians 11 passage depends upon an explicitly gendered argument, but is one in which Paul makes no obvious somatic *self*-presentation; the argument and language of this text will then be used as an intertextual key to the final passage in this thesis. In that passage (2 Cor 3:7-18) Paul constructs an explicit and devastating attack upon Moses, an attack which ironically argues for the apostle's own feminized and shameful weakness in the proclamation of Christ his head.

CHAPTER FIVE: 2 CORINTHIANS 3:7-18

In Chapter One, I outlined my thesis regarding the leadership and authority implications of Paul's gendered self-presentation of his physical body; I also set forth my SRI methodologies, and reviewed the major works of recent literature dealing directly with Pauline somatic concerns. Following Chapter Three's examination of the Greco-Roman cothematization of gender, status, strength, and speech in 1 Cor 2:1-5, I further demonstrated in Chapter Four (2 Cor 11:16—12:13) the intertwining of gender and power, shame and servility, of weakness and feminization. In each of these investigations, the apostle's weakness was shown to be a conscious reflection of the gendered weakness and shame seen in the crucified Christ. In the second half of this present chapter, I will apply an SRI analytic to 2 Cor 3:7-18, in order to support the gendered status claims laid out earlier in the thesis. The chapter will begin, however, by examining the language and social expectations evidenced in 1 Cor 11:2-16. I will then set forth the broad connections existing between 2 Cor 3:7-18 and 1 Cor 11:2-16, demonstrating the reasonableness of treating the 1 Corinthians text as a social and linguistic intertextual key to the Moses passage.

Both passages deal explicitly with themes of glory, covering, and of speaking in the context of divine matters; they each deal with weakness, explicitly in the latter passage, implicitly in the former; further still, they deal with headship, explicitly in the former, and in the latter in implicit form. Ciampa and Rosner call these “conceptual and lexical ties ... remarkable.”¹ Especially of interest are the parallels evident between Paul and the women on one hand, and Moses and the men on the

¹ Ciampa and Rosner, *First Corinthians*, 513.

other hand. I will suggest that Paul has in the Moses passage “womanized” himself, thus turning on its head his own apparent earlier argument regarding a necessary concomitance of personal weakness with disallowance of speech. This chapter advances my thesis through a demonstration of how the themes of feminine weakness, rhetorical inability/foreclosure, and somatic infirmities intertwine to produce an argument for such a bodily state being not only compatible with, but necessary and integral to, Paul’s status of leadership and power.

5.1 1 Cor 11:2-16 as Intertextural Key

The following two sections (5.1.1 and 5.1.2) will make use of inner texture and intertextural analysis to note the passage’s underlying structure of praise/glory and shame, as well as to point out the relative insignificance of the particular referents for Pauline “covering” terminology. Social and cultural texture will be used, along with both ideological and sacred textures, to demonstrate what is actually at stake in Paul’s argument beyond the bare fact of women speaking with bared heads. Paul’s broad argument in 11:2-16 is that an uncovered woman brings shame when she publicly speaks in connection with deity, and that a man conversely brings about such shame speaking of such matters when he is covered. The honourable or shameful nature of the activity is determined by the speaker’s gender; that is, the speaker’s gender combined with presence or lack of head covering determines whether his/her verbal representation of God is disgraceful or honourable, a matter of glory or of shame. The requirement of gender-distinct actions and appearances is supported on

the basis of “headship” (11:3-7),² the temporal order of creation (11:7-12), and of φύσις (11:13-16); however, these supports draw their power of conviction from a social *habitus* that is shared by the Corinthians and Paul and which pairs gender with the issues of glory and shame.³

This section will not exegete 1 Cor 11:2-16 for its own sake, nor seek to answer the many questions which vex interpreters; rather, it will outline the general flow of the text’s argument, and identify those terms and themes which might form an intertextual substructure for an analysis of 2 Cor 3:7-18. For example, the question of whether ἄνδρες καὶ γυναῖκες has reference to “men and women” as biologically-ordered pairs or to “husbands and wives” as covenantally-defined particulars is of no moment for the present discussion, as both understandings treat the female as the subordinate member of the pairing by virtue of her femaleness. Among other questions not pertinent to the present discussion are the specific referent of “covering/uncovered” (περιβόλαιον/ἀκατακάλυπτος) and the theological force of ἡ κεφαλή (head). Ciampa and Rosner have provided an excellent introductory list of such questions.⁴

² I am using “head” here, instead of “source,” “ruler,” “preeminence,” etc., in light of Gregory Dawes’ argument regarding κεφαλή as a “living metaphor” (Dawes, *Body in Question*, 122-149). Even should one disagree with Dawes’ conclusion, his work demonstrates the debatable wisdom of predetermining one’s reading and application by an “unpacking” of the metaphor. Though Thiselton ultimately chooses to bracket “head” as a possible rendering in such passages, he clearly recognizes the value of Dawes’ argumentation for the polyvalency of κεφαλή. Thiselton’s choice of “preeminent” is based at least in part on the strength of “head” as a contemporary living metaphor: the English terms have controlling metaphorical values which curtail the breadth of possible meanings found in the ancient Greek term (Thiselton, *First Corinthians*, 801, 811-822; Ciampa and Rosner, *First Corinthians*, 508-510).

³ Ciampa and Rosner, *First Corinthians*, 503-504; Thiselton, *First Corinthians*, 826-827; Barrett, *First Corinthians*, 251; Bruce, *1 & 2 Corinthians*, 104-105; Witherington, *Conflict and Community*, 237; Hays, *First Corinthians*, 184-185; Garland, *1 Corinthians*, 508-510; Stuckenbruck, “Why Should Women Cover,” 213.

⁴ Ciampa and Rosner, *First Corinthians*, 503.

Though this 1 Corinthians passage contains no Pauline somatic *self*-presentation, it does combine terms and themes also found in the text of 2 Corinthians 3. Among the terms and themes common to these passages are δόξα (glory), εἰκόν (image), covering-uncovering-veiling, and speaking as a representative of God/Christ. Another uncommon Pauline term is διαθήκη (covenant) (Rom 9:4; 11:27; Gal 3:15, 17; 4:24; Eph 2:12), which term occurs paired with a specific mention of καινή or παλαιᾶς (new/old) only in 2 Cor 3:6, 14 and in 1 Cor 11:25. The latter passage is a quotation, and slightly outside the limits of those texts discussed in this chapter, but it is of note that it is directly related to the suffering death of Christ.⁵ Explicitly-stated elements of this 1 Corinthians passage will prove helpful in uncovering implicit themes that might otherwise remain hidden in the passage dealing with the veiling of Moses.

To those who might object that such connections between the two passages would be less visible to the Corinthian audience than to the modern reader with her concordances and textual commentaries, I offer the following broad replies. First, that the Corinthians were aware of the apostle's earlier words to them seems self-evident from the fact that in 1 Cor 11:2 Paul praises them for their complete and careful (πάντα, καθώς) remembrance of the traditions he had passed on. That the Corinthians have at times *misunderstood* or *disagreed with* Paul's earlier statements (e.g., in 1 Cor 5:9-11; 2 Cor 1:14-18; even the entirety of 2 Corinthians read as the apostle's response to Corinthian reactions to his earlier correspondence) is quite beside the point, since misunderstanding requires awareness and disagreement implies

⁵ Cf. Hafemann, *Paul*, 119.

remembrance.⁶ Secondly, the conceptions of gender and attire underlying Paul's argumentation in 1 Cor 11:2-16 are not unique to himself, but are in keeping with those held by the broader Greco-Roman world. As these gender expectations were part of the *habitus*, one need not posit an explicit awareness of the passage in order to make a connection between its argument and a later piece of Pauline correspondence such as 2 Corinthians 3. That Paul can set out a conclusion to his argument with ἐν ὑμῖν αὐτοῖς κρίνετε "you should judge among yourselves" implies that Paul is depending upon shared cultural assumptions (regarding, *inter alia*, gender, shame, glory, covering, speech). If his model reader possesses such sensibilities, then no specific memory of literary interactions need be posited between the readers of the two passages.⁷

5.1.1 Structure of 1 Cor 11:2-16

This section will use inner texture in determining the flow of Paul's argument, while intertextual use of the larger Hippocratic corpus will provide a greater understanding of Paul's references to hair and "nature" (φύσις). Examining the importance of ritual space with regard to male and female activity will involve us in both ideological and sacred textural analysis. Social and cultural texture will assist in developing an appreciation of the passage's assumptions regarding gendered alterity and distinction of roles.

There is no serious question regarding the textual parameters of the passage: 1

⁶ Mitchell, "Corinthian Correspondence," 46-47, 50-52; Mitchell, *Birth of Christian Hermeneutics*; Shi, *Message*, 181; Thiselton, *First Corinthians*, 809-810; Fotopoulos, "1 Corinthians," 421-422; Wire, "Reconciled to Glory," 274.

⁷ Wire, *Corinthian Women Prophets*, 123; Lakey, *Image and Glory of God*, 137-141, 143; Winter, *Roman Wives*, 85, 92-93.

Cor 11:2-16 is treated by all as a distinct textual unit. Though the passage is most often understood as the introduction of a discussion extending through 14:40, a minority suggests it is an interpolation.⁸ In the absence of supporting manuscript or tradition, however, the minority view appears to be special pleading—a conjectural emendation in reaction to exegetical frustration.⁹ Moreover, the passage is universally understood as affirming a distinction between men and women (or husbands and wives) with regard to public speech related to deity (prayer and prophecy), and to the structures of authority in relation to somatic covering and disclosure. That is to say, the act of covering is not Paul's true concern, but a culturally-required expression of the condition for which he is arguing: that of sexual/gender differentiation. Though Paul does affirm some sort of gender "equality" in light of the Christ event forming the identity of each believer, this equality is nevertheless predicated upon their gendered alterity.¹⁰ Jorunn Økland's monograph on this passage centres on the unique limitations and requirements placed upon the discursive activities of women within sanctuary/ritual space, where there occurs speech related to deity. The ritual nature of the location opens it to female activity,¹¹ while the mixed-gender context makes the

⁸ Witherington, *Conflict and Community*, 231; Murphy-O'Connor, *Keys*, 129-141; Murphy-O'Connor, "Sex and Logic in 1 Corinthians 11:2-16," 482-483; Mitchell, *Reconciliation*, 258 n. 402; Allo, *Première Épitre*, 253; Collins, *First Corinthians*, 393-394; Lakey, *Image and Glory of God*, 98-100, 102; Blomberg, "Neither Hierarchalist nor Egalitarian," 302-304; Peterson, *Der erste Brief*, 217, 233-234.

⁹ For this reasoning, cf. Mount, "Spirit Possession and Authority," 313-317; Stuckenbruck, "Why Should Women Cover," 207.

¹⁰ The agreement for such an understanding is so broad as to be only represented by the following citations. Volf, *Exclusion and Embrace*, 182, 185-187; Badiou, *Saint Paul*, 104-106, 108-110; Bailey, *Paul through Mediterranean Eyes*, 299-300; Økland, *Women in Their Place*, 191-195, 220, 239-240; Ciampa and Rosner, *First Corinthians*, 507, 514; Lakey, *Image and Glory of God*, 122-126; Thiselton, *First Corinthians*, 799-800, 829-831, 833-834; Heil, *Rhetorical Role*, 178; Gundry-Volf, "Gender and Creation," 153-155, 160, 164, 168-169; Neyrey, "Body Language in 1 Corinthians," 154; Mitchell, *Reconciliation*, 261; Yeo, "Differentiation and Mutuality," passim; Hjort, "Gender Hierarchy," 65-66; Loader, *NT on Sexuality*, 372, 376; Peterson, *Der erste Brief*, 221-222.

¹¹ Fischler, "Imperial Cult," 172-174.

clear marking of gender distinctions all the more necessary. This distinction between ritual and domestic/female space holds true even though it is likely that early Christian ἐκκλησία met within the physical confines of what would otherwise be a private house.¹²

The larger context deals with issues of “the strong” and their treatment of the weak in the Lord’s Supper (11:17-34) and in the exercising of spiritual gifts (12:1—14:40). And at the end of this section (14:33-38) Paul returns to the question of women and men speaking in relation to divine matters. The uncertain history of the text at 14:33b-35 is amply reviewed by Thiselton. Regardless of whether these verses may be judged to be original, displaced, or a non-Pauline interpolation, the larger point regarding gendered alterity and Corinthian communal worship still stands.¹³ The apostolic granting of praise in 11:2 (ἐπαινῶ δὲ ὑμῶς) is clearly paralleled by the withholding of the same in 11:17 (οὐκ ἐπαινῶ); thus, the discussions in 11:2-16 and 11:17-34 may be viewed as subsections of one larger argument regarding proper activity within Corinthian communal worship.¹⁴ The ordered listing in 11:11-12 parallels that of 11:3, these being the only portions of the argument to include references to man, woman, God, and Christ (termed κύριος in the latter passage). The presented hierarchy of 11:3 must be read in light of the gendered equality or lack

¹² Økland, *Women in Their Place*, 1-3, 31-38 58-60, 67-71, 126-127, 137-143, 166-167, 177-178, 233-238; Kraemer, *Unreliable Witnesses*, 255-259, 270-271; Cameron, *Feminism and Linguistic Theory*, 153-154; Germond, “Rhetoric of Gender,” 362; Hogan, *No Longer Male and Female*, 4; Boer, “Julia Kristeva, Marx, and the Singularity of Paul,” 214-215.

¹³ Thiselton, *First Corinthians*, 1146-1150; cf. Payne, “MS. 88,” ; Niccum, “Voice of the Manuscripts,” passim.

¹⁴ Mitchell, *Reconciliation*, 258-260; Ciampa and Rosner, *First Corinthians*, 499-503; Wire, *Corinthian Women Prophets*, 98-134; Allo, *Seconde Épitre*, 253-254; cf. Mount, “Spirit Possession and Authority,” 315; Økland, *Women in Their Place*, 2; Blomberg, “Neither Hierarchalist nor Egalitarian,” 295; Stuckenbruck, “Why Should Women Cover,” 217; Zeller, *Der erste Brief*, 350, 354; Hjort, “Gender Hierarchy,” 74; Loader, *NT on Sexuality*, 368, 372, 380-381.

of distinction presented in 11:11-12. Not only does the broader creation argument demonstrate the interdependence of ἀνὴρ and γυνή, but the Christ-redemptive argument also demonstrates their equality.

Though the ordering of the passage does display a general downward trending of authority, the elements in Paul's list are not presented in a simple sequence. An "orderly" reconstructed list would of course be God–Christ–Man–Woman,

However, the question of the nature of the hierarchy—authority, origination or pre-eminence—is ultimately less significant than the fact that, by occupying different positions in the hierarchy, man and woman each relate to a different κεφαλή.¹⁵

As Thiselton points out, gender differentiation and distinction implies neither a strict hierarchy nor a denial of God's image to women.¹⁶ Judith Gundry-Volf understands Paul's concern to be that

man and woman are both the *glory of another* and therefore both have an obligation not to cause shame to their 'heads' ... since they are the glory of *different* persons—man is the glory of God and woman is the glory of man—they must use different means to avoid shaming their 'heads.'"¹⁷

Fiddes is also in agreement, and sees the non-sequential ordering of the heads as a "comparison of sets of covenantal relationships" with a complete lack of hierarchical intention on Paul's part.¹⁸

Paul's omission of the expected εἰκὼν θεοῦ "image of God" in reference to

¹⁵ Lakey, *Image and Glory of God*, 104; cf. Watson, *Agape*, 43-44.

¹⁶ Thiselton, *The Hermeneutics of Doctrine*, 233; cf. Jasper, *Because of Beauvoir*, 62.

¹⁷ Gundry-Volf, "Gender and Creation," 157; Ciampa and Rosner, *First Corinthians*, 503-504, 524-525; Scroggs, "Paul and the Eschatological Woman," 301; Hooker, "Authority on Her Head," 415; Loader, *NT on Sexuality*, 374-375.

¹⁸ Fiddes, "Woman's Head," 372.

the woman is ambiguous: it may leave the reader unclear as to whether the apostle believes woman to be in God's image, but again this simply is not the point of his argument. Wire notes that Paul's departure from the more-expected "Christ is God's image, and *all* believers become conformed to him" even more strongly highlights the apostle's intention to focus on gender differentiation.¹⁹ It is clear that Paul makes an explicitly gendered distinction when it comes to δόξα. Paul's affirmation that woman

is δόξα ἀνδρός means that she is not δόξα θεοῦ. This itself is sufficient to warrant the covering directive (v. 10); if man as δόξα θεοῦ is created to manifest the glory of God by uncovering, then, for Paul, woman as δόξα ἀνδρός is not.²⁰

In summary, it may be said that, while theologians are in general rightly concerned with how woman is related to God, in this passage Paul is interested in gender distinctions, and with how woman is related to man.

Some have suggested that the "however" clause (πλήν) is Paul's own embarrassed interruption because he recognizes that his argument from creation is unconvincing. On the other hand, Økland reads the clause as emphasizing what is important about the preceding argument, rather than as signalling a purely adversative or concessive shift.²¹ For the following reasons, I believe it is preferable to read 11:11-16 as the apostle's willing clarification, rather than as an exasperated or embarrassed concession. First, it should be noted in general that the cohesiveness of an ancient author's argument is not disproven by later readers' lack of appreciation.²²

¹⁹ Wire, *Corinthian Women Prophets*, 120-121, 1128-130, 132-134.

²⁰ Lakey, *Image and Glory of God*, 112-113, cf. 128-129, 139-140; Gundry-Volf, "Gender and Creation," 163-164; Hooker, "Authority on Her Head," 411; Økland, *Women in Their Place*, 182-183.

²¹ Økland, *Women in Their Place*, 187; Schüssler Fiorenza, *In Memory of Her*; Watson, *Agape*, 88; Furnish, *The Theology of the First Letter to the Corinthians*, 77; Jaubert, "Le voile des femmes," 419.

²² Köstenberger, "Gender Passages in the NT," 260.

Second, and more directly, as Troy Martin has pointed out, Paul's appeal to the Corinthians' conscience and the practice of the churches is logically connected to the preceding paragraphs, integrated with the question of Paul's own ἡθoς.

The argument from creation lacks persuasive force apart from the ἡθoς of Paul and the churches of God. If the Corinthian Christians abandon this ἡθoς and return to their pagan ἡθoς, the creation story in Genesis ceases to be authoritative, and different myths inform their worldview and authorize practices other than those Paul recommends. Similarly, the argument from propriety based on nature is persuasive only if the Corinthian Christians retain their Christian ἡθoς. If they return to their pagan ἡθoς, their sense of propriety shifts, and the argument fails to persuade them to maintain the countercultural practice Paul delivered to them. Paul's appeal to ἡθoς is thus crucial in responding to someone who purposes to be contentious.²³

Arguments from obviousness are made both in 11:5b-6 and 11:15-16. The former passage implies the obviousness through a syllogistic structure in which the major premise is a culturally-formed assumption:

A woman being shaved or clipped is shameful
Being uncovered is equal to being shaved or clipped
 A woman being uncovered is shameful

Paul's argument is more specific, for the shame is specifically applied to the act of divine speech matters (praying and prophesying). These specifics do not affect the *form* of the argument: the argument is formally valid, and its minor premise may easily be granted on grounds of definitional agreement. The argument's truthfulness, however, depends upon the assumptive major premise.²⁴ And it is, in fact, the same assumption that is made in 11:15-16. There, Paul uses a rhetorically-implied question, “φύσις itself teaches you what is proper, doesn't it?” The assumption is that a

²³ Martin, “Veiled Exhortations,” 258, 271-273.

²⁴ Loader, *NT on Sexuality*, 370-380.

female's short hair or lack of covering is self-obviously shameful, and that a man being covered is obviously shameful as well.

In struggling with Paul's confusing argument regarding hair and shame, Troy Martin suggests that the term περιβόλαιον should be rendered as "testicle" in 1 Cor 11:15.²⁵ Martin's lexical argument, based on Euripides, *Herc. fur.*, 1269, fails to be convincing. While some of the difficulties with his gloss are reviewed immediately below, it may be noted at the start that Ciampa and Rosner in passing pronounce it "unlikely," while Fitzmeyer summarily brushes Martin's suggestion away by calling it "completely far-fetched." Murphy-O'Connor, Michael Lakey, and Mark Goodacre each afford relatively more space for discussion, but still reject the suggestion.²⁶ Nevertheless, the bulk of Martin's article is illuminating with regard to the Greco-Roman view of hair. In general, he points out that hair was believed to draw semen upwards to the head, in the same manner as the testicles drew it downward to the penis where it could be ejaculated.²⁷ Thus, men were to keep their hair short to avoid drawing semen upward and weakening their proper male functionality. Women were to keep their hair long, so that their own imperfect semen would not descend, and semen implanted through intercourse would be drawn up toward the uterus. And, of course, since the woman's hair thus functioned in a sexual manner, it should be covered in men's presence just as a man's genitals ought to be covered in the presence of women.

²⁵ Martin, "Paul's Argument from Nature," passim.

²⁶ Ciampa and Rosner, *First Corinthians*; Fitzmeyer, *First Corinthians*, 421; Murphy-O'Connor, *Keys*, 180; Lakey, *Image and Glory of God*, 120-121; Goodacre, "περιβόλαιον," esp. 395-396.

²⁷ Cf. Dean-Jones, "Cultural Construct," 128-129.

As stated earlier, the lexical argument here is quite forced. Martin renders the Euripidean passage ἐπεὶ δὲ σαρκὸς περιβόλαι' ἐκτησάμην ἤβωντα as “After I received my bags of flesh [testicles], which are the outward signs of puberty.”²⁸ But the more traditional rendering of “When I received the youthful covering of flesh” makes perfect sense in terms of Hercules’ young strong musculature, thus first of all rendering Martin’s unique gloss unnecessary. Martin’s sole other reference in support of his gloss (Tatius, *Leuc. Clit.*, 1.15.2) is from a text some six centuries later than Euripides. Martin notes that Tatius uses περιβολαί as he “describes the entwining of the flowers, embracings of the leaves, and intercourses of the fruits (αἱ τῶν πετάλων περιπλοκαί, τῶν φύλλων περιβολαί, τῶν καρπῶν συμπλοκαί).”²⁹ While the ancient writer does associate the garden with erotic activity, this does not provide logical support for Martin’s assertion that the leaves are here to be allegorized as testicles. Even should the allegorical force of the term be found convincing, this would not support a change in actual reference which Martin affirms for the term found in 1 Corinthians. While Martin’s proposed gloss remains unconvincing to most scholars, this does not invalidate the review of evidence regarding hair and sexuality as presented in the remainder of his article.

Regardless of the particulars of one’s interpretation, Paul’s assumptive premise must be rooted in a cultural agreement regarding the significance of an observed phenomenon. As Bakhtin writes, “No natural phenomenon has ‘meaning,’ only signs (including words) have meaning.”³⁰ While it may to some readers seem a

²⁸ Martin, “Paul’s Argument from Nature,” 77.

²⁹ Ibid.

³⁰ Bakhtin, “Problem of the Text,” 113.

statement of the obvious, this is the very point being made by Bakhtin and his interpreters: what is “natural” and “obvious” is in part predetermined through one’s presuppositions and preperceptions.

Communication and comprehension of a gesture are achieved through the establishing of a reciprocity between the other’s intention and my own. Neither his intention nor mine is thematized; in both cases it ‘inhabits’ our body. Our interaction involves neither a mechanical process nor an intellectual operation, but a pre-reflective act of structuring the world on the part of one body-subject and a corresponding pre-reflective act of recapturing the meaning of that structuration on the part of the other incarnate subject. What we have here is a pre-reflective dialogue involving an invitation to concur with a certain way of perceiving the world, and a response to that invitation by an adjusting of the body’s powers so as to overlap the intentional object outlined by the other’s gesture.³¹

It should be noted that the term φύσις has no necessary and straightforward correspondence with what we may tend to call the “natural world.”³² Notions of proper gender and attire were rooted in Ancient Mediterranean views of male honour. The social norms are “naturalized” by means of their connectedness to the divine ordering of society and the world. As Le Guin aptly summarizes, “societies see human beings as divided into two kinds, the fundamental division being power, and they grant one gender superior power.”³³ In this way, the social norms became equivalent to φύσις, and the term comes to include the “way things are” by force of long-standing self-obvious custom. Paul, perhaps in order to avoid the appearance of

³¹ Langer, *Merleau-Ponty*, 61; cf. Asad, “Remarks,” 46-47; Stuckenbruck, “Why Should Women Cover,” 218-219.

³² Osiek and Pouya, “Constructions of Gender,” 49.

³³ Le Guin, “Unchosen Love,” 71.

pure concession to the customs of the present surrounding κόσμος, naturalizes his demands through an appeal to the Genesis creation accounts.³⁴

For a marvellous example of φύσις being subsumed under societal expectations, read Soranus on the proper swaddling and bathing of a newborn child (Soranus, *Gyn.*, 2.9.14-15; 2.16.32, 34; 2.19.42). The physician directs the midwife to “bind the child in accordance with the *natural* shape of each bodily part” (δεῖ διαπλάσσειν ... ὡς ἔχει ἕκαστον φυσικοῦ σχήματος). Dealing with specifics, he directs that the female child should be bound tightly around the breasts and loosely about the hips as this will result in a more pleasing (εὐπρεπέστερον) female shape. In discussing the male infant whose foreskin is lacking or smaller than desired, Soranus instructs the midwife to take measures for stretching it out. Given time and physical persuasion, “the foreskin will assume its *natural* length and retain its *natural* pleasing shape through being *accustomed* to do so” (τὸ κατὰ φύσιν ἀπολαμβάνει μῆκος καλύπτουσα τὴν βάλανον καὶ συνεθιζομένη τὴν φυσικὴν εὐμορφίαν τηρεῖν). The size and shaping of an infant’s feet, spine, and head, as well as the right-handedness of the child are all elements of “nature” dependent upon the skill and shaping of the midwife. That which is according to φύσις is subject to the demands of ἦθος.³⁵ It is clear that φύσις includes that which is “obviously in keeping” with societal standards, even when such standards are not met by unaided “nature.”

³⁴ Lahey, *Image and Glory of God*, 73, 95-96, 119-121, 145, 152; Thiselton, *First Corinthians*, 844-846; Fee, *First Corinthians*, 527; Winkler, *Constraints of Desire*, 17-18; Økland, *Women in Their Place*, 194; Watson, *Agape*, 87-88. For a discussion of the general process of habitual naturalization, cf. Bourdieu, *Masculine Domination*, 35, passim; Kraemer, *Unreliable Witnesses*, 260-264; Young and Ford, *Meaning and Truth*, 222-223.

³⁵ Cf. Holmes, *Gender*, 52-55; Bourdieu, *Masculine Domination*, 13; Gleason, *Making Men*, 73, 80-81.

5.1.2 Analysis of 1 Cor 11:2-16

In terms of physical referent, a great deal of distinction may be made between veils, hoods, hair, and hairstyle; indeed, in terms of purely historical accuracy, there is undeniably some importance attached to making such fine distinctions. Thus, exegetes spend time and space attempting to discern and argue which of these are intended by Paul in passages such as that beginning in 1 Cor 11:2. In terms of rhetorical significance, however, no distinction need be made. The sometimes heated discussions regarding the specific meaning of κεφαλή and the referent of the covering materials are largely unproductive, since the argumentative context of the passage demonstrates that the issues at hand are “honour, shame and attire,” while the method and material are not as important as the bare fact of covering.³⁶

Cairns has demonstrated that veiling, covering, and seclusion each function similarly to the other in guarding a woman from her own shame and from bringing dishonour on her husband.³⁷ Llewellyn-Jones has produced a carefully argued monograph demonstrating that any and all types of garment used to cover face and/or head may be viewed through a single lens.³⁸ Llewellyn-Jones’ reviewers have sometimes missed this important part of his argument, resulting in their faulting him for lack of technical terminological precision (“Is he talking about ‘veils’ or ‘hoods’? What kind of veils? He’s just not precise!”) when his well-supported claim is just that such terminological precision is either simply beside the point or even a harmful

³⁶ Lakey, *Image and Glory of God*, 33, 49, 65-68, 104-107; Gundry-Volf, “Gender and Creation,” passim; Wire, *Corinthian Women Prophets*, 117-119, 130.

³⁷ Cairns, “Meaning of the Veil,” 73, 77, 80-81; Loader, *NT on Sexuality*, 373-374; Jaubert, “Le voile des femmes,” 425-428; Martin, “Veiled Exhortations,” 266.

³⁸ Llewellyn-Jones, *Aphrodite’s Tortoise*, 23-83, esp. 33-36, 146, 316; Blundell, “Clutching at Clothes,” 158-159; El Guindi, *Veil*.

distraction.³⁹ Technical terminology and distinctions ought not distract one from the unity of significance; the covering separates and silences—makes the women *qua* her own person unseen and unheard—and this effect is accomplished without regard to the material, manner, or extent of covering. Even a slender hairband may be viewed as a functional equivalent to a veil, in that the loosing of either item effects a similar set of social and sexual expectations. A woman depicted as removing either is understood as preparing to engage in some sexual activity, while the replacing or raising of the covering into place may signal that she is somehow “fending off an assault on her chastity.”⁴⁰ It may be noted that Paul explicitly argues for at least a functional equivalence between a woman’s hair and other physical head coverings—in other words, they “amount to the same thing.”

Though at first blush it may seem superfluous (even tautological) to say, it must be noted that the significance of a matter or thing is to be found in that which it signifies. As Leder states, “In employing a sign I do not thematize its sheer physical presence (the signifier) but attend from it to that which is signified. The signifier thus undergoes a focal disappearance as it is incorporated.”⁴¹ The necessity of making this statement arises from the multiple senses for the term “significance”: while it carries a technical meaning related to (but by no means identical with) the term “referent,” it is popularly used to convey the sense of “importance” or “worthwhileness.”

As veils, hair, and hoods are all means of covering the head or face, once we locate the *signified* as the covered head, the specific *referent* of the covering retains

³⁹ Lee, “Review of *Aphrodite’s Tortoise*,” 119; Davidson, “Review of *Aphrodite’s Tortoise*,” 183; but cf. Dillon, “Review of *Aphrodite’s Tortoise*,” passim.

⁴⁰ Blundell, “Clutching at Clothes,” 158, 161.

⁴¹ Leder, *The Absent Body*, 121.

no significance in either sense of that term. Indeed, as the significance of each listed item is the covering of the head, one may also add “removal of shame,” and “silencing” to the list; while there is no direct referential connection between these and the former four terms, the addition is rhetorically proper in that silencing and shame-guarding result from or are intended by that condition of which covering is also the means of accomplishment. Means, intention, result, condition—each and all may be posited as varying angles from which the same event or circumstance is viewed.⁴²

5.1.3 Gendered Expectations of Veiling

The following two sections (5.1.3.1 and 5.1.3.2) will further and more specifically demonstrate the gendered expectations of Greco-Roman veiling. Intertextual analysis will be performed, not only with regard to written texts, but also to visual representations of women. Ideological texture will again assist in analyzing the gendered assumptions of both the Greco-Roman audience and later interpreters of the Pauline text. Social and cultural texture is used to elucidate the female gendered clothing expectations of the model society created by and reflected in the passage. All these expectations will then be briefly contrasted with those regarding men.

As has been pointed out by Leon Wurmser, shame is rooted in the trauma of scopophilic rejection—the desire to be seen gone awry, the gaze of the Other become hostile, the applause of observers turned to disapprobation.⁴³ The experience of shame, then, may be remedied or responded to by the covering of one’s self, which

⁴² Llewellyn-Jones, *Aphrodite’s Tortoise*, 261-263, 268; Lightfoot, *Talmud*, 4:229-232, 235, 237.

⁴³ Cf. Wurmser, *Mask of Shame*, passim.

self is signified by the head or face. Veiling is a means of indicating or averting shame and the display of weakness; thus, while both men and women may be veiled, the expectedness of the action differs from one gender to the other.

The uncovered woman is so exceptional that she must be understood as existing outside the normal course of life. Women exist in a weak, shameful, and shaming state at all times—especially in relation to men—and are therefore expected to be covered except when in female spaces. Their covering/veiling guards them from being a source or recipient of pollution. Their susceptibility to dishonour(ing) in their physical bodies is understood as a mirror of the social and cosmological danger posed by weakness, pollution, and attack. An uncovered woman dishonours her husband, and his resulting shame weakens the state and world; a covered woman brings glory and honour to her man, displaying his strength to all who see her.

Men, on the other hand, are expected to live life in the open, being unveiled and displaying their honour and strength. It is in exceptional moments of weakness or shame—whether real, imagined, or threatened—that a man resorts to a veil. By means of such a covering, the man's glory is hidden and he becomes for all social intents and purposes a woman. So strong is the expectation for a man to be uncovered, that a veiled man may not be recognized *qua* man even in close quarters. For both genders, veiling is a mark of shame and weakness; however, while the shame of a woman is an ontological constant, a man's shame is a situational and (it was to be hoped) temporary state of affairs.

5.1.3.1 The veiling of women. Llewellyn-Jones demonstrates that the Greco-Roman custom of female veiling was so deeply built into the male ideology that it

“seldom receives a mention in the ancient male sources.” Issues of everyday life are seldom discussed except in instances of abuse or unexpected failure; thus,

texts tend to focus on the subject of female *unveiling*, an act in which the usual and accepted social prescripts of veiling are broken by a non-conforming woman. A veiled and compliant woman tends to pass in the literary sources without much (if any) comment.⁴⁴

And while Kraemer has questioned whether the artistic representations of women support the claim that women were routinely veiled,⁴⁵ the same limitations of interpretation apply since these male-produced statues and drawings of veiled and veiling women were not annotated and may thus be ambiguous in their signification.⁴⁶ As Llewellyn-Jones argues, the ancient “female gesture of face-veiling is so natural that it needs no further comment or elaboration.” It is not unlike the task of proving from modern literature that men used to take off their hats when entering a building: there will be little in the way of direct statements regarding positive compliance with the expectation (whether legal or social), though one might expect any exceptions to receive mention.

But one of the difficulties stems from the attempt to explain the reasons for the alternating presence or absence of the veil in various situations.⁴⁷ Indeed, on the basis of a discussion in Lucian, Massey notes that “art may not be a reliable guide for interpreting daily life in ancient Greece; [Lucian’s text] implies that female figures in art depicted with their heads unveiled may not conform to custom.”⁴⁸ Scholars have

⁴⁴ Llewellyn-Jones, *Aphrodite’s Tortoise*, 10; cf. Kraemer, *Unreliable Witnesses*, 263-264.

⁴⁵ Kraemer, *Unreliable Witnesses*, 40.

⁴⁶ Fontaine, “A Heifer from Thy Stable,” 70; Bourdieu, *Field of Cultural Production*, 215-227.

⁴⁷ Llewellyn-Jones, *Aphrodite’s Tortoise*, 1-3, 10, 14-15, cf. 123, 156, 170, 315; Kilmer, “Genital Phobia,” 104; Anderson, “Social Structure and the Veil,” 398.

⁴⁸ Massey, “Meaning of κατακαλύπτω,” 517-518.

for years held two apparently contradictory views regarding women in the Greco-Roman world. On the one hand, respectable women were secluded from the male gaze and association behind the walls of the home; on the other, such women were afforded liberty to circulate among and even speak with men. Llewellyn-Jones demonstrates that these two views are reconciled through the veil, which “creates a portable form of seclusion that a woman is able to wear on her visits into the male public world.” In other words, the veil is much like the shell of the tortoise (an ancient symbol of Aphrodite), who carries his house with him wherever he may go.⁴⁹ So Pliny praises his wife for concealing herself behind a screen so that she will not be seen when she listens to his public readings (Pliny, *Ep.*, 4.19.2-3).

Brooten points out that a veil is “physically restricting. Removing it gives a woman greater freedom of movement.” She then suggests, however, that even while limiting the woman’s movement, the veil may also have provided women a measure of safety from attack likely to be experienced in a wider scope of travels. All of this serves to highlight the complexity of the situation. The physical restraint of the veil was at the same time a source both of (limited) social liberty and of authority.⁵⁰ The public veiling of women was a normal affair, and the veil afforded a woman a broad scope of safety, travel, commerce, and speech. An unveiled woman was severely limited in her social choices and ability, and her public unveiling was performed only

⁴⁹ Llewellyn-Jones, *Aphrodite’s Tortoise*, 4, 189-214, 318; El Guindi, *Veil*, 77-79, 93-95.

⁵⁰ Brooten, “Response to ‘Corinthian Veils’,” 296; cf. Blundell, “Clutching at Clothes,” 162, *passim*; Davary, “Miss Elsa and the Veil,” 49-50.

in extraordinary moments of distress or shame (Livy, *Hist.*, 1.26.2; Aeschylus, *Pers.*, 537-539; Chrysostom, *Or.*, 64.3).⁵¹

It may be argued that women also unveiled in non-shame situations, such as mourning and weddings. These situations, however, may also be subsumed under the shame category.⁵² Since the woman has no honour of her own, a loss experienced by her husband would implicate her in shame; thus, at the death or shaming of her husband, a woman lost her (source of) honour and would unveil and loose her hair.⁵³ If the husband had not experienced such a loss, then the woman's unveiling could effectively produce that shame by placing her husband in the situation of being publicly challenged with regard to his honour.⁵⁴ Moving from the mourning of death and challenge to the opposite end of the social spectrum, wedding unveilings (ἀνακαλυπτηρία) may also be understood in terms of a shame response. The public demonstration of uncovering symbolized that the woman was soon to be privately humiliated by her husband.⁵⁵

Bourdieu has gone to great lengths to explicate those historical and cultural mechanisms that result in what often are viewed as eternal and transcultural structures of sexuality and gender. A culture's acceptance of domination may be so complete that it neither offers nor requires any explanation or justification for its own programmes or expectations. The biological distinctions are conflated with the social

⁵¹ Hoodfar, "Veil in Their Minds," 430-436; Rousselle, "Body Politics," 315; Anderson, "Social Structure and the Veil," 402. Llewellyn-Jones, *Aphrodite's Tortoise*, 301-304; Cairns, "Veiling, αἰδώς," 153-155; Cairns, "Off with her ΑΙΔΩΣ," passim; Kraemer, *Unreliable Witnesses*, 254-255.

⁵² Pace e.g. Thompson, "Hairstyles," 104; Oster, "When Men Wore Veils To Worship," passim.

⁵³ Cf. Böhme, "Conquest of the Real by the Imaginary," 241.

⁵⁴ Llewellyn-Jones, *Aphrodite's Tortoise*, 122, 130, 136, 156-157, 163, 208.

⁵⁵ Carson, "Putting Her in Her Place," 163.

distinctions, and then the social structure is defended by reference to the objective biological data that is now seen clearly to support the distinctions. In other words, an entrenched and systematized culture argues for and with its own logic in a circular manner. Both the dominating and the dominated within such a society accept the neutrality or eternality of the order, and the cultural argumentation appears entirely natural and obvious.⁵⁶ Such conflation is not limited to the ancient Greco-Roman world, but is well-attested in the present-day West.⁵⁷ One man may say to another, “You pussy!” using a reference to female genitalia to identify a male’s acting in a weak (thus, unmanly) manner. And, as I have heard even my Conservative Evangelical female students say as they speak to one another about being courageous, “Grow some balls!”

That the identity and social functioning of women should be so physically circumscribed may appear nonsensical, but the demands are in keeping with the overall view of women in Greco-Roman society. Social control and bodily control go hand-in-hand, as the dangers posed to and by the female body are seen as reflecting the relative vulnerability of both πόλις and κόσμος to pollution or attack. As Newbold points out (referencing Mary Douglas), the cothematization of social and bodily boundaries becomes a matter of concern when a society is subjected to pressure. The permeability of physical bodies reflects that of the body politic, and thus there arises a social, political, and religious need for covering the orifices which may allow for pollution from within or from without. Order is imposed on “inherently untidy experience ... by exaggerating the difference between within and without,

⁵⁶ Bourdieu, *Masculine Domination*, vii-viii, 5, 7, 9, 11, 33, 35.

⁵⁷ Rosslyn, “Hero of Our Time,” passim, esp. 196; Caesar, *Taking It Like a Man*, 7, 225, 228; Steele, “An Hour or Two Sacred to Sorrow,” 127.

above and below, with and against, male and female.”⁵⁸ This control of the social structures is expressed through and inscribed upon the boundaried (veiled) body.⁵⁹

Mitchell understands Paul’s ἐξουσία argument as affirming that the woman, though she does have the right to speak, ought to forgo this right by veiling herself for the sake of ὁμόνοια.⁶⁰ That is, a woman ought to veil herself *instead of* speaking. In line with most other commentators,⁶¹ however, it seems better to understand Paul as arguing for a specific *manner* of speaking. It is not a question of whether a woman is to speak *or* to veil, but of whether a speaking woman should be veiled or unveiled. The ἐξουσία/authority is the woman’s own act of control, her self-determination to be respectable in the manner of her speech and thus to bring honour/glory to her husband/head. As she covers herself, she may freely choose to speak and thus participate appropriately and modestly in the re-ordering of the κόσμος and πόλις along properly gendered lines. Such is the opinion of Schrage: “ἐξουσία is an abstract noun and certainly cannot denote passively experienced external powers and authority, but only that of the woman who does it herself, not that of the man over the

⁵⁸ Newbold, “Boundaries and Bodies,” 107; Douglas, *Purity and Danger*, 5. Cf. Sissa, “Sexual Philosophies,” passim; Isherwood, *Fat Jesus*, 12, 19-21, 24, 144.

⁵⁹ Neyrey, “Body Language in 1 Corinthians,” 132-138; Neyrey, “Unclean, Common, Polluted, and Taboo,” 77; Douglas, *Purity and Danger*, 115; Bourdieu, *Masculine Domination*, 65; Bourdieu, *Outline of a Theory of Practice*, 91, 94; Økland, *Women in Their Place*, 1; Corrington, “Headless Woman,” 223-224; Lakey, *Image and Glory of God*, 176; Newbold, “Boundaries and Bodies,” 103-104; Vogel, *Body Theology*, 88.

The need for covering that which is dishonourable or shameful is mentioned also in 12:22-24, which is also in a context of speaking within the ritual space (D’Angelo, “Veils, Virgins,” 393-394).

⁶⁰ Mitchell, *Reconciliation*, 262.

⁶¹ Cf. Lakey, *Image and Glory of God*, 110, 133-134, 188; Thiselton, *First Corinthians*, 829, 838-839; Watson, *Agape*, 53, 69-71; Lightfoot, *Talmud*, 4:237; Loader, *NT on Sexuality*, 376. For a brief overview of meanings that have been applied to the term in this passage, cf. Stuckenbruck, “Why Should Women Cover,” 214-215.

woman.”⁶² And Allo likewise states that “women must veil in public not only as a sign of submission, but also to express that they who are the glory of man as he is that of God [also] participate in the power of man.”⁶³

Llewellyn-Jones’ summarization of Paul’s argument is worth quoting at length.

As an act within her power, veiling is a woman’s way of encasing her body within the restrictive and protective confines mandated by her culture. *She* veils *herself*, thereby situating herself in her proper position in the social hierarchy. In veil societies the veil is both a signal of a woman’s own authority and power and a sign of her weakness and powerlessness (relative, that is, to men). But while on the one hand she retains the power to veil her head or face, in that she veils *herself*, on the other, this cannot be allowed to mask the ideology of veiling (ancient and modern) as a way of effecting the subordination of women. By veiling herself, a woman (willingly?) implicates herself in the ideology that justifies her separation from male society and the control placed over her as a weak, dangerous, and polluting element of society.⁶⁴

Women were a sexual and social risk, and thus needed to be guarded and guarded against. The first (and untrustworthy) woman was created as a punishment for man’s deceit, and was at the moment of her shaping bounded by the chaste Athena when the goddess placed a covering upon the head (κατὰ κρη̄θεν δὲ καλύπτρην) of Pandora (Hesiod, *Theog.*, 573-575). The veiling of women “makes sense as a

⁶² “... ἐξουσία ist ein Abstraktum und kann erst recht nicht die passiv erfahrene *fremde* Vollmacht und Autorität bezeichnen, sondern nur die eigene der Frau, die sie selbst ausübt, also nicht die des Mannes über die Frau” (Schrage, *Der erste Brief* 2, 514).

⁶³ “Ainsi la femme, d’après Paul, doit porter un voile en public, non seulement en signe de sujétion, mais pour exprimer qu’elle participe à la puissance de l’homme, dont elle est la gloire comme il est celle de Dieu” (Allo, *Première Épître*, 267).

⁶⁴ Llewellyn-Jones, *Aphrodite’s Tortoise*, 179-180, 316-318; cf. Bourdieu, *Masculine Domination*, 22-42; Mahmood, “Agency,” 186; Anderson, “Social Structure and the Veil,” 397-398; Wolfson, “Occultation of the Feminine ” 141-142, *passim*.

therapeutic intervention in response to female nature—‘since [being more fluid] woman does not bound herself, she must be *bounded*.’”⁶⁵

Veils or head-coverings are assumed to be a woman’s necessary everyday clothing and sufficient to identify the wearer as a woman (Chrysostom, *Or.*, 33.48). Dio Cassius (*Hist.*, 42.11.2-3) recounts how unveiled women were used to enable an attack upon a city. When the guards saw the loosened hair of the female infiltrators, they could not imagine the presence of such women and so assumed them to be spirits. The women then set fire to the garrison and let in their soldiers. On a more romantic note (*Chaer.*, 1.14), the novel’s heroine is mistaken by the inhabitants of the house for the goddess Aphrodite when Theron ἀποκαλύψας τὴν Καλλιρόην καὶ λύσας αὐτῆς τὴν κόμην “unveils Callirhoe and sets loose her hair.” This is surely not due simply to her beauty, but to the unexpected nature of Theron’s stratagem. Plutarch’s recounting of the Chalcedonian custom of veiling half the female face (*Mor.*, 302E-303A) is clearly concerned not with the question “Why do these women veil themselves?” but “Why do they not cover the *entire* face?”

The veil is intimately connected to the concept of αἰδώς—a display of attitudes and actions consistent with σοφροσύνη/*puḍicitia* (shame, modesty, reserve).⁶⁶ As Moschion says of Glykera (Menander, *Perik.*, 311-312), ἡ μὲν αὐσχυνεῖτ’ ἐπειδὴν εἰσῴμεν δηλαδὴ / παρακαλύπεταί τ’, ἔθος γὰρ τοῦτο

⁶⁵ Carson, “Putting Her in Her Place,” 156; Martin, *Corinthian Body*, 239, passim; Lakey, *Image and Glory of God*, 125-126; Cairns, “Meaning of the Veil,” 80; Økland, *Women in Their Place*, 45; Stuckenbruck, “Why Should Women Cover,” 228-233; Loader, *NT on Sexuality*, 377, 380; Aspegren, *Male Woman*, 22, 124-125; cf. Plato, *Leg.* 781E. For a more extended investigation of the feminine need for boundaries as evidenced even in the diction of Greco-Roman literature, cf. Dutsch, “Boundless Nature,” passim, esp. 21-32.

⁶⁶ Llewellyn-Jones, *Aphrodite’s Tortoise*, 7, 103-104, 110, 155, 158, 165, 172; Massey, “Meaning of κατακαλύπτω,” 518, 522; Stuckenbruck, “Why Should Women Cover,” 233; Watson, *Agape*, 45-52; Osborne, “Sculpted Men,” 37.

“It’s clear she’ll be ashamed when we come in, / And she’ll cover herself, for that’s the custom.” The covering provided a boundary guarding against shame and the speaking of what was shameful or foolish, whether that shame was real or feigned (Plato, *Phaedr.*, 237A4-6).⁶⁷ When Phaedra bursts out in uncontrolled mad and fevered speech (Euripides, *Hipp.*, 239-246), she is unveiled (a state evidenced by the fact that the Chorus in line 175 comments upon her colouring); when she realizes the shamefulness of her speech she immediately asks to have her head again covered. Once covered she is conspicuously and explicitly silent while the Chorus must question the attendant regarding her plight. When Hermione unveils herself in shame (Euripides, *Andr.*, 825-832), she explicitly mentions the tearing of her hair, disfiguring of her face, and the uncovering of her tresses: ἰὼ μοί μοι / σπάρραγμα κόμας ὀνύχων τε / δάι’ ἀμύγματα θήσομαι / ... αἰαὶ αἰαὶ / ἔρρ’ αἰθέριον πλοκάμων ἐμῶν ἄπο, / λεπτόμιτον φάρος “Oh, woe is me! / I’ll tear my hair to shreds / and claw till I leave scars / ... Oh, oh! / Go from my tresses slowly on the wind, / you finely-woven cloth.” And yet, at the point where the veil is thrown off, the nurse begs her to modestly cover her breast. It may be reasonably inferred that Hermione had torn open her gown at the same time as discarding her veil; however, it must be noted that her stated intention in displaying shame had reference only to the head and face.

Since veiling was a matter of custom, rather than of legislation, and since the “new women” may have been unwilling to cover their heads due to the danger of ruining their elaborate hairstyles, one might assume the social importance attached to

⁶⁷ Lakey, *Image and Glory of God*, 126; Martin, *Corinthian Body*, 239. Unfortunately, some renditions veil Socrates’ intent by translating ἐγκαλυψάμενος “veiled/wrapped up” as “blindfolded” and ὑπ’ αἰσχύνῃς διαπορῶμαι “I am overwhelmed by shame” as “I am embarrassed.”

veiling to be quite superficial.⁶⁸ But Winter convincingly argues that the new women were pursuing a life of personal satisfaction, at the expense of their commonly expected duties of caring for husbands and households. Such pursuits and attitudes were reflected in—even enabled by—the style of hair and clothing worn by the women, in defiance and rejection of the appearance and conduct of “prudent moderation” promoted throughout the Empire. The new hairstyles of the new women were not “merely” hairstyles: the body always signifies something beyond itself. The new women’s trespass into traditionally male territory seems to have been undertaken with a view toward a greater equality in multiple social roles, including those of public speech.⁶⁹

Since the human head in general is seen as the locus of speech, thought, and identity—consistently concerns of the male—the symbolic power of the female head becomes problematic. The rhetorical force of the female head must be kept distinct from that of the male, and yet through the strength of *habitus*, the head *qua* head necessarily remains in itself a symbol of powers attributed to males alone. To simply posit a head without power would be unthinkable. Such a move would weaken the rhetorical force of the head itself, and thus weaken the male claim to power, based as it was upon the head. As Eilberg-Schwartz has argued, the distinction in force was accomplished through a separation of the head from the female: by the act of literal or metaphoric decapitation, the head could be affirmed as the locus of identity, speech, and thought, while such powers were denied to female ontology.⁷⁰ While such

⁶⁸ Croom, *Roman Clothing*, 75, 89, 98, 122, 132, 147.

⁶⁹ Winter, *Roman Wives*, 5, 21, 34-35, 60, 73-74, 178-179.

⁷⁰ Eilberg-Schwartz, “Spectacle,” 1-2, 8; Isherwood and McEwan, *Introducing Feminist Theology*, 64.

decapitation could involve a literal removal of the head from the neck, it more often is accomplished through a less radical removal of the head from view.

This perceived separation of the female from rational activity is also well-attested in the modern era. On a purely street level, one might think of a phrase spoken only to women, such as “Don’t worry your pretty little head about it.” The more makeup on her face, the less a woman is perceived as having anything intelligent to say. The less makeup she appears to wear, the more serious she is perceived as being, and the more seriously she is likely to be taken. Cosmetics, hair, veils, and the silencing of speech are each a means of symbolically removing the female head, thereby denying to the hooded female those powers assumed by the headed male.⁷¹ For evidence from sociological and philosophical circles, one might start with Bourdieu (*Masculine Domination*) or Code (*What Can She Know?*). On a more popular literary level, consider the following. Celebrated author Joyce Carol Oates relates that she was frequently asked why she wrote, and that often the question came from men who doubted the value or abilities of a female writer. Rather than strike back with acerbic wit, Oates would offer an apparently harmless reply. Her ironic self-evaluation of these exchanges? “When I am being polite, my mind goes blank, and at such times I am most feminine.”⁷² As in Greco-Roman times, so in our day, the comic retort may reflect social reality more openly than “historical” texts.

Watson notes that the woman’s veil “is a symbol directed at a man... In order that *he* may listen and not look, it imposes on *him* the humiliation of a blindfold.”⁷³

⁷¹ Eilberg-Schwartz, “Nakedness,” 166.

⁷² Oates, “Preface,” xi.

⁷³ Watson, *Agape*, 41 (italics added for emphasis).

This covering-removal of the female head results in an eroticization of the entire woman, leaving her socially capable of only erotic and reproductive functions. When the female head is uncovered—through public speech or a loosing of hair and veil—it is viewed as being subsumed by the female body, and is thus thematized as a producer of erotics, rather than of personal identity and ability. When the female head remains covered, it does so in deference to the body-nature of the female, thus symbolizing the erotic or reproductive no less than if it had been uncovered.⁷⁴

The female head is not allowed to be rhetorically present as a head, but is removed through absence or abjection, in order that the female might be seen as the non-bearer of speech, identity, and thought.⁷⁵ Bourdieu's summarization is worthy of note:

Everything in the genesis of the female habitus and in the social conditions of its actualization combines to make the female experience of the body the limiting case of the universal experience of the body-for-others, constantly exposed to the objectification performed by the gaze and the discourse of others.⁷⁶

And in response to those who might object that this sounds for all the world like a “damned if she does, damned if she doesn't!” argument, it must be replied that this is precisely the point being made by the many feminist studies herein presented. As discussed at some length earlier in the thesis, a woman was seen as weak and foolish, a passive recipient of the imposed will of others; and anyone (regardless of biology) who was so weak and passive was in turn recognized as a woman.

⁷⁴ Eilberg-Schwartz, “Spectacle,” 1-2; Cameron, *Feminism and Linguistic Theory*, 69.

⁷⁵ Eilberg-Schwartz, “Spectacle,” 9.

⁷⁶ Bourdieu, *Masculine Domination*, 63

A woman's veil was a status indicator, bringing honour not to herself, but to her husband; the veil's public removal was an indication of the absence of such a man or of his honour status.⁷⁷ The head-covering symbolized a woman's *σοφροσύνη* in general, and in particular her submissive connection to her husband; its removal in public could be viewed as a rejection of the husband's sole right to bodily access. Nor could the woman's inner attitude of modesty be a defence against an accusation and application of shame based on her outward appearance. So obvious did the connection appear between such a head-covering and a woman's modesty, that a man who accosted an uncovered woman was not subject to the same severity of punishment as if the woman had a covered head⁷⁸

In seeking a lover, states Ovid (*Ars*, 1.31-32), one should warn away any respectable woman, whom the poet refers to as a "slender headband," the metonym of her decorum. *Este procul, vittae tenues, insigne pudoris, / Quaeque tegis medios, instita longa, pedes* "Go away, you slender headband, sign of modesty, / You who cover to the foot with lengthy gowns!" Sue Blundell notes that even in goddess sculptures the removing of the mantle clearly is intended to portray "what in modern parlance is called the 'come-on.'"⁷⁹ Public female-male conversation was regularly interposed by the veil, as the uncovered female head and hair, in antiquity, were a focus of male lust, and thus considered a sign of sexual availability (Plutarch, *Mor.*,

⁷⁷ Ciampa and Rosner, *First Corinthians*, 516-517, 521-522; Germond, "Rhetoric of Gender," 363; Hogan, *No Longer Male and Female*, 4; Hogan, "Paul and Women," 226-227; Osiek and Pouya, "Constructions of Gender," 46-47, 49-53; Wanamaker, "By the Power of God," 211; Lakey, *Image and Glory of God*, 105-106; Ivarsson, "Vice Lists and Deviant Masculinity," 172-173.

⁷⁸ *The Digest*, 47.10.15; cf. Winter, *Roman Wives*, 78-83, 96.

⁷⁹ Blundell, *Women in Ancient Greece*, 194.

142D, 232C; Euripides, *Hec.*, 968-977; Aeschylus, *Ag.*, 1178; Euripides, *Iph. taur.*, 372-373; Tacitus, *Ann.*, 11.27; Apuleius, *Metam.*, 2.8-17; Livy, *Hist.*, 34.2.9-10).⁸⁰

It has also been noted that erogenous zones are associated with liminal spaces—areas of the body where a discontinuity is presented, and that clothing was for the Greeks an item of concern for women rather than for men. The boundaries created by the putting on and off of clothing parallels the boundaries of social space—uncovered relates to the private female domain while covered relates to the public. Of course, it is a common-place that “any barrier [is] a tease. The very existence of a prohibition [evokes] the desire to cross it, in the way that the closed blinds of the bedroom invite the voyeur.”⁸¹ Thus, that which is typically veiled on a woman “becomes an object of erotic, often mysterious, desire.”⁸² And if such a concept seems too foreign to Western thought, one only has to recall the Elizabethan eroticization of the “well-turned ankle”!

Because the veiled head or face was eroticized, it was quite naturally conflated with other sites of eroticization. And once one recognizes the physiognomic and Hippocratic connections assumed between the head and genitals, it is not difficult to see how in the “covering [of] her upper mouth, the veil simultaneously covers a

⁸⁰ Carson, “Putting Her in Her Place,” 152, 160-161; Winter, *Roman Wives*, 81; Sebesta, “Symbolism in the Costume of the Roman Woman,” 48; Ciampa and Rosner, *First Corinthians*, 516-519, 521-522; Solevåg, “Perpetua and Felicitas,” 281; Keener, “Head Coverings,” 445-446; Gill, “Importance of Roman Portraiture,” 250-251, 254-257; Rousselle, “Body Politics,” 315, 320; Pomeroy, *Goddesses*, 182; Thiselton, *First Corinthians*, 802; cf. Heil, *Rhetorical Role*, 174; Martin, “Veiled Exhortations,” 268-269; Solevåg, *Birthing Salvation*, 237. The connection of status, δόξα/glory, and τιμή/honor with one’s husband is found in Jewish texts, as well (Prov 11:16 [LXX]; Esth 1:20 [LXX]; 1 Esdr 4:17; 3 Macc 4.6-7).

⁸¹ Barton, *Roman Honor*, 216.

⁸² Llewellyn-Jones, *Aphrodite’s Tortoise*, 285; Blundell, “Clutching at Clothes,” 144-146, 153-154, 162, passim; Ciampa and Rosner, *First Corinthians*, 517-518, 532; Barthes, *Pleasure of the Text*, 6-10.

woman's lower mouth too."⁸³ Such a conflation fits well within the larger context of 1 Cor 5—12, where Paul consistently shows concern with bodily orifices and purity of space, self, and social structures.⁸⁴ A woman's voice, head, and hair are associated with her genitalia—an association that may be noted in sources as diverse as the Babylonian Talmud (*Berachot*, 24A), NT Apocrypha (*Ethiopian Apocalypse of Peter*, 7.22), Sigmund Freud,⁸⁵ and the 17th-century mythopoeic paintings of Rossetti. The literal or socio-metaphorical removal of the head results in a covering of one's voice and identity. The veiling of the face—whether of a man or a woman—effects, *inter alia*, the veiling of that one's sexuality. The issues of gender—with all its implications for speech and silence, shame and honour, for weakness and strength with all their accompanying performance expectations—are by means of veiling displaced onto the hidden face and head.⁸⁶

5.1.3.2 *The veiling of men.* There was a strong expectation that men would have an uncovered face and head, in strong distinction to the social requirements laid upon women. This expectation functioned on the habitual level even to the extent that a man could by wearing a veil become invisible *qua* man and apparently take on the identity of a woman (Plutarch, *Mor.*, 245E-F; Juvenal, *Sat.*, 2.90-102). The man who

⁸³ Llewellyn-Jones, *Aphrodite's Tortoise*, 264-265; Kraemer, *Unreliable Witnesses*, 36-37; Vernant and Frontisi-Ducroux, "Features of the Mask," 195; D'Angelo, "Veils, Virgins," 397-399; Keener, *1-2 Corinthians*, 91; Hallpike, "Social Hair," *passim*; Seneca, *Contr.* 2.7.6.

⁸⁴ Neyrey, "Body Language in 1 Corinthians," 129-130; Neyrey, "Unclean, Common, Polluted, and Taboo," 76, 80; cf. Martin, *Inventing Superstition*, 30.

⁸⁵ Of course, some may claim that Freud thematized *everything* as sexual; nevertheless, he suggests that women's involvement in the production of coverings (textiles) may be due to the manner in which their pubic hair functions. While a man's pubic hair surrounds the penis, it does not hide it; as the female develops pubic hair her genitals are hidden, and thus the hair both covers her sexuality and brings to her awareness the fact that she lacks a penis (Strachey, ed. *Freud SE*, 22: 132; cf. Martin, "Paul's Argument from Nature," 82).

⁸⁶ Eilberg-Schwartz, "Nakedness," 179; Eilberg-Schwartz, "Spectacle," 1; Leach, "Magical Hair," 149; Ciampa and Rosner, *First Corinthians*, 517-518; Loader, *NT on Sexuality*, 377-379.

covers his head or face with an article of clothing is assumed to be hiding something. The conflation of honour with openness in both speech and action, of concealment with dishonour and shame was clear in Greco-Roman thought;⁸⁷ thus, male veiling, as “an inversion of the norm, is frequently mentioned in connection with the notion of concealing a dark secret, or a misdeed, or a negative trait.”⁸⁸ For example (Aristophanes, *Thesm.*, 498-501), an adulterer might invisibly sneak out of his lover’s house, right under the gaze of the cuckolded husband, provided there is a bit of distraction and the offender is veiled.

Men were strong and women weak; visibility was strength, and weakness was evidenced by being covered.⁸⁹ At the same time, speech was conflated with openness and silence with being covered: this is true to such an extent that female public speech was likened to public nakedness (Plutarch, *Mor.*, 142D; Clement, *Strom.* 4.522C).⁹⁰ Aristophanes (*Lys.*, 529-534) has a judge’s refusal of women’s speech overcome when a woman removes her veil and tosses it over the judge’s own head. The transformation is comic and immediate. Much in the manner of a caged bird, the now-veiled man falls submissively silent and the unveiled woman proceeds to exercise verbal authority. Elsewhere (*Thesm.*, 888-927), Aristophanes represents Euripides as unable to recognize a “stranger” as a man because that man had earlier been veiled. The connection of veiling with femininity was so strong, that the non-recognition persisted even after that veil had been removed. Xenophon’s account of the Theban

⁸⁷ Belleville, *Reflections of Glory*, 194-198, 215-217, 270; Wright, *Climax of the Covenant*, 179, 186.

⁸⁸ Llewellyn-Jones, *Aphrodite’s Tortoise*, 203; cf. Philo, *Conf.* 71, 116; Plato, *Gorg.* 523d3; Plutarch, *Mor.* 121B10; Plato, *Meno* 76B4.

⁸⁹ Barton, *Roman Honor*, 58-61.

⁹⁰ Gleason, *Making Men*, 98.

assassinations (*Hell.*, 5.4.4-6) is only reasonable on the assumption that the presence of a veil was so obviously feminine that it would obviate even the clear evidence of an enemy soldier's size and gait.⁹¹

Just as women's veiling was due to their shamed state, so men would veil or seclude themselves "at times of intense stress when male honour was at stake or at moments when a certain 'feminization' needed to be evoked" (Livy, *Hist.*, 3.49.5; 4.12.10-11; Homer, *Od.*, 8.85-93; Herodotus, *Hist.*, 6.67; Josephus, *Ant.*, 7.254; Est. 6:12).⁹² When Magius was arrested and condemned, he continued to publicly declare his rights as a free man *quoad capite aperto* "as long as his head remained uncovered." His speech was rousing the populace, so his silence was effected immediately by covering his head (Livy, *Hist.*, 23.10.5-9; cf. Cicero, *Rab. Perd.*, 4.13). Covering one's head removed one's personhood, for the head was the "focus of one's social being."⁹³ In addition to being forcefully covered, a man might voluntarily veil his head in the presence of deity as a reverent act of effacing himself,⁹⁴ but could also veil in order to hide his shamed and feminized state in the presence of overwhelming enemies, loss of self-control, or failure in a public endeavour.⁹⁵ Indeed, these circumstances are not so different to each other, as the sacred is what causes shame—it is produced whenever one transgresses boundaries, whether the movement is intentional for an act of worship or unintentional in a breach of social (and thus

⁹¹ Cf. Vernant and Frontisi-Ducroux, "Features of the Mask," 198-199.

⁹² Hawley, "Male Body," 90.

⁹³ Barton, *Roman Honor*, 252.

⁹⁴ Barton, *Roman Honor*, 253.

⁹⁵ Barton, *Roman Honor*, 239-240.

divinely instituted) mores.⁹⁶ As a portable form of interiorization and seclusion, veiling is an indicator of feminization with regard to the one so secluded. The veil creates a social separation, “in effect [turning] the man into a woman, because it makes him socially invisible.”⁹⁷

Keener explicitly recognizes the seclusion and veiling of women as a gender issue, then goes on to say that men “might also refuse to be seen in public, but only for special reasons unrelated to their gender, for example, grief (Chariton, *Chaer.*, 2.1.1).”⁹⁸ It is certainly true that men hid their faces for reasons of grief, shame, and fear; what Keener has missed is the complexity of Greco-Roman gendering which identifies such emotion-based responses with femininity. Gender is not to be so lightly identified with biological morphology, circumscribed by the twin protocols of dominance and self-control. Male honour and status are obtained only by those who respect these protocols, “while allegations of non-conformity are typically intended to dishonour a man. Failure to abide by the protocols is seen as a sign of effeminacy. A man has to do what a man has to do. And if he does not, he is womanish and ‘soft’ (*mollis* in Latin, *malakos* in Greek).”⁹⁹ By doing what a man does not do, a veiled man is reduced “to the level of a woman: men veil or stay indoors when their honour is impaired or at stake.”¹⁰⁰ Even the veiling of men in death—violent or otherwise—is seen in numerous texts as a function of shame and weakness (Livy, *Hist.*, 1.26.11;

⁹⁶ Barton, *Roman Honor*, 205-207.

⁹⁷ Llewellyn-Jones, *Aphrodite's Tortoise*, 17, 204; Murphy, “Social Distance,” esp. 1257, 1267; Cairns, “Anger and the Veil,” esp. 23-27; Cairns, “Meaning of the Veil,” 73-77, 81-82, passim; Cairns, “Off with her ΑΙΔΩΣ,” passim; Massey, “Meaning of κατακαλύπτω,” 507-509, 511-512; El Guindi, *Veil*, 99, 102; Aristophanes, *Thesm.* 598-501; Plato, *Phaedr.* 237a4.

⁹⁸ Keener, “Head Coverings,” 443.

⁹⁹ Ivarsson, “A Man has to Do What a Man has to Do,” 185, 187.

¹⁰⁰ Cairns, “Meaning of the Veil,” 77; Watson, *Agape*, 44.

3.49.5; 4.12.11; 23.10.9; Cassius, *Hist.*, 42.4.5). By whatever process the feminizing shame overtakes them, when their strength and living honour are overcome, men veil their heads and avert their eyes.

5.2 2 Cor 3:7-18 and the Unveiled Face

These findings regarding gender and veiling as drawn from 1 Cor 11:2-16 will now be applied to an examination of 2 Cor 3:7-18. The remainder of this chapter will demonstrate that Paul's self-comparison to Moses would ultimately reveal the apostle to be weak and feminized. It will also be shown that the Corinthians were exhorted to gaze upon Paul in this shamed state, and thus be transformed by the glory of the crucified Lord. It may appear on the surface that arguments presented in earlier portions of this thesis would serve to cast the veiled Moses in a feminized light and present open-faced Paul as a socially attractive honourable man; such a reading, however, does not do justice to the complexities of Greco-Roman gendered expectations. It must be remembered that one was not constituted a man simply by virtue of being open-faced and unveiled. After all, a woman was through her unveiling demonstrated all the more clearly to *be* a woman, her weakness and shame made visible for all to see. A man's veiling sufficed to place him in a feminized light, precisely because viewers were aware that his veiling was blocking something shameful from their sight. Unveiling and honestly open self-presentation did prove one to be a man, but only if the action of unveiling made evident the strength and honour expected of one worthy to be termed "man." And these social expectations, operating as they did on the level of the *habitus*, made exception for no-one—not even Paul the apostle or Moses himself.

The issues of shame/honour, veils, and speaking in regard to deity are among the lexical and conceptual elements shared by this passage with 1 Cor 11:2-16. There are but few NT passages containing both δόξα and εἰκόν, each of them Pauline. There is also a Corinthian connection to each of the passages. The one use not found within the Corinthian correspondence (Rom 1:23) is in a letter written while Paul was staying in Corinth (cf. Rom 16:1). Rom 1:23 relates δόξα directly with God, and uses εἰκόν to denote pagan idols; 2 Cor 4:4 applies both terms to Christ; the remaining two uses are in 1 Cor 11:7 and 2 Cor 3:18, in both of which passages the terms are applied to human beings and their relationship to God as well as to one another. Both passages in their larger contexts deal with themes of covering, weakness, heads/faces, and speaking as a representative of the deity. Both passages deal with the idea of a man reflecting the glory of the Lord. In addition, Moses' self-*unveiling* when speaking with the Lord or to others in the Lord's name brings to mind the 1 Corinthians 11 proscription against a man covering himself in prayer or prophecy. Though Paul is not concerned specifically with his own actions or self in 1 Cor 11:2-16, an examination of 2 Cor 3:7-18 in light of themes found in that earlier passage should further clarify the implications of feminization for Paul's somatic self-presentation *vis-à-vis* Moses and the New Covenant.

5.2.1 Structure and Argument of 2 Cor 3:7-18

Inner textural analysis will be used in this section, in order to discern the boundaries and argumentative flow of the Pauline text. Intertextural references, both from the surrounding cotext and from the underlying story of Exodus 34, will be applied to the 2 Cor 3:7-18 passage to understand its flow, while examination of the

ideological texture will clarify Paul's predicament in apparently arguing both for and against Mosaic authority and honour. Central to Paul's argument is the importance of the minister's unveiled face. His own unveiled self-representation is linked to the apostolic ministry of Spirit, righteousness, and life, while Moses' veiled face is ambiguously presented as representing a weaker and fading ministry and authority.¹⁰¹

There is general agreement that this passage may be treated as a distinct exegetical unit, though it certainly stands in close argumentative relationship to its surrounding text.¹⁰² There is, on the other hand, little in the way of agreement regarding how best to interpret particulars of the passage, as writers note the uncertainty of its historical reconstruction, the ambiguity of various terms (καταργέω, κατοπτρίζομαι), and its "tortured grammar." As Allo notes, "If the heart of this passage is clear, its form remains somewhat tangled and obscure. Paul repeats himself, resumes without concern for good style, like one who is improvising on a grand idea with no mature expression."¹⁰³ In a lightly humorous dig at his colleagues, Best notes that the difficulties encountered in 3:12-18 are "usually well-explained though not solved in the more academic commentaries."¹⁰⁴ As with my examination of passages earlier in this thesis, I will not be attempting to exegete each

¹⁰¹ Belleville, *Reflections of Glory*, 297.

¹⁰² *Inter alia*, Hafemann, *Paul*, 265-266; Thrall, *2 Corinthians*, 133-138; Stockhausen, *Moses' Veil*, 90-91; Matera, *II Corinthians*, 82-97; Lambrecht, *Second Corinthians*, 49-63; Belleville, *2 Corinthians*, 95-113; Scott, *2 Corinthians*, 72-83; Kruse, "Paul," 110-111; Aernie, "Relationship," 31.

The preceding commentators view 3:7-18 as a reasonable unit, though usually subdivided; other writers (e.g., Renwick, *Paul, the Temple*, 54-56; Danker, *II Corinthians*, 53-59; Pfitzner, *Strength in Weakness*, 37-66) read the section as beginning a bit earlier, but all treat 3:12-18 as the terminus.

¹⁰³ "Si le fond de ce passage est lumineux, la forme reste cependant un peu enchevêtré et obscure. Paul se répète, se reprend, sans nul souci de bon style, comme un improvisateur à qui vient une grand idée dont il n'a pas mûri l'expression" (Allo, *Seconde Épître*, 88). Also Hafemann, *Paul*, 255; Stockhausen, *Moses' Veil*, 2, 32, 37-38; Baker, "Did the Glory Fade," 1; Barrett, *Second Corinthians*, 118-121; Belleville, *2 Corinthians*, 100.

¹⁰⁴ Best, *Second Corinthians*, 32. For an example of such treatments, cf. the "Excursus" in Georgi, *Opponents of Paul*, 264-271.

difficult phrase. Rather, my aim is to demonstrate the viability of an interpretation that makes sense of both the immediate context and the general flow of the letter's argument. Such an interpretation should also further illuminate the concepts of gendered somatic expectations as discussed throughout this thesis.

The apologetic nature of 2 Corinthians is clear and largely unquestioned with its purpose of demonstrating Paul's own credibility and authority as an apostolic minister.¹⁰⁵ And this purpose is evidenced in 1:1—5:10 through a broad chiasmic structure of **A-B-C-B'-A'** as described here and illustrated in the following chart.

- | |
|--|
| <p>A (1:8—2:11) Paul presents himself as weak, sincere, honest in his presentation, and looking forward to a future glory.</p> <p>B (2:12—3:6) Paul presents his life-giving message as being brought through his own experience of suffering and death, and affirms that his honest ministry needs only God's commendation.</p> <p>C (3:7-18) Paul compares himself to Moses in terms of glory, openness, and effect of ministry.</p> <p>B' (4:1-12) Paul presents his ministry as bringing life while he is in the midst of death, and affirms that while he is commended by God he ought to be accepted by the Corinthians as well.</p> <p>A' (4:13—6:10) Paul presents himself as weak, sincere, honest in his presentation, and looking forward to a future glory.</p> |
|--|

Paul defends his apparent weakness of planning and speech with the Corinthians in **A** (1:8—2:11). In **B** (2:12—3:6) he argues that his ministry and speech

¹⁰⁵ Cf. Young and Ford, *Meaning and Truth*, 208; Belleville, *Reflections of Glory*, 120-135, 143-146, 215; Stockhausen, *Moses' Veil*, 17-18; Hafemann, *Paul*, 93-97; Renwick, *Paul, the Temple*, 95-98; Olson, "Confidence Expressions," 143-148; Aernie, *Is Paul also among the Prophets*, 113, 186, 196; Aernie, "Relationship," 13-15, 29, 35, 53; Wright, *Climax of the Covenant*, 176; Kruse, "Paul," 111; Kraftchick, "Death in Us," 165-166; Jewett, "Honor and Shame," 271.

have been powerfully attested by God himself and that Paul has no ulterior motives, such as dishonest monetary gain: οὐ γὰρ ἔσμεν ὡς οἱ πολλοὶ καπηλεύοντες τὸν λόγον τοῦ θεοῦ “for we are not like the many who peddle God’s message for gain.” On the basis of his care for the Corinthians’ benefit, the apostle claims in **B’** (4:1-12) that as a suffering minister he preaches openly and has separated himself from all dishonest approaches: ἀλλὰ ἀπειπάμεθα τὰ κρυπτὰ τῆς αἰσχύνης, μὴ περιπατοῦντες ἐν πανουργίᾳ μηδὲ δολοῦντες τὸν λόγον τοῦ θεοῦ “rather, we have renounced the hidden things of shame, neither acting in deceitfulness nor distorting God’s message.” He makes abundantly clear in **A’** (4:13—6:10) that his weakness and suffering are evidences of Christ’s powerful ministry through him for the benefit of others. Fitzmyer sees no connection of **C** with its theme of glory to **B** and **B’** and the discussion of recommendation letters; he does not appear, however, to have considered how the concept of honour is common to all the surrounding sections. Letters of recommendation attribute honour to their subject, and honour or social standing is implied by δόξα.¹⁰⁶ Since the chiastic centre **C** is surrounded by discussions of Paul’s somatic weakness, openness of self-presentation, and questions of honesty, it is reasonable to expect these same themes to be present in **C** itself where Paul compares himself to Moses and his ministry.¹⁰⁷

It is clear in this passage that Paul has in mind the Exodus 34 account of Moses’ giving of the Law.¹⁰⁸ And Paul’s repeated use of a *qal wahomer/a fortiori* line

¹⁰⁶ Fitzmyer, “Glory Reflected on the Face of Christ,” 632-637.

¹⁰⁷ Aernie, *Is Paul also among the Prophets*, 123-124, 195-196; Aernie, “Relationship,” 19-24, 34; Kruse, “Paul,” 111; Georgi, *Opponents of Paul*, 254-259.

¹⁰⁸ Schulz, “Die Decke,” et al. For a protracted argument that Paul was consciously using other LXX texts as well (*inter alia*, Exodus 36; Jeremiah 38-39; Ezekiel 11, 26), cf. Stockhausen, *Moses’ Veil*, 38-71. For the suggested addition of Haggai as an intertextual key, cf. Renwick, *Paul, the*

of argumentation sets it beyond debate that the apostle is comparing himself to the Lawgiver. And this is an apt comparison, since the context of 2 Corinthians is an argument regarding Paul's authority just as Moses' authority is in view throughout Exodus 34.¹⁰⁹ Paul's ministry is more glorious than that given on Sinai; the apostle brings the Spirit where Moses ministered death; Moses' ministry does not last but Paul's ministry remains. With all the debate regarding specific nuancing of terms within the passage, still it is clear that the apostle intends to compare his ministry and methods to those of Moses, and that Moses comes off the worse in this comparison.

Moses and his ministry are glorious, as Paul and his ministry are glorious; but the latter is *more* glorious than the former.¹¹⁰ As Norris points out, Paul's ultimate intention is not to disrespect Moses, but rather

to commend himself as a valid and candid minister of God. If he disparages the old covenant, its adherents, and its lawgiver, he does so to more convincingly present his own status. If apologetic be thought of as having two aspects, self commendation and polemic, then Paul's apologetic here focuses on the former.¹¹¹

It is in light of this precarious position that we should seek to understand Paul's presentation of Moses. He wishes to affirm the superiority of his own apostolic ministry, but is not attempting directly to deny Moses his own honour. In other words, though this passage is constructed around the Sinaitic narrative, it is concerned not

Temple, 113-119. For lengthy treatments of possible Rabbinic intertextualities, cf. Hafemann, *Paul*, 63-91; Belleville, *Reflections of Glory*, 26-79.

¹⁰⁹ Hafemann, *Paul*, 189, 361-362; Stockhausen, *Moses' Veil*, 87-91, 95-122; Allo, *Seconde Épitre*, 87; Hughes, *Second Corinthians*, 75; Belleville, "Scripture and Other Voices," 234-235; Kruse, "Paul," 111; van Unnik, "With Unveiled Face," 158; Wright, *Climax of the Covenant*, 177; Aernie, *Is Paul also among the Prophets*, 121-122, 128-129; Aernie, "Relationship," 13-15, 29, 35; Sarna, *Exodus*, 221; Ryken, *Exodus*, 1072-1073; Polak, "Theophany and Mediator," 142-143; de Regt, "Syntax and Rhetoric," 516-517.

¹¹⁰ Stockhausen, *Moses' Veil*, 123; Hafemann, *Paul*, 34, 100-103, 185, 449-450.

¹¹¹ Olson, "Confidence Expressions," 153-154.

with turning the Corinthians away from Moses but with encouraging them to accept and follow Paul. The major distinctions Paul makes from Moses to himself are two: the Mosaic ministry produced death while his own produces life; the mediator at Sinai self-veiled while the Corinthian apostle presented himself with an unveiled face.

Paul's contrasting claims of death/condemnation and life/Spirit may seem overly simplistic here. He elsewhere (Rom 7:12-13) defends the Law as holy, righteous, and good, denying it is the Law itself that produces death. Moreover, Paul has just affirmed (2 Cor 2:14-16) that his apostolic proclamation brings death as well as life, depending on the state of the one who hears that proclamation and beholds the "triumphal procession"; he continues (2 Cor 4:7-12) with a prolonged statement of his own ongoing experience of death and dying. Given these statements, it seems that Paul may be in part setting up a Mosaic straw man.¹¹² Hafemann is certainly correct, however, in insisting that Paul's distinction is not directly the Spirit and the "Law" as a method of divine revelation; rather, the apostle's focus is on the heart of those who are encountered by that revelation. There is no deficiency intrinsic to the Sinai encounter, except that which is produced by the stiffnecked rebelliousness of the sons of Israel.¹¹³ Paul is concerned with demonstrating that the Mosaic experience of God's ministry is "fraught with the dangers of death, and was thus quite undesirable" while the Pauline experience of God's presence led to life. This is so, even though the evidence of Paul's own life seemed to argue for quite a different conclusion.¹¹⁴

¹¹² Stockhausen, *Moses' Veil*, 78-80, 113-115; Scott, *2 Corinthians*, 74-75; Pfitzner, *Strength in Weakness*, 59-61; Aernie, *Is Paul also among the Prophets*, 192-195; Kruse, "Paul," 109-110, 129.

¹¹³ Cf. Hafemann, *Paul*, 160-166, 177-186, 225, 227, 439-444; Wright, *Climax of the Covenant*, 180-181, 183, 185; Aernie, "Relationship," 26-27, 37-39, 55, 68-71, 75-76; Provenca, "Who Is Sufficient," 70-71; Robbins, *Invention of Christian Discourse*, 424.

¹¹⁴ Renwick, *Paul, the Temple*, 98.

Paul's self-comparison to Moses is definitely a status claim, as Moses was afforded great honour in the ancient world. This consistent evaluation of Moses has been thoroughly overviewed by Belleville.¹¹⁵ While there are anti-Semitic exceptions, both Jewish and Gentile sources affirm Moses' wisdom and honour. However, Moses' covering of his face or head would be understood by Paul's Greco-Roman audience as implicating the Lawgiver in weakness and shame. So also do the cotexts of 2 Cor 2:17 and 4:1-2 suggest that Moses' actions are implicated in shameful. On both sides of our passage, Paul claims that he—unlike others—does not use deception or insincerity in his ministry. So then, in 3:13, his claim to act οὐ καθάπερ Μωϋσῆς “not like Moses” appears as an accusation of Mosaic non-παρησία in regard to his use of the veil.

Stockhausen argues that 2 Cor 3:1—4:6 connects with the glorious heavenly side of Paul's ministry while 4:7—6:10 deals with the earthly experience of the hidden treasure. She understands Moses' glory to have been physical radiance, while Paul's glory is interior and thus presently invisible.¹¹⁶ Such a reading has Paul claiming that he—along with the Corinthians—will one day have glory to show, but that he presently does not possess it. This seems a most difficult reading, counter-productive to Paul's broader apologetic in the Corinthian correspondence. If, instead, we read the glory of the Lord as being that of the crucified Christ, there need be no break between 4:6 and 4:7. Paul does physically reflect the glory of the Lord in his shameful suffering state, since the Lord's glory is that of shameful crucifixion and social rejection. It is by viewing and understanding this very weakness that the

¹¹⁵ Belleville, *Reflections of Glory*, 26-76; cf. Hafemann, *Paul*, 63-69; Aernie, *Is Paul also among the Prophets*, 120-124; Aernie, “Relationship,” 35-36; Wire, “Reconciled to Glory,” 267.

¹¹⁶ Stockhausen, *Moses' Veil*, 159, 174-175.

Corinthians will themselves be transformed into the image of Christ who, though risen, remains the crucified one. Though some commentators see Paul presenting his weakness as a backdrop against which Christ's glory may be seen, it is better to say that Paul in his own suffering "affirms the cross" acting as a "revelatory agent of the glory of God."¹¹⁷

5.2.2 *The Effects of Veiling*

This section will address the question of veiling, using intertextual as well as social and cultural analysis. The former will be used as a tool for investigating the unwarranted direct connection posited by some interpreters between veiling and blindness in the Greco-Roman world. The latter approach will assist in defining the practical effects of veiling, in order to identify just who would be the veiled one in a given described situation. Blinding and veiling are not at all equivalent one to the other; rather, the one who is veiled produces a limited functional blindness in the person *observing* the one who wears the veil. Since the blindness/hardness of heart among Paul's contemporaries is due to the persistent veiling of Moses the Lord's minister, their healing/softening must be accomplished through a removal of the minister's veil, and a revelation of his true character.

Tied into Paul's discussion of his own *παρρησία* and unveiled face is his insistence that the Mosaic veiling has persisted from the time of Moses up until the apostle's own day. Paul states that the *same* veil (τὸ αὐτὸ κάλυμμα) remains at the reading of Moses. The most natural way to take this is that, as far as the understanding of the Jews is concerned, *Moses* is still wearing the veil. And because

¹¹⁷ Hafemann, *Paul*, 31-33, 99-100, 327.

they see the unveiled Moses only when he has been with the Lord and returned to the people with authoritative proclamations, the sons of Israel see nothing but strength in the presentation of the Law. Regardless of Moses' intentions, the result of his veiling whenever he was not directly involved in his role of mediating the Lord's presence before the people was that the people never saw Moses in an inglorious or less than authoritative and powerful light. They see Moses' face only accompanied by visible glory, and thus are kept from making a positive connection from any weakness to the authority of the Lord's messenger. And because Moses' veiling naturally persists in the textual presentation, so also do contemporary readers assume Moses' glorious strength is persisting behind his veil. Just as the sons of Israel at the foot of Sinai were kept from understanding the full nature of Moses' ministry, so also are Paul's contemporaries kept from turning to Christ whose weakness is ever visible.

On the face of it, the veil does appear to some commentators to shift locations: from Moses' own face to the act of reading Torah, from the act of reading to the hearts and minds of unbelieving Jews. And this "shift in the location of the veil" is typically explained in metaphorical terms.¹¹⁸ There was previously a veil on Moses' face, but now the metaphorical veiling of the Israelites' perceptions produces the same effect as though the veil were literally upon the Israelites' hearts and minds.¹¹⁹ If Stockhausen, Hafemann, and Belleville are correct, the veil has moved; however, this would be a shift not otherwise signaled in the text, and not consonant with the effects of veiling itself.

¹¹⁸ Stockhausen, *Moses' Veil*, 131-149, 171.

¹¹⁹ Belleville, *Reflections of Glory*, 177, 238-241; Renwick, *Paul, the Temple*, 146-148; Stockhausen, *Moses' Veil*, 136.

The phrase τὸ αὐτὸ κάλυμμα “the *same* veil” obviously states that Moses’ very own veil is in view; in addition, μένει “remains” is most naturally understood as indicating that the veil has not moved from its original position on the Lawgiver’s face. The immediate repetition of κάλυμμα in 3:15 cannot lightly be assumed to refer to another, or suddenly metaphorical veil. Belleville argues for a difference in veils since the κάλυμμα of 3:15 is anarthrous (even though she goes on to note the clearly parallel construction of the two veil references).¹²⁰ Given the tight structure of Paul’s presentation, the absence of the article would seem more to argue for a conceptual unity than for a lack of identity.

A shift in the veil’s location is deemed logically necessary by some commentators, since it cannot “rest on Moses face any longer, since he died in the wilderness.”¹²¹ However, rather than a temporally-bound situation which must end at the death of the flesh-and-blood Moses, the Pauline argument has in view the text of Exodus with Moses as a character in the story. Note the easy switch in 3:14-15 from ἐπὶ τῇ ἀναγνώσει τῆς παλαιᾶς διαθήκης “when the Old Covenant is read” to ἃν ἀναγινώσκηται Μωϋσῆς “when Moses is read.” The text does not change—every time it is read, the reader sees either Moses’ brilliant face or is kept from seeing Moses’ face at all because of the veil. The repetitive references to the veil, the syntax of 3:15, and the literary nature of the references to Moses all suggest that Jewish hearts are not the present or past location of the veil. Paul’s contemporaries are not wearing a metaphorical veil, any more than was the physical veil in Moses’ day worn by the sons of Israel. In both time periods they have the *effects* of a veil resting upon

¹²⁰ Belleville, *Reflections of Glory*, 238-239.

¹²¹ Stockhausen, *Moses’ Veil*, 133-149, 171; Renwick, *Paul, the Temple*, 146; Hafemann, *Paul*, 373-376, 379, 453-454.

them. Whenever Paul's Jewish contemporaries read Moses/the old covenant, they still experience the deceptive effects of Moses' veiling, just as did their ancestors who stood at the foot of Sinai.

The quite obvious fact regarding the nature of veiling, is that a veil is not used to blind its wearer, but to keep the wearer from being seen. That a veil may be constructed of opaque materials is not being denied (cf., e.g., Mark 14:65; Luke 22:64); the point being presently argued, however, is that Greco-Roman veiling in general and the Exodus account in particular are means of hiding the veiled one from the view of observers, rather than of blinding or otherwise incapacitating the wearer. The veiled one is not kept from seeing, but from being seen; the observer is kept from seeing that which is behind the veil.¹²² Should the sons of Israel or Paul's Jewish contemporaries wear a veil upon their hearts or minds, this would not hinder them from gazing upon the glory of the Lord. Such a veil would only keep others from comprehending the state of the veiled ones' thoughts. When a woman wishes not to be seen by men, she does not place a veil upon the man, but secludes herself behind a veil. When Moses desired his audience not to gaze upon him, he veiled not the sons of Israel but his own face. Yet this simple concept appears to go unnoticed by most commentators.

Certainly there is a common ancient literary *connection* between blindness and lack of understanding—this really is not debated. But while some commentators simply *equate* veiling with blindness, such an equation is unfounded. Belleville argues that references to the veiling of heart/mind are commonly used to denote the

¹²² van der Toorn, "Significance of the Veil," 328; El Guindi, *Veil*, 94, 102; Watson, *Agape*, 1-2, 41, 71-72, 78; Cassuto, *Exodus*, 450.

act of blinding or otherwise dulling of the veiled one's senses;¹²³ however, her examples do not support her claims, as will be made clear by the following examination. In a number of passages adduced by Belleville (Rom 1:21; Eph 4:18; *Gosp. Thom.* 2:48; *M.M.* 6.3), though blindness and a lack of understanding are present, veiling is not mentioned at all. In her use of Job 17:4 (καρδίαν αὐτῶν ἔκρυψας ἀπὸ φρονήσεως “you have hidden their hearts from understanding”), Belleville has uncritically conflated καλύπτω with κρύπτω “to hide.” The manner of hiding is nowhere specified in the passage; moreover, this latter term is neither a synonym for the former nor used to denote actions associated with veiling.

In other passages (e.g. Philo, *Fug.*, 34; *Somn.*, 1.87; *Gosp. Thom.* 33, 85) Belleville has confused the location of the veil relative to the observer and the observed. Where the ancient author speaks of one wishing to peer *behind* the veil in order to discern mysteries and hidden truths, Belleville refers to the *seeker* being veiled in this process. She has ignored the critical distinction of a veiled object from a veiled subject. Hafemann has also equated veiling and blindness, stating that what is rendered inoperative in Christ is the veil as a metonym for Israel's hardness or lack of perception.¹²⁴ But such a metonymy requires the same mistakenly direct association between veiling and blindness as made by Belleville: in fact, a veil keeps the wearer from being perceived or known rather than from seeing and knowing. Moreover, such moves are not necessary, if only one recognizes the persistent *literary* setting of the veil:¹²⁵ it is in Christ that the veil which remains on Moses' face is rendered

¹²³ Belleville, *Reflections of Glory*, 240-247.

¹²⁴ Hafemann, *Paul*, 380-381, 395.

¹²⁵ Cf. Watson, *Paul and the Hermeneutics of Faith*, 274-275, 281-282, 287, 305, 514; Wright, *Climax of the Covenant*, 182-183.

ineffective, because Christ and Paul are not veiled and the fullness of their shared character—weakness and all—is open to be seen, understood, and imitated.

Belleville also mistakenly appeals to a partially elided quote from *GR* 2.56 (a decidedly insular and anti-Jewish text [cf., e.g., *GR* 1.97]). Even were the veiling-blindness equation perfectly obvious in this text, a single Mandaean reference would hardly warrant a re-evaluation of the broader evidence; however, a reading of the non-elided text does not support Belleville's claim:

Whoever turns to the Lord will be neither rejected nor dishonored, but the evildoers and the faithless, those who have estranged themselves from the source of illumination and those who are swaddled in darkness, do not want to look upon light and do not want to hear the Lord's call. All those of evil persuasion fall by their own will into the great Sea of Suf. They will find their abode in darkness, and the mountain of darkness will swallow them, until the Day of Judgment.

Here, the subject is kept from seeing by being covered in darkness: an uncritical assumption that the darkness is caused by a veil is simply unwarranted.

There is one biblical passage meriting mention, which is surprisingly absent from Belleville's list, as it appears on its face to support her equation of blindness and veiling. In Job 9:24 (LXX) the suffering man complains, *παραδέδονται γὰρ εἰς χεῖρας ἀσεβοῦς πρόσωπα κριτῶν αὐτῆς συγκαλύπτει* “for the land has been handed over to the wicked; [God] covers the judges' faces” (בִּידְרָשָׁע פְּגַי־שִׁפְטֵיָהּ יִכְסֶה) (אֶרֶץ נִתְּנָה [MT]). This veiling could be understood as having a blinding effect upon the judges, God causing them to be unaware of the injustices being perpetrated throughout the land. It is also possible, however, to understand this veiling as a hiding of the officials' faces/attention from those who would seek a righteous judgment in the court of law. And it is this second reading which best fits within the larger argument. In 9:11, Job's lament is not that he or his plight are hidden, but that he is

unable to perceive God; Job goes on to complain (9:14-19), not that God is kept from seeing undeserved suffering, but that the divine judge will not afford him an audience; this same general accusation is levied in the famous lines of 9:32-33, as Job opines the absence of an arbitrator between himself and the God who hides himself away. The judges falling under Job's scrutiny are not accused of being ignorant, but inaccessible; they are not sightless, but shameless. While blinding is possible if 9:24 is read on its own, it is more likely in light of the whole passage that God's veiling of the judges is akin to his hanging a sign on the legal chambers, reading "You may not see the judge—no audience today."

Scott points out that the veiling of Moses is later (2 Cor 4:1-6) associated in some manner with a blinding by Satan.¹²⁶ That there is a thematic connection is undeniable from the parallel phrasing of 3:12-18 and 4:1-6—ἔχοντες οὖν τοιαύτην ἐλπίδα ... διὰ τοῦτο, ἔχοντες τὴν διακονίαν ταύτην "so since we have such an expectation ... that is why, having this ministry."¹²⁷ But the parallel to 3:15 is 4:3, where Paul writes εἰ δὲ καὶ ἔστιν κεκαλυμμένον τὸ εὐαγγέλιον ἡμῶν, ἐν τοῖς ἀπολλυμένοις ἔστιν κεκαλυμμένον "but even if our gospel has been veiled, it is veiled among those who are perishing." It is explicitly clear in this latter text that what is veiled is the *gospel*, rather than those who are being destroyed. This group of people then experiences the adverse effects of veiling, since they are kept from seeing that which has been covered. This same effect has been addressed by Paul in 1 Corinthians 2, where it is clear that the blinding is in relation to the inability of the perishing properly to evaluate or appreciate the weakness of Christ (and of the

¹²⁶ Scott, *2 Corinthians*, 83.

¹²⁷ Cf. Stockhausen, *Moses' Veil*, 158-159.

apostle).¹²⁸ There is no mention of veiling within the 1 Corinthians 2 text; however, even if one were to uncritically and unconvincingly conflate Paul's use of ἀποκρύπτω (1 Cor 2:7) with καλύπτω, it must still be noted that what has been hidden in 1 Corinthians 2 is not the foolish and ignorant observers, but the wisdom (σοφίαν ... τὴν ἀποκεκρυμμένην) which they unsuccessfully seek.

Blindness is also discussed in close proximity to the act of veiling or covering in Classical texts, but once again the connection between these two states is not equative. Apollodorus recounts that when Tiresias—famed in literature from Homer to Euripides—came upon Athena bathing and γυμνὴν ἐπὶ πάντα ἰδεῖν “saw her completely naked,” she blinded him by laying hands upon his eyes. Tiresias' blinding is certainly associated with the act of covering; however, the blinding is not equivalent to a veil being cast upon the prophet. In fact, his blinding is functionally equivalent to a veiling of the previously revealed and naked Athena. Apollodorus recounts in succession three distinct traditions regarding the blinding of Tiresias, who spent portions of life both as a man and as a woman. In addition to the Athena story, Apollodorus says Tiresias' blindness was inflicted upon him because he revealed secrets that the gods wished to be kept hidden. Finally, it is recorded that Hera blinded him for revealing to Zeus the secret of the intensity of female sexual pleasure (Apollodorus, *Lib.*, 3.6.7). In each of these three traditions, the offence involves disclosure of what ought to be hidden; in two of the accounts, the disclosure explicitly involves the nature of woman's body.

The Tiresias blindness tradition has another interesting Pauline connection through the text of Acts 26:14. The ascended Christ addresses the blinded Saul,

¹²⁸ Olson, “Confidence Expressions,” 157 n. 3.

saying τί με διώκεις; σκληρόν σοι πρὸς κέντρα λακτίζειν “Why are you persecuting me? It is difficult for you to kick against the goads.” The phrase is surely a quotation from (or at least allusion to) Euripides’ *Bacchae*, familiar to Paul’s royal Greco-Roman audience. Blind Tiresias has scolded Pentheus for his persecution of the god-man, prophesying that the matter will not end well. Dionysius then warns Pentheus in person, θύοιμ’ ἄν αὐτῷ μᾶλλον ἢ θυμούμενος / πρὸς κέντρα λακτίζοιμι θνητὸς ὢν θεῷ “If I were a mortal kicking against the goads, rather than anger the god I would be sacrificing to him” (*Bacch.*, 794-795). The play proceeds with the systematic humiliation of Pentheus through being dressed (and addressed) as a woman, followed by his grisly death at the hands of unveiled wild-haired Dionysian women. Of course, the Acts record (9:1-19) of the threatening encounter with the God-man results in Saul being blinded—an object lesson of his inability to truly see and comprehend the crucified Christ. Subsequently, the blindness is removed and it is revealed to Paul that his apostolic ministry will be characterized by suffering.

Veiling results in a hiding of the veiled one from view. One’s blindness (physical or metaphorical) is functionally equivalent, not to being veiled, but to having veiled that which one is attempting to observe and understand. As discussed earlier, one wears a veil when there is something to be hidden, some mark of weakness or shame, some feminized state of being. The veil imposes a blindfold not on its wearer, but on the observer.¹²⁹ When Moses veils himself, he is not thereby covering the sins of the people; rather, he is concealing something of himself. Thus,

¹²⁹ Watson, *Agape*, 41.

when Paul compares himself to the veiled Moses, a Greco-Roman reading must include a gendered evaluation of the Lawgiver's honour, honesty, and strength.

5.2.3 *Moses' Veiled Face*

This section will further examine Paul's presentation of Moses, through an intertextual analysis of both the Pentateuch and Paul's use of *καταργέω* (the meaning and gloss of which term will be debated below at length). This examination will also include a broader analysis of Rabbinic materials. An ideological approach brings to light the possibility that Moses' intention in veiling may not entirely coincide with Paul's intention in his Mosaic self-comparison. Paul's Greco-Roman presentation suggests that Moses is deceptive, concealing a shameful weakness behind both temporary visible glory and a persistent physical veil. An intertextual comparison with Ex 4:1-16 suggests that there is a strong contrast between the proclamational ministries of Moses and Paul. And this suggestion is supported by an inner textual analysis of 2 Cor 3:12-18, which has just such a contrast built explicitly into its structure. Social and cultural textual analysis will also be noted to recognize that even the honourable activity of successful ministry in prophecy and prayer may be viewed in a humiliating and feminizing manner.

Belleville sees Moses as a "model of humility and self-effacement," not only for his Sinaitic self-veiling, but also for his earlier reticence in speaking and his insistence that he is not a *ἰκανός* "sufficient" representative of the Lord (Ex 4:10-12 LXX). She then parallels what she sees as Moses' laudable attitude with Paul's statement "it is not ourselves we preach" (2 Cor 4:5). Hafemann also believes that Paul's *παρησία* in the face of his detractors is in keeping with the pattern initially

set by Moses and continued by the prophets.¹³⁰ But these writers miss the fact that the apostle's Sinai account sets up a *contrast* between himself and Moses, rather than points of likeness.¹³¹ And this contrast may be seen not only in the magnitude of their ministries' glory and the veiled/non-veiled state of the two men, but also in the different attitudes taken by each with regard to their own ability.

The continued reticence of Moses is presented in Ex 4:1-16 not as appropriate humility but as a function of his fear and lack of faith which result in the Lord's anger against him.¹³² On the other hand, while Paul does insist he does not preach himself, this is a question of content rather than ability. When the apostle directly addresses his lack of speaking abilities, his attitude is quite the opposite to that of Moses. In response to the *πρὸς ταῦτα τίς ἰκανός* "who is sufficient for these things" of 2:16, Paul's implied "I am" stands in clear contrast to the *οὐχ ... εἰμι* of Moses.¹³³ As discussed in Chapter Three, Paul views his lack of eloquence as a powerful means of portraying the weak power and foolish wisdom of God which is seen most clearly in the person of the crucified Christ. In addition, the *res gestae* beginning in 2 Cor 4:7 may be read as a foreshadowing of the more complex *Peristasenkatalog* of 11:16—12:11.¹³⁴ In each instance, Paul's weakness is not presented as a temporary low status that will one day give way to strength and honour, but as a deeply shaming feminization that *in itself* demonstrates the glory and honour of the crucified Christ.

¹³⁰ Belleville, *Reflections of Glory*, 32, 150, 173; Hafemann, *Paul*, 246, 368-370, 378-379; Aernie, *Is Paul also among the Prophets*, 12, 17, 23, 113-184, esp. 112-116; Cassuto, *Exodus*, 450.

¹³¹ Robbins, *Invention of Christian Discourse*, 424-425, 442-443, 478-479.

¹³² Hafemann, *Paul*, 42-47; Aernie, "Relationship," 62-63.

¹³³ Hafemann, *Paul*, 39.

¹³⁴ Stockhausen, *Moses' Veil*, 173-174.

Any reticence or displayed humility on the part of Moses may thus be viewed either as a deceptive covering or as an admission of feminine weakness.

A common approach to determining Moses' intention in self-veiling has been to demonstrate that Moses' glory persisted as a mark of the Lord's holy judgment against sin. Hafemann has provided a thorough review of this approach, briefly represented here.¹³⁵ If the glory of the Lord would prove harmful to the sinful sons of Israel, and if Moses is always presented in both Scripture and tradition as radiant, and if it is shown that Paul's use of *καταργέω* cannot mean "to fade away," then Moses must be intending to hide the Lord's glory from the people for their own protection. On the other hand, if *καταργέω* does allow for the idea of fading, and if the scriptural and traditional evidence for Moses' radiance is at least ambiguous, one may instead recognize that Moses is concealing weakness. In other words, there is a question as to whether Moses' veil should be understood as an indication of his godly humility and mercy or as a deceptive hiding of his weakened and humiliated state.

In the LXX (e.g. Lev 9:24; 10:1-3; Num 14:10-15; 16:19-21, 41-42; Isa 6:1-9; Ez 1:28—2:3; 11:22-23; 43:1-9; Ps 96:6; 1 Enoch 14:20—15:2), the visible display of God's glory denoted the Lord's presence as an approval of the minister, location, and specific activities of God. And this display within the assembly was often followed immediately by judgment and condemnation.¹³⁶ Thus, some scholars read Moses as veiling his glory in order that he might protect the Israelites from being destroyed by the Lord's judgment confronting their sin. If the divine *δόξα* were encountered openly by those with hardened and disobedient hearts, its *τέλος* would be

¹³⁵ Hafemann, *Paul*, 255-263.

¹³⁶ Renwick, *Paul, the Temple*, 102-105; Propp, *Exodus 19—40*, 620; Cassuto, *Exodus*, 450-451.

condemnation and death; for this reason—so that the sons of Israel would not die—Moses veiled his glory.¹³⁷ And in this view Moses' repeated re-veiling of himself after again speaking with the Lord is seen as highlighting the danger of divine judgment upon the disobedient people, making them aware of their tenuous position, unable to encounter the glory of the Lord even at a remove.¹³⁸

While such a view does do justice to the condemnatory function of divine glory in the broader Hebrew text, it does not sufficiently account for the timing of Moses' repeated veiling/unveiling in Exodus 34. Certain commentators miss the nature and timing of Moses' repeated *unveiling*. They understand Moses as remaining veiled before the people at all times subsequent to the initial presentation of the second set of tablets, and unveiled only when he is alone in the direct presence of the Lord. So does Allo state that immediately after Moses' descent from the mountain, whenever he spoke to the people his face “was covered with a veil, which he removed only to return to the presence of Yahweh.”¹³⁹ But in the biblical text, Moses' radiant face is *uncovered* when he is facing the people and relating the Lord's commands; he is veiled only when the people are *not* in contact with him as the representative of the Law. This is quite opposite to one's expectations, if Moses were intending to guard the people from a condemning glory, as he wears the veil “only at those times when he is *not* fulfilling his role as mediator of God's commandments.”¹⁴⁰ That he would

¹³⁷ Hafemann, *Paul*, 204-231; Schulz, “Die Decke,” 13; Scott, *2 Corinthians*, 73; Jacob, *Exodus*, 1006; Stuart, *Exodus*, 738-740.

¹³⁸ Hafemann, *Paul*, 278-286; cf. Jacob, *Exodus*, 1007; Moberley, *At the Mountain*, 108; Keil and Delitzsch, *Exodus*, 244.

¹³⁹ “Aussi, quand il leur eut parlé, il le couvrit d'un voile, qu'il n'ôtait que pour retourner en présence de Yahweh” (Allo, *Seconde Épitre*, 87).

¹⁴⁰ Watson, *Paul and the Hermeneutics of Faith*, 291-294; cf. Britt, “Concealment,” 230-231; Leibowitz, *Studies in Shemot*, 636-640; Sarna, *Exodus*, 221; Ryken, *Exodus*, 1072.

regularly *unveil* his radiant face as he represented the Lord before the people brings into serious question whether Moses' intention could have been to protect these people from the divine radiance. And if the τέλος "intention/goal/end" of the veiling was not to keep the divine effulgence from being seen,¹⁴¹ may it be that it was to hide from view the weakness evidenced by a *fading* glory?

Scott claims that there exists a nearly monolithic tradition regarding Moses' sustained glory—that his radiance persisted throughout his life and even after his death.¹⁴² However, there are a number of difficulties with accepting the force of this claim. First, it may be argued in light of Paul's presentation that such a tradition itself could be the result of Israel's hardened hearts. That is, the absence of evidence for a fading of Mosaic glory could be due, not to the glory's persistence, but to Moses' success in self-concealment. Second, the scriptural references to the event are surprisingly few, and they do not include comments on Moses' use of the veil. It is at least worthy of note that there is "not a single reference to his veil after Exod. 34 either by Moses himself, or by anybody contemporary with Moses, or by anyone else throughout OT history Not only does Exod. 34 provide the only [OT biblical] reference to Moses' veil, but it also provides the only reference to his shining face."¹⁴³

This strange absence of commentary regarding Moses' veil continues from Hebrew Scripture on into Rabbinic literature. While the Rabbinic materials post-date

¹⁴¹ Renwick has given a fine overview of different approaches to the meaning of τέλος (*termination* of either Moses' glory/ministry; the *goal* of obtaining Christ or condemnation), and also of the syntactical force (purposive or resultative) of πρὸς τὸ μὴ ἀτενίσαι "not able to gaze." The distinctions are of interest for a full exegesis of the passage, but not of importance for this thesis (Renwick, *Paul, the Temple*, 135-144).

¹⁴² Scott, *2 Corinthians*, 73-75.

¹⁴³ Stuart, *Exodus*, 589-590; cf. Dozeman, *Exodus*, 753; van Unnik, "With Unveiled Face," 161-162; Britt, "Concealment," 228-233, 260; Watson, *Paul and the Hermeneutics of Faith*, 301-302.

Paul, and thus may be related only indirectly to a discussion of the apostle's claims, it is still of interest that such an apparently significant action would be overlooked in these writings. Throughout Halakha, Haggadah, and Kabbalah, Moses' veiling is virtually ignored. Even though the Exodus narrative makes clear that the Lawgiver repeatedly spoke to the assembly radiant and unveiled, the Rabbinic corpus (*Midrash Rabba*, 47.6; Ashkenazi, *Weekly Midrash*, 452-454; Bab. Tal. *Hag* 2.VI.2.c; Ginzberg, *Legends*, 119, 137, 143-145, 430, 467-470; *Zohar*, 31b, 192b-194b) speaks of radiance so bright that not even angels could look upon Moses' face.

Though Rabbinic materials do affirm Mosaic brightness in excessive terms, they avoid entirely any recognition or mention of Moses' veil. This systematic avoidance of an obvious textual element seems suspiciously like a kind of special pleading or "stacking the evidential deck." Whatever argumentative fallacy may apply here, the traditional presentation is suspect. That there are no biblical texts beyond Exodus 34 for discussing the matter makes any claim to a discerned "pattern" questionable. Without further treatment or clarity in the subsequent Hebrew canon or in Rabbinic tradition, it still remains to examine whether Paul may have commented on the relation of veiling to the persistence or ephemeral nature of Moses' brilliance.

The term καταργέω appears three times in 3:11-14, often translated as "pass away" "fade" or "remove." The use of the term is complex, and its precise meaning within the Corinthian text has been long-debated. Commentators are left with the difficulty of determining just what action is in view with this verbal, and what object the verbal acts upon. That is, is something fading away and if so, what? The term is often used (Rom 3:3, 31; 6:6; 7:2, 6; Eph 2:15; 1 Cor [2:6?]; 15:24; Eusebius, *Hist. eccl.*, 5.23; Barnabas, *Barn.*, 5.6; 9.4; 15.5; Basil, *Ep.*, 265.21; Damascus, *Vita*

Barlaam, 37.342) to denote the cancelling of contractual authority or the removal of one's power. The juxtaposition of the term in Heb 2:14 with τὸν τὸ κράτος ἔχοντα “the one who has power” suggests that these are near synonyms—by his human death Jesus overpowers the one who wields death's power. Gal 3:17 addresses the conditions under which a later covenant is able to annul an earlier one. In regard to such a contract dispute, Paul concludes that the Mosaic Law does not have sufficient standing εἰς τὸ καταργῆσαι ἐπαγγελίαν “to annul the promise.” In Gal 5:4 and 5:11, the apostle warns Gentile believers who become circumcised καταργήθητε ἀπὸ χριστοῦ “you are removed from Christ,” and that the acceptance of circumcision as necessary to faith κατήργηται τὸ σκάνδαλον τοῦ σταυροῦ “removes the scandal of the cross.”

The term may refer to a lack of use, necessity, or productivity (1 Cor 13:8-11; Luke 13:7). In one of his Oedipal plays (*Phoen.*, 753), Euripides presents Eteocles choosing to go and defend the city walls against his brother's attack. He wishes to kill his brother at the gates, and so he says ἀλλ' εἶμ', ὅπως ἂν μὴ καταργῶμεν χεῖρα “Well, I'm going, so that my hands will not be idle.” The term here is set quite generally in opposition to physical activity. In Rom 4:14, Paul places the term in parallel with κενόω “to be empty,” while John of Damascus (*Vita Barlaam*, 2.10) sets it in direct contrast to ἐνεργέω “to be active.” The term in 2 Thess 2:8 is closely associated with ἀναίρέω “to destroy/kill,” and is used elsewhere (1 Cor 6:13; *Barn.*, 16.2) in clear reference to the act of physical destruction.

The text of 1 Cor 1:27-29 is worth looking at in full, giving attention to the structure in which this term appears.

τὰ μωρὰ τοῦ κόσμου ἐξελέξατο ὁ θεός, ἵνα καταισχύνη τοὺς σοφοὺς, καὶ τὰ ἀσθενῆ τοῦ κόσμου ἐξελέξατο ὁ θεός, ἵνα καταισχύνη τὰ ἰσχυρά, καὶ τὰ ἀγενῆ τοῦ κόσμου καὶ τὰ ἐξουθενημένα ἐξελέξατο ὁ θεός, τὰ μὴ ὄντα, ἵνα τὰ ὄντα καταργήσῃ, ὅπως μὴ καυχῆσθῃται πᾶσα σὰρξ ἐνώπιον τοῦ θεοῦ.

God has chosen the world's foolish things, so that he might shame the wise; God has chosen the world's weak things, so that he might shame the strong; God has chosen the world's insignificant and despised things—things that are not—so that he might render ineffective the things that are: all in order that no manner of being may make a boast before God.

Paul's conclusory remark regards God's intention of removing any possibility that others would boast in his presence. This intention is fulfilled through the action described in three consecutive ἐξελέξατο ... ἵνα "chosen ... for the purpose of" clause-sets. The first two of these sets have shaming (καταισχύνω) as their explicit intention, while the third set replaces καταισχύνω with καταργήσῃ. The perfectly parallel structuring of these clauses makes it clear that the action of καταργέω here involves humiliation and shaming. Not that the term should be glossed by "humiliate," but the two terms do clearly function within the same semantic domain when paired with other terms relating to honour or status.

In two passages, καταργέω is placed in direct contrast to φωτίζω "to shine/illuminate." The μέν ... δέ construction of 2 Tim 1:10 clearly contrasts the illuminating work of Christ upon immortal life with his work of setting death in darkness. At his appearance Christ will be revealed as the one καταργήσαντος μὲν τὸν θάνατον φωτίσαντος δὲ ζωὴν καὶ ἀφθαρσίαν διὰ τοῦ εὐαγγελίου "who through the gospel neutralized death and illuminated life and incorruptibility." John of Damascus (*Vita Barlaam*, 7.55) makes a similar comment: when the disciples baptize and teach the nations, the result is that ἐφώτισαν οὖν τὰ ἔθνη τὰ

πεπλανημένα, καὶ τὴν δεισιδαίμονα πλάνην τῶν εἰδώλων κατήργησαν
 “then the deceived nations will be enlightened, and the superstitious deceit of the
 idols will be brought to nothing.” Even without the clean structural contrast of 2 Tim
 1:10, the juxtaposition in John’s text is clear. Those who once had been deceived
 receive light, while that which deceived them receives the opposing effect of
 καταργεῖν. John (*Vita Barlaam*, 9.70) also places the term in parallel with ἀφανίζω
 “to destroy/blot out,” and Basil (*Ep.*, 223) sets it in general opposition to the activity
 surrounding the light of the Gospel’s truth.

Mark Given suggests that καταργέω be rendered by the functional (though
 perhaps less than elegant) “disempower.”¹⁴⁴ Regardless of disagreements over
 English glosses (e.g., be idle, overpower, annul, separate, remove, render ineffective,
 humiliate), it is clear that the Greek term signifies a lack of effectiveness or power.
 What is not found within the term itself is the means by which the “disempowerment”
 is brought about.¹⁴⁵ It should be noted that, while the term does not *mean* “fade
 away,” visible glory or light may well be rendered ineffective through fading or
 extinguishment. Thus, in the context of the Sinai event, καταργέω does allow for the
 concept of a fading radiance or a lack of persistence in Moses’ glory.

While some would prefer to read Exodus 34 as indicating Moses’ desire to
 protect the sons of Israel by concealing the holy radiance of the Lord, this does not
 appear to be the best understanding of the text. As Georgi notes, the fact that Moses
 briefly and repeatedly unveils only *after* meeting with the Lord and not *before*, may

¹⁴⁴ Given, “On His Majesty’s Secret Service,” 199, 211-213.

¹⁴⁵ Hafemann, *Paul*, 301-309); Stockhausen, *Moses’ Veil*, 118-121; Hays, *Echoes*, 133-138;
 Thrall, *2 Corinthians*, 135; Pfitzner, *Strength in Weakness*, 61; Danker, *II Corinthians*, 58; Barrett,
Second Corinthians, 116-118; Belleville, *2 Corinthians*, 99-104; Best, *Second Corinthians*, 32;
 Lambrecht, *Second Corinthians*, 52, 58-60.

indicate a timing calculated to reveal only a “recharged” glory.¹⁴⁶ More importantly for the present investigation, such a reading does not fit easily within the *Pauline* argument. Indeed, it may be that even were *Moses*’ intention to conceal the glory, *Paul*’s intention is to present Moses as hiding its diminishment.¹⁴⁷ In the Pauline presentation, Moses’ veiling results in a perpetual lack of understanding on the part of Israel—it does not result in the Jews’ repentant recognition of deserved yet unlevied judgment, it does not result in their enjoyment of peace in the presence of the Lord. It is clear that regardless of either Moses’ intention in veiling or its effect on the sons of Israel, “*Paul* does not understand the κάλυμμα motif as being positive.”¹⁴⁸ Moses is presented by the apostle either as not acting to protect his audience or as failing to achieve his intention.

Any conclusion as to the nature of Moses’ ultimate intentions in self-veiling as presented in 2 Corinthians must be reached through our reading of Paul rather than through our reading of Exodus.¹⁴⁹ The intention is discussed neither in the Hebrew text nor in extant Rabbinic literature. Is Paul’s reading of Exodus 34 exegetically supportable? Were the Corinthians familiar with such a reading? Were they accepting of such a hermeneutic? For the purposes of this thesis, such questions are of little moment: whatever the case, the apostle evidently felt his interpretation of Moses’ actions would be persuasive. Belleville argues that while Paul does define Moses’ motive for veiling—he does not wish the Israelites to continue gazing on the glory—

¹⁴⁶ Dozeman, *Exodus*, 751; Childs, *Exodus*, 610, 618-619; Stuart, *Exodus*, 588-589; Jacob, *Exodus*, 1007; Moberley, *At the Mountain*, 108; Keil and Delitzsch, *Exodus*, 244.

¹⁴⁷ Garland, *2 Corinthians*, 172-187; Dozeman, *Exodus*, 754; Given, “On His Majesty’s Secret Service,” 209-210; Given, *Paul’s True Rhetoric*, 123.

¹⁴⁸ Georgi, *Opponents of Paul*, 261.

¹⁴⁹ Cf. Hafemann, *Paul*, 262; Ciampa, “Approaching Paul’s Use of Scripture,” 304-308.

he does not clarify the “motive behind the motive.”¹⁵⁰ But we are not concerned here with the understanding of Moses and his audience; rather, we are concerned with the habitual understanding of Paul and his Greco-Roman readers. Paul’s model readers were informed by both a shared culture and prior correspondence to view Moses’ veiling as being implicated in some measure of deceitfulness or shame. The act was “in the symbolic language of Paul’s time first a sign of shame and bondage.”¹⁵¹

If it still seems strange that Moses should be viewed in any way other than a powerful light, it should be noted also that prayer and worship are submissive in nature, and that prophecy may be conceptualized as a divine penetration of the speaker. God’s presence humbles and feminizes the one who comes near—the higher the exaltation he offers, the lower the worshiper must bend (Philo, *QE*, 2.3).¹⁵² Eilberg-Schwartz has suggested that the complaint in Num 11:1-12 reflects Moses’ awareness of his own feminized role, and even that Moses’ veiling after conversing with the Lord may be understood in the same manner as the veiling of a woman who has been humbled in intercourse with her husband.¹⁵³ Such an interpretation may appear quite radical to many readers, but it does serve to further demonstrate the breadth of possible connections existing here between veiling, ministry, the feminine, and bodily weakness. It has already been argued in this thesis that actions socially construed as feminine and shameful produce such shame within the actor, regardless of what might otherwise be considered his “objective” status. Certainly, if a veiled

¹⁵⁰ Belleville, *Reflections of Glory*, 206-208; van Unnik, “With Unveiled Face,” 157; Aernie, “Relationship,” 15, 63.

¹⁵¹ van Unnik, “With Unveiled Face,” 161.

¹⁵² Aspegren, *Male Woman*, 95-96, 98; Burkert, *Creation of the Sacred*, 90-91; Barton, *Roman Honor*, 192.

¹⁵³ Kraemer, *Unreliable Witnesses*, 31, 248-252, 265; Eilberg-Schwartz, “Nakedness,” 168-169, 178, 180.

man is habitually seen as shameful and deceptive, Moses will not be exempted from this perception simply “because he is Moses.” And if the Lawgiver’s veil implicates him in shameful and feminizing deceptiveness, Paul’s self-contrasting open-faced ministry might be expected to surround the apostle in an aura of masculine honour.

5.2.4 *Paul’s Unveiled Face*

Inner texture will be analyzed in this section to uncover parallel structures of the argument, and to demonstrate the referential continuity of both the unveiled face and the veil throughout the passage. Intertextual analysis will also be used to define the proper meaning and force of *κατοπτρίζομαι*, as well as to note the constraints of the singular in reference to the *ἀνακεκαλυμμένω προσώπῳ* “unveiled face.” These investigations will support an affirmation that the unveiled face belongs to Paul, rather than to believers, Moses, or to Christ. While this affirmation may seem to some as overly exalting of Paul, that is precisely the point of the apostle’s self-commendatory apologetic. Paul affirms that he and his ministry are glorious indeed, and that the Corinthians should behold the glory remaining on his face and thus follow him and become transformed into the image of Christ. The nature of Paul’s glory, however, is then revealed in the *res gestae* of 2 Cor 4:7—6:10 to be shameful suffering, a feminizing weakness. Indeed, this redefinition of glory has been the subject of 2 Corinthians all along, as Paul repeatedly “defends” himself through a complex self-affirmation of weakness and shame matched only by those seen in his crucified Lord.

It is clear that Moses’ self-veiling conceals something from the Israelites, and it is just this unmanly act of concealment which Paul claims to avoid. Whatever

Moses' intentions may have been in self-veiling, he does not appear to Paul's Greco-Roman audience to have acted in a manner befitting a man. Georgi goes so far as to say that κάλυμμα and καλύπτω are to be treated as conceptually synonymous to πανουργία "deceit" and δολέω "to deceive."¹⁵⁴ To deny that Paul presents the Lawgiver's veiling as deceptive would demand that we exempt Moses from the habitual force of the Corinthians' perceptions, and also that we separate the present passage from Paul's comments regarding others' dishonest treatment of God's Word (2:17) and his own refusal to be false by hiding things from the Corinthians (4:2).¹⁵⁵ As stated earlier, Paul's self-presentation is constructed as a contrast with Moses, with the primary elements being the presence or absence of a veil and honest or deceitful treatment of the Lord's glory as seen in the ministry of God's Word.

The immediate argument begins in 3:13 with Moses placing κάλυμμα ἐπὶ τὸ πρόσωπον αὐτοῦ "a veil upon his face," and concludes with a reference to ἀνακεκαλυμμένῳ προσώπῳ "an unveiled face." Surely the parallel is too obvious to ignore or to be unintentional: Paul is moving argumentatively from Moses' covered face to an uncovered one. That Paul intends to compare and contrast himself and his ministry to Moses' activity is clear from the interposition of καὶ οὐ καθάπερ "not like Moses." Not wearing a veil is to act with πολλῇ παρρησίᾳ "great openness and confidence," while to be without such openness would be equivalent to Moses' action of placing κάλυμμα ἐπὶ τὸ πρόσωπον.¹⁵⁶ By whatever means and in whatever

¹⁵⁴ Georgi, *Opponents of Paul*, 260.

¹⁵⁵ Watson, *Paul and the Hermeneutics of Faith*, 295-296, 305, 311, 518, 521-523; Wan, "Charismatic Exegesis," 76; Provence, "Who Is Sufficient," 74-76; van Unnik, "With Unveiled Face," 161-162, 165.

¹⁵⁶ Stockhausen, *Moses' Veil*, 124, 129; van Unnik, "With Unveiled Face," 159-161; Schulz, "Die Decke," 9; Barton, *Roman Honor*, 161-164.

manner Moses' δόξα is rendered ineffective, the argumentative point is that his veiling stands in contrast to Paul's own παρρησία. Moses' self-veiling demonstrates a weakness and an unwillingness to "face up" to the Israelites, while Paul's self-unveiling demonstrates his willingness to be viewed without concealment. The glory that is thereby revealed, however, is not the culturally-expected apostolic strength and honour, but Paul's weakness. As earlier discussed with reference to Paul's "thorn in the flesh," it is not some attractive and impressive effulgence which shines through in spite of Paul's weakness and shame, but the very weakness of Christ crucified which is seen on Paul's openly suffering face.

This identification of Paul as the one with the ἀνακεκαλυμμένῳ προσώπῳ is of importance for a proper understanding of Paul's self-presentation in this passage. If the unveiled face belongs to all believers, then Paul does not here claim any glory or authority beyond that of any other follower of Christ. Indeed, such a reading would favourably contrast all believers to Moses. As Scott notes, if Paul says we all have access to the Spirit of God, he opens himself (*à la* Korah's rebellion) to the possibility of his readers rejecting his unique apostolic authority. After all (to echo Moses' siblings in Numbers 12), if we all are able to be glorious, why do we need Paul?¹⁵⁷ On the other hand, if the glory is not to be reflected from every believer's face, but to be observed by them on the face of the Corinthian apostle, then Paul has claimed for himself a somatic glory quite different in both its persistence and effect from that over which Moses placed his veil.

That Paul refuses to veil his face like Moses is not what allows him to see the Lord's glory—once again, the function of a veil is not to blind the wearer but to hide

¹⁵⁷ Scott, *2 Corinthians*, 82.

him from view. Nor do the Corinthians need unveiled faces to see the Lord: that which is unveiled is not made able to see, but to be seen. Disobedient Israel looks upon Moses' veiled face and is hardened; Paul offers his own unconcealed face, in order that the Corinthians might look on it and thus be transformed by the glory of the crucified Christ. In using the term *κατοπτρίζομαι*, Paul is not encouraging the Corinthians to *reflect* the Lord's glory, but to *look* at it, and his unveiled face is precisely that upon which they are encouraged to gaze.

There is disagreement among commentators and translations regarding the force of *κατοπτριζόμενοι* in this verse. Along with the Vulgate, most major English translations (KJV, NKJV, ASV, NASB, RSV, NRSV) render the word along the lines of "looking at" or "beholding," though a minority (NIV, NLT, TEV) chooses "reflecting." The NET Bible renders the term as "reflecting," but also provides "beholding" as an alternative. Likewise, most commentators read the term as indicating the act of looking, though a few have understood it as the act of reflection. Stockhausen claims that the term is ambiguous, but writes that the "parallelism with Moses in 'ἀνακεκαλυμμένῳ προσώπῳ' is determinative for Paul's intention in using the verb," going on to say that Christ is also the mirror upon which the Christians may see a reflection of God's glory. She does not, unfortunately, offer any clarification as to how this determination is made. So also does Wright affirm believers both beholding *and* reflecting the glory.¹⁵⁸ Thrall states that Christians must be reflecting the glory just as did Moses; Belleville concurs, but adds that the middle of this verb can mean *either* to reflect or to behold. Matera also states that either sense

¹⁵⁸ Stockhausen, *Moses' Veil*, 90, 150-152; Wright, *Climax of the Covenant*, 185.

is to be found in the verb, but leans in favour of “behold.”¹⁵⁹ Barrett and Garland each briefly cite support for their views but do not offer discussion of the evidence; these two writers come down cautiously in favour of “beholding,” rather than “reflecting.” Numerous other commentators state, but barely argue, that the word denotes the act of beholding.¹⁶⁰ Because the preceding commentators on all sides offer little or no lexical and literary support for their positions, I am of course unable to critically engage with their rationales. It is possible, however, directly to examine the evidence which the commentators have left undiscussed.

Notwithstanding the confident assertions made by Belleville and Matera, the force of the verb is not ambiguous; nor should the middle voice be translated as “reflect.” The major lexica state clearly that the idea of reflecting is displayed through the active voice, but that the middle voice means “to behold.”¹⁶¹ In a surprising concession of lexicographic evidence to exegetical concerns, LSJ inserts “but here [2 Cor 3:18] perh. *reflect*,” while BDAG appends a short list of dissenting writers. Neither of the lexica provides any sense of support for a unique grammar in the passage. Danker glosses the active voice form as “producing a reflection,” while the middle is shown to denote the act of looking. It is true that Danker suggests the meaning of looking *at oneself*, but this specification, where applicable, results from contextual rather than lexical forces. There is a single text of ambiguous sense to be considered, where it is not possible to judge whether the middle voice of the term

¹⁵⁹ Thrall, *2 Corinthians*, 136; Belleville, *2 Corinthians*, 111-112, 285; Matera, *II Corinthians*, 96-97.

¹⁶⁰ Barrett, *Second Corinthians*, 124-125; Garland, *2 Corinthians*, 199-200; Pfitzner, *Strength in Weakness*, 65-66; Scott, *2 Corinthians*, 82; Stegman, *Second Corinthians*, 95-96; Lambrecht, *Second Corinthians*, 62; Barnett, *Second Corinthians*, 205-206.

¹⁶¹ Hafemann, *Paul*, 409; Aernie, “Relationship,” 82-83; *LSJ*, 9th ed., s.v. “κατοπτρίζω”; *BDAG*, 3rd ed., s.v. “κατοπτρίζω”.

carries the meaning of looking or of reflecting. Telling of a self-absorbed man walking daintily along the water's edge and frowning at the mud, Diogenes Laertius (*Lives*, 7.17) says this is natural, since οὐ γὰρ ἔστιν ἐν αὐτῷ κατοπτρίσασθαι. The context does not clarify whether the subject of the verbal idea is the man or the mud: "he is not *reflected* in it" or "he does not *see himself* in it." One may not make a firm pronouncement as to whether the man did not see himself reflected, or the mud did not reflect the man.

The remaining uses of the term in Greek literature, however, are clear. While Barrett's caution stems from his belief that the infrequency of the verb provides less than certain data, an examination of the verb's use provides firm assurance that the lexica are well-founded in their glosses. In recounting Anaxagoras' view of how the rainbow is formed by reflection (Ps-Plutarch, *Plac. Phil.* 3.5), the active participial form of the verb is used appositely to refraction. Αναξαγόρουσ ἀνάκλασιν ἀπὸ νέφους πυκνοῦ τῆσ ἡλιακῆσ περιφεγγείασ, καταντικρὺ δὲ τοῦ κατοπτρίζοντοσ αὐτῆν ἀστέροσ διὰ παντοῦ ἴστασθαι "Anaxagoras' [opinion is that] when the sun is directly opposite, the refraction of the solar radiance from a dense cloud forms it [the rainbow] through reflection." The active voice refers to the production of the sun's reflection, rather than one's observation of that effect.

The remaining occurrences of the verbal are all middle/passive, as is the single biblical use of the term in 2 Cor 3:18. Athenaeus (*Deipn.*, 15.687c) represents Aphrodite as walking onstage ἀλειφομένην ... καὶ κατοπτριζομένην "perfuming herself ... and gazing in the mirror." Socrates (Laertius, *Lives*, 2.33) advised young men συνεχῆσ κατοπτρίζεσθαι "to be in the habit of looking in the mirror," so that handsome men might be encouraged to act in keeping with their looks, and that ugly

men might by means of education τὴν δυσείδειαν ἐπικαλύπτοιεν “conceal their defects.” (One might also note that the καλύπτειν verbal here carries the expected force of keeping the covered physical defects from view, rather than of blinding the ugly man.) Likewise, Plato (*Lives*, 3.39) is said to have encouraged drunkards to κατοπτρίζεσθαι, which act would cause them to abandon such unseemliness. Philo (*Leg.*, 3.101) records Moses’ expressed desire, μὴ γὰρ ἐμφανισθείης μοι δι’ οὐρανοῦ ... μηδὲ κατοπτρισαίμην ἐν ἄλλῳ τινὶ τὴν σὴν ἰδέαν ἢ ἐν σοὶ τῷ θεῷ “do not be made visible to me through heaven[ly things] ... nor may I see your form in any other thing except in your divine self.” These passages with the middle form clearly present the viewer in the act of seeing a reflection, rather than of reflecting. It may also be noticed that, in keeping with the larger concerns evidenced by Paul in 2 Cor 3:18, the one who does the viewing is somehow changed (or at least encouraged to do so) by the viewing of the image.

John of Damascus (*Vita Barlaam*, 8:61; 15:131) and Eusebius (*Hist. eccl.*, 7.32.19) each use this verb, but they do so in commentary on 2 Cor 3:18, without an explicit definition of the term. These texts are thus not helpful in determining the verb’s force. Other forms of the word (κατοπτρεία, κατοπτρεύω, κατόπτρης, κατόπτρος) have not been included in this study, as cognates do not necessarily reflect the same nuances of meaning. There are no further uses of the term in Philo, LXX, Pseudepigrapha, Josephus, or the Apostolic Fathers. While the Classical corpus is exceedingly large and incompletely tagged, searches of the Perseus database have revealed no further uses. The great preponderance of evidence demonstrates that κατοπτρίζομαι here refers to the act of looking, rather than reflecting.

Most commentators understand the ἀνακεκαλυμμένῳ προσώπῳ as referring to the faces of believers. Practical applications are often made as to the expectation of deep spiritual change to be experienced by all believers, but typically no argument or evidence is offered for the identity of the reference. Neither Thrall nor Garland make the identification explicit, but they do imply it; Belleville begins by identifying the unveiled face as that of the NT minister (and especially Paul) but later broadens the reference to include all believers.¹⁶² Stockhausen diagrams the logical and rhetorical relationships in the passage in such a way as to make Moses' veiled face parallel with the unveiled faces of Christians, as do both Aernie and Wan.¹⁶³ Aernie is, however, inconsistent in this identification, elsewhere stating that the parallels in the passage are between the Corinthians and the Sons of Israel and that connecting believers with the one who "turns to the Lord" is not the most obvious reading of the flow of argument in the passage.¹⁶⁴ Indeed, such a reading would require one to set aside the overarching comparison being made in the passage between Moses and *Paul*. From the very start of the passage Moses' veiled face is explicitly contrasted with Paul's unveiled self-presentation; within the central portion of the passage the hardened hearts of the sons of Israel kept from perceiving the Lord's glory are contrasted with believers who are transformed as they behold the glory. Surely the parallels here are not a positive one between Moses and Corinthian

¹⁶² Stockhausen, *Moses' Veil*, 128-129; Nguyen, *Christian Identity in Corinth*, 187-192; Scott, *2 Corinthians*, 82; Pfitzner, *Strength in Weakness*, 65-66; Matera, *II Corinthians*, 96-97; Hughes, *Second Corinthians*, 78-79; Stegman, *Second Corinthians*, 95; Best, *Second Corinthians*, 33-34; Lambrecht, *Second Corinthians*, 61-62; Barnett, *Second Corinthians*, 189, 204-205; Thrall, *2 Corinthians*, 136; Garland, *2 Corinthians*, 179, 190, 198-199; Belleville, *2 Corinthians*, 102, 111-112; Stuart, *Exodus*, 735-736.

¹⁶³ Stockhausen, *Moses' Veil*, 128-129; Wan, "Charismatic Exegesis," 73-75; Aernie, "Relationship," 81-82, 85-86.

¹⁶⁴ Aernie, "Relationship," 43-44, 72-73.

believers, but dual contrastive ones between Moses and Paul (veiled/unveiled) and Corinthian believers and Israel (transformed by gazing/hardened by being kept from gazing).¹⁶⁵

Identifying the unveiled face as that of believers would require that *κατοπτρίζομαι* indicates a reflection, an interpretation which has been demonstrated as untenable. The contrastive argumentative flow of the passage also makes it highly unlikely that the unveiled face is other than Paul's own. In addition to these barriers, there is the syntactical difficulty of having a singular oblique substantive attached to the plural subject of a plural verb. While it is not unknown for a singular *subject* to be attached to a plural verb, such is not the grammar of this verse. Here we have an explicitly stated plural subject *ἡμεῖς δὲ πάντες* "we all" and its attendant plural participial phrases (*κατοπτριζόμενοι ... μεταμορφούμεθα*; "gazing ... being transformed"). The difficulty lies in the direct application of the singular dative phrase to this plural construction. As illustrations of a similar construction Smyth suggests P.A. 41a *ὅσοι δίκαιοι ἐγένοντο ἐν τῷ ἑαυτῶν βίῳ* "however many have been just in their lives," and Blass-Debrunner similarly offers Jer 18:16 (LXX) *κινήσουσι τὴν κεφαλὴν αὐτῶν* "shaking their heads."¹⁶⁶ These examples are faulty, however, on account of the presence of the plural distributive term [ἐ]αυτῶν. I have found no other instance of a construction including a singular substantive in an oblique case referencing the plural subject. Even were a limited number of such constructions located, it would still be the simpler course to understand the dative case of

¹⁶⁵ Olson, "Confidence Expressions," 150-152.

¹⁶⁶ For a discussion of the complexities (as well as clear and regular expectations) regarding numerical concord, cf. Robertson, *Historical Research*, 403-409; Blass and DeBrunner, *Greek Grammar*, §§131-142; Smyth, *Greek Grammar*, §§949-1012.

ἀνακεκαλυμμένῳ προσώπῳ as indicating the location of the verbal act's object, rather than as an indicator of attendant circumstance.

In light of the contextual, grammatical, and syntactical evidence against the unveiled face belonging to believers, the clause may be rendered “we are all . . . beholding the Lord's glory reflected *on an unveiled face*.” The gazing is not accomplished *with* an uncovered face, but directed to the image and glory able to be seen upon a face that is not covered. While one may think at first to identify this face as being that of Christ, such a move ignores the overarching contrastive theme of the passage: Paul is not contrasting Moses with Christ but with himself. It is true that the transformative image is that of Christ, but the location of that image for viewing is contextually-argumentatively limited to the apostle's face. Paul is not arguing the Corinthians into looking at Christ with acceptance, but into accepting what they see in himself. Though Nguyen identifies the “unveiled face” with all believers, he then immediately affirms that it is *Paul's* own person and actions that are the visible manifestation of Christ's εἰκόν; Nguyen also notes that Paul later (2 Cor 10:1) claims to present to the Corinthians—through his suffering and hardships—the πρόσωπον of Christ.¹⁶⁷ Along with Olson, I reject the reading of those “who take ἀνακεκαλυμμένῳ προσώπῳ as a reference to the face of Christ. In their favour can be cited the reference to Christ's face in 4:6. On the other side, I would cite the contrast in 3:12 and the charge of veiledness against Paul (cf. 4:4).” Also, as Olson points out, even in 4:6 it is to describe *Paul's* mode of existence that Christ's face is mentioned.¹⁶⁸

¹⁶⁷ Nguyen, *Christian Identity in Corinth*, 187-192, 194-200.

¹⁶⁸ Olson, “Confidence Expressions,” 157 n. 3.

The more immediate context, the overall focus on Paul's self-comparison with the veiled Moses, the force of *κατοπτρίζομαι*, and both the grammatical and logical constraints of the dative phrase, all demand that the unveiled face is that of Paul. Indeed, the central portion of the passage appears to function as an explanation for why the Corinthians should view Paul in a positive light, given the veiling distinctions between Moses and himself. The Corinthians are asked to gaze upon the face of Paul, the one who—*οὐ καθάπερ Μωϋσῆς*—does not veil himself. The sinful sons of Israel were kept from gazing upon Moses' face, but the Corinthians are asked to gaze upon Paul who in his weakness more and more reflects the glory of the crucified Christ. It is in looking at the apostle's unveiled face—his honest and open self-presented actions and attitude—that the Corinthians will see the glorious image of the crucified Christ.

If the judgmental *τέλος* is rendered ineffective in Christ through a transformation of hearts, there is no need for Paul to veil. The *τέλος* of the *δόξα* for the transformed heart will not be death, but glorious life.¹⁶⁹ The glorious appearance of a man's face would seem to a Greco-Roman audience to be an indication of approval from God; Paul's lack of such a glorious appearance would be seen as evidence of non-approval by God.¹⁷⁰ This is the background to 5:12, where Paul condemns *τοὺς ἐν προσώπῳ καυχομένους καὶ μὴ ἐν καρδίᾳ* “those who boast of their appearance rather than about their heart.” The difficulty faced by Paul, however, is not a need to deny the standard interpretation of *δόξα* as indicating

¹⁶⁹ Renwick, *Paul, the Temple*, 143-145.

¹⁷⁰ Renwick, *Paul, the Temple*, 106-110.

divine approval, but to redefine δόξα itself in terms of weakness.¹⁷¹ The apostle's argument is that "the glowing face of Moses ... was no longer to be regarded as the image and pattern of the manifestation of δόξα in the present age. Rather the appropriate image was that of the face of Christ—Christ crucified."¹⁷²

Because Paul has an expectation of lasting glory in his ministry,¹⁷³ he claims to speak and act in a certain manner.¹⁷⁴ In positive terms, the apostle uses great openness; negatively stated, he does not place a veil over his face. Paul's action of presenting himself with uncovered face is entirely in keeping with masculine expectations and the demands of Greco-Roman honour, yet this action paradoxically results in his own shame and loss of status. In what would for others be a manly act of unveiling himself, Paul makes clear that he is indeed weak and shameful, and not a "real man" after all. His unveiled face reflects not the Greco-Roman manly strength and honour expected by the Corinthians of their apostolic leader, but the feminizingly shameful weak strength and foolish wisdom of the crucified Christ himself.

5.3 Summary of 2 Cor 3:7-18

Paul's claim in 2 Cor 3:7-18 is deceptively simple: his ministry is more glorious than that of Moses, and this is demonstrated by the fact that Moses veiled himself and Paul does not. And since the wearing of a veil culturally implicates a man in feminized and shameful behaviour, the apostle's argument takes on great weight

¹⁷¹ Dewey, "Matter of Honor," passim; Pickett, *Cross in Corinth*, 197.

¹⁷² Renwick, *Paul, the Temple*, 106-108, 158-159; Pickett, *Cross in Corinth*, 186-187.

¹⁷³ Certainly τοιαύτην ἐλπίδα "such an expectation" has reference to the preceding discussion of the abiding nature of Spirit-glory (cf. Given, *Paul's True Rhetoric*, 122).

¹⁷⁴ Hafemann, *Paul*, 336-341; Stockhausen, *Moses' Veil*, 124; Belleville, *Reflections of Glory*, 192.

and the force of what is “natural.” Moses’ veiledness would be felt by Paul’s audience as shameful and deceptive; Paul is thus able to favourably compare himself and his ministry to Moses in the Corinthians’ eyes. This claim of weakness and deception is possible because the audience with whose *habitus* we are concerned is not Moses’ Sinaitic rebels, but the Corinthians of Paul’s own day. Paul’s openness of speech and self-presentation would in itself be seen as honourable and manly: if it were not for what the Corinthians knew about the apostle, his Mosaic self-comparison would be easy to accept as commendatory. Paul’s *παρρησία*, however, consistently revealed a weak and shameful man—no *vir bonus* but a feminized humiliated sufferer begging the Corinthians to gaze upon and to be like him.

5.4 Chapter Summary

Veiling was inextricably joined in the Greco-Roman world to conceptions of gender, authority, honour and shame. The strength of this habitual understanding has been illustrated through an examination of 1 Cor 11:2-16. For a woman to be covered was appropriate, for the shame implied by the act was in keeping with her weak and shameful *φύσις*. A woman’s unveiling was cothematized with humiliation, shame, and sexual submission. Due to his natural place of honour and authority, a man did not normally veil—such an action was in keeping neither with his *φύσις* nor with his *ἦθος*. But under certain circumstances, men did veil. In worship, the act might serve as an admission of his submissive state *vis-à-vis* the deity; in times of anger, it could indicate his determination to avoid a possible shameful act. In most situations—whether or not by his own intention—a man’s veiling was construed as a feminine act; it therefore identified him as a weak and shameful being who lacked authority.

These feminine implications attached themselves to the one who was veiled, regardless of that one's biological sex.

Paul's self-comparison to Moses in 2 Cor 3:7-18 was examined in light of this veil-shame conflation. Moses veiled, thus casting himself for Paul's audience in a deceptive feminine light; that his veiling may have been done for the good of his Sinaitic audience would not exempt him from the Greco-Roman gendered implications of his act. Paul's refusal to veil would be understood as a manly act of courage; that is, until his unveiled self was clearly seen to be dishonourable on account of his feminizing shameful weakness. For while unveiledness was a necessary element of manly honour, it was not a sufficient element. The unveiled face upon which he asks the Corinthians to gaze, is a face which reflects the image of the crucified Christ. It is the face of one who will immediately afterward (2 Cor 4:7—5:4) describe himself as hard-pressed, perplexed, and wasting away, groaning and burdened, always carrying in his own body the death of Christ, a shameful experience of feminizing suffering and of social rejection.

CHAPTER SIX: CONCLUSION

This Conclusion consists of two sections. In the first, I will briefly review the focus and findings of the preceding chapters; the second will look forward to what I hope may be accomplished or encouraged through the argument of this thesis. While earlier discussions of biblical and Pauline $\sigma\hat{\omega}\mu\alpha$ concentrated on lexical and referential issues, the closing decade of the millennium saw the focus shift to questions of the body's philosophical and social significance. Even up into the present century, discussion of *gendered* somatic issues was conspicuously absent within the scholarly Pauline community.¹ In recent years, however, there has been a growing recognition of gender's importance to the field, with the result that Oxford has now published its sizable *Encyclopedia of the Bible and Gender Studies*.²

While this study examined only texts within the Pauline Corinthian correspondence, this limitation was due to considerations of length, and its methods and conclusions may certainly be applied to other portions of the Pauline corpus. The significance of the body within the Greco-Roman world has already been a matter of discussion with regard to the Gospels, and the gendered argument of this thesis should be able to speak into that conversation with little modification. There is an ongoing need for recognition of gendered assumptions with regard to rhetoric and authority in biblical studies as well as in everyday personal, business, and political pursuits. A thesis-length Pauline treatment of a cothematization of speech and weakness with gendered issues of honour and shame has not yet been forthcoming, and so I offer

¹ Cf. Marchal, *Politics of Heaven*, 3, 18; Foxhall and Salmon, eds., *Thinking Men*, x-xi.

² This long-awaited volume (O'Brien, ed. *OEBGS*) was published too late to be consulted for the present study.

here what I hope will prove to be a reasoned and even compelling voice in this burgeoning and changing conversation, as we re-assess our contemporary presuppositions regarding gender, interpersonal relationalities, and authority both within the Church and in the Church's dealings with the rest of the world.

6.1 Review

This study began with an observation that the significance of the physical body is constructed and determined by the social *habitus* within which the body is perceived. The Literature Review revealed a consistent affirmation of the importance of “boundaries” to this discussion: within the Greco-Roman milieu, the body signified one's proper place within society, family, and universe, functioning as a mirror of the soul and a determiner of one's social status. I have argued that the significance of the Pauline body is to be found in an understanding of the heavily gendered nature of these social and cultural expectations. The complexity of this social *habitus* has been examined through an equally complex SRI analytic to demonstrate that the Pauline body is to be understood in light of the socially-constructed relationalities of rhetoric, gender, weakness, and shame. Furthermore, it has been shown that the apostle's somatic self-presentation functions as an argument for his authoritative leadership on the very basis of his social unacceptability, a shameful state clearly mirroring the feminized status of the crucified Christ.

Chapter Three (1 Cor 2:1-5) focused on the Greco-Roman conflation of rhetorical ability with both masculinity and social power, to demonstrate that the apostle's proclamation is in keeping with the feminizing shame of the crucified Christ. Paul's self-presented physical and rhetorical weakness implicate him in a

feminine and therefore low status, but rather than avoid the accusation of being an unacceptable orator, Paul accepts it and then disputes the significance of this state. He challenges his audience to see his weakness itself as an ἀπόδειξις δυνάμεως θεου “demonstration of the power of God,” in contradistinction to the expected δυνάμεως λόγου “power of the speech.” The apostle did not view his lack of competence as a barrier to be overcome, but as a mirror of Christ’s crucifixion, the goal and effect of which was the abjection of masculine honour and power. As Paul has determined that the weakness of his proclamatory activity would mirror Christ, so is he determined that his audience should mirror himself. To follow Paul in his ἀσθένεια, φόβος, and τρόμος, is to follow Christ in the weakness and shame of his crucifixion. Not in spite of Paul’s weakness of speech and body, not in any minimizing of his less-than-manly ἥθος, but on the basis of these inverted values, the Corinthians are called to imitate the one who imitates Christ. To deny the authority and leadership of Paul on the basis of his low and feminized status, would entail a rejection of the crucified Christ himself.

Chapter Four (2 Cor 11:16—12:11) demonstrates that Paul’s presentation of his own experience is patterned after the feminizing suffering and shame of the crucified Christ. This demonstration is accomplished by an examination of the complexities of Paul’s hardship list and subsequent narratives of the Damascus escape and heavenly journey. The bare occurrence of a *Peristasenkatalog* suggests Paul as a manly hero, while the ascent and healing narratives lead the audience to view their narrator as possessing divine connections and revelatory authority. But the structuring of these texts destroys all expectations even as they are set up, revealing Paul to be weak and feminized. Rather than a true *res gestae*, Paul’s list portrays him as unable

to overcome the dangers of imprisonments, stoning, and beatings; his escape from Damascus clearly reveals a lack of manly courage; his heavenly journey is fatally marred by Paul's inability to speak of the experience or even to successfully call upon God for relief from the penetrating pain of the *σκόλωψ τῆ σαρκί*. While the earlier discussion focused greatly upon the apostle's self-determination to mirror his humiliated Lord, this passage furthers the argument by examining those experiences and sufferings not directly under the apostle's control. Indeed, the penetrating shame and pain is inflicted upon Paul not only by Jews and Romans alike, but also by the hand of the Lord himself. Paul's self-presented status is that of a shamed and feminized man who is, at the same time and by virtue of the same circumstances, a divinely-empowered recipient and herald of the knowledge and power of Christ. Paul's suffering implicates him in the sufferings of Christ; his weakness is boasted to be the very image of Christ's strength.

Chapter Five (2 Cor 3:7-18) argues that Paul's boast of open speech and self-disclosure implicated him in a feminizing act of unveiling his own shame, weakness, and lack of rhetorical skill. This position is supported by an evaluation of Paul's Sinai account in light of the complexities of the Greco-Roman attitude toward veiling. A vocabulary for this discussion was developed from 1 Cor 11:2-16, which argues that an uncovered woman brought shame when she spoke publicly in connection with deity, but that a man conversely brings about such shame if he is covered when so speaking. Paul's model readers were informed by both a shared *habitus* and prior correspondence to view a man's veiling as implicating him in deceitfulness, weakness, and shame. Veiling hid something shameful, producing a functional blindness in the observers, and was understood as a feminizing act, regardless of the

biological sex of the one who was veiled. A woman covers her “natural” shame by veiling; when a man is veiled, his glory is hidden and he becomes for all social intents and purposes a woman. Paul’s self-comparison to Moses focuses on the fact that the Lawgiver concealed himself while the apostle does not. While this distinction would seem to feminize Moses and reveal Paul as a true man, the audience’s expectations are again disappointed, for an open face proved one to be a man only when it revealed the strength and honour expected of one worthy to bear that name. Thus, Paul’s *παρρησία* would be understood as a manly act only until his unveiled self was revealed as shamefully weak. The apostle affirms that he and his ministry are glorious indeed, and that as the Corinthians behold his unconcealed face and character they will be transformed into the glorious reflected image of Christ. But that glory and image ultimately is seen to be feminized and weak—it is the very suffering and shame of the crucified Lord to whom Paul submits and whom he proclaims.

6.2 Prospectus

The questions of power, submission, vulnerability, and weakness in relation to God and to various interrelated human groups and classes inform a great crisis in philosophy, theology, and society at large.³ Many people have been reticent to accept a submissive model of Christianity, since submission has for so long and across multiple cultures been associated with an expectation that women, colonized persons, and other “others” bow their own desires and will to that of a white male elite.⁴ For example, the feminist rejection of divine patriarchy is fueled by the historically-

³ Coakley, *Powers and Submissions*, xiv-xviii.

⁴ Coakley, *Powers and Submissions*, 1-39, 56-57, 61; Levine, “Feminist Criticism,” 163-164.

accepted melding of divine prerogatives with the authority of human males.⁵ The model of God as divine king, along with his power-wielding ambassadors, is one which tends to exclude societal “others” from participation. Viewing Paul through a lens of gendered weakness that itself includes his participation in divine power may assist greater numbers of readers and interpreters to accept the gospel message of submission without any accompanying valorization of domination. An understanding of a weak or suffering God who exercises power-with and power-for rather than power-over others is liberating to those who have no experience of power in themselves; an understanding that the apostle himself both receives and provides power-for others is equally freeing.⁶ A recognition that the authoritative apostle was, no less than any woman or other marginalized person, under the sole rule of God in Christ, is true to a biblical theology of both creation and redemption; it is also liberating in its affirmation of the solidarity and value of all humanity and of each member of Christ’s body.

In examining the effect of linguistic patterns upon the feminist programme, Cameron writes, “I have no illusions that positive language will change the world. More women will not take up science just because scientists are referred to as *she*. But what might be achieved is a raising of people’s consciousness when they are confronted with their own and others’ prejudices against saying *she*.”⁷ Just so, I expect that my present study may assist in raising awareness among biblical interpreters regarding the gendered force of social constructedness, both in Paul’s day

⁵ Coakley, *Powers and Submissions*, 30-31.

⁶ Coakley, *Powers and Submissions*, 101.

⁷ Cameron, *Feminism and Linguistic Theory*, 88-90.

and in our own. And this raised hermeneutical awareness may serve to encourage and enable practical expressions of truly biblical character, for such an awareness seems to me a prerequisite for a greater ethical enactment of the submissive life to which we are called by the weak and humiliated example of the apostle Paul.

Until we all recognize our solidarity in “otherness” before the one God, recognize that the feminine is not the “other” before the male norm, we will continue to experience a Body of Christ splintered by biology. When we do not recognize the differences produced by gender in our readings, we are kept from understanding the agents of the text. Not knowing them well enough, “we cannot care for them well, hear their testimony well, recognize when empathy is appropriate.”⁸ That is, a gender-conscious reading and epistemology is as much an ethical as a hermeneutical act.⁹ Until the gendered distinctions of the text are discovered, interpreters cannot fully move on to an ethical enactment of the text’s implications.¹⁰

The question of women in leadership is, of course, a major ethical concern for the Church. This thesis does not directly address the question of whether women should lead; rather, it challenges the propriety of the question itself. The biblical issue is not one of simple biology, for when Scripture speaks of “women” or “men” it does so within a *habitus* of complex socially-gendered expectations. From Greco-Roman times down to the present day, masculinity has been cothematized with authority and the ability to lead. Woman, moreover, has been consistently presented as “not-

⁸ Code, *Rhetorical Spaces*, xiv.

⁹ Kleinman, “Everything That Really Matters,” 325-329, 331.

¹⁰ Coakley, *Powers and Submissions*, 61; Cameron, *Feminism and Linguistic Theory*, 88; Day and Pressler, eds., *Engaging the Bible in a Gendered World*, xvii.

man/masculine,” in a binary oppositional and exclusionary manner.¹¹ As a result, without direct examination of their own character and qualities women have been excluded from positions and definitions of power. Paul’s somatic self-presentation, however, argues that feminine shame and weakness is where the true power of the church is found, and that such qualities are the proper and expected state of Christ’s servants. While churches valorize the “crucified life,” this is often done in a way that ignores the realities of personal suffering, weakness, and marginalization that are experienced daily by the “others” of society, including women. The crucified life is viewed “theologically” and from the standpoint of the powerful and able who choose each moment to be patient with the failings of others and steadfast against personal sin. Paul’s life argues not so much for the biological gender of those who lead, but for their gendered character. We should be asking what kind of character is required to lead, and also why women are still today in both Church and society presumed by default to be possessed of a character that does not measure up.

These same questions may be asked as well regarding the poor and those otherwise on the fringes of “mainstream society.” As the Gospel message is increasingly proclaimed *from*, rather than *to*, Third-World nations, we must evaluate our expectations for leaders. While we are eager to hear a message of appeal and exhortation from the persecuted church, are we as willing to be taught by pastors who live without persecution but in abject poverty and social powerlessness? Do we have a leadership space for the physically handicapped in the Church, other than as “ministers for the physically challenged”? Are the emotionally disabled able to lead and minister to us without our acceptance being accompanied by feelings of grateful

¹¹ Cameron, *Feminism and Linguistic Theory*, 57; Chopp, *Power to Speak*, 1-2.

superiority? A clearer understanding of Paul's socially-gendered weakness, as argued throughout this thesis, provides a means for beginning to struggle with and to answer such questions.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

- Adamopoulo, Themistocles Anthony. "Endurance, Greek and Early Christian: The Moral Transformation of the Greek Idea of Endurance from the Homeric Battlefield to the Apostle Paul." Ph.D. Dissertation, Brown University, 1996.
- Adams, Sean A. "Crucifixion in the Ancient World: A Response to L.L. Welborn." In *Paul's World*, edited by Stanley E. Porter, 111-129. Leiden: E. J. Brill, 2008.
- Aernie, Jeffrey W. *Is Paul also among the Prophets? An Examination of the Relationship between Paul and the Old Testament Prophetic Tradition in 2 Corinthians*. LNTS. London: T. & T. Clark, 2012.
- _____. "The Relationship between the Old and New Covenants: An Analysis of 2 Corinthians 3:7-18." M.Div. Thesis, TEDS, 2008.
- Aeschylus. *Agamemnon*. Translated by Herbert Weir Smyth. LCL. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University, 1971.
- _____. *Persians*. Translated by Herbert Weir Smyth. LCL. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University, 1973.
- Akin, Daniel L. "Triumphalism, Suffering, and Spiritual Maturity: An Exposition of 2 Corinthians 12:1-10 in Its Literary, Theological, and Historical Context." *CTR* 4, no. 1 (1989): 119-144.
- Aland, Barbara, Kurt Aland, Johannes Karavidopoulos, *et al*, eds. *Novum Testamentum Graece: Nestle-Aland 27 (revised)*. Stuttgart: Deutsche Bibelgesellschaft, 1993.
- Allo, B. E. *Saint Paul: Première Épitre Aux Corinthiens*. 2nd ed. EBib. Paris: J. Gabalda, 1956.
- _____. *Saint Paul: Seconde Épitre Aux Corinthiens*. EBib. Paris: J. Gabalda, 1956.
- Alston, Richard. "Arms and the Man: Soldiers, Masculinity and Power in Republican and Imperial Rome." In *When Men Were Men: Masculinity, Power and Identity in Classical Antiquity*, edited by Lin Foxhall and John B. Salmon, 205-223. London: Routledge, 1998.
- Amador, James David [Hester]. "Re-Reading 2 Corinthians: A Rhetorical Approach." In *Rhetorical Argumentation in Biblical Texts: Essays from the Lund 2000 Conference*, edited by Anders Eriksson, Thomas H. Olbricht, and Walter Übelacker, 276-295. Harrisburg, PA: Trinity Press International, 2002.
- _____. "Socio-Rhetorical Criticism and the Parable of the Tenants." In *New Testament Interpretation and Methods: A Sheffield Reader*, edited by Stanley E. Porter and Craig A. Evans, 221-249. Sheffield: Sheffield Academic, 1997.
- Anderson, Jon W. "Social Structure and the Veil: Comportment and the Composition of Interaction in Afghanistan." *Anthropos* 77 (1982): 397-420.
- Anderson, R. Dean. *Ancient Rhetorical Theory and Paul*. Rev. ed. Contributions to Biblical Exegesis and Theology. Leuven: Peeters, 1999.
- Anderson, William S. *Essays on Roman Satire*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University, 1982.
- Andrews, Scott B. "Too Weak not to Lead: The Form and Function of 2 Cor 11.23b-33." *NTS* 41 (1995): 263-276.

- Apollodorus. *Library*. Translated by James G. Frazer. LCL. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University, 1921.
- Apuleius. *Metamorphoses*. Translated by W. Adlington and S. Gaselee. LCL. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University, 1977.
- Aristides. *To Plato: In Defence of Oratory*. Translated by C. A. Behr. LCL. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University, 1973.
- Aristophanes. *Acharnians*. Translated by B. B. Rogers. LCL. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University, 1972.
- _____. *Aves*. Translated by B. B. Rogers. LCL. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University, 1972.
- _____. *Ecclesiazusae*. Translated by B. B. Rogers. LCL. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University, 1972.
- _____. *Lysistrata*. Translated by Jeffrey Henderson. LCL. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University, 2000.
- _____. *Thesmophoriazusae*. Translated by Jeffrey Henderson. LCL. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University, 2000.
- Aristotle. *Generation of Animals*. Translated by A L Peck. LCL. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University, 1979.
- _____. *Nicomachean Ethics*. Translated by H. Rackham. LCL. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University, 1934.
- _____. *Poetics*. Translated by Stephen Halliwell. LCL. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University, 1995.
- _____. *Rhetoric*. Translated by John Henry Freese. LCL. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University, 1975.
- Armour, Ellen T. and Susan M. St. Ville. "Judith Butler—In Theory." In *Bodily Citations: Religion and Judith Butler*, edited by Ellen T. Armour and Susan M. St. Ville, 1-12. New York, NY: Columbia University, 2006.
- Asad, Talal. "Remarks on the Anthropology of the Body." In *Religion and the Body*, edited by Sarah Coakley, 42-52. Cambridge: Cambridge University, 1997.
- Ashkenazi, Yaakov ben Yitzchak. *Tz'ena Ur'enah / The Weekly Midrash*. Translated by Miriam Stark Zakon. Brooklyn, NY: Mesorah, 1994.
- Aspegren, Kerstin. *The Male Woman: A Feminine Ideal in the Early Church*. Acta Universitatis Upsaliensis: Uppsala Women's Studies: A. Women in Religion. Stockholm: Almqvist & Wiksell International, 1990.
- Athenaeus. *Deipnosophists*. Translated by Charles Burton Gulick. LCL. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University, 1963-1971.
- Baba Mesia*. Translated by Jacob Neusner. The Talmud of Babylonia: An Academic Commentary. Atlanta, GA: Scholars Press, 1994.
- Badiou, Alain. *Saint Paul: The Foundation of Universalism*. Translated by Ray Brassier. Stanford, CA: Stanford University, 2003.
- Bailey, Kenneth E. *Paul through Mediterranean Eyes: Cultural Studies in 1 Corinthians*. Downers Grove, IL: Intervarsity, 2011.
- Baird, William. "Visions, Revelation, and Ministry: Reflections on 2 Cor 12:1-5 and Gal 1:11-17." *JBL* 104 (1985): 651-662.
- Baker, William R. "Did the Glory of Moses' Face Fade? A Reexamination of in 2 Corinthians 3:7-18." *BBR* 10, no. 1 (2000): 1-15.

- Bakhtin, Mikhail Mikhailovich. *The Dialogic Imagination*. Translated by Carol Emerson and Michael Holquist. Austin, TX: University of Texas, 1981.
- _____. "The Problem of Speech Genres." In *Speech Genres and Other Late Essays*, edited by Carol Emerson and Michael Holquist, 60-102. Austin, TX: University of Texas, 1986.
- _____. "The Problem of the Text in Linguistics, Philology, and the Human Sciences: An Experiment in Philosophical Analysis." In *Speech Genres and Other Late Essays*, edited by Carol Emerson and Michael Holquist, 103-131. Austin, TX: University of Texas, 1986.
- _____. *Rabelais and His World*. Translated by Helene Iswolsky. Cambridge, MA: MIT, 1968.
- _____. *Speech Genres and Other Late Essays*. Translated by Vern W. McGee. Austin, TX: University of Texas, 1986.
- Bal, Mieke. "Perpetual Contest." In *Perpetua's Passions: Multidisciplinary Approaches to the Passio Perpetuae et Felicitatis*, edited by Jan M. Bremmer and Marco Formisano, 134-149. Oxford: Oxford University, 2012.
- Barclay, John M. G. "Brilliant Study of the Body in Corinth." *ExpTim* 107 (1996): 184.
- Barnabas. *Barnabas*. Translated by Michael W. Holmes. Grand Rapids, MI: Baker, 2007.
- Barnett, Paul W. *The Second Epistle to the Corinthians*. NICNT. Grand Rapids, MI: Eerdmans, 1997.
- Barr, James. *The Semantics of Biblical Language*. London: Oxford University, 1961.
- Barram, Michael. "Review of *Belly and Body in the Pauline Epistles*." *Reviews in Religion and Theology* 11, no. 3 (2004): 335-338.
- Barrett, Charles K. *The First Epistle to the Corinthians*. BNTC. Peabody, MA: Hendrickson, 1968.
- _____. *The Second Epistle to the Corinthians*. BNTC. Peabody, MA: Hendrickson, 1973.
- Barthes, Roland. *New Critical Essays*. Translated by Richard Howard. New York, NY: Hill and Wang, 1980.
- _____. *The Pleasure of the Text*. Translated by Richard Miller. New York, NY: Hill and Wang, 1975.
- Barton, Carlin A. *Roman Honor: The Fire in the Bones*. Berkeley, CA: University of California, 2001.
- Barton, John. "Introduction." In *The Cambridge Companion to Biblical Interpretation*, edited by John Barton, 1-6. Cambridge: Cambridge University, 1998.
- Basil. *Epistulae*. Translated by Roy J. Deferrari. LCL. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University, 1961.
- Bassler, Jouette M. "Paul and His Letters." In *The Blackwell Companion to the New Testament*, edited by David E. Aune, 373-397. Malden, MA: Wiley-Blackwell, 2010.
- Bates, Matthew W. "Beyond Hays's *Echoes of Scripture in the Letters of Paul*: A Proposed Diachronic Intertextuality with Romans 10:16 as a Test Case." In *Paul and Scripture: Extending the Conversation*, edited by Christopher D. Stanley, 263-291. Atlanta, GA: SBL, 2012.

- Bauer, Walter, Frederick W. Danker, W. F. Arndt, *et al*, *A Greek-English Lexicon of the New Testament and Other Early Christian Literature*. Chicago, IL: University of Chicago, 2000.
- Becker, Eva-Marie. *Letter-Hermeneutics in 2 Corinthians: Studies in Literar-Kritik and Communication Theory*. Translated by Helen S. Heron. New York, NY: Continuum, 2004.
- Begbie, Jeremy. "What We Learn about Time, Theology, and the Structure of Creation from the Experience of Music." *Mars Hill Audio Journal* 64, no. 2 Track 2 (2003): 24:10-26:14.
- Belleville, Linda. "Scripture and Other Voices in Paul's Theology." In *Paul and Scripture: Extending the Conversation*, edited by Christopher D. Stanley, 233-261. Atlanta, GA: SBL, 2012.
- Belleville, Linda L. *2 Corinthians*. IVPNT. Downers Grove, IL: Intervarsity, 1996.
- _____. *Reflections of Glory: Paul's Polemical Use of the Moses-Doxa Tradition in 2 Corinthians 3.1-18*. JSNTSup. Sheffield: JSOT Press, 1991.
- Berachot*. Translated by Jacob Neusner. The Talmud of Babylonia: An Academic Commentary. Atlanta, GA: Scholars Press, 1994.
- Berger, Peter and Thomas Luckmann. *The Social Construction of Reality: A Treatise in the Sociology of Knowledge*. New York, NY: Random House, 1966.
- Bernard, J.H. "The Second Epistle to the Corinthians." In *The Expositor's Greek Testament*, edited by W. Robertson Nicoll. Grand Rapids, MI: Eerdmans, 1974.
- Best, Ernest E. *Second Corinthians*. Interpretation. Atlanta, GA: John Knox, 1987.
- Bird, Jennifer. "Rosemary Hennessy and the Circumscribed Symptomatic Symbolism of 1 Peter's Haustafel." In *Marxist Feminist Criticism of the Bible*, edited by Roland Boer and Jorunn Økland, 229-243. Sheffield: Sheffield Phoenix, 2008.
- Bird, Michael F. "Reassessing a Rhetorical Approach to Paul's Letters." *ExpTim* 119, no. 8 (2008): 374-379.
- Black, David Alan. *Paul, Apostle of Weakness: Astheneia and its Cognates in the Pauline Literature*. American University Studies: Theology and Religion. New York, NY: Peter Lang, 1984.
- Black, Edwin. "The Second Persona." In *Readings in Rhetorical Criticism*, edited by Carl R. Burgchardt, 190-200. State College, PA: Strata, 2000.
- Blass, F. and A. DeBrunner. *A Greek Grammar of the New Testament and Other Early Christian Literature*. Translated by Robert W. Funk. Chicago, IL: Chicago University, 1961.
- Blomberg, Craig L. "Neither Hierarchalist nor Egalitarian: Gender Roles in Paul." In *Paul and His Theology*, edited by Stanley E. Porter, 283-326. Leiden: E. J. Brill, 2006.
- Bloomquist, L. Gregory. "Paul's Inclusive Language: The Ideological Texture of Romans I." In *Fabrics of Discourse: Essays in Honor of Vernon K. Robbins*, edited by David B. Gowler, L. Gregory Bloomquist, and Duane F. Watson, 165-193. Harrisburg, PA: Trinity Press International, 2003.
- Blundell, Sue. "Clutching at Clothes." In *Women's Dress in the Ancient Greek World*, edited by Lloyd Llewellyn-Jones, 143-169. London & Swansea: Duckworth & The Classical Press of Wales, 2002.
- _____. *Women in Ancient Greece*. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University, 1995.

- Boer, Roland. "Julia Kristeva, Marx, and the Singularity of Paul." In *Marxist Feminist Criticism of the Bible*, edited by Roland Boer and Jorunn Økland, 204-228. Sheffield: Sheffield Phoenix, 2008.
- Böhme, Hartmut. "The Conquest of the Real by the Imaginary: On the *Passio Perpetuae*." In *Perpetua's Passions: Multidisciplinary Approaches to the Passio Perpetuae et Felicitatis*, edited by Jan M. Bremmer and Marco Formisano, 220-243. Oxford: Oxford University, 2012.
- Booth, Wayne C. *The Rhetoric of Fiction*. 2nd ed. Chicago, IL: University of Chicago, 1983.
- Bordo, Susan. "The Cartesian Masculinization of Thought." *Signs* 11, no. 35 (1986): 439-456.
- Boswell, John Eastburn. *Christianity, Social Tolerance, and Homosexuality: Gay People in Western Europe from the Beginning of the Christian Era to the Fourteenth Century*. Chicago, IL: University of Chicago, 1980.
- Botha, Pieter J. J. and Johannes N. Vorster. "Introduction: Rhetoric, Scripture and Theology." In *Rhetoric, Scripture and Theology: Essays from the 1994 Pretoria Conference*, edited by Stanley E. Porter and Thomas H. Olbricht, 17-26. Sheffield: Sheffield Academic, 1996.
- Bourdieu, Pierre. *The Field of Cultural Production: Essays on Art and Literature*. Translated by Randal Johnson. European Perspectives: A Series in Social Thought and Cultural Criticism. New York, NY: Columbia University, 1993.
- _____. *Masculine Domination*. Translated by Richard Nice. Stanford, CA: Stanford University, 2001.
- _____. *Outline of a Theory of Practice*. Translated by Richard Nice. New York, NY: Cambridge University, 1977.
- _____. *Practical Reason*. Translated by Richard Nice. Stanford, CA: Stanford University, 1998.
- Bourdieu, Pierre and Loïc J. D. Wacquant. *An Invitation to Reflexive Sociology*. Chicago, IL: University of Chicago, 1992.
- Boxall, Ian. *SCM Studyguide to New Testament Interpretation*. Norwich: SCM, 2007.
- Boyarin, Daniel. "Review of *The Corinthian Body*." *JBL* 116 (1997): 152-155.
- Braun, Willi. "Fugitives from Femininity: Greco-Roman Gender Ideology and the Limits of Early Christian Women's Emancipation." In *Fabrics of Discourse: Essays in Honor of Vernon K. Robbins*, edited by David B. Gowler, L. Gregory Bloomquist, and Duane F. Watson, 317-332. Harrisburg, PA: Trinity Press International, 2003.
- Bremmer, Jan N. "Non-Verbal Communication in Antiquity." In *A History of Ancient Greek from the Beginnings to Late Antiquity*, edited by A. -F. Christidis, 1420-1427. New York, NY: Cambridge University, 2007.
- Britt, Brian. "Concealment, Revelation, and Gender: The Veil of Moses in the Bible and in Christian Art." *RelArts* 7, no. 3 (2003): 226-273.
- Brooten, Bernadette J. "Response to 'Corinthian Veils and Gnostic Androgynes' by Dennis Ronald MacDonald." In *Images of the Feminine in Gnosticism*, edited by Karen L. King, 293-296. Philadelphia, PA: Fortress, 1988.
- Brown, David. *Divine Humanity: Kenosis and the Construction of a Christian Theology*. Waco, TX: Baylor University, 2011.

- Brownstein, Oscar L. "Aristotle and the Rhetorical Process." In *Rhetoric: A Tradition in Transition*, edited by Walter R. Fisher. East Lansing, MI: Michigan State University, 1974.
- Bruce, F. F. *1 & 2 Corinthians*. NCB. Grand Rapids, MI: Eerdmans, 1980.
- _____. "The New Testament and Classical Studies (SNTS Presidential Address, 1975)." *NTS* 22 (1976): 229-242.
- Buell, Denise Kimber. "God's own People: Specters of Race, Ethnicity, and Gender in Early Christian Studies." In *Prejudice and Christian Beginnings: Investigating Race, Gender, and Ethnicity in Early Christian Studies*, edited by Laura Nasralla and Elisabeth Schüssler Fiorenza, 159-190. Minneapolis, MN: Fortress, 2009.
- Bultmann, Rudolf K. *The Second Letter to the Corinthians*. Translated by Roy A. Harrisville. Minneapolis, MN: Augsburg, 1985.
- _____. *Theology of the New Testament*. Translated by Kendrick Grobel. Vol. I. New York, NY: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1951.
- Burke, Kenneth. *A Rhetoric of Motives*. Berkeley, CA: University of California, 1969.
- Burkert, Walter. *Creation of the Sacred: Tracks of Biology in Early Religions*. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University, 1996.
- Burrow, Beverly Jean. "Pauline Autobiography: Theological Content, Rhetorical Function, and Biblical Antecedents." Ph.D. Dissertation, Baylor University, 1996.
- Burrus, Virginia. "Mapping as Metamorphosis: Initial Reflections on Gender and Ancient Religious Discourses." In *Mapping Gender in Ancient Religious Discourses*, edited by R. Alan Culpepper and Ellen van Wolde, 1-10. Leiden: E. J. Brill, 2007.
- Burton, Ernest De Witt. *Syntax of the Moods and Tenses in New Testament Greek*. 3rd ed. Edinburgh: T. & T. Clark, 1898.
- Bury, Benjamin. "Review of *Paul, the Stoics, and the Body of Christ*." *Reviews in Religion and Theology* 14, no. 3 (2007): 344-347.
- Butler, Judith P. *Bodies That Matter: On the Discursive Limits of "Sex"*. New York, NY: Routledge, 1993.
- _____. "Changing the Subject: Judith Butler's Politics of Radical Resignification." In *The Judith Butler Reader*, edited by Sara Salih and Judith P. Butler, 325-356. Malden, MA: Blackwell, 2004.
- _____. *Gender Trouble: Feminism and the Subversion of Identity*. New York, NY: Routledge, 1999.
- _____. "Variations on Sex and Gender: Beauvoir, Wittig, Foucault (1987)." In *The Judith Butler Reader*, edited by Sara Salih and Judith P. Butler, 21-38. Malden, MA: Blackwell, 2004.
- Bynum, Caroline Walker. "Introduction: The Complexity of Symbols." In *Gender and Religion: On the Complexity of Symbols*, edited by Caroline Walker Bynum, Stevan Harrell, and Paula Richman, 1-20. Boston, MA: Beacon, 1986.
- _____. *The Resurrection of the Body in Western Christianity: 200-1336*. New York, NY: Columbia University, 1995.
- Caesar, Adrian. *Taking It Like a Man: Suffering, Sexuality and the War Poets*. Manchester: Manchester University, 1993.

- Cairns, Douglas L. "Anger and the Veil in Ancient Greek Culture." *Greece & Rome* 48, no. 1 (2001): 18-32.
- _____. "The Meaning of the Veil in Ancient Greek Culture." In *Women's Dress in the Ancient Greek World*, edited by Lloyd Llewellyn-Jones, 73-93. London & Swansea: Duckworth & The Classical Press of Wales, 2002.
- _____. "'Off with her ΑΙΔΩΣ': Herodotus 1.8.3-4." *CQ* 46, no. 1 (1996): 78-83.
- _____. "Veiling, αἰδώς, and a Red-Figure Amphora by Phintias." *JHS* 116 (1996): 152-158.
- Cameron, Deborah. *Feminism and Linguistic Theory*. New York, NY: St. Martin's Press, 1985.
- Carson, Anne. "Putting Her in Her Place: Woman, Dirt, and Desire." In *Before Sexuality: The Construction of Erotic Experience in the Ancient Greek World*, edited by David M. Halperin, John J. Winkler, and Froma I. Zeitlin, 135-169. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University, 1990.
- Carson, Donald A. *The Cross and Christian Ministry: Leadership Lessons from 1 Corinthians*. Grand Rapids, MI: Baker, 2004.
- _____. *From Triumphalism to Maturity: An Exposition of 2 Corinthians 10—13*. Grand Rapids, MI: Baker, 1984.
- Cartledge, Paul. "The *Machismo* of the Athenian Empire—or the Reign of the *Phaulus*?" In *When Men Were Men: Masculinity, Power and Identity in Classical Antiquity*, edited by Lin Foxhall and John B. Salmon, 54-67. London: Routledge, 1998.
- Cassius, Dio. *Roman History*. Translated by Earnest Cary. LCL. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University, 1968.
- Cassuto, Umberto. *A Commentary on the Book of Exodus*. Translated by Israel Abrahams. Jerusalem: Magnes Press, 1967.
- Castelli, Elizabeth A. "Heteroglossia, Hermeneutics, and History: A Review Essay of Recent Feminist Studies of Early Christianity." *JFSR* 10, no. 2 (1994): 73-98.
- _____. *Imitating Paul: A Discourse of Power*. Literary Currents in Biblical Interpretation. Louisville, KY: Westminster/John Knox, 1991.
- _____. *Martyrdom and Memory: Early Christian Culture Making*. Gender, Theory, and Religion. New York, NY: Columbia University, 2004.
- Chapman, David W. *Ancient Jewish and Christian Perceptions of Crucifixion*. Grand Rapids, MI: Baker Academic, 2008.
- Chariton. *Chaereas and Callirhoe*. Translated by G. P. Goold. LCL. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University, 1995.
- Chesterton, Gilbert Keith. *The Defendant*. 2nd ed. London: R. Brimley Johnson, 1901.
- Childs, Brevard S. *The Book of Exodus: A Critical, Theological Commentary*. OTL. Philadelphia, PA: Westminster, 1974.
- Chopp, Rebecca S. *The Power to Speak: Feminism, Language, God*. New York, NY: Crossroad, 1991.
- Christiansen, Daniel L. "Review of *Christ's Body in Corinth: The Politics of a Metaphor*." *Bible and Critical Theory* 5, no. 3 (2009): 44.1-44.2.
- Chrysostom, Dio. *Orationes*. Translated by J. W. Cohoon and H. Lamar Crosby. LCL. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University, 1962-1979.

- Ciampa, Roy E. "Approaching Paul's Use of Scripture in Light of Translation Studies." In *Paul and Scripture: Extending the Conversation*, edited by Christopher D. Stanley, 293-318. Atlanta, GA: SBL, 2012.
- Ciampa, Roy E. and Brian S. Rosner. *The First Letter to the Corinthians*. Grand Rapids, MI: Eerdmans, 2010.
- Cicero. *De Oratore*. Translated by E. W. Sutton and H. Rackham. LCL. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University, 1977.
- _____. *Epistulae ad Brutum*. Translated by H. M. Hubbell. LCL. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University, 1971.
- _____. *Po Milone*. Translated by N. H. Watts. LCL. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University, 1972.
- _____. *Pro Rabirio Perduellionis Reo*. Translated by H. Grose Hodge. LCL. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University, 1966.
- _____. *Tusculanae disputationes*. Translated by J. E. King. LCL. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University, 1927.
- Clark, Donald Lemen. *Rhetoric in Greco-Roman Education*. Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 1977.
- Clark, Gillian. "The Old Adam: The Fathers and the Unmaking of Masculinity." In *Thinking Men: Masculinity and its Self-Representation in the Classical Tradition*, edited by Lin Foxhall and John B. Salmon, 170-182. London: Routledge, 1998.
- Clark, Greg. "General Hermeneutics." In *The Face of New Testament Studies: A Survey of Recent Research*, edited by Scot McKnight and Grant R. Osborne, 104-117. Grand Rapids, MI: Baker Academic, 2004.
- Clarke, Andrew D. *A Pauline Theology of Church Leadership*. LNTS. London: T. & T. Clark, 2008.
- _____. *Secular and Christian Leadership in Corinth: A Socio-Historical and Exegetical Study of 1 Corinthians 1-6*. Paternoster Biblical Monographs. Leiden: Paternoster, 2006.
- Classen, Carl Joachim. *Rhetorical Criticism of the New Testament*. Leiden: E. J. Brill, 2002.
- Clines, David J. A. "Paul, the Invisible Man." In *New Testament Masculinities*, edited by Stephen D. Moore and Janice Capel Anderson, 181-192. Atlanta, GA: SBL, 2003.
- Coakley, Sarah. *Powers and Submissions: Spirituality, Philosophy and Gender. Challenges in Contemporary Theology*. Malden, MA: Blackwell, 2002.
- Code, Lorraine. *Rhetorical Spaces: Essays on Gendered Locations*. New York, NY: Routledge, 1995.
- _____. *What Can She Know? Feminist Theory and the Construction of Knowledge*. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University, 1991.
- Collins, Adela Yarbro. "Traveling Up and Away: Journeys to the Upper and Outer Regions of the World." In *GRCNT*, edited by David E. Aune and Frederick E. Brenk, 135-166. Leiden: E. J. Brill, 2012.
- Collins, Raymond F. *First Corinthians*. SP. Collegeville, MN: Liturgical Press, 1999.
- Combrink, H. J. Bernard. "The Challenge of Making and Redrawing Boundaries: A Perspective on Socio-Rhetorical Criticism." *NGTT* 40 (1999): 18-30.

- _____. "The Challenges and Opportunities of a Socio-Rhetorical Commentary." *Scriptura* 79 (2002): 106-121.
- _____. "The Contribution of Socio-Rhetorical Interpretation to the Reformed Interpretation of Scripture." In *Reformed Theology: Identity and Ecumenicity II: Biblical Interpretation in the Reformed Tradition*, edited by Wallace M. Alston and Michael Welker, 91-106. Grand Rapids, MI: Eerdmans, 2007.
- _____. "Shame on the Hypocritical Leaders in the Church: A Socio-Rhetorical Interpretation of the Reproaches in Matthew 23." In *Fabrics of Discourse: Essays in Honor of Vernon K. Robbins*, edited by David B. Gowler, L. Gregory Bloomquist, and Duane F. Watson, 1-35. Harrisburg, PA: Trinity Press International, 2003.
- Conzelmann, Hans. *A Commentary on the First Epistle to the Corinthians*. Translated by James W. Leitch. Hermeneia. Philadelphia, PA: Fortress, 1975.
- Cook, John Granger. *Crucifixion in the Mediterranean World*. WUNT. Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck, 2014.
- Corrington, Gail Paterson. "The 'Headless Woman': Paul and the Language of the Body in 1 Cor. 11:2-16." *PRSt* 18 (1991): 223-231.
- Cortez, Marc. *Embodied Souls, Ensouled Bodies: An Exercise in Christological Anthropology and Its Significance for the Mind/Body Debate*. T. & T. Clark Studies in Systematic Theology. New York, NY: T. & T. Clark, 2008.
- Crafton, Jeffrey A. *The Agency of the Apostle: A Dramatistic Analysis of Paul's Responses to the Conflict in 2 Corinthians*. JSNTSup. Sheffield: Sheffield, 1991.
- Crisp, Oliver P. *Divinity and Humanity: The Incarnation Reconsidered*. Current Issues in Theology. Cambridge: Cambridge University, 2007.
- Croom, Alexandra T. *Roman Clothing and Fashion*. Charleston, SC: Tempus Publishing, 2000.
- Culpepper, R. Alan. "Mapping the Textures of New Testament Criticism: A Response to Socio-Rhetorical Criticism." *JSNT* 70 (1998): 71-77.
- D'Angelo, Mary Rose. "Veils, Virgins, and the Tongues of Men and Angels: Women's Heads in Early Christianity." In *Women, Gender, Religion: A Reader*, edited by Elizabeth A. Castelli and Rosamund C. Rodman, 389-419. New York, NY: Palgrave, 2001.
- Dahl, Nils A. "Paul and the Church at Corinth According to 1 Corinthians 1:10—4:21." In *Christian History and Interpretation: Studies Presented to John Knox*, edited by W. R. Farmer, C. F. D. Moule, and R. R. Niebuhr, 313-335. Cambridge: Cambridge University, 1967.
- Damascus, John of. *Vita Barlaam et Joasaph*. Translated by G. R. Woodward and H. Mattingly. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University, 1914.
- Danker, Frederick W. *II Corinthians*. ACNT. Minneapolis, MN: Augsburg, 1989.
- Davary, Bahar. "Miss Elsa and the Veil: Honor, Shame, and Identity Negotiations." *JFSR* 25, no. 2 (2009): 47-65.
- Davidson, James. "Review of *Aphrodite's Tortoise*." *JHS* 125 (2005): 181-183.
- Dawes, Gregory W. *The Body in Question: Metaphor and Meaning in the Interpretation of Ephesians 5:21-23*. Biblical Interpretation Series. Leiden: E. J. Brill, 1998.

- Day, Linda and Carolyn Pressler, eds. *Engaging the Bible in a Gendered World: An Introduction to Feminist Biblical Interpretation in Honor of Katharine Doob Sakenfeld*. Louisville, KY: Westminster/John Knox, 2006.
- De Boer, Martinus. "The Composition of 1 Corinthians." NTS 40 (1994): 229-245.
- de Regt, Lénart J. "Aspects of the Syntax and Rhetoric of Participant Reference in Exodus." In *Studies in the Book of Exodus: Redaction-Reception-Interpretation*, edited by Marc Vervenne, 515-522. Leuven: University Press, 1996.
- Dean, Margaret E. "Textured Criticism." JSNT 70 (1998): 79-91.
- Dean-Jones, Lesley. "The Cultural Construct of the Female Body in Classical Greek Science." In *Women's History and Ancient History*, edited by Sarah B. Pomeroy, 111-137. Chapel Hill, NC: University of North Carolina, 1991.
- Delling, Gerhard, *TDNT*. Grand Rapids, MI: Eerdmans, 1971.
- Demosthenes. *Against Conon*. Translated by A. T. Murray. LCL. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University, 1939.
- _____. *On the Crown*. Translated by C. A. Vince and J. H. Vince. LCL. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University, 1963.
- deSilva, David A. "Embodying the Word: Social-Scientific Interpretation of the New Testament." In *The Face of New Testament Studies: A Survey of Recent Research*, edited by Scot McKnight and Grant R. Osborne, 118-129. Grand Rapids, MI: Baker Academic, 2004.
- _____. "Hebrews 6:4-8: A Socio-Rhetorical Investigation (Part 1)." TynBul 50, no. 1 (1999): 33-57.
- _____. *Honor, Patronage, Kinship and Purity: Unlocking New Testament Culture*. Downers Grove, IL: Intervarsity, 2000.
- _____. "A Sociorhetorical Interpretation of Revelation 14:6-13. A Call to Act Justly toward the Just and Judging God." BBR 9 (1999): 65-117.
- _____. "Toward a Socio-Rhetorical Taxonomy of Divine Intervention: Miracle Discourse in the Revelation to John." In *Fabrics of Discourse: Essays in Honor of Vernon K. Robbins*, edited by David B. Gowler, L. Gregory Bloomquist, and Duane F. Watson, 303-316. Harrisburg, PA: Trinity Press International, 2003.
- Dewey, Arthur J. "A Matter of Honor: A Socio-Historical Analysis of 2 Corinthians 10." HTR 78, no. 1-2 (1985): 209-217.
- Dewey, Joanna. "Feminist Readings, Gospel Narrative and Critical Theory." BTB 22, no. 4 (1992): 167-173.
- DiCicco, Mario M. *Paul's Use of Ethos, Pathos, and Logos in Second Corinthians 10—13*. Lewiston, NY: Edwin Mellen, 1995.
- Dillon, Sheila. "Review of *Aphrodite's Tortoise*." The Classical Review 55, no. 2 (2005): 682-684.
- Doughty, Darrell J. "Review of *Sōma in Biblical Theology*." JBL 97, no. 2 (1978): 301-303.
- Douglas, Mary. *Implicit Meanings: Essays in Anthropology*. Boston, MA: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1975.
- _____. "Pollution." In *Implicit Meanings: Essays in Anthropology*, 47-59. Boston, MA: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1975.

- _____. *Purity and Danger: An Analysis of Concept of Pollution and Taboo*. New York, NY: Routledge, 1966.
- Dover, Kenneth J. *Greek Homosexuality*. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University, 1978, 1989.
- Dozeman, Thomas B. *Commentary on Exodus*. ECC. Grand Rapids, MI: Eerdmans, 2009.
- duBois, Page. "Ancient Masculinities." In *New Testament Masculinities*, edited by Stephen D. Moore and Janice Capel Anderson, 319-323. Atlanta, GA: SBL, 2003.
- Duling, Dennis C. "2 Corinthians 11:22: Historical Context, Rhetoric, and Ethnicity." *HvTSt* 64, no. 2 (2008): 819-843.
- _____. "Encomium: Fabrics of Discourse." In *Fabrics of Discourse: Essays in Honor of Vernon K. Robbins*, edited by David B. Gowler, L. Gregory Bloomquist, and Duane F. Watson, xi-xiii. Harrisburg, PA: Trinity Press International, 2003.
- _____. "'Whatever Gain I Had ...': Ethnicity and Paul's Self-Identification in Philippians 3:5-6." In *Fabrics of Discourse: Essays in Honor of Vernon K. Robbins*, edited by David B. Gowler, L. Gregory Bloomquist, and Duane F. Watson, 222-241. Harrisburg, PA: Trinity Press International, 2003.
- Dunderberg, Ismo. "Review of *Paul, the Stoics, and the Body of Christ*." *JR* 88, no. 2 (2008): 227-228.
- Dunn, James D. G. *1 Corinthians*. NTG. Sheffield: Sheffield, 1995.
- _____. *Beginning from Jerusalem. Christianity in the Making*. Grand Rapids, MI: Eerdmans, 2009.
- _____. *Christology in the Making: A New Testament Inquiry into the Origins of the Doctrine of the Incarnation*. Grand Rapids, MI: Eerdmans, 1996.
- _____. "The Pauline Letters." In *The Cambridge Companion to Biblical Interpretation*, edited by John Barton, 276-289. Cambridge: Cambridge University, 1998.
- Dupertuis, Atilio. "Review of *Sōma in Biblical Theology*." *AUSS* 27, no. 1 (1989): 86-87.
- Dutsch, Dorota. "Boundless Nature: The Construction of Female Speech in Plautus." Ph.D. Dissertation, McGill University, 2000.
- Eagleton, Terry. *Literary Theory: An Introduction*. Minneapolis, MN: University of Minnesota, 1983.
- Easthope, Anthony and Kate McGowan, eds. *A Critical and Cultural Theory Reader*. Buffalo, NY: University of Toronto, 1992.
- Eastman, Susan Grove. "Philippians 2:6-11: Incarnation as Mimetic Participation." *JSPL* 1, no. 1 (2010): 1-22.
- Eco, Umberto. *The Limits of Interpretation*. Advances in Semiotics. Bloomington, IN: Indiana University, 1990.
- Edwards, Marlo. "Gender Theory and Criticism." In *The Johns Hopkins Guide to Literary Theory and Criticism*, edited by Michael Groden, Martin Kreiswirth, and Imre Szeman, 421-426. Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University, 2005.
- Ehrensperger, Kathy. *Paul and the Dynamics of Power: Communication and Interaction in the Early Christ-Movement*. LNTS. London: T. & T. Clark, 2007.

- Eilberg-Schwartz, Howard. "The Nakedness of a Woman's Voice, the Pleasure in a Man's Mouth: An Oral History of Ancient Judaism." In *Off with Her Head! The Denial of Women's Identity in Myth, Religion, and Culture*, edited by Howard Eilberg-Schwartz and Wendy Doniger, 165-184. Berkeley, CA: University of California, 1995.
- _____. "The Problem of the Body for the People of the Book." In *Reading Bibles, Writing Bodies: Identity and The Book*, edited by Timothy K. Beal and David M. Gunn, 34-55. London: Routledge, 1997.
- _____. "The Spectacle of the Female Head." In *Off with Her Head! The Denial of Women's Identity in Myth, Religion, and Culture*, edited by Howard Eilberg-Schwartz and Wendy Doniger, 1-13. Berkeley, CA: University of California, 1995.
- El Guindi, Fadwa. *Veil: Modesty, Privacy and Resistance*. Dress, Body, Culture. Oxford: Berg, 1999.
- Ellingworth, Paul and Howard Hatton. *A Translator's Handbook on Paul's First Letter to the Corinthians*. Helps for Translators. New York, NY: United Bible Society, 1985.
- Elliott, John H. *What is Social-Scientific Criticism?* GBS. Minneapolis, MN: Fortress, 1993.
- Ellis, E. Earle. *Paul and His Recent Interpreters*. Grand Rapids, MI: Eerdmans, 1961.
- Engberg-Pedersen, Troels. "Review of *Belly and Body in the Pauline Epistles*." *JSNT* 26, no. 3 (2004): 373-376.
- Eriksson, Anders. *Traditions as Rhetorical Proof: Pauline Argumentation in I Corinthians*. Stockholm: Almqvist & Wiksell, 1998.
- Ethiopian Apocalypse of Peter*. Translated by Robert McLachlan Wilson. New Testament Apocrypha. Cambridge: James Clarke & Co., 1991.
- Euripides. *Andromache*. Translated by David Kovacs. LCL. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University, 1995.
- _____. *Bacchae*. Translated by David Kovacs. LCL. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University, 2002.
- _____. *Hecuba*. Translated by David Kovacs. LCL. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University, 1995.
- _____. *Hercules furens*. Translated by Arthur Sanders Way. LCL. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University, 1971.
- _____. *Hippolytus*. Translated by David Kovacs. LCL. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University, 1995.
- _____. *Ion*. Translated by Arthur Sanders Way. LCL. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University, 1971.
- _____. *Iphigenia in Taurica*. Translated by Arthur Sanders Way. LCL. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University, 1978.
- _____. *Phoenician Maidens*. Translated by Arthur Sanders Way. LCL. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University, 1971.
- Eusebius. *Historia ecclesiastica*. Translated by Kirsopp Lake and J. E. L. Oulton. LCL. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University, 1926-1932.
- Exum, J. Cheryl. "Murder They Wrote: Ideology and the Manipulation of Female Presence in Biblical Narrative." In *The Pleasure of Her Text: Feminist*

- Readings of Biblical and Historical Texts*, edited by Alice Bach, 45-67. Philadelphia, PA: Trinity Press International, 1990.
- Fanning, Buist M. *Verbal Aspect in New Testament Greek*. Oxford Theological Monographs. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1990.
- Fascher, Erich. *Der Erste Brief des Paulus an die Korinther*. Vol. 7/1. 3rd ed. THKNT. Berlin: Evangelische Verlagsanstalt, 1984.
- Fee, Gordon D. *The First Epistle to the Corinthians*. NICNT. Grand Rapids, MI: Eerdmans, 1987.
- Fergusson, David. *Rudolf Bultmann*. Outstanding Christian Thinkers. London: Continuum, 2000.
- Fiddes, Paul S. "'Woman's Head Is Man': Reflections upon a Pauline Text." BQ 31 (1986): 370-383.
- Fischler, Susan. "Imperial Cult: Engendering the Cosmos." In *When Men Were Men: Masculinity, Power and Identity in Classical Antiquity*, edited by Lin Foxhall and John B. Salmon, 165-183. London: Routledge, 1998.
- Fisher, Nick. "Violence, Masculinity and the Law in Classical Athens." In *When Men Were Men: Masculinity, Power and Identity in Classical Antiquity*, edited by Lin Foxhall and John B. Salmon, 68-97. London: Routledge, 1998.
- Fitzgerald, John T. *Cracks in an Earthen Vessel: An Examination of the Catalogues of Hardships in the Corinthian Correspondence*. SBLDS. Atlanta, GA: Scholars Press, 1988.
- Fitzmyer, Joseph A. *First Corinthians*. AB. New Haven, CT: Yale University, 2008.
- _____. "Glory Reflected on the Face of Christ (2Cor 3:7—4:6) and a Palestinian Jewish Motif." TS 42, no. 4 (1981): 630-644.
- Fonow, Mary Margaret and Judith A. Cook. "Feminist Methodology: New Applications in the Academy and Public Policy." SignsJ 30, no. 4 (2005): 2211-2236.
- Fontaine, Carole R. "A Heifer from Thy Stable: On Goddesses and the Status of Women in the Ancient Near East." In *The Pleasure of Her Text: Feminist Readings of Biblical and Historical Texts*, edited by Alice Bach, 69-95. Philadelphia, PA: Trinity Press International, 1990.
- Forbes, Christopher. "Ancient Rhetoric and Ancient Letters: Models for Reading Paul, and Their Limits." In *Paul and Rhetoric*, edited by J. Paul Sampley and Peter Lampe, 143-160. New York, NY: T. & T. Clark, 2010.
- _____. "Comparison, Self-Praise and Irony: Paul's Boasting and the Conventions of Hellenistic Rhetoric." NTS 32 (1986): 1-30.
- _____. "Paul and Rhetorical Comparison." In *Paul in the Greco-Roman World: A Handbook*, edited by J. Paul Sampley, 134-171. Harrisburg, PA: Trinity Press International, 2003.
- Formisano, Marco. "Perpetua's Prisons: Notes on the Margins of Literature." In *Perpetua's Passions: Multidisciplinary Approaches to the Passio Perpetuae et Felicitatis*, edited by Jan M. Bremmer and Marco Formisano, 329-347. Oxford: Oxford University, 2012.
- Fotopoulos, John. "1 Corinthians." In *The Blackwell Companion to the New Testament*, edited by David E. Aune, 413-433. Malden, MA: Wiley-Blackwell, 2010.

- Foucault, Michel. *The Care of the Self*. Translated by Robert Hurley. Vol. 3. The History of Sexuality. New York, NY: Random House, 1986.
- _____. *Discipline and Punish: The Birth of the Prison*. Translated by Alan Sheridan. New York, NY: Random House, 1977.
- Fox, Kenneth A. "Review of *Belly and Body in the Pauline Epistles*." *NovT* 47, no. 1 (2005): 97-98.
- Fox, Matthew. "The Constrained Man." In *Thinking Men: Masculinity and its Self-Representation in the Classical Tradition*, edited by Lin Foxhall and John B. Salmon, 6-22. London: Routledge, 1998.
- Foxhall, Lin. "Introduction." In *When Men Were Men: Masculinity, Power and Identity in Classical Antiquity*, edited by Lin Foxhall and John B. Salmon, 1-9. London: Routledge, 1998.
- _____. "Introduction." In *Thinking Men: Masculinity and its Self-Representation in the Classical Tradition*, edited by Lin Foxhall and John B. Salmon, 1-5. London: Routledge, 1998.
- _____. "Natural Sex: The Attribution of Sex and Gender to Plants in Ancient Greece." In *Thinking Men: Masculinity and its Self-Representation in the Classical Tradition*, edited by Lin Foxhall and John B. Salmon, 57-70. London: Routledge, 1998.
- Foxhall, Lin and John B. Salmon, eds. *Thinking Men: Masculinity and its Self-Representation in the Classical Tradition*, Leicester-Nottingham Studies in Ancient Society. London: Routledge, 1998.
- Fredrickson, David E. "Review of *The Corinthian Body*." *WW* 17 (1997): 222-224.
- Frilingos, Chris. "Wearing It Well: Gender at Work in the Shadow of Empire." In *Mapping Gender in Ancient Religious Discourses*, edited by R. Alan Culpepper and Ellen van Wolde, 333-349. Leiden: E. J. Brill, 2007.
- Fuentes, Carlos. "How I Started to Write." In *Myself with Others: Selected Essays*, 3-27. London: André Deutsch Limited, 1988.
- Fulkerson, Laurel. *No Regrets: Remorse in Classical Antiquity*. Oxford: Oxford University, 2013.
- Fung, Siu-Sing. "Spiritual Warfare in 2 Corinthians 10—13." Ph.D. Dissertation, Westminster Theological Seminary, 1994.
- Furnish, Victor Paul. *II Corinthians*. AB. Garden City, NY: Doubleday, 1964.
- _____. *The Theology of the First Letter to the Corinthians*. New Testament Theology Series. Cambridge: Cambridge University, 1999.
- Gardner, Jane F. "Sexing a Roman: Imperfect Men in Roman Law." In *When Men Were Men: Masculinity, Power and Identity in Classical Antiquity*, edited by Lin Foxhall and John B. Salmon, 136-152. London: Routledge, 1998.
- Garland, David E. *I Corinthians*. Grand Rapids, MI: Baker, 2003.
- _____. *2 Corinthians*. NAC. Nashville, TN: Broadman & Holman, 1999.
- Geisler, Norman L. *The Battle for the Resurrection*. Nashville, TN: Thomas Nelson, 1989.
- Geisterfer, Priscilla. "Full Turns and Half Turns: Engaging the Dialogue/Dance between Elisabeth Schüssler Fiorenza and Vernon Robbins." In *Her Master's Tools?: Feminist and Postcolonial Engagements of Historical-Critical Discourse*, edited by Caroline Vander Stichele and Todd Penner, 129-144. Leiden: E. J. Brill, 2005.

- Georgi, Dieter. *The Opponents of Paul in Second Corinthians*. Studies of the New Testament and Its World. Edinburgh: T. & T. Clark, 1986.
- Germond, Paul. "A Rhetoric of Gender in Early Christianity: Sex and Salvation in the Acts of Thomas." In *Rhetoric, Scripture and Theology: Essays from the 1994 Pretoria Conference*, edited by Stanley E. Porter and Thomas H. Olbricht, 350-368. Sheffield: Sheffield Academic, 1996.
- Gill, David W. J. "The Importance of Roman Portraiture for Head-Coverings in 1 Corinthians 11:2-16." *TynBul* 41, no. 2 (1990): 245-260.
- Gilmore, David D. *Manhood in the Making: Cultural Concepts of Masculinity*. New Haven, CT: Yale University, 1990.
- Ginzberg, Louis. *The Legends of the Jews*. Translated by Paul Radin. Philadelphia, PA: Jewish Publication Society of America, 1939.
- Given, Mark D. "On His Majesty's Secret Service: The Undercover *Ēthos* of Paul." In *Rhetoric, Ethic, and Moral Persuasion in Biblical Discourse: Essays from the 2002 Heidelberg Conference*, edited by Thomas H. Olbricht and Anders Eriksson, 196-213. London: T. & T. Clark, 2005.
- _____. *Paul's True Rhetoric: Ambiguity, Cunning, and Deception in Greece and Rome*. Emory Studies in Early Christianity. Harrisburg, PA: Trinity Press International, 2001.
- Glancy, Jennifer A. "Boasting of Beatings (2 Corinthians 11:23-25)." *JBL* 123, no. 1 (2004): 99-135.
- _____. *Corporal Knowledge: Early Christian Bodies*. New York, NY: Oxford University, 2010.
- _____. *Slavery in Early Christianity*. Minneapolis, MN: Fortress, 2006.
- Gleason, Maud W. "By Whose Gender Standards (If Anybody's) Was Jesus a Real Man?" In *New Testament Masculinities*, edited by Stephen D. Moore and Janice Capel Anderson, 325-327. Atlanta, GA: SBL, 2003.
- _____. *Making Men, Sophists and Self-Presentation in Ancient Rome*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University, 1995.
- Godet, Frederic Louis. *Commentary on First Corinthians*. Kregel Reprint Library. Grand Rapids, MI: Kregel, 1985.
- Goodacre, Mark. "Does περιβόλαιον mean 'Testicle' in 1 Corinthians 11:15?" *JBL* 130, no. 2 (2011): 391-396.
- Gooder, Paula R. *Only The Third Heaven? 2 Corinthians 12:1-10 and Heavenly Ascent*. LNTS. New York, NY: T. & T. Clark, 2006.
- Goodrich, John K. "Review of *Paul's Message of the Cross as Body Language*." *RelSRev* 35, no. 4 (2009): 267.
- Goulder, Michael D. "Visions and Revelations of the Lord (2 Corinthians 12:1-10)." In *Paul and the Corinthians: Studies on a Community in Conflict. Essays in Honor of Margaret Thrall*, edited by Trevor J. Burke and J. Keith Elliott, 59, 303-312. Leiden: E. J. Brill, 2003.
- Gowler, David B. "Introduction: New Boundaries in Old Territory: Form and Social Rhetoric in Mark." In *New Boundaries in Old Territory: Form and Social Rhetoric in Mark*, edited by Vernon K. Robbins and David B. Gowler, 1-36. Atlanta, GA: Scholars Press, 1994.
- _____. "Socio-Rhetorical Interpretation: Textures of a Text and its Reception." *JSNT* 33, no. 2 (2010): 191-206.

- _____. "Text, Culture, and Ideology in Luke 7:1-10: A Dialogic Reading." In *Fabrics of Discourse: Essays in Honor of Vernon K. Robbins*, edited by David B. Gowler, L. Gregory Bloomquist, and Duane F. Watson, 89-125. Harrisburg, PA: Trinity Press International, 2003.
- Gowler, David B., L. Gregory Bloomquist, and Duane F. Watson. "Editors' Preface: Fabrics of Discourse." In *Fabrics of Discourse: Essays in Honor of Vernon K. Robbins*, edited by David B. Gowler, L. Gregory Bloomquist, and Duane F. Watson, vii-xiii. Harrisburg, PA: Trinity Press International, 2003.
- Grafton, Sue. *O is for Outlaw*. New York, NY: Henry Holt & Co., 1999.
- Green, Barbara. *Mikhail Bakhtin and Biblical Scholarship: An Introduction*. Atlanta, GA: SBL, 2000.
- Green, Joel B. *Body, Soul, and Human Life: The Nature of Humanity in the Bible*. Studies in Theological Interpretation. Grand Rapids, MI: Baker, 2008.
- Greenfield, Guy. "Review of *Sōma in Biblical Theology*." *SwJT* 31 (1989): 72.
- Greenfield, Stanley B. "The Authenticating Voice in *Beowulf*." In *The Beowulf Reader*, edited by Peter S. Baker, 97-110. New York, NY: Routledge, 2000.
- Grindheim, Sigurd. *The Crux of Election: Paul's Critique of the Jewish Confidence in the Election of Israel*. WUNT2. Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck, 2005.
- Grosheide, F. W. *Commentary on the First Epistle to the Corinthians*. Grand Rapids, MI: Eerdmans, 1953.
- Guerin, Wilfred L., Earle Labor, Lee Morgan, et al. *A Handbook of Critical Approaches to Literature*. 4th ed. New York, NY: Oxford University, 1999.
- Gundry, Robert H. *Sōma in Biblical Theology: With Emphasis on Pauline Anthropology*. Grand Rapids, MI: Zondervan, 1987.
- Gundry-Volf, Judith M. "Gender and Creation in 1 Cor 11:2-16: A Study in Paul's Theological Method." In *Evangelium, Schriftauslegung, Kirche. Festschrift für Peter Stuhlmacher zum 65. Geburtstag*, edited by Jostein Ådna, Scott J. Hafemann, and Otfried Hofius, 151-171. Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 1997.
- Hafemann, Scott J. *Paul, Moses, and the History of Israel: The Letter/Spirit Contrast and the Argument from Scripture in 2 Corinthians 3*. Peabody, MA: Hendrickson, 2005.
- _____. *Suffering and the Spirit: An Exegetical Study of 2 Corinthians 2:14—3:3 within the Context of the Corinthian Correspondence*. WUNT2. Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck, 1986.
- Hall, David R. *The Unity of the Corinthian Correspondence*. New York, NY: T. & T. Clark, 2003.
- Hall, Edward T. *The Silent Language*. New York, NY: Doubleday, 1990.
- Hallpike, C. R. "Social Hair." *Man* 4 (1969): 256-264.
- Hamerton-Kelly, Robert G. "A Girardian Interpretation of Paul: Rivalry, Mimesis, and Victimage in the Corinthian Correspondence." *Semeia* 33 (1985): 65-81.
- Hamori, Esther J. "Divine Embodiment in the Hebrew Bible and Some Implications for Jewish and Christian Incarnational Theologies." In *Bodies, Embodiment, and Theology of the Hebrew Bible*, edited by S. Tamar Kamionkowski and Wonil Kim, 161-183. New York, NY: T. & T. Clark, 2010.
- Harlow, Mary. "In the Name of the Father: Procreation, Paternity and Patriarchy." In *Thinking Men: Masculinity and its Self-Representation in the Classical*

- Tradition*, edited by Lin Foxhall and John B. Salmon, 155-169. London: Routledge, 1998.
- Harries, Jill. "The Cube and the Square: Masculinity and Male Social Roles in Roman Boiotia." In *When Men Were Men: Masculinity, Power and Identity in Classical Antiquity*, edited by Lin Foxhall and John B. Salmon, 184-194. London: Routledge, 1998.
- Harrill, J. Albert. "Invective against Paul (2 Cor 10:10), the Physiognomics of the Ancient Slave Body, and the Greco-Roman Rhetoric of Manhood." In *Antiquity and Humanity: Essays on Ancient Religion and Philosophy Presented to Hans Dieter Betz on His 70th Birthday*, edited by Adela Yarbro Collins and Margaret M. Mitchell, 189-213. Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck, 2001.
- _____. *The Manumission of Slaves in Early Christianity*. HUZT. Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck, 1998.
- _____. *Slaves in the New Testament: Literary, Social, and Moral Dimensions*. Minneapolis, MN: Fortress, 2006.
- Harrington, Daniel J. "Review of *Sōma in Biblical Theology*." Bib 58, no. 1 (1977): 136-138.
- Harris, Murray J. *From Grave to Glory: Resurrection in the New Testament*. Grand Rapids, MI: Zondervan, 1990.
- _____. *Raised Immortal: Resurrection and Immortality in the New Testament*. Grand Rapids, MI: Eerdmans, 1983.
- _____. *The Second Epistle to the Corinthians*. Grand Rapids, MI: Eerdmans, 2005.
- Harvey, A. E. *Renewal through Suffering: A Study of 2 Corinthians*. New York, NY: Continuum, 1996.
- Hass, Andrew W. "The Future of English Literature and Theology." In *The Oxford Handbook of English Literature and Theology*, edited by Andrew W. Hass, David Jasper, and Elisabeth Jay, 841-857. Oxford: Oxford University, 2007.
- Hawkins, Faith Kirkham. "Does Paul Make a Difference?" In *A Feminist Companion to Paul*, edited by Amy-Jill Levine and Marianne Blickenstaff, 169-182. Cleveland, OH: Pilgrim, 2004.
- Hawley, Richard. "The Male Body as Spectacle in Attic Drama." In *Thinking Men: Masculinity and its Self-Representation in the Classical Tradition*, edited by Lin Foxhall and John B. Salmon, 83-99. London: Routledge, 1998.
- Hay, David M. "The Shaping of Theology in 2 Corinthians: Convictions, Doubts, and Warrants." In *Pauline Theology: Vol. II: 1 and 2 Corinthians*, edited by David M. Hay, 135-155. Minneapolis, MN: Augsburg Fortress, 1991.
- Hays, Richard B. *Echoes of Scripture in the Letters of Paul*. New Haven, CT: Yale University, 1989.
- _____. *First Corinthians*. IBC. Louisville, KY: John Knox, 1997.
- Heil, John Paul. *The Rhetorical Role of Scripture in 1 Corinthians*. SBLStBl. Atlanta, GA: SBL, 2005.
- Henderson, Ian. *Rudolf Bultmann. Makers of Contemporary Theology*. Richmond, VA: John Knox, 1966.
- Hengel, Martin. *Crucifixion in the Ancient World and the Folly of the Message of the Cross*. Translated by John Bowden. Philadelphia, PA: Fortress, 1977.

- _____. *The 'Hellenization' of Judaea in the First Century after Christ*. London: SCM, 1989.
- Hengel, Martin and Anna Maria Schwemer. *Paul between Damascus and Antioch: The Unknown Years*. Translated by John Bowden. Louisville, KY: Westminster John Knox, 1997.
- Herodotus. *Histories*. Translated by Aubrey de Sélincourt. LCL. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University, 1969-1975.
- Hesiod. *Theogony*. Translated by Jeffrey Henderson. LCL. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University, 2006.
- Hjort, Birgitte Graakjær. "Gender Hierarchy or Religious Androgyny? Male-Female Interaction in the Corinthian Community—a Reading of 1 Cor. 11,2-16." *ST* 55 (2001): 58-80.
- Hodgson, Robert. "Paul the Apostle and First Century Tribulation Lists." *ZNW* 74, no. 1-2 (1983): 59-80.
- Hogan, Pauline Nigh. *No Longer Male and Female: Interpreting Galatians 3:28 in Early Christianity*. LNTS. London: T. & T. Clark, 2008.
- _____. "Paul and Women in Second-Century Christianity." In *Paul and the Second Century*, edited by Michael F. Bird and Joseph R. Dodson, 226-242. London: T. & T. Clark, 2011.
- Holden, Lynn. *Forms of Deformity*. JSOTSup. Sheffield: JSOT, 1991.
- Holmes, Brooke. *Gender: Antiquity and Its Legacy*. Ancients and Moderns. Oxford: Oxford University, 2012.
- Homer. *Odyssey*. Translated by A. T. Murray and George E. Dimock. LCL. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University, 1995.
- Hoodfar, Homa. "The Veil in Their Minds and on Our Heads: Veiling Practices and Muslim Women." In *Women, Gender, Religion: A Reader*, edited by Elizabeth A. Castelli and Rosamund C. Rodman, 420-446. New York, NY: Palgrave, 2001.
- Hooker, Morna D. "Authority on Her Head: An Examination of I Cor. XI. 10." *NTS* 10 (1964): 410-416.
- Horrell, David G. "Converging Ideologies: Berger and Luckmann and the Pastoral Epistles." In *New Testament Interpretation and Methods: A Sheffield Reader*, edited by Stanley E. Porter and Craig A. Evans, 102-120. Sheffield: Sheffield Academic, 1997.
- Horsley, Richard A. *1 Corinthians*. ANTC. Nashville, TN: Abingdon, 1998.
- Hughes, Philip Edgecumbe. *Paul's Second Epistle to the Corinthians*. NICNT. Grand Rapids, MI: Eerdmans, 1962.
- Hughes, R. Kent. *2 Corinthians: Power in Weakness*. Wheaton, IL: Crossway, 2006.
- Isherwood, Lisa. *The Fat Jesus: Christianity and Body Image*. New York, NY: Seabury Books, 2008.
- Isherwood, Lisa and Dorothea McEwan. *Introducing Feminist Theology*. Sheffield: Sheffield, 1993.
- Isocrates. *Antidosis*. Translated by LaRue Van Hook. LCL. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University, 1966.
- _____. *De pace*. Translated by LaRue Van Hook. LCL. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University, 1966.

- _____. *Epistulae*. Translated by LaRue Van Hook. LCL. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University, 1966.
- _____. *Evagorus*. Translated by LaRue Van Hook. LCL. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University, 1966.
- _____. *Lochites*. Translated by LaRue Van Hook. LCL. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University, 1966.
- _____. *Panathenaicus*. Translated by LaRue Van Hook. LCL. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University, 1966.
- _____. *Panegyricus*. Translated by LaRue Van Hook. LCL. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University, 1966.
- _____. *To Philip*. Translated by LaRue Van Hook. LCL. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University, 1966.
- Ivarsson, Fredrik. "A Man has to Do What a Man has to Do: Protocols of Masculine Sexual Behaviour and 1 Corinthians 5—7." In *Identity Formation in the New Testament*, edited by Bengt Holmberg and Mikael Winninge, 183-198. Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck, 2008.
- _____. "Vice Lists and Deviant Masculinity: The Rhetorical Function of 1 Corinthians 5:10-11 and 6:9-10." In *Mapping Gender in Ancient Religious Discourses*, edited by R. Alan Culpepper and Ellen van Wolde, 163-184. Leiden: E. J. Brill, 2007.
- Jacob, Benno. *Exodus*. Translated by Walter Jacob and Yaakov Elman. Hoboken, NJ: KTAV, 1992.
- Jasper, Alison E. *Because of Beauvoir: Christianity and the Cultivation of Female Genius*. Waco, TX: Baylor University, 2012.
- _____. "Body and Word." In *The Oxford Handbook of English Literature and Theology*, edited by Andrew W. Hass, David Jasper, and Elisabeth Jay, 776-792. Oxford: Oxford University, 2007.
- Jasper, David. "The Study of Literature and Theology." In *The Oxford Handbook of English Literature and Theology*, edited by Andrew W. Hass, David Jasper, and Elisabeth Jay, 15-32. Oxford: Oxford University, 2007.
- Jaubert, Annie. "Le voile des femmes (I Cor. XI.2-16)." *NTS* 18, no. 4 (1972): 419-430.
- Jeffrey, David Lyle and Gregory Maillet. *Christianity and Literature: Philosophical Foundations and Critical Practice*. Christian Worldview Integration Series. Downers Grove, IL: Intervarsity, 2011.
- Jewett, Robert. "Honor and Shame in the Argument of Romans." In *Putting Body and Soul Together: Essays in Honor of Robin Scroggs*, edited by Virginia Wiles, Alexandra Brown, and Graydon F. Snyder, 258-273. Valley Forge, PA: Trinity Press International, 1997.
- Jones, Meriel. *Playing the Man: Performing Masculinities in the Ancient Greek Novel*. OSCLGT. Oxford: Oxford University, 2012.
- Josephus. *Jewish Antiquities*. Translated by H. St. J. Thackeray and Ralph Marcus. LCL. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University, 1963.
- _____. *Jewish War*. Translated by H. St. J. Thackeray. LCL. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University, 1963.
- Judge, Edwin A. "Paul's Boasting in Relation to Contemporary Professional Practice." *ABR* 16 (1968): 37-50.

- Jung, Sungkook. "Paul's Missional Use of Scripture: A Redefined Approach with Special Reference to 2 Cor 3." Ph.D. Dissertation, Westminster Theological Seminary, 2010.
- Juvenal. *Sixteen Satires*. Translated by Peter Green. New York, NY: Penguin, 1967.
- Keener, Craig S. *1—2 Corinthians*. Cambridge: Cambridge University, 2005.
- _____. "Head Coverings." In *DNTB*, edited by Craig A. Evans and Stanley E. Porter, 442-447. Downers Grove, IL: Intervarsity, 2000.
- Keil, C. F. and F. Delitzsch. *Exodus*. Translated by James Martin. Vol. II. K&D. Gand Rapids, MI: Eerdmans, 1996.
- Kelhoffer, James A. "Suffering as Defense of Paul's Apostolic Authority in Galatians and 2 Corinthians." *Svensk Exegetisk Årsbok* 74 (2009): 127-143.
- Kennedy, George A. *The Art of Persuasion in Greece*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University, 1963.
- _____. "Historical Survey of Rhetoric." In *HCRHP*, edited by Stanley E. Porter, 3-41. Leiden: E. J. Brill, 1997.
- Kiefer, Otto. *Sexual Life in Ancient Rome*. New York, NY: AMS, 1975.
- Kilmer, Martin F. "Genital Phobia and Depilation." *JHS* 102 (1982): 104-112.
- Kim, Yung Suk. *Christ's Body in Corinth: The Politics of a Metaphor*. Minneapolis, MN: Fortress, 2008.
- King, Helen. "Chronic Pain and the Creation of Narrative." In *Constructions of the Classical Body*, edited by James I. Porter, 269-286. Ann Arbor, MI: University of Michigan, 1999.
- King, Martin Luther, Jr. "Letter from Birmingham Jail." In *The Norton Anthology of African American Literature*, edited by Henry Louis Gates, Jr. and Nellie Y. McKay, 1854-1866. New York, NY: Norton, 1997.
- King, Ursula. "Introduction [Empirical Investigations]." In *Religion and Gender*, edited by Ursula King, 195-197. Oxford: Blackwell, 1995.
- _____. "Introduction: Gender and the Study of Religion." In *Religion and Gender*, edited by Ursula King, 1-38. Oxford: Blackwell, 1995.
- _____. "A Question of Identity: Women Scholars and the Study of Religion." In *Religion and Gender*, edited by Ursula King, 219-244. Oxford: Blackwell, 1995.
- Kirova, Milena. "The Early Fathers of Marxist Feminism and the Holy Book." In *Marxist Feminist Criticism of the Bible*, edited by Roland Boer and Jorunn Økland, 26-46. Sheffield: Sheffield Phoenix, 2008.
- Kistemaker, Simon J. *2 Corinthians*. Grand Rapids, MI: Baker, 1997.
- Kleinman, Arthur. "'Everything That Really Matters': Social Suffering, Subjectivity, and the Remaking of Human Experience in a Disorderly World." *HTR* 90, no. 3 (1997): 315-335.
- Kloppenborg, John S. "Ideological Texture in the Parable of the Tenants." In *Fabrics of Discourse: Essays in Honor of Vernon K. Robbins*, edited by David B. Gowler, L. Gregory Bloomquist, and Duane F. Watson, 64-88. Harrisburg, PA: Trinity Press International, 2003.
- Kolodny, Annette. "Dancing through the Minefield: Some Observations on the Theory, Practice, and Politics of a Feminist Literary Criticism." *Feminist Studies* 6, no. 1 (1980): 1-25.

- _____. "A Map for Rereading: Or, Gender and the Interpretation of Literary Texts." *NLH* 11, no. 3 (1980): 451-467.
- Korte, Barbara. *Body Language in Literature. Theory/Culture*. Toronto: University of Toronto, 1993.
- Köstenberger, Andreas J. "Gender Passages in the NT: Hermeneutical Fallacies Critiqued." *WTJ* 56, no. 2 (1994): 259-283.
- Kraemer, Ross Shepard. *Unreliable Witnesses: Religion, Gender, and History in the Greco-Roman Mediterranean*. New York, NY: Oxford University, 2011.
- Kraftchick, Steven J. "Death in Us, Life in You: The Apostolic Medium." In *Pauline Theology: Vol. II: 1 and 2 Corinthians*, edited by David M. Hay, 156-181. Minneapolis, MN: Augsburg Fortress, 1991.
- Kraus, Manfred. "Ethos as a Technical Means of Persuasion in Ancient Rhetorical Theory." In *Rhetoric, Ethic, and Moral Persuasion in Biblical Discourse: Essays from the 2002 Heidelberg Conference*, edited by Thomas H. Olbricht and Anders Eriksson, 73-87. London: T. & T. Clark, 2005.
- Kruse, Colin G. *2 Corinthians*. TNTC. Grand Rapids, MI: Eerdmans, 1987.
- _____. "Paul, the Law and the Spirit." In *Paul and His Theology*, edited by Stanley E. Porter, 109-130. Leiden: E. J. Brill, 2006.
- Laertius, Diogenes. *Lives of Eminent Philosophers*. Translated by R. D. Hicks. LCL. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University, 1970-1972.
- Lakey, Michael J. *Image and Glory of God: 1 Corinthians 11:2-16 as a Case Study in Bible, Gender and Hermeneutics*. LNTS. London: T. & T. Clark, 2010.
- Lambrecht, Jan. "Paul's Foolish Discourse." *ETL* 83, no. 4 (2007): 407-411.
- _____. *Second Corinthians*. Sacra Pagina. Collegeville, MN: Liturgical Press, 1999.
- Lampe, Peter. "Can Words Be Violent or Do They Only Sound That Way? Second Corinthians: Verbal Warfare from Afar as a Complement to a Placid Personal Presence." In *Paul and Rhetoric*, edited by J. Paul Sampley and Peter Lampe, 223-239. New York, NY: T. & T. Clark, 2010.
- _____. "Paul's Concept of a Spiritual Body." In *Resurrection Theological and Scientific Assessments*, edited by Ted Peters, 103-114. Grand Rapids, MI: Eerdmans, 2002.
- _____. "Quintilian's Psychological Insights in his *Institution Oratoria*." In *Paul and Rhetoric*, edited by J. Paul Sampley and Peter Lampe, 180-199. New York, NY: T. & T. Clark, 2010.
- _____. "Rhetorical Analysis of Pauline Texts—Quo Vadit? Methodological Reflections." In *Paul and Rhetoric*, edited by J. Paul Sampley and Peter Lampe, 3-21. New York, NY: T. & T. Clark, 2010.
- Langer, Monika M. *Merleau-Ponty's Phenomenology of Perception: A Guide and Commentary*. Tallahassee, FL: Florida State University, 1989.
- Laqueur, Thomas. *Making Sex: Body and Gender from the Greeks to Freud*. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University, 1990.
- Larson, Jennifer. "Paul's Masculinity." *JBL* 123, no. 1 (2004): 85-97.
- Le Guin, Ursula K. "Unchosen Love." In *The Birthday of the World and Other Stories*, 69-90. New York, NY: HarperCollins, 2002.

- _____. "Where Do You Get Your Ideas From?" In *Dancing at the Edge of the World: Thoughts on Words, Women, Places*, 192-200. New York, NY: Grove Press, 1989.
- Leach, E. R. "Magical Hair." *Royal Anthropological Institute of Great Britain and Ireland* 88 (1958): 147-164.
- Leder, Drew. *The Absent Body*. Chicago, IL: University of Chicago, 1990.
- _____. "Medicine and Paradigms of Embodiment." *Journal of Medicine & Philosophy* 9 (1984): 29-43.
- Lee, Michelle V. *Paul, the Stoics, and the Body of Christ*. Vol. 137. SNTSMS. Cambridge: Cambridge University, 2006.
- Lee, Mireille M. "Review of *Aphrodite's Tortoise*." *AJA* 109, no. 1 (2005): 117-119.
- Leibowitz, Nehama. *Studies in Shemot: The Book of Exodus*. Jerusalem: World Zionist Organization, 1976.
- Levine, Amy-Jill. "Feminist Criticism." In *The Blackwell Companion to the New Testament*, edited by David E. Aune, 156-165. Malden, MA: Blackwell, 2010.
- Liddell, H. G., R. Scott, H. S. Jones, et al, *LSJ*. Oxford: Oxford University, 1996.
- Lieu, Judith M. "Literary Strategies of Personification." In *Identity Formation in the New Testament*, edited by Bengt Holmberg and Mikael Winninge, 61-78. Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck, 2008.
- _____. "Review of *Paul, the Stoics, and the Body of Christ*." *Ecclesiology* 4, no. 2 (2008): 259-261.
- Lightfoot, John. *A Commentary on the New Testament from the Talmud and Hebraica*. Peabody, MA: Hendrickson, 1979 [1859].
- Lim, Kar Yong. *'The Sufferings of Christ are Abundant in Us': A Narrative Dynamics Investigation of Paul's Sufferings in 2 Corinthians*. LNTS. New York, NY: T. & T. Clark, 2009.
- Lincoln, A. T. "'Paul the Visionary': The Setting and Significance of the Rapture to Paradise in II Corinthians XII.1-10." *NTS* 25 (1979): 204-220.
- Litfin, Duane. *St. Paul's Theology of Proclamation: 1 Cor 1-4 and Greco-Roman Rhetoric*. Cambridge: Cambridge University, 1994.
- Livy. *History*. Translated by B. O. Foster and Frank Gardner Moore. LCL. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University, 1966-1976.
- Llewellyn-Jones, Lloyd. *Aphrodite's Tortoise: The Veiled Woman of Ancient Greece*. Swansea: The Classical Press of Wales, 2010.
- Loader, William. *The New Testament on Sexuality: Attitudes toward Sexuality in Judaism and Christianity in the Hellenistic Greco-Roman Era*. Grand Rapids, MI: Eerdmans, 2012.
- Loades, Ann. "Feminist Interpretation." In *The Cambridge Companion to Biblical Interpretation*, edited by John Barton, 81-94. Cambridge: Cambridge University, 1998.
- Long, Fredrick J. *Ancient Rhetoric and Paul's Apology: The Compositional Unity of 2 Corinthians*. Cambridge: Cambridge University, 2004.
- _____. "'Have we been defending ourselves to you?' (2 Cor 12:19): Forensic Rhetoric and the Rhetorical Unity of 2 Corinthians." Ph.D. Dissertation, Marquette University, 1999.
- Lopez, Davina C. "Before Your very Eyes: Roman Imperial Ideology, Gender Constructs and Paul's Inter-Nationalism." In *Mapping Gender in Ancient*

- Religious Discourses*, edited by R. Alan Culpepper and Ellen van Wolde, 115-162. Leiden: E. J. Brill, 2007.
- Loubser, J. A. "A New Look at Paradox and Irony in 2 Corinthians 10—13." *Neot* 26, no. 2 (1992): 507-521.
- Lovell, Terry. "Thinking Feminism with and against Bourdieu." In *Reading Bourdieu on Society and Culture*, edited by Bridget Fowler, 27-48. Oxford: Blackwell, 2000.
- Lyall, Francis. *Slaves, Citizens, Sons: Legal Metaphors in the Epistles*. Grand Rapids, MI: Zondervan, 1984.
- Macherey, Pierre. *A Theory of Literary Production*. Translated by Geoffrey Wall. London: Routledge, 2006.
- Mack, Burton L. *Rhetoric and the New Testament*. GBS. Minneapolis, MN: Fortress, 1990.
- Magli, Patrizia. "The Face and the Soul." In *Zone 4: Fragments for a History of the Human Body, Part Two*, edited by Michel Feher, 86-127. New York, NY: Zone, 1989.
- Mahmood, Saba. "Agency, Performativity, and the Feminist Subject." In *Bodily Citations: Religion and Judith Butler*, edited by Ellen T. Armour and Susan M. St. Ville, 177-221. New York, NY: Columbia University, 2006.
- Malherbe, Abraham J. "'Gentle as a Nurse': The Cynic Background to 1 Thess 2." *NovT* 12, no. 2 (1970): 203-217.
- Malina, Bruce J. *Christian Origins and Cultural Anthropology: Practical Models for Biblical Interpretation*. Atlanta, GA: John Knox, 1986.
- _____. "Is There a Circum-Mediterranean Person? Looking for Stereotypes." *BTB* 22, no. 2 (1992): 66-87.
- _____. *The New Testament World: Insights from Cultural Anthropology*. Louisville, KY: Westminster/John Knox, 1993.
- _____. "Understanding New Testament Persons." In *The Social Sciences and New Testament Interpretation*, edited by Richard L. Rohrbaugh, 41-61. Peabody, MA: Hendrickson, 1996.
- _____. "Why Interpret the Bible with the Social Sciences?" *ABQ* 2 (1983): 119-133.
- Malina, Bruce J. and Jerome H. Neyrey. "First-Century Personality: Dyadic, Not Individualistic." In *The Social World of Luke-Acts: Models for Interpretation*, edited by Jerome H. Neyrey, 67-96. Peabody, MA: Hendrickson, 1981.
- Malina, Bruce J. and Richard L. Rohrbaugh. *Social-Science Commentary on the Synoptic Gospels*. 2nd ed. Minneapolis, MN: Fortress, 2003.
- Marchal, Joseph A. "Mimicry and Colonial Differences: Gender, Ethnicity, and Empire in the Interpretation of Pauline Imitation." In *Prejudice and Christian Beginnings: Investigating Race, Gender, and Ethnicity in Early Christian Studies*, edited by Laura Nasralla and Elisabeth Schüssler Fiorenza, 101-127. Minneapolis, MN: Fortress, 2009.
- _____. *The Politics of Heaven: Women, Gender, and Empire in the Study of Paul*. Paul in Critical Contexts. Minneapolis, MN: Fortress, 2008.
- Marguerat, Daniel. "2 Corinthiens 10—13: Paul et l'Experience de Dieu." *ETR* 4 (1988): 497-519.

- Marjanen, Antti. "Male Women Martyrs: The Function of Gender-Transformation Language in Early Christian Martyrdom Accounts." In *Metamorphoses: Resurrection, Body and Transformative Practices in Early Christianity*, edited by Turid Karlsen Seim and Jorunn Øklund, 231-247. Berlin: Walter de Gruyter, 2009.
- Marshall, Eireann. "Sex and Paternity: Gendering the Foundation of Kyrene." In *When Men Were Men: Masculinity, Power and Identity in Classical Antiquity*, edited by Lin Foxhall and John B. Salmon, 98-110. London: Routledge, 1998.
- Martin, Dale B. *The Corinthian Body*. New Haven, CT: Yale University, 1995.
- _____. *Inventing Superstition: From the Hippocratics to the Christians*. Cambridge: Cambridge University, 2004.
- Martin, Ralph P. *2 Corinthians*. WBC. Waco, TX: Word Books, 1982.
- Martin, Troy W. "Paul's Argument from Nature for the Veil in 1 Corinthians 11:13-15: a Testicle instead of a Head Covering." *JBL* 123, no. 1 (2004): 75-84.
- _____. "Veiled Exhortations Regarding the Veil: Ethos as the Controlling Proof in Moral Persuasion (1 Cor 11:2-16)." In *Rhetoric, Ethic, and Moral Persuasion in Biblical Discourse: Essays from the 2002 Heidelberg Conference*, edited by Thomas H. Olbricht and Anders Eriksson, 255-273. London: T. & T. Clark, 2005.
- Massey, Preston T. "The Meaning of κατακαλύπτω and κατὰ κεφαλῆς ἔχων in 1 Corinthians 11.2-16." *NTS* 53 (2007): 502-523.
- Matera, Frank J. *II Corinthians: A Commentary*. Louisville, KY: Westminster/John Knox, 2004.
- McCant, Jerry W. "Paul's Thorn of Rejected Apostleship." *NTS* 34 (1988): 550-572.
- McDonough, Carla J. *Staging Masculinity: Male Identity in Contemporary American Drama*. Jefferson, NC: McFarland, 1997.
- McFarlane, Seth (dir). "It takes a village idiot, and I married one." *Family Guy*. May 13, 2007.
- McKay, Kenneth L. *A New Syntax of the Verb in New Testament Greek: An Aspectual Approach*. Studies in Biblical Greek. New York, NY: Peter Lang, 1994.
- McLuhan, Marshall. *Understanding Media: The Extensions of Man*. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1994.
- Meeks, Wayne A. *The First Urban Christians*. New Haven, CT: Yale University, 1983.
- _____. *The Moral World of the First Christians*. Vol. 6. LEC. Philadelphia, PA: Westminster, 1986.
- Melzack, Ronald and Patrick D. Wall. *The Challenge of Pain*. New York, NY: Basic Books, 1983.
- Menander. *Perikeiromene*. Translated by W. G. Arnott. LCL. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University, 1996.
- Merleau-Ponty, Maurice. "Man and Adversity." In *Signs*, 224-243. Evanston, IL: Northwestern University, 1964.
- _____. *Phenomenology of Perception*. Translated by Colin Smith. International Library of Philosophy and Scientific Method. London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1962.
- Mesnard, Philippe. "The Power of Uncertainty: Interpreting the *Passion of Perpetua and Felicitas*." In *Perpetua's Passions: Multidisciplinary Approaches to the*

- Passio Perpetuae et Felicitatis*, edited by Jan M. Bremmer and Marco Formisano, 321-328. Oxford: Oxford University, 2012.
- Messer-Davidow, Ellen. "Feminist Theory and Criticism: 1. From Movement Critique to Discourse Analysis." In *The Johns Hopkins Guide to Literary Theory and Criticism*, edited by Michael Groden, Martin Kreiswirth, and Imre Szeman, 299-306. Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University, 2005.
- Meyer, Heinrich August Wilhelm. *Critical and Exegetical Hand-Book to the Epistles to the Corinthians*. New York, NY: Funk & Wagnalls, 1884.
- Midrash Rabba*. Translated by S. M. Lehrman. London: Soncino Press, 1983.
- Mihaila, Corin. *The Paul-Apollos Relationship and Paul's Stance toward Greco-Roman Rhetoric: An Exegetical and Socio-Historical Study of 1 Corinthians 1-4*. LNTS. London: T. & T. Clark, 2009.
- Milnor, Kristina. *Gender, Domesticity, and the Age of Augustus: Inventing Private Life*. OSCLGT. Oxford: Oxford University, 2005.
- Mitchell, Margaret M. "The Corinthian Correspondence and the Birth of Pauline Hermeneutics." In *Paul and the Corinthians: Studies on a Community in Conflict. Essays in Honour of Margaret Thrall*, edited by Trevor J. Burke and J. Keith Elliott, 17-53. Leiden: E. J. Brill, 2003.
- _____. "A Patristic Perspective on Pauline περιουτολογία." NTS 47, no. 3 (2001): 354-371.
- _____. *Paul and the Rhetoric of Reconciliation: An Exegetical Investigation of the Language and Composition of 1 Corinthians*. Louisville, KY: Westminster/John Knox, 1993.
- _____. *Paul, the Corinthians and the Birth of Christian Hermeneutics*. Cambridge: Cambridge University, 2010.
- Moberley, R. W. L. *At the Mountain of God: Story and Theology in Exodus 32-34*. JSOTSup. Sheffield: Sheffield, 1983.
- Montserrat, Dominic. "Experiencing the Male Body in Ancient Egypt." In *When Men Were Men: Masculinity, Power and Identity in Classical Antiquity*, edited by Lin Foxhall and John B. Salmon, 153-164. London: Routledge, 1998.
- Moore, Stephen D. "'O Man, Who Art Thou ...?': Masculinity Studies and New Testament Studies." In *New Testament Masculinities*, edited by Stephen D. Moore and Janice Capel Anderson, 1-22. Atlanta, GA: SBL, 2003.
- Moore, Stephen D. and Janice Capel Anderson. "Taking It Like a Man: Masculinity in 4 Maccabees." JBL 117, no. 2 (1998): 249-273.
- Morris, Leon. *The First Epistle of Paul to the Corinthians*. TNTC. Grand Rapids, MI: Eerdmans, 1978.
- Morris, Thomas V. *The Logic of God Incarnate*. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University, 1986.
- Mount, Christopher. "1 Corinthians 11:3-16: Spirit Possession and Authority in a Non-Pauline Interpretation." JBL 124, no. 2 (2005): 313-340.
- Moxnes, Halvor. "Body, Gender and Social Space: Dilemmas in Constructing Early Christian Identities." In *Identity Formation in the New Testament*, edited by Bengt Holmberg and Mikael Winninge, 163-181. Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck, 2008.

- Mrozik, Susanne. "Materializations of Virtue: Buddhist Discourses on Bodies." In *Bodily Citations: Religion and Judith Butler*, edited by Ellen T. Armour and Susan M. St. Ville, 15-47. New York, NY: Columbia University, 2006.
- Murphy, Robert F. "Social Distance and the Veil." *AmAnth* 66, no. 6 (1964): 1257-1274.
- Murphy-O'Connor, Jerome. *1 Corinthians*. Garden City, NY: Doubleday, 1998.
- _____. "Interpolations in 1 Corinthians." *CBQ* 48, no. 1 (1986): 81-94.
- _____. *Keys to First Corinthians*. Oxford: Oxford University, 2009.
- _____. *Paul: A Critical Life*. New York, NY: Oxford University, 1996.
- _____. "Sex and Logic in 1 Corinthians 11:2-16." *CBQ* 42 (1980): 482-500.
- _____. *The Theology of the Second Letter to the Corinthians*. New Testament Theology. Cambridge: Cambridge University, 1991.
- Neuger, Christie Cozad. "Image and Imagination: Why Inclusive Language Matters." In *Engaging the Bible in a Gendered World: An Introduction to Feminist Biblical Interpretation in Honor of Katharine Doob Sakenfeld*, edited by Linda Day and Carolyn Pressler, 153-165. Louisville, KY: Westminster/John Knox, 2006.
- Neusner, Jacob and Bruce D. Chilton. "Uncleanness: A Moral or an Ontological Category in the Early Centuries A.D.?" *BBR* 1 (1981): 63-88.
- Newbold, R. F. "Boundaries and Bodies in Late Antiquity." *Arethusa* 12 (1979): 93-114.
- Newby, Gordon D. "Quranic Texture: A Review of Vernon Robbins' *The Tapestry of Early Christian Doctrine* and *Exploring the Texture of Texts*." *JSNT* 70 (1998): 93-100.
- Neyrey, Jerome H. "Body Language in 1 Corinthians: The Use of Anthropological Models for Understanding Paul and His Opponents." *Semeia* 35 (1986): 129-170.
- _____. "Clean/Unclean, Pure/Polluted, and Holy/Profane: The Idea and the System of Purity." In *The Social Sciences and New Testament Interpretation*, edited by Richard L. Rohrbaugh, 80-104. Peabody, MA: Hendrickson, 1996.
- _____. "The Social Location of Paul: Education as a Key." In *Fabrics of Discourse: Essays in Honor of Vernon K. Robbins*, edited by David B. Gowler, L. Gregory Bloomquist, and Duane F. Watson, 126-164. Harrisburg, PA: Trinity Press International, 2003.
- _____. "Social-Scientific Criticism." In *The Blackwell Companion to the New Testament*, edited by David E. Aune, 177-191. Malden, MA: Wiley-Blackwell, 2010.
- _____. "Unclean, Common, Polluted, and Taboo: A Short Reading Guide." *Forum* 44, no. 3 (1988): 63-91.
- _____. "Witchcraft Accusations in 2 Cor 10—13: Paul in Social Science Perspective." *List* 21, no. 2 (1986): 160-170.
- Nguyen, V. Henry T. *Christian Identity in Corinth: A Comparative Study of 2 Corinthians, Epictetus and Valerius Maximus*. WUNT2. Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck, 2008.
- Niccum, Curt. "The Voice of the Manuscripts on the Silence of Women: the External Evidence for 1 Cor 14.34-5." *NTS* 43 (1997): 242-255.

- Nortjé, S. J. "On the Road to Emmaus – A Woman's Experience." In *Text and Interpretation: New Approaches in the Criticism of the New Testament*, edited by P. J. Hartin and J. H. Petzer, 271-280. Leiden: E. J. Brill, 1991.
- Nye, Robert A. "Locating Masculinity: Some Recent Work on Men." *SignsJ* 30, no. 3 (2005): 1937-1962.
- O'Brien, Julia M., ed. *The Oxford Encyclopedia of the Bible and Gender Studies*. New York, NY: Oxford University, 2014.
- O'Collins, Gerald G. "Power Made Perfect in Weakness: 2 Cor 12:9-10." *CBQ* 33 (1971): 528-537.
- O'Connor, June. "The Epistemological Significance of Feminist Research in Religion." In *Religion and Gender*, edited by Ursula King, 45-63. Oxford: Blackwell, 1995.
- Oates, Joyce Carol. "Preface: The Nature of Short Fiction; or, The Nature of My Short Fiction." In *Handbook of Short Story Writing*, edited by Frank A. Dickson and Sandra Smythe, xi-xviii. Cincinnati, OH: Writer's Digest, 1970.
- Økland, Jorunn. "Textual Reproduction as Surplus Value: Paul on Pleasing Christ and Spouses, in Light of Simone de Beauvoir." In *Marxist Feminist Criticism of the Bible*, edited by Roland Boer and Jorunn Økland, 182-203. Sheffield: Sheffield Phoenix, 2008.
- _____. *Women in Their Place: Paul and the Corinthian Discourse of Gender and Sanctuary Space*. JSNTSup. London: T. & T. Clark, 2004.
- Økland, Jorunn and Roland Boer. "Toward Marxist Feminist Biblical Criticism." In *Marxist Feminist Criticism of the Bible*, edited by Roland Boer and Jorunn Økland, 1-25. Sheffield: Sheffield Phoenix, 2008.
- Olbricht, Thomas H. "Delivery and Memory." In *HCRHP*, edited by Stanley E. Porter, 159-167. Leiden: E. J. Brill, 1997.
- _____. "The Foundations of the Ethos in Paul and in the Classical Rhetoricians." In *Rhetoric, Ethic, and Moral Persuasion in Biblical Discourse: Essays from the 2002 Heidelberg Conference*, edited by Thomas H. Olbricht and Anders Eriksson, 138-159. London: T. & T. Clark, 2005.
- Olbricht, Thomas H. and Anders Eriksson. "Rhetoric, Ethic, and Moral Persuasion: Introduction." In *Rhetoric, Ethic, and Moral Persuasion in Biblical Discourse: Essays from the 2002 Heidelberg Conference*, edited by Thomas H. Olbricht and Anders Eriksson, 1-8. London: T. & T. Clark, 2005.
- Olson, Stanley Norris. "Confidence Expressions in Paul: Epistolary Conventions and the Purpose of 2 Corinthians." Ph.D. Dissertation, Yale University, 1976.
- Osborne, Robin. "Sculpted Men of Athens: Masculinity and Power in the Field of Vision." In *Thinking Men: Masculinity and its Self-Representation in the Classical Tradition*, edited by Lin Foxhall and John B. Salmon, 23-42. London: Routledge, 1998.
- Osiek, Carolyn. "The Social Sciences and the Second Testament: Problems and Challenges." *BTB* 22, no. 2 (1992): 88-95.
- Osiek, Carolyn and Jennifer Pouya. "Constructions of Gender in the Roman Imperial World." In *Understanding the Social World of the New Testament*, edited by Dietmar Neufeld and Richard E. DeMaris, 44-56. London: Routledge, 2010.
- Oster, Richard E. "When Men Wore Veils to Worship: The Historical Context of 1 Corinthians 11.4." *NTS* 34 (1988): 481-505.

- Ovid. *Ars amatoria*. Translated by J. H. Mozley and G. P. Goold. LCL. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University, 1979.
- _____. *Metamorphoses*. Translated by Frank Justus Miller and G. P. Gould. LCL. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University, 1976.
- Padgug, Robert A. "Sexual Matters: On Conceptualizing Sexuality in History." *Radical History Review* 20 (1979): 3-23.
- Park, David M. "Paul's σκόλοψ τῆ σαρκί: Thorn or Stake? (2 Cor. XII 7)." *NovT* 22, no. 2 (1980): 179-183.
- Parsons, Mikeal C. *Body and Character in Luke and Acts: The Subversion of Physiognomy in Early Christianity*. Grand Rapids, MI: Baker, 2006.
- Parsons, Susan Frank. *Feminism and Christian Ethics*. New Studies in Christian Ethics. Cambridge: Cambridge University, 1996.
- Patrick, Dale and Allen Scult. *Rhetoric and Biblical Interpretation*. JSOTSup. Sheffield: Almond Press, 1990.
- Patte, Daniel. "Acknowledging the Contextual Character of Male, European-American Critical Exegeses: An Androcritical Perspective." In *Reading from this Place: Volume I: Social Location and Biblical Interpretation in the United States*, edited by Fernando F. Segovia and Mary Ann Tolbert, 35-55. Minneapolis, MN: Fortress, 1995.
- Payne, Philip B. "MS. 88 as Evidence for a Text without 1 Cor 14.34-5." *NTS* 44 (1998): 152-158.
- Penner, Todd and Caroline Vander Stichele. "Script(ur)ing Gender in Acts: The Past and Present Power of *Imperium*." In *Mapping Gender in Ancient Religious Discourses*, edited by R. Alan Culpepper and Ellen van Wolde, 231-266. Leiden: E. J. Brill, 2007.
- Perkins, Judith. *The Suffering Self: Paul and Narrative Representation in the Early Christian Era*. New York, NY: Routledge, 1995.
- Peterson, Brian K. *Eloquence and the Proclamation of the Gospel in Corinth*. SBLDS. Atlanta, GA: Scholars Press, 1998.
- Peterson, Erik. *Der erste Brief an die Korinther und Paulus-Studien*. Würzburg: Echter, 2006.
- Pfitzner, Victor C. *Strength in Weakness*. Adelaide, SA: Lutheran Publishing House, 1992.
- Philo. *De confusione linguarum*. Translated by F. H. Colson and G. H. Whitaker. LCL. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University, 1985.
- _____. *De fuga et inventione*. Translated by F. H. Colson and G. H. Whitaker. LCL. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University, 1929.
- _____. *De somniis*. Translated by F. H. Colson and G. H. Whitaker. LCL. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University, 1929.
- _____. *Legum Allegoriae*. Translated by F. H. Colson and G. H. Whitaker. LCL. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University, 1929.
- _____. *Questions and Answers on Exodus*. Translated by Ralph Marcus. LCL. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University, 1929.
- Pickett, Raymond. *The Cross in Corinth: The Social Significance of the Death of Jesus*. JSNTSup. Sheffield: Sheffield, 1997.

- Pierce, Karen F. "Ideals of Masculinity in New Comedy." In *Thinking Men: Masculinity and its Self-Representation in the Classical Tradition*, edited by Lin Foxhall and John B. Salmon, 130-147. London: Routledge, 1998.
- Pippin, Tina. "Eros and the End: Reading for Gender in the Apocalypse of John." *Semeia* 59 (1992): 193-226.
- Plato. *Apologia*. Translated by Harold North Fowler. LCL. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University, 1967.
- _____. *Gorgias*. Translated by W. R. M. Lamb. LCL. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University, 1975.
- _____. *Laws*. Translated by R. G. Bury. LCL. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University, 1926.
- _____. *Meno*. Translated by W. R. M. Lamb. LCL. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University, 1977.
- _____. *Phaedrus*. Translated by Harold North Fowler. LCL. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University, 1977.
- _____. *Republic*. Translated by Paul Shorey. LCL. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University, 1935.
- _____. *Timaieus*. Translated by R. G. Bury. LCL. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University, 1967.
- Pliny. *Epistulae*. Translated by Betty Radice. LCL. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University, 1972.
- Pliny, Elder. *Natural History*. Translated by W Jones, H. S. LCL. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University, 1960.
- Plummer, Alfred. *Second Epistle of St Paul to the Corinthians*. ICC. Edinburgh: T. & T. Clark, 1956.
- Plutarch. *Moralia*. Translated by Frank Cole Babbitt, Philip H. De Lacy, and Benedict Einarson. LCL. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University, 1927-1969.
- _____. *Romulus*. Translated by Bernadotte Perrin. LCL. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University, 1967.
- _____. *Theseus*. Translated by Bernadotte Perrin. LCL. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University, 1967.
- Polak, Frank. "Theophany and Mediator: The Unfolding of a Theme in the Book of Exodus." In *Studies in the Book of Exodus: Redaction-Reception-Interpretation*, edited by Marc Vervenne, 113-147. Leuven: University Press, 1996.
- Polaski, Sandra Hack. *Paul and the Discourse of Power*. Sheffield: Sheffield, 2001.
- Pomeroy, Sarah B. *Goddesses, Whores, Wives, and Slaves: Women in Classical Antiquity*. New York, NY: Schocken, 1975.
- Porter, Stanley E. *Idioms of the Greek New Testament*. Sheffield: Sheffield Academic Press, 1992.
- _____. "Paul of Tarsus and His Letters." In *HCRHP*, edited by Stanley E. Porter, 533-585. Leiden: E. J. Brill, 1997.
- Porter, Stanley E. and Bryan R. Dyer. "Oral Texts? A Reassessment of the Oral and Rhetorical Nature of Paul's Letters in Light of Recent Studies." *JETS* 55, no. 2 (2012): 323-341.
- Price, Robert M. "Punished in Paradise (An Exegetical Theory on II Corinthians 12:1-10)." *JSNT* 7 (1980): 33-40.

- Propp, William H. *Exodus 19-40: A New Translation with Introduction and Commentary*. AB. New York, NY: Doubleday, 1964.
- Prosic, Tamara. "Schizoid Coitus: Christ and the Feminine." In *Marxist Feminist Criticism of the Bible*, edited by Roland Boer and Jorunn Økland, 47-69. Sheffield: Sheffield Phoenix, 2008.
- Provence, Thomas E. "'Who Is Sufficient for these Things?': An Exegesis of 2 Corinthians ii 15-iii 18." *NovT* 24, no. 1 (1982): 54-81.
- Quintilian. *Institutio Oratoria*. Translated by Donald A. Russell. LCL. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University, 2001.
- Raphael, Rebecca. *Biblical Corpora: Representations of Disability in Hebrew Biblical Literature*. LHBOTS. New York, NY: T. & T. Clark, 2008.
- Rapport, Nigel and Joanna Overing. *Social and Cultural Anthropology: The Key Concepts*. London: Routledge, 2000.
- Rashbi, Simon bar Yochai. *The Zohar*. Translated by Maurice Simon and Paul P. Levertoff. London: Soncino Press, 1984.
- Reardon, B. P. "Chariton." In *The Novel in the Ancient World*, edited by Gareth Schmeling, 309-335. Leiden: E. J. Brill, 2003.
- Renwick, David A. *Paul, the Temple, and the Presence of God*. Atlanta, GA: Scholars Press, 1991.
- Reumann, John. "St. Paul's Use of Irony." *LQ* 7 (1955): 140-145.
- Rhetorica ad Herennium*. Translated by Harry Caplan. LCL. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University, 1977.
- Ricoeur, Paul. *Oneself as Another*. Translated by Kathleen Blamey. Chicago, IL: University of Chicago, 1992.
- Robbins, Vernon K. "Argumentative Textures in Socio-Rhetorical Interpretation." In *Rhetorical Argumentation in Biblical Texts: Essays from the Lund 2000 Conference*, edited by Anders Eriksson, Thomas H. Olbricht, and Walter Übelacker, 27-65. Harrisburg, PA: Trinity Press International, 2002.
- _____. "Beginnings and Developments in Socio-Rhetorical Interpretation." Atlanta, GA, 2004.
- _____. "Divine Dialogue and the Lord's Prayer: Socio-Rhetorical Interpretation of Sacred Texts." *Dialogue* 28 (1995): 117-146.
- _____. *Exploring the Texture of Texts: A Guide to Socio-Rhetorical Interpretation*. Valley Forge, PA: Trinity Press, 1996.
- _____. "From Heidelberg to Heidelberg: Rhetorical Interpretation of the Bible at the Seven 'Pepperdine' Conferences from 1992 to 2002." In *Rhetoric, Ethic, and Moral Persuasion in Biblical Discourse: Essays from the 2002 Heidelberg Conference*, edited by Thomas H. Olbricht and Anders Eriksson, 335-377. London: T. & T. Clark, 2005.
- _____. "Historical, Rhetorical, Literary, Linguistic, Cultural, and Artistic Intertextuality—A Response." *Semeia* 80 (1997): 291-303.
- _____. *The Invention of Christian Discourse. Rhetoric of Religious Antiquity*. Dorset: Deo, 2009.
- _____. "A Male Reads a Feminist Reading: The Dialogical Nature of Pippin's Power." *Semeia* 59 (1992): 211-217.

- _____. "The Present and Future of Rhetorical Analysis." In *The Rhetorical Analysis of Scripture: The 1995 London Conference*, edited by Stanley E. Porter and Thomas H. Olbricht, 24-52. Sheffield: Sheffield, 1997.
- _____. "Response [to Reviewers]." *JSNT* 70 (1998): 101-107.
- _____. "Response—Using Bakhtin's Lexicon Dialogicae to Interpret Canon, Apocalyptic, New Testament, and Toni Morrison." In *Bakhtin and Genre Theory in Biblical Studies*, edited by Roland Boer, 187-219. Atlanta, GA: SBL, 2007.
- _____. "Review of Witherington, *What's in the Word*." *RBL* (2012): [n.p.].
- _____. "Rhetoric and Culture: Exploring Types of Cultural Rhetoric in a Text." In *Rhetoric and the New Testament: Essays from the 1992 Heidelberg Conference*, edited by Stanley E. Porter and Thomas H. Olbricht, 443-463. Sheffield: Sheffield, 1993.
- _____. "Socio-Rhetorical Interpretation." In *The Blackwell Companion to the New Testament*, edited by David E. Aune, 192-219. Malden, MA: Blackwell, 2010.
- _____. "Socio-Rhetorical Interpretation from its Beginnings to the Present." Pretoria, 1999.
- _____. *The Tapestry of Early Christian Discourse: Rhetoric, Society and Ideology*. New York, NY: Routledge, 1996.
- _____. "Using a Socio-Rhetorical Poetics to Develop a Unified Method: The Woman who Anointed Jesus as a Test Case." In *SBLSem*, edited by Eugene H. Lovering. Atlanta, GA: Scholars Press, 1992.
- Roberts, Mark Edward. "Weak Enough to Lead: Paul's Response to Criticism and Rivals in 2 Corinthians 10—13: A Rhetorical Reading." Ph.D. Dissertation, Vanderbilt University, 2002.
- Robertson, A. T. *A Grammar of the Greek New Testament in the Light of Historical Research*. Nashville, TN: Broadman & Holman, 1934.
- Robinson, John A. T. *The Body: A Study in Pauline Theology*. London: SCM, 1952.
- _____. "Review of *Sōma in Biblical Theology*." *JTS* 28, no. 1 (1977): 163-166.
- Robinson, William Childs. "Word and Power (1 Corinthians 1:17—2:5)." In *Soli Deo Gloria: New Testament Studies in Honor of William Childs Robinson*, edited by J. McDowell Richards, 68-82. Richmond, VA: John Knox, 1968.
- Roetzel, Calvin J. "2 Corinthians." In *The Blackwell Companion to the New Testament*, edited by David E. Aune, 434-454. Malden, MA: Wiley-Blackwell, 2010.
- _____. "The Language of War (2 Cor. 10:1-6) and the Language of Weakness (2 Cor. 11:21b-13:10)." *Biblical Interpretation* 17 (2009): 77-99.
- Rohrbaugh, Richard L. "'Social Location of Thought' as a Heuristic Construct in New Testament Study." *JSNT* 30 (1987): 103-119.
- Ross, Ellen M. "Human Persons as Images of the Divine: A Reconsideration." In *The Pleasure of Her Text: Feminist Readings of Biblical and Historical Texts*, edited by Alice Bach, 97-116. Philadelphia, PA: Trinity Press International, 1990.
- Rosslyn, Felicity. "The Hero of Our Time: Classic Heroes and Post-Classical Drama." In *Thinking Men: Masculinity and its Self-Representation in the Classical Tradition*, edited by Lin Foxhall and John B. Salmon, 183-196. London: Routledge, 1998.

- Rousselle, Aline. "Body Politics in Ancient Rome." In *A History of Women in the West, I: From Ancient Goddesses to Christian Saints*, edited by Pauline Schmitt Pantel, 296-336. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University, 1992.
- _____. "Personal Status and Sexual Practice in the Roman Empire." In *Zone 5: Fragments for a History of the Human Body, Part Three*, edited by Michel Feher, 300-333. New York, NY: Zone, 1989.
- _____. *Porneia: On Desire and the Body in Antiquity*. Translated by Felicia Pheasant. Cambridge: Blackwell, 1988.
- Roy, Jim. "The Masculinity of the Hellenistic King." In *When Men Were Men: Masculinity, Power and Identity in Classical Antiquity*, edited by Lin Foxhall and John B. Salmon, 111-135. London: Routledge, 1998.
- Ruef, John. *Paul's First Letter to Corinth*. WC. Philadelphia, PA: Westminster Press, 1977.
- Russell, Brigitte Ford. "The Emasculation of Antony: The Construction of Gender in Plutarch's *Life of Antony*." *Helios* 25, no. 2 (1998): 121-137.
- Ryan, Francis. *The Body as Symbol: Merleau-Ponty and Incarnational Theology*. Corpus Papers. Washington, DC: Corpus Books, 1970.
- Ryken, Philip Graham. *Exodus: Saved for God's Glory*. Wheaton, IL: Crossway Books, 2005.
- Sallust. *Bellum catalinae*. Translated by J. C. Rolfe. LCL. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University, 1971.
- Samuelsson, Gunnar. *Crucifixion in Antiquity*. WUNT2. Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck, 2011.
- Sandmel, Samuel. "Parallelomania." *JBL* 81 (1962): 1-13.
- Sandnes, Karl Olav. *Belly and Body in the Pauline Epistles*. Vol. 120. SNTSMS. Cambridge: Cambridge University, 2002.
- Sanhedrin*. Translated by Jacob Neusner. Chicago Studies in the History of Judaism. Chicago, IL: University of Chicago, 1984.
- Sappho. *Poems*. Translated by David A. Campbell. LCL. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University, 1982.
- Sarano, Jacques. *The Meaning of the Body*. Translated by James H. Farley. Philadelphia: Westminster, 1966.
- Sarna, Nahum. *Exodus*. JPSTC. New York, NY: JPS, 1991.
- Satlow, Michael L. "'Try to Be a Man': The Rabbinic Construction of Masculinity." In *Men and Masculinities in Christianity and Judaism: A Critical Reader*, edited by Björn Krondorfer, 261-276. London: SCM, 2009.
- Savage, Timothy B. *Power through Weakness: Paul's Understanding of the Christian Ministry in 2 Corinthians*. Cambridge: Cambridge University, 2004.
- Sawyer, Deborah F. *God, Gender and the Bible*. Biblical Limits. New York, NY: Routledge, 2002.
- Scarry, Elaine. *The Body in Pain: The Making and Unmaking of the World*. New York, NY: Oxford University, 1985.
- Schipper, Jeremy. *Disability Studies and the Hebrew Bible: Figuring Mephibosheth in the David Story*. Library of HB/OT Studies. New York, NY: T. & T. Clark, 2006.

- _____. "Embodying Deuteronomistic Theology in 1 Kings 15:22-24." In *Bodies, Embodiment, and Theology of the Hebrew Bible*, edited by S. Tamar Kamionkowski and Wonil Kim, 77-89. New York, NY: T. & T. Clark, 2010.
- Schmithals, Walter. *An Introduction to the Theology of Rudolf Bultmann*. Translated by John Bowden. Minneapolis, MN: Augsburg, 1968.
- _____. *The Theology of the First Christians*. Translated by O. C. Dean. Louisville, KY: Westminster/John Knox, 1997.
- Schmitt, Jean-Claude. "The Ethics of Gesture." In *Zone 4: Fragments for a History of the Human Body, Part Two*, edited by Michel Feher, 128-147. New York, NY: Zone, 1989.
- Schnabel, Eckhard J. *Der erste Brief des Paulus an die Korinther*. Vol. 4. Historisch-Theologische Auslegung. Wuppertal: R. Brockhaus, 2006.
- Schneider, Jane. "Of Vigilance and Virgins: Honor, Shame and Access to Resources in Mediterranean Societies." *Ethnology* 9 (1971): 1-24.
- Schneiders, Sandra M. "Feminist Ideology Criticism and Biblical Hermeneutics." *BTB* 19, no. 1 (1989): 3-10.
- Schotroff, Luise. "'Not Many Powerful': Approaches to a Sociology of Early Christianity." In *Social-Scientific Approaches to New Testament Interpretation*, edited by David G. Horrell, 275-287. Edinburgh: T. & T. Clark, 1999.
- Schotroff, Luise, Silvia Schroer, and Marie-Theres Wacker. *Feminist Interpretation: The Bible in Women's Perspective*. Translated by Martin and Barbara Rumscheidt. Minneapolis, MN: Fortress, 1998.
- Schrage, Wolfgang. *Der erste Brief an die Korinther: 1 Kor 1,1—6,11*. Vol. 7/1. 2nd ed. EKKNT. Zürich/Neukirchen-Vluyn: Benziger/Neukirchener, 2008.
- _____. *Der erste Brief an die Korinther. 1 Kor 6,12—11,16*. Vol. 7/2. EKKNT. Zürich/Neukirchen-Vluyn: Benziger/Neukirchener, 1995.
- Schulz, Siegfried. "Die Decke des Moses." *ZNW* 49, no. 1-2 (1956): 1-30.
- Schüssler Fiorenza, Elisabeth. *Bread not Stone: The Challenge of Feminist Biblical Interpretation*. Boston, MA: Beacon Press, 1984.
- _____. "Challenging the Rhetorical Half-Turn: Feminist and Rhetorical Biblical Criticism." In *Rhetoric, Scripture and Theology: Essays from the 1994 Pretoria Conference*, edited by Stanley E. Porter and Thomas H. Olbricht, 28-53. Sheffield: Sheffield Academic, 1996.
- _____. "Disciplinary Matters: A Critical Rhetoric and Ethic of Enquiry." In *Rhetoric, Ethic, and Moral Persuasion in Biblical Discourse: Essays from the 2002 Heidelberg Conference*, edited by Thomas H. Olbricht and Anders Eriksson, 9-32. London: T. & T. Clark, 2005.
- _____. "The Ethics of Biblical Interpretation: Decentering Biblical Scholarship." *JBL* 107, no. 1 (1988): 3-17.
- _____. "Exploring the Intersections of Race, Gender, Status, and Ethnicity in Early Christian Studies: Introduction." In *Prejudice and Christian Beginnings: Investigating Race, Gender, and Ethnicity in Early Christian Studies*, edited by Laura Nasralla and Elisabeth Schüssler Fiorenza, 1-23. Minneapolis, MN: Fortress, 2009.
- _____. *In Memory of Her: A Feminist Theological Reconstruction of Christian Origins*. New York, NY: Crossroad, 1983.

- _____. "Response to 'The Social Functions of Women's Asceticism in the Roman East' by Antoinette Clark Wire." In *Images of the Feminine in Gnosticism*, edited by Karen L. King, 324-328. Philadelphia, PA: Fortress, 1988.
- _____. *Rhetoric and Ethic: The Politics of Biblical Studies*. Minneapolis, MN: Fortress, 1999.
- _____. "Rhetorical Situation and Historical Reconstruction in 1 Corinthians." *NTS* 33, no. 3 (1987): 386-403.
- Scodel, Ruth. "Drama and Rhetoric." In *HCRHP*, edited by Stanley E. Porter, 489-504. Leiden: E. J. Brill, 1997.
- Scornaienchi, Lorenzo. *Sarx un Soma bei Paulus: Der Mensch zwischen Destruktivität und Konstruktivität*. NTOA. Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 2010.
- Scott, James M. *2 Corinthians*. NIVBC. Peabody, MA: Hendrickson, 1998.
- Scroggs, Robin. "Paul and the Eschatological Woman." *JAAR* 40 (1972): 283-303.
- _____. "Paul: Σοφός and Πνευματικός." *NTS* 14 (1967): 33-55.
- _____. "Review of *The Corinthian Body*." *CBQ* 59 (1997): 384-386.
- Sebesta, Judith Lynn. "Symbolism in the Costume of the Roman Woman." In *The World of Roman Costume*, edited by Judith Lynn Sebesta and Larissa Bonfante, 46-53. Madison, WI: University of Wisconsin, 1994.
- Segovia, Fernando F. "'And They Began to Speak in Other Tongues': Competing Modes of Discourse in Contemporary Biblical Criticism: Introduction." In *Reading from this Place: Volume I: Social Location and Biblical Interpretation in the United States*, edited by Fernando F. Segovia and Mary Ann Tolbert, 1-32. Minneapolis, MN: Fortress, 1995.
- Semahot*. Translated by Dov Zlotnick. Yale Judaica Series. New Haven, CT: Yale University, 1966.
- Seneca. *Ad Lucilium*. Translated by John W. Basore. LCL. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University, 1970.
- _____. *Controversiae*. Translated by Michael Winterbottom. LCL. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University, 1974.
- _____. *Epistulae Morales*. Translated by Richard M. Gummere. LCL. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University, 1962.
- _____. *Suasoriae*. Translated by Michael Winterbottom. LCL. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University, 1974.
- _____. *Troades*. Translated by Frank Justus Miller. LCL. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University, 1968.
- Shackelford, John M. *Biblical Body Language: The Figurative Face of Scripture*. Lanham, MD: University Press of America, 2000.
- Shaw, Brent D. "Body/Power/Identity: Passions of the Martyrs." *J ECS* 4, no. 3 (1996): 269-312.
- Shaw, Rosalind. "Feminist Anthropology and the Gendering of Religious Studies." In *Religion and Gender*, edited by Ursula King, 65-76. Oxford: Blackwell, 1995.
- Shi, Wenhua. *Paul's Message of the Cross as Body Language*. WUNT2. Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck, 2008.
- Sigismund-Nielsen, Hanne. "Vibia Perpetua—An Indecent Woman." In *Perpetua's Passions: Multidisciplinary Approaches to the Passio Perpetuae et Felicitatis*,

- edited by Jan M. Bremmer and Marco Formisano, 103-117. Oxford: Oxford University, 2012.
- Simonides. *Lyric Poetry*. Translated by David A. Campbell. LCL. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University, 1991.
- Sissa, Giulia. "The Sexual Philosophies of Plato and Aristotle." In *A History of Women in the West, I: From Ancient Goddesses to Christian Saints*, edited by Pauline Schmitt Pantel, Georges Duby, and Michelle Perrot, 46-81. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University, 1992.
- _____. "Socrate's Passion." In *Perpetua's Passions: Multidisciplinary Approaches to the Passio Perpetuae et Felicitatis*, edited by Jan M. Bremmer and Marco Formisano, 244-253. Oxford: Oxford University, 2012.
- Sisson, Russell B. "A Common Agōn: Ideology and Rhetorical Intertexture in Philippians." In *Fabrics of Discourse: Essays in Honor of Vernon K. Robbins*, edited by David B. Gowler, L. Gregory Bloomquist, and Duane F. Watson, 242-263. Harrisburg, PA: Trinity Press International, 2003.
- Smit, Dirk. "Rhetoric and Ethic?: A Reformed Perspective on the Politics of Reading the Bible." In *Reformed Theology: Identity and Ecumenicity II: Biblical Interpretation in the Reformed Tradition*, edited by Wallace M. Alston and Michael Welker, 385-418. Grand Rapids, MI: Eerdmans, 2007.
- Smith, Tyson and Michael Kimmel. "The Hidden Discourse of Masculinity in Gender Discrimination Law." *Signs* 30, no. 3 (2005): 1827-1849.
- Smyth, Herbert Weir. *Greek Grammar*. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University, 1920 [1956].
- Snyder, Graydon F. *First Corinthians: A Faith Community Commentary*. Macon, GA: Mercer University, 1992.
- Soards, Marion L. *1 Corinthians*. NIBCNT. Peabody, MA: Hendrickson, 1999.
- Solevåg, Anna Rebecca. *Birthing Salvation: Gender and Class in Early Christian Childbearing Discourse*. Biblical Interpretation. Leiden: E. J. Brill, 2013.
- _____. "Perpetua and Felicitas—Reinterpreting Empire, Family and Gender." In *Identity Formation in the New Testament*, edited by Bengt Holmberg and Mikael Winninge, 269-284. Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck, 2008.
- Sommerstein, Alan H. "Rape and Young Manhood in Athenian Comedy." In *Thinking Men: Masculinity and its Self-Representation in the Classical Tradition*, edited by Lin Foxhall and John B. Salmon, 100-114. London: Routledge, 1998.
- Sophocles. *Antigone*. Translated by Hugh Lloyd-Jones. LCL. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University, 1994.
- Soranus. *Sorani Gynaeciorum*. Corpus Medicorum Graecorum/Latinorum. Leipzig & Berlin: [n.p.], 1927.
- Sotah*. Translated by Jacob Neusner. The Talmud of Babylonia: An Academic Commentary. Atlanta, GA: Scholars Press, 1994.
- Spencer, Aida Besançon. *Paul's Literary Style: A Stylistic and Historical Comparison of 2 Corinthians 11:16—12:13, Romans 8:9-39, and Philippians 3:2-4*. Lanham, MD: University Press of America, 1998.
- _____. "The Wise Fool (and the Foolish Wise): A Study of Irony in Paul." *NovT* 23, no. 4 (1981): 349-360.

- Stansbury, Harry. "Corinthian Honor, Corinthian Conflict: A Social History of Early Roman Corinth and Its Pauline Community." Ph.D. Dissertation, University of California, 1990.
- Steele, Richard. "An Hour or Two Sacred to Sorrow." In *The Art of the Personal Essay: An Anthology from the Classical Era to the Present*, edited by Phillip Lopate, 126-128. New York, NY: Doubleday, 1994 [orig. 1710].
- Stegman, Thomas D. *Second Corinthians*. CCSS. Grand Rapids, MI: Baker Academic, 2009.
- Stevenson, Robert Louis. "An Apology for Idlers." In *Virginibus Puerisque*, 115-136. London: C. Kegan Paul, 1881.
- Stockhausen, Carol Kern. *Moses' Veil and the Glory of the New Covenant: The Exegetical Substructure of II Cor. 3,1-4,6*. Vol. 116. AnBib. Rome: Editrice Pontificio Istituto Biblico, 1989.
- Stowe, Harriet Beecher. *Uncle Tom's Cabin*. New York, NY: Airmont, 1967.
- Strachey, J., ed. *The Standard Edition of the Complete Psychological Works of Sigmund Freud*. London: The Hogarth Press, 1961.
- Stuart, Douglas K. *Exodus*. NAC. Nashville, TN: Broadman & Holman, 2006.
- Stuckenbruck, Loren T. "Why Should Women Cover Their Heads because of the Angels? (1 Corinthians 11:10)." *Stone-Campbell Journal* 4 (2001): 205-234.
- Stuhlmacher, Peter. "The Hermeneutical Significance of 1 Cor 2:6-16." In *Tradition and Interpretation in the New Testament: Essays in Honor of E. Earle Ellis for his 60th Birthday*, edited by Gerald F. Hawthorne and Otto Betz, 328-347. Grand Rapids, MI: Eerdmans, 1988.
- Suetonius. *Divus Augustus*. Translated by J. C. Rolfe. LCL. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University, 1964.
- _____. *Gaius Caligula*. Translated by J. C. Rolfe. LCL. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University, 1964.
- _____. *Nero*. Translated by J. C. Rolfe. LCL. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University, 1964.
- Tabor, James D. *Things Unutterable: Paul's Ascent to Paradise in its Greco-Roman, Judaic, and Early Christian Contexts*. Studies in Judaism. Lanham, MD: University Press of America, 1986.
- Tacitus. *Annales*. Translated by John Jackson. LCL. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University, 1963.
- _____. *Dialogus de oratoribus*. Translated by W. Peterson and M. Winterbottom. LCL. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University, 1970.
- Talbert, Charles H. *Reading Corinthians: A Literary and Theological Commentary on 1 and 2 Corinthians*. Macon, GA: Smith & Helwys, 2002.
- _____. "Review of *Belly and Body in the Pauline Epistles*." *PRSt* 30, no. 4 (2003): 490-491.
- Tatius, Achilles. *Leucippe et Clitophon*. Translated by S. Gaselee. LCL. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University, 1969.
- Thiem, Annika. "No Gendered Bodies without Queer Desires: Judith Butler and Biblical Gender Trouble." *OTE* 20, no. 2 (2007): 456-470.
- Thiselton, Anthony C. "Biblical Studies and Theoretical Hermeneutics." In *The Cambridge Companion to Biblical Interpretation*, edited by John Barton, 95-113. Cambridge: Cambridge University, 1998.

- _____. *The First Epistle to the Corinthians*. NIGTC. Grand Rapids, MI: Eerdmans, 2000.
- _____. "The Future of Biblical Interpretation and Responsible Plurality in Biblical Hermeneutics." In *The Future of Biblical Interpretation: Responsible Plurality in Biblical Hermeneutics*, edited by Stanley E. Porter and Matthew R. Malcolm, 11-27. Downers Grove, IL: Intervarsity, 2013.
- _____. *The Hermeneutics of Doctrine*. Grand Rapids, MI: Eerdmans, 2007.
- Thompson, Cynthia L. "Hairstyles, Head-coverings, and St. Paul: *Portraits from Roman Corinth*." BA 51 (1988): 99-115.
- Thompson, James W. "Review of *Paul, the Stoics, and the Body of Christ*." RelSRev 33, no. 2 (2007): 155.
- Thrall, Margaret E. *The Second Epistle to the Corinthians*. 2 vols. ICC. New York, NY: T. & T. Clark, 2004.
- Tobin, Thomas H. "Review of *The Corinthian Body*." TS 57 (1996): 740-741.
- Tolbert, Mary Ann. "The Politics and Poetics of Location: Afterwords." In *Reading from this Place: Volume I: Social Location and Biblical Interpretation in the United States*, edited by Fernando F. Segovia and Mary Ann Tolbert, 305-317. Minneapolis, MN: Fortress, 1995.
- _____. "Protestant Feminists and the Bible: On the Horns of a Dilemma." In *The Pleasure of Her Text: Feminist Readings of Biblical and Historical Texts*, edited by Alice Bach, 5-23. Philadelphia, PA: Trinity Press International, 1990.
- _____. "Reading for Liberation." In *Reading from this Place: Volume I: Social Location and Biblical Interpretation in the United States*, edited by Fernando F. Segovia and Mary Ann Tolbert, 263-276. Minneapolis, MN: Fortress, 1995.
- Torrance, Thomas F. *The Incarnation: Ecumenical Studies in the Nicene-Constantinopolitan Creed*. Edinburgh: Handsel Press, 1981.
- _____. *Incarnation: The Person and Life of Christ*. Downers Grove, IL: Intervarsity, 2008.
- Trail, Ronald L. *An Exegetical Summary of 1 Corinthians 1—9*. Dallas, TX: SIL, 1995.
- Travis, S. H. "Paul's Boasting in 2 Corinthians 10—12." In *Fourth International Congress on New Testament Studies*, edited by Elizabeth A. Livingstone, 527-532. Berlin: Akademie-Verlag, 1973.
- Trible, Phyllis. *Rhetorical Criticism: Context, Method, and the Book of Jonah*. GBS. Minneapolis, MN: Fortress, 1994.
- Turner, Bryan S. "The Body in Western Society: Social Theory and Its Perspectives." In *Religion and the Body*, edited by Sarah Coakley, 15-41. Cambridge: Cambridge University, 1997.
- van der Toorn, Karel. "The Significance of the Veil in the Ancient Near East." In *Pomegranates and Golden Bells: Studies in Biblical, Jewish, and Near Eastern Ritual, Law, and Literature in Honor of Jacob Milgrom*, edited by David P. Wright, David Noel Freedman, and Avi Hurvitz, 327-339. Winona Lake, IN: Eisenbrauns, 1995.
- van Driel, Edwin Chr. *Incarnation Anyway: Arguments for a Supralapsarian Christology*. AARAcadS. Oxford: Oxford University, 2008.

- van Unnik, Willem Cornelis. "'With Unveiled Face': An Exegesis of 2 Corinthians iii 12-18." *NovT* 6 (1963): 153-169.
- Van Weese, Hans. "A Brief History of Tears: Gender Differentiation in Archaic Greece." In *When Men Were Men: Masculinity, Power and Identity in Classical Antiquity*, edited by Lin Foxhall and John B. Salmon, 10-53. London: Routledge, 1998.
- Vernant, Jean-Pierre and François Frontisi-Ducroux. "Features of the Mask in Ancient Greece." In *Myth and Tragedy in Ancient Greece*, edited by Jean-Pierre Vernant and Pierre Vidal-Naquet, 189-206. New York, NY: Zone, 1990.
- Vigarello, Georges. "The Upward Training of the Body from the Age of Chivalry to Courtly Civility." In *Zone 4: Fragments for a History of the Human Body, Part Two*, edited by Michel Feher, 148-199. New York, NY: Zone, 1989.
- Vogel, Arthur Anton. *Body Theology: God's Presence in Man's World*. New York, NY: Harper & Row, 1973.
- Volf, Miroslav. *Exclusion and Embrace: A Theological Exploration of Identity, Otherness, and Reconciliation*. Nashville, TN: Abingdon, 1996.
- Wachob, Wesley H. "The Epistle of James and the Book of Psalms: A Socio-Rhetorical Perspective of Intertexture, Culture, and Ideology in Religious Discourse." In *Fabrics of Discourse: Essays in Honor of Vernon K. Robbins*, edited by David B. Gowler, L. Gregory Bloomquist, and Duane F. Watson, 264-280. Harrisburg, PA: Trinity Press International, 2003.
- Waetjen, Herman C. "Review of *The Corinthian Body*." *ThTo* 53 (1997): 540-543.
- _____. "Social Location and the Hermeneutical Mode of Integration." In *Reading from this Place: Volume I: Social Location and Biblical Interpretation in the United States*, edited by Fernando F. Segovia and Mary Ann Tolbert, 75-93. Minneapolis, MN: Fortress, 1995.
- Wallace, James Buchanan. *Snatched into Paradise: Paul's Heavenly Journey in the Context of Early Christian Experience*. BZNW. Berlin: De Gruyter, 2011.
- Walters, Jonathan. "Juvenal, *Satire* 2: Putting Male Sexual Deviants on Show." In *Thinking Men: Masculinity and its Self-Representation in the Classical Tradition*, edited by Lin Foxhall and John B. Salmon, 148-154. London: Routledge, 1998.
- Wan, Sze-kar. "Charismatic Exegesis: Philo and Paul Compared." *Studia Philonica Annual* 6 (1994): 54-82.
- Wanamaker, Charles A. "'By the Power of God': Rhetoric and Ideology in 2 Corinthians 10-13." In *Fabrics of Discourse: Essays in Honor of Vernon K. Robbins*, edited by David B. Gowler, L. Gregory Bloomquist, and Duane F. Watson, 194-221. Harrisburg, PA: Trinity Press International, 2003.
- Wander, Philip. "The Third Persona: An Ideological Turn in Rhetorical Theory." In *Contemporary Rhetorical Theory: A Reader*, edited by John Louis Lucaites, Celeste Michelle Condit, and Sally Caudill, 357-379. New York, NY: Guilford, 1999.
- Wardy, Robert. *The Birth of Rhetoric: Gorgias, Plato and Their Successors*. Issues in Ancient Philosophy. New York, NY: Routledge, 1996.
- Watson, Duane F. "Introduction [to Vernon Robbins]." *JSNT* 70 (1998): 69-70.

- _____. “‘Keep Yourselves from Idols’: A Socio-Rhetorical Analysis of the Exordium and Peroration of I John.” In *Fabrics of Discourse: Essays in Honor of Vernon K. Robbins*, edited by David B. Gowler, L. Gregory Bloomquist, and Duane F. Watson, 281-302. Harrisburg, PA: Trinity Press International, 2003.
- _____. “Paul and Boasting.” In *Paul in the Greco-Roman World: A Handbook*, edited by J. Paul Sampley, 77-100. Harrisburg, PA: Trinity Press International, 2003.
- _____. “Paul’s Boasting in 2 Corinthians 10—13 as Defense of his Honor: A Socio-Rhetorical Analysis.” In *Rhetorical Argumentation in Biblical Texts: Essays from the Lund 2000 Conference*, edited by Anders Eriksson, Thomas H. Olbricht, and Walter Übelacker, 260-275. Harrisburg, PA: Trinity Press International, 2002.
- _____. “Rhetorical Criticism.” In *The Blackwell Companion to the New Testament*, edited by David E. Aune, 166-176. Malden, MA: Wiley-Blackwell, 2010.
- _____. “Why We Need Socio-Rhetorical Commentary and What It Might Look Like.” In *Rhetorical Criticism and the Bible*, edited by Stanley E. Porter and Dennis L. Stamps, 129-157. Sheffield: Sheffield Academic, 2002.
- Watson, Duane F. and Vernon K. Robbins. “Dialogue between Vernon Robbins and the Reviewers.” *JSNT* 70 (1998): 109-115.
- Watson, Francis. *Agape, Eros, Gender: Towards a Pauline Sexual Ethic*. Cambridge: Cambridge University, 2000.
- _____. *Paul and the Hermeneutics of Faith*. London: T. & T. Clark, 2004.
- Weigel, Sigrid. “Exemplum and Sacrifice, Blood Testimony and Written Testimony: Lucretia and Perpetua as Transitional Figures in the Cultural History of Martyrdom.” In *Perpetua’s Passions: Multidisciplinary Approaches to the Passio Perpetuae et Felicitatis*, edited by Jan M. Bremmer and Marco Formisano, 180-200. Oxford: Oxford University, 2012.
- Welborn, Laurence L. “On the Discord in Corinth: 1 Corinthians 1-4 and Ancient Politics.” *JBL* 106, no. 1 (1987): 85-111.
- _____. *Paul, the Fool of Christ: A Study of 1 Corinthians 1—4 in the Comic-Philosophic Tradition*. New York, NY: Continuum, 2006.
- _____. “The Runaway Paul.” *HTR* 92, no. 2 (1999): 115-163.
- West, Gerald. “The Contribution of Tamar’s Story to the Construction of Alternative African Masculinities.” In *Bodies, Embodiment, and Theology of the Hebrew Bible*, edited by S. Tamar Kamionkowski and Wonil Kim, 184-200. New York, NY: T. & T. Clark, 2010.
- White, Erin. “Religion and the Hermeneutics of Gender: An Examination of the Work of Paul Ricoeur.” In *Religion and Gender*, edited by Ursula King, 77-100. Oxford: Blackwell, 1995.
- Williams, Craig. “Perpetua’s Gender: A Latinist Reads the *Passio Perpetuae et Felicitatis*.” In *Perpetua’s Passions: Multidisciplinary Approaches to the Passio Perpetuae et Felicitatis*, edited by Jan M. Bremmer and Marco Formisano, 54-77. Oxford: Oxford University, 2012.
- Williams III, H. H. Drake. “Review of *Belly and Body in the Pauline Epistles*.” *JBL* 123, no. 1 (2004): 169-171.

- Winkler, John J. *The Constraints of Desire: The Anthropology of Sex and Gender in Ancient Greece*. New York, NY: Routledge, 1990.
- Winter, Bruce W. *After Paul Left Corinth: The Influence of Secular Ethics and Social Change*. Grand Rapids, MI: Eerdmans, 2001.
- _____. "The Enigma of Imperial Cultic Activities and Paul in Corinth." In *GRCNT*, edited by David E. Aune and Frederick E. Brenk, 49-72. Leiden: E. J. Brill, 2012.
- _____. *Philo and Paul among the Sophists: Alexandrian and Corinthian Responses to a Julio-Claudian Movement*. Grand Rapids, MI: Eerdmans, 2002.
- _____. *Roman Wives, Roman Widows: The Appearance of New Women and the Pauline Communities*. Grand Rapids, MI: Eerdmans, 2003.
- Wire, Antoinette C. *The Corinthian Women Prophets: A Reconstruction through Paul's Rhetoric*. Philadelphia, PA: Fortress, 1990.
- _____. "Reconciled to Glory in Corinth? 2 Cor 2:14—7:4." In *Antiquity and Humanity: Essays on Ancient Religion and Philosophy Presented to Hans Dieter Betz on His 70th Birthday*, edited by Adela Yarbro Collins and Margaret M. Mitchell, 263-275. Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck, 2001.
- Witherington, Ben. *Conflict and Community in Corinth: A Socio-Rhetorical Commentary on 1 and 2 Corinthians*. Grand Rapids, MI: Eerdmans, 1995.
- _____. *The Paul Quest: The Renewed Search for the Jew of Tarsus*. Downers Grove, IL: Intervarsity, 1998.
- Witt, Charlotte. "Feminist Interpretation of the Philosophical Canon." *SignsJ* 31, no. 2 (2006): 537-552.
- Wolff, Christian. *Der zweite Brief des Paulus an die Korinther*. THKNT. Berlin: Evangelische Verlagsanstalt, 1989.
- Wolfson, Elliot R. "Occultation of the Feminine and the Body of Secrecy in Medieval Kabbalah." In *Rending the Veil: Concealment and Secrecy in the History of Religions*, edited by Elliot R. Wolfson, 113-154. New York and London: Seven Bridges Press, 1999.
- Woods, Laurie. "Opposition to a Man and his Message: Paul's 'Thorn in the Flesh' (2 Cor 12:7)." *ABR* 39 (1991): 44-53.
- Wright, N. T. *The Climax of the Covenant: Christ and the Law in Pauline Theology*. Minneapolis, MN: Fortress, 1992.
- _____. *The Resurrection of the Son of God*. Christian Origins and the Question of God. Minneapolis, MN: Fortress, 2003.
- Wurmser, Leon. *The Mask of Shame*. Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University, 1981.
- Wyke, Maria A. "Introduction: Parchments of Gender: Deciphering the Bodies of Antiquity." In *Parchments of Gender: Deciphering the Bodies of Antiquity*, edited by Maria A Wyke, 1-11. Oxford: Clarendon, 1998.
- Xenophon. *Hellenica*. Translated by Carleton L. Brownson. LCL. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University, 1968.
- _____. *Oeconomicus*. Translated by E. C. Marchant, O. J. Todd, and Jeffrey Henderson. LCL. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University, 2013.
- Yee, Gale A. "The Author/Text/Reader and Power: Suggestions for a Critical Framework for Biblical Studies." In *Reading from this Place: Volume I:*

- Social Location and Biblical Interpretation in the United States*, edited by Fernando F. Segovia and Mary Ann Tolbert, 109-118. Minneapolis, MN: Fortress, 1995.
- Yeo, Khiok-Khng. "Differentiation and Mutuality of Male Female Relations in 1 Corinthians 11:2-16." BR 43 (1998): 7-21.
- _____. *Rhetorical Interaction in 1 Corinthians 8 and 10: a Formal Analysis with Preliminary Suggestions for a Chinese Cross-Cultural Hermeneutic*. Vol. 8. Biblical Interpretation Series. Leiden: E. J. Brill, 1995.
- Young, Frances M. and David F. Ford. *Meaning and Truth in 2 Corinthians*. Grand Rapids, MI: Eerdmans, 1987.
- Zeitlin, Froma I. "Playing the Other: Theater, Theatricality, and the Feminine in Greek Drama." *Representations* 11 (1985): 63-94.
- Zeller, Dieter. *Der erste Brief an die Korinther*. Vol. 5. KEK. Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 2010.
- Zmijewski, Josef. *Der Stil der paulinischen "Narrenrede": Analyse der Sprachgestaltung in 2 Kor 11,1—12,10 als Beitrag zur Methodik von Stiluntersuchungen neutestamentlicher Texte*. Bonner Biblische Beiträge. Köln: Peter Hanstein Verlag, 1978.