'To subject the north of the country to his rule'

MacInnes, Iain A.

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‘To subject the north of the country to his rule’: Edward III and the ‘Lochindorb chevauchée’ of 1336

The 1336 military campaign season witnessed the last major attempt by Edward III to subjugate Scotland. The 1336 campaigns also involved the largest number of invasions during the period of intensive English involvement in Scotland between 1332 and 1338. During the course of the year Edward Balliol and Henry of Lancaster mounted a two-pronged invasion of southern Scotland and Thomas Roslin led a naval expedition to the north-east. Edward III entered Scotland in the summer and mounted his own campaign in the Scottish Highlands, following which John of Eltham raided south-west Scotland. Edward III would later return again to Scotland in October of the same year to rebuild and regarrison Bothwell Castle. The significance of this military activity has, however been denied. A.E. Prince suggested that ‘it is unnecessary…to dwell on the campaigns of 1336, as they are of no magnitude and of little military value.’¹ Even Ranald Nicholson, who produced the most detailed examination of Edward III’s military education in Scotland, ended his study rather abruptly in 1335, ignoring the events of 1336 altogether.² More recent surveys have examined in greater detail Edward III’s Scottish wars and the campaigns of 1336 have been subjected to increased scrutiny. Rogers in particular provides detailed examination of the campaign but bases his analysis on well-known sources that suggest little new about the campaign. Rogers also, along with Penman and Sumption, contextualises the events of 1336 in relation to wider European affairs, in particular the possibility of French forces entering Scotland through Aberdeen.³ This focus diminishes the Scottish context for these events and, as a result, the Lochindorb campaign itself remains an unfortunately neglected incident.

To appreciate the significance of the Lochindorb campaign, it is necessary to set the episode in a wider Scottish context. Northern Scotland had become an important battleground in 1335, with David Strathbogie leading a determined campaign to win the allegiance of the region in favour of the Disinherited lords who claimed territories within the north and Edward Balliol.\(^4\) Strathbogie’s siege of Kildrummy Castle had brought a force of Bruce Scots, under the command of Andrew Murray, into the north-east in November to oppose him. The two sides met at Culblean in Mar where Strathbogie was defeated and killed. The Bruce Scots continued their northern campaign, capturing Loch Kinord Castle and then besieging Lochindorb Castle, the defence of which was led by Strathbogie’s widow, Katherine Beaumont, countess of Atholl.\(^5\) Negotiations between the English and David II’s exiled government in France led to a truce and temporary cessation of the Lochindorb siege. Although the truce was extended until 12 May 1336, both sides were provided with the opportunity to prepare for the forthcoming campaign season.\(^6\)

The Bruce Scots, upon the end of the truce, renewed the siege of Lochindorb, as well as their similarly suspended siege of Cupar Castle. Around the same time, a large Balliol/English army entered Scotland. Departing from Newcastle in May, the army was led jointly by Edward Balliol and Henry of Lancaster.\(^7\) Relatively soon on its march, the army was divided in two.\(^8\) Balliol’s contingent marched through southeast Scotland and Lothian, while Lancaster’s men travelled ‘through the forests and mountains’ as they traversed western Scotland.\(^9\) Lancaster’s force then headed up Clydesdale and into Lanarkshire, where on 27


\(^{6}\) Rogers, *War Cruel and Sharp*, 104-13; see also Penman, *David II*, 63; *Foedera*, ii, p. ii, 933.


May two of his men lost horses at Monklands.\textsuperscript{10} Along the route William Douglas of Liddesdale and his men lay in wait in the forested areas of southern Scotland and harried the Disinherited/English forces on their northward advance.\textsuperscript{11} Despite such attacks, Lancaster and Balliol’s northward progress continued and they recombined their forces around Stirling. It was here that the army came under further Bruce attack, this time from forces led by Andrew Murray. The Bruce Scots were forced to flee and several were captured.\textsuperscript{12} From Stirling the Balliol/English army marched to Perth where it came under attack once again from Bruce forces. According to one English source, many Bruce Scots were captured on this occasion but few were spared, perhaps as an attempt by the Balliol/English leaders to put an end to further acts of resistance through a decisive show of force.\textsuperscript{13}

The purpose of Balliol and Lancaster’s invasion appears to have been two-fold. Firstly, the invasion was a response to the renewed Bruce siege of Balliol/English-held castles. A hastily arranged force, comprising much of the English garrison of Edinburgh Castle, had successfully driven off the Bruce Scots besieging Cupar but a more definitive statement of Balliol/English power was required to counter the Bruce resurgence further north.\textsuperscript{14} The combined forces of Balliol and Lancaster, based at Perth, were in a useful strategic position to guard eastern Scotland from Bruce attack, as well as to deny easy movement of Bruce forces from north to south. The second part of their mission appears to have been to secure Perth as a base of Balliol/English operations by expanding their area of control around the town. To this end repairs were begun on Perth’s defences. These included a reconstructed mud wall augmented by a sizeable new defensive ditch around the town, and perhaps too repaired buildings previously destroyed by the Bruce Scots during a former brief occupation of Perth.\textsuperscript{15}

\textsuperscript{10} London, The National Archives [TNA], E101/15/12, fo. 1v.
\textsuperscript{11} Ellis, \textit{Original Letters}, i, 32-3; Rogers, \textit{Wars of Edward III}, 48.
\textsuperscript{12} Ellis, \textit{Original Letters}, i, 33; Rogers, \textit{Wars of Edward III}, 48.
\textsuperscript{13} Ellis, \textit{Original Letters}, i, 33; Rogers, \textit{Wars of Edward III}, 48.
\textsuperscript{14} \textit{Chron. Lanercost} (Maxwell), 296-7; \textit{Calendar of Documents relating to Scotland}, ed. J. Bain (Edinburgh, 1881-8), iii, p354; London, British Library [BL], MS Cotton Nero C VIII, fo. 276v.
\textsuperscript{15} \textit{Chron. Lanercost} (Maxwell), 298.
The Balliol/English forces then began military operations in the Perthshire countryside and they appear to have extended their activities into Fife.\textsuperscript{16}

Up to this point Balliol/English activities appear to have followed a similar pattern to the previous year’s large-scale summer campaign, when a two-pronged invasion of southern Scotland had been followed by the occupation of Perth and the forced submission of the local population. In 1336 there was, however, an interesting difference. Around the same time that Lancaster and Balliol were preparing to depart Newcastle on their march north, English troops were boarding ship at the Norfolk port of Lynn. Under the command of Thomas Roslin (formerly custodian of Edinburgh Castle), the force of 160 men-at-arms and archers – together with a number of masons, carpenters and other workmen – sailed from Lynn on 1 May bound for Dunnottar Castle. Their orders appear to have been to repair and garrison the fortification as a forward base of Balliol/English operations.\textsuperscript{17} This projection of force into an area of Scotland far distant from previous English activity is the first suggestion that Edward III now planned to extend English – as opposed to Balliol – military activity into northern Scotland.\textsuperscript{18} In the meantime, the king himself remained absent. Edward III had received intelligence earlier in the year of French plans either to invade England, or to land large numbers of troops in Scotland, utilising ships already assembled for Philip VI’s aborted crusade.\textsuperscript{19} Apparently fearing an imminent French naval attack in the south the English king remained behind to oversee defensive preparations while his armies continued their operations in Scotland.\textsuperscript{20}

Despite the presence of Balliol/English troops in Perthshire, Fife and the northeast, the Bruce siege of Lochindorb Castle continued. In charge of the siege was Andrew Murray, who

\textsuperscript{16} Chron. Hemingburgh, ii, 311. See also TNA, E101/15/12, fo. 1v; E101/19/36, fos 3v, 5v.
\textsuperscript{17} BL, Cotton Nero C VIII, fo. 251; cf. Chron. Hemingburgh, ii, 311-2.
\textsuperscript{18} Roslin’s original commission to array forces for this campaign was dated 23 March 1336 and planning continued over the following months (Rotuli Scotiae in Turri Londinensi et in Domo Capitulari Westmonasteriensis Asservati, ed. D. Macpherson et al. (London, 1814-19), i, 411, 414, 416; see also Calendar of Close Rolls (London, 1892 - ), 1333-37, 576, 597).
\textsuperscript{19} Ellis, Original Letters, i, 30-2; Rogers, Wars of Edward III, 47-8; Rogers, War Cruel and Sharp, 113-5; Sumption, Trial by Battle, 155-8; Penman, David II, 63-4.
\textsuperscript{20} For English fears of French invasion see Edward III’s summonses for military service in 1336 (for example, Rot. Scot., i, 420).
appears to have safely returned to the north following his defeat in the skirmish with Balliol and Lancaster’s forces around Stirling. It was during this period of continued Bruce activity, when Lancaster and Balliol’s forces remained firmly entrenched at Perth, that Edward III decided to intervene personally in Scotland. He may have believed that, as the campaigning season progressed, the threat of French invasion had receded. He may also have believed, as has been argued, that a French invasion was more likely to land in Scotland than in southern England.\footnote{Rogers, War Cruel and Sharp, 113-5; Sumption, Trial by Battle, 155-8; Penman, David II, 63-4.}

Departing Newcastle on 14 June, Edward III rode north with a force comprised almost exclusively of his household knights and scutifers, provoking contemporary English chroniclers to make startled pronouncements about their king’s bravery for riding through hostile territory with so few men.\footnote{BL, Cotton Nero C VIII, fos 241-2; Chron. Lanercost (Maxwell), 298; Scalacronica (King), 123; The Annonimale Chronicle, 1333 to 1381, ed. V.H. Galbraith (Manchester, 1927), 7; Chron. Hemingburgh, ii, 311-2; Chronica Monasterii de Melsa, ed. E.A. Bond (Rolls Series, London, 1868), ii, 311-2; Adam Murimuth, ‘Continuatio Chronicarum’, in Adae Murimuth Continuation Chronicarum Robertus de Avesbury De gestis Mirabilibus Regis Edwardi Tertii, ed. E.M. Thompson (Rolls Series, London, 1889), 77; Chronicon Galfridi le Baker de Swynebroke, ed. E.M. Thompson (Oxford, 1889), 57-8; Chron. Bower, vii, 119. For further details about Edward III’s household, see J.S. Bothwell, Edward III and the English Peerage (Woodbridge, 2004), 168-9.}

Having reached Kelso on 16 June, the king and his entourage made rapid progress north and reached Perth by 18 June.\footnote{Edward III is recorded making a donation of 7s at the altar of the church of Kelso on 16 June (BL, Cotton Nero C VIII, fo. 205v; see also CCR 1333-37, 594.).} The accounts provided by English chroniclers proceeded directly from the king’s arrival at Perth to the launching of the Lochindorb chevauchée. English record evidence demonstrates, however, that events were more complex than the chroniclers’ simple narrative suggests and Edward III may have had to deal with local unrest before embarking on his northern expedition.

As already indicated, Balliol and Lancaster’s troops based in Perth had been involved in local operations aimed at pacifying Perthshire and Fife. The possibility that they met with Bruce resistance is suggested by the English \textit{restauro equorum} accounts that record the details of horses lost by Englishmen who served in Scotland in 1336. Of course, not all horse losses were necessarily combat losses. Conditions within army encampments at Perth may well have been far from ideal for soldiers’ mounts. Nevertheless, some losses may have occurred as a result of enemy action. Of note are those deaths that occurred in clusters, for
example on 16 June (before Edward III’s arrival) when three English troops lost their mounts
‘in the vicinity of St John’s town.’ In the run-up to the departure of Edward III and his men
for Lochindorb three mounts were also lost on 2 July, with a further four recorded deaths on 9
July. Of particular interest is the loss of four horses over two days (25-26 June). Those
occurred in the ‘forest of Branan’ – either Birnam Wood, northwest of Perth, or Strath Braan
in Highland Perthshire, both of which lay along the route Edward III would take over two
weeks later – and on terrain similar to that used historically by the Bruce Scots to launch
guerrilla attacks against Balliol/English forces. The date of these English horse losses at
‘Branan’ coupled with the losses ‘around Perth’ suggests that Balliol/English forces at Perth
were not completely secure in their position. Indeed, Edward III may have foreseen the need
to neutralise pockets of Bruce resistance around Perth, in order both to protect the town and
his armies, and to clear his route of enemy forces ahead of his northern campaign. This would
explain his three-week stay at the town before finally sallying out to relieve Lochindorb.

On 12 July 1336 Edward III assembled a force of around 800 mounted troops and rode
out of Perth ‘so suddenly that no one was notified to arm himself.’ Having ridden twelve
miles on the first day the Balliol/English forces camped ‘in the fields’ that first night. They
then rode a further thirty miles on 13 July to Blair Atholl Castle. A further forty-five mile
ride on 14 July ‘through the highest and most difficult areas of Scotland’ took the
Balliol/English troops into Badenoch. By the morning of 15 July they had received

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24 TNA, E101/15/12, fo. 1v; E101/19/36, fo. 7.
25 TNA, E101/15/12, fo. 1v; E101/19/36, fos 2, 7.
26 TNA, E101/19/36, fos 2v, 7v.
28 Rogers, Wars of Edward III, 49; Ellis, Original Letters, i, 35; Chron. Lanercost (Maxwell), 298;
Scalacronica (King), 123; Chron. Anonimalle (Galbraith), 7; Chron. Bower, vii, 119; Chron. Melsa, ii,
311-2; Chron. Murimuth; 77; Chron. Baker, 57-8.
29 For the purposes of this paper, leagues given in the letter have been converted to miles using
an approximate conversion of 1½ modern miles to each league. Rogers provided a straight swap of
leagues for miles but this underestimates the distance between locations.
30 Rogers, Wars of Edward III, 49. Corroborative evidence demonstrating the accuracy of the
newsletter’s dates is provided by, for example, the payment on 13 July at Blair Atholl to Hugh Kendy,
who was directed to discover the whereabouts of Andrew Murray and his men (BL, Cotton Nero C
VIII, fo. 279).
31 The newsletter described the English forces stopping at ‘Fythawyn’, perhaps a misrepresentation of
Ruthven. For strategic and defensive considerations Ruthven was an obvious choice, considering the
intelligence from scouts sent ahead of the main force regarding the number and disposition of Andrew Murray’s forces. Following this discovery Edward III’s forces rode the twenty-four miles to the church of Kincardine, near Boat of Garten.32

Further details of the campaign are supplied by Andrew Wyntoun, whose comprehensive narrative of the Lochindorb siege was based on a ‘reasonably well-informed source.’33 Moving to within three miles of Lochindorb the English could see the tents of the besiegers and Wyntoun noted that scouts from both sides clashed in the vicinity of the castle.34 Both the newsletter and Wyntoun agreed that the Bruce Scots were forewarned of the English advance and withdrew before Edward III and his troops arrived in force. The English source described how the Bruce Scots ‘all fled into Ross.’35 Wyntoun wrote instead of a leisurely withdrawal by Andrew Murray. His troops did not dare to disturb Murray’s celebration of Mass to inform him of the English advance and the Bruce commander delayed to repair his armour before leading his troops to safety.36 According to Wyntoun the English army followed the retreating Bruce Scots as far as Blairs, just south of Forres, a detail not included in the English letter, but having failed in their attempts they returned to Lochindorb.37 There they were welcomed by the countess of Atholl and told of the plight of those within the castle, whose supplies were almost exhausted.38 Edward III, possibly because of the impoverished state of the garrison, took his leave of the countess that evening and returned to his baggage train which had been left behind in the final stages of the ride towards Lochindorb.

Balliol/English force’s increasing proximity to the Bruce siege (Rogers, Wars of Edward III, 49; Ellis, Original Letters, 35).
34 Chron. Wyntoun (Laing), ii, 429.
35 Ellis, Original Letters, i, 35; Rogers, Wars of Edward III, 49.
36 Chron. Wyntoun (Laing), ii, 429-30.
37 Chron. Wyntoun (Laing), ii, 430; Barrow, ‘Wood of Stronkalter’, 78.
38 Rogers, Wars of Edward III, 49; Ellis, Original Letters, i, 36).
The English forces were themselves short of provisions. The newsletter suggested that there had been barely ‘a side of beef’ to feed Edward III and his troops. Horses had also been lost as the army rode long distances through difficult Highland terrain. By 16 July the problems of supply had been alleviated by foraging parties: following ‘a moderate days’ ride, namely eight miles, up to Aberkarf in the highlands of Mar; they led a thousand and more animals to our army. It appears that the countess of Atholl and her household had joined up with the army around this time, albeit briefly, as the newsletter records that the countess took her leave of the king on 16 July. Nothing was written of her destination. From here the Balliol/English forces rode thirty miles on 17 July, reaching Forres. The town and surrounding countryside were burned before the troops settled for the night at Kinloss Abbey. There they found wine, beer, salted fish, corn ‘and other necessaries, by which our men were restored and more than a little comforted.’ Indeed, the quantity of foodstuffs was so plentiful that Edward III despatched supplies westward for the Lochindorb garrison. Edward III and his forces then travelled twelve miles east on 18 July towards Elgin. There, as at Forres, the town’s hinterland was put to flame but the town itself was spared, apparently because of the king’s reverence for the Holy Trinity to which the town’s church was dedicated. Heading east along the Moray coast on 19 July the army rode twenty-seven miles, crossed the Spey and arrived at Cullen. On 20 July it travelled twenty-four miles and reached ‘Doghwan’.

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39 Rogers, Wars of Edward III, 49; Ellis, Original Letters, i, 36; Scalacronica (King), 123.
40 Rogers, Wars of Edward III, 49; Ellis, Original Letters, i, 36.
41 Rogers, Wars of Edward III, 49; Ellis, Original Letters, i, 36; Scalacronica (King), 123.
42 Rogers, Wars of Edward III, 49; Ellis, Original Letters, i, 36; Chron. Wyntoun (Laing), ii, 430; Chron. Bower, vii, 119.
43 Rogers, Wars of Edward III, 49; Ellis, Original Letters, i, 36-7.
44 Rogers, Wars of Edward III, 49; Ellis, Original Letters, i, 36-7; BL, Cotton Nero C VIII, fo. 279.
45 Ellis, Original Letters, 36-7; Rogers, Wars of Edward III, 49. Interestingly, the pious motivation of Edward III in this case is confirmed by Scottish chroniclers who similarly wrote of Elgin being spared (Chron. Fordun, ii, 352; Chron. Bower, vii, 119). Edward III’s devotion to this particular cult may be seen in his dedication of St Stephen’s chapel, Westminster, to (among others) the Trinity, although Ormrod argues that the king’s personal devotion was dominated by reverence for the Virgin Mary, with the Black Prince more inclined towards ‘the newly fashionable cult of the Trinity’ (W.M. Ormrod, ‘The Personal Religion of Edward III’, Speculum, 64 (1989), 849-77, at 858).
perhaps a location somewhere along the River Deveron.\footnote{The distance covered by the Balliol/English force suggests somewhere in this vicinity.} Passing safely to the east of Kildrummy Castle – perhaps occupied by Bruce forces – the army reached Aberdeen on the evening of 21 July.\footnote{Ellis, \textit{Original Letters}, i, 37; Rogers, \textit{Wars of Edward III}, 49-50; Chron. Bower, vii, 119; Chron. Lanercost (Maxwell), 298; Chron. Anonimalle (Galbraith), 7; Chron. Melsa, ii, 377-8.} There the English king remained for over two days. Old Aberdeen was burned on 22 July and the surrounding countryside raided for anything of value. Sending his baggage train ahead, Edward III remained in Aberdeen on 23 July to ensure that the destruction of the town was complete.\footnote{Ellis, \textit{Original Letters}, i, 37-8; Rogers, \textit{Wars of Edward III}, 49-50; Chron. Bower, vii, 119; Chron. Lanercost (Maxwell), 298; Chron. Anonimalle (Galbraith), 7; Chron. Melsa, ii, 377-8.} It is, however, from around this time that evidence emerges which conflicts with the established chronology of the newsletter. The \textit{restauro equorum} accounts record that on 20 and 21 July, while the English army made its ride towards Aberdeen, three men lost horses ‘in the mountains.’ This phrase was used previously in the same accounts to describe horses lost during the progress towards Lochindorb, perhaps suggesting that these losses occurred in the same geographical area.\footnote{Discovery of various coin hoards in Aberdeen, at least one of which is dated tentatively to this time, suggests that the townsmen were aware of the Balliol/English approach and feared for the devastation they were to suffer (D.H. Evans and S. Thain, ‘New light on old coin hoards from the Aberdeen area’, \textit{PSAS}, 119 (1989), 327-44, at 339).} Moreover on 22 July, while Old Aberdeen was put to the flames, an unknown soldier lost his horse ‘in the vicinity of Lochindorb’ and on 23 July the knight Robert de Sanso Marresy lost his horse ‘around Loghabr.’\footnote{TNA, E101/19/36, fo. 3v.} Meanwhile, according to the newsletter, Edward III and his forces travelled twenty-four miles on 24 July and reached ‘Morton in the Mearns’, probably re-garrisoning Dunnottar Castle en route. Other troops may have been left at the smaller castles of Kinneff and Lauriston, on the route south from Dunnottar, although the newsletter makes no mention of these locations.\footnote{TNA, E101/19/36, fo. 2.} The following day involved another twenty-four mile ride, probably followed by a stay at Brechin, before Forfar was reached on 26 July.\footnote{Chron. Fordun, ii, 352; Chron. Bower, vii, 123.} There word reached the king that William Douglas ‘with a messenger from Edward Balliol arrived with letters for Edward III while he was at Brechin on 25 July (BL, Cotton Nero, C VIII, fo. 279).
thousand men’ was lying in wait in the forest of Plater (Angus). Henry of Lancaster was dispatched to flush him out and appears to have been successful in driving Douglas and his men south. This clash may not, however, have been as one-sided as the newsletter suggests. The English restauro equorum accounts indicate the loss of six horses on the same day (26 July) ‘around St John’s town’, all six belonging to Henry of Lancaster’s retinue. The king, meanwhile, continued south to Perth and at this point the newsletter’s commentary of events came to an end. Two last pieces of information from the restauro equorum accounts do, though, point to some continued military involvement in northern Scotland after the king’s return to Perth. On 29 July, almost a week since the king’s force had departed, an unknown soldier lost his horse at Aberdeen. John Ogle also lost his horse at Aberdeen, over three weeks after Edward III and his troops had systematically ravaged the town, and it is only with this entry of 15 August that evidence of English involvement in northern Scotland comes to an end.

The evidence of the northern campaign in 1336 invites two main lines of enquiry. Firstly, who were these men whose location indicates their separation from Edward III’s main force and what were they doing during this campaign? Secondly, does this new evidence provide grounds for a re-evaluation of the Lochindorb campaign itself, and of Edward III’s campaigns in 1336 more generally? To begin, it is worth focussing on the evidence of the lost horses and assessing what this suggests about the Lochindorb chevauchée itself. The earliest horse losses that do not match up with the dates of Edward III’s own progress relate to the area around Lochindorb Castle. Three horses were noted on 20 and 21 July as lost ‘in the mountains’, a term which suggests losses in territory to the south of Lochindorb where the English newsletter stated other horses were lost during the ride through rough mountain

53 Rogers, Wars of Edward III, 50; Ellis, Original Letters, i, 38.
54 Ellis, Original Letters, i, 38; Rogers, Wars of Edward III, 50. The Scots were said to have fled to Birnam Wood/Strath Braan. They then retreated further south towards Stirling and were joined in their flight by the garrisons of castles that remained in Bruce hands (Rogers, Wars of Edward III, 50; Ellis, Original Letters, i, 38).
55 TNA, E101/15/12, f. 1v; E101/19/36, fos 7, 7v.
56 TNA, E101/19/36, fo. 6v.
57 TNA, E101/19/36, fo. 3.
terrain on the way to the castle.\textsuperscript{58} Losses there at this time suggests that the troops involved may have been part of the force ordered to remain to oversee the defence of the castle and which was mounting offensive sorties from the fortification. Meanwhile, Robert de Sanso Maressey lost his horse near ‘Loghabr.’ A military push into Lochaber would have involved activity that severely stretched the lines of communication of this small army, but it seems likely that English forces at least explored the area to the south-west of Lochindorb.\textsuperscript{59} Of interest is the fact that the four men who lost their horses belonged to three different retinues, those of the earl of Warwick, Henry Percy and Henry Beaumont. It seems unlikely that all three retinues were ordered to remain behind in full at Lochindorb while the king continued on with his campaign but it is unclear how many troops may have been detached from the king’s own force at this time. The presence of at least one man from Beaumont’s retinue is, however, interesting since the defence of Lochindorb Castle was led by the countess of Atholl, Katherine Beaumont, daughter of Henry Beaumont and wife of the deceased David Strathbogie.\textsuperscript{60} It is possible that Henry Beaumont, or some of his retinue, remained behind in order to escort the countess and her household back to the relative safety of Perth. The English newsletter noted that the countess left the king’s company on 16 July and a return journey to Perth of between five and seven days would not seem excessively lengthy. Importantly, if this suggestion is correct, then at least some of Beaumont’s men were dispatched direct from Lochindorb to Perth or deputed to remain in and around the castle, reducing the size of Edward III’s force during its progress and prior to the ride to Aberdeen.

The forces at the king’s disposal may have been further reduced during the campaign. The horses lost on 22 July (at Lochindorb), on 25 and 26 July (at Elgin) and on 29 July (at Aberdeen), all belonged to men from the earl of Warwick’s retinue. A further member of the

\textsuperscript{58} TNA, E101/19/36, fos 2, 7v.
\textsuperscript{59} Movement of troops to the south-west is also suggested by English forces seizing cattle around ‘Aberkarf.’ The English newsletter suggested that this location was in ‘the mountains of Mar.’ Barrow, while noting that he could not identify ‘Aberkarf’, extrapolated from the distances involved a location somewhere in the vicinity of Boat of Cromdale, east of Grantown-on-Spey. It remains possible, however, that this was a reference to Abertarf parish which extends eastwards from the south-eastern shore of Loch Ness (Barrow, ‘Wood of Stronkalter’, 78, n.4).
\textsuperscript{60} Rogers, War Cruel and Sharp, 116.
earl’s retinue had lost a horse ‘in the mountains’ on 21 July.\textsuperscript{61} If located at Lochindorb on 22 July, Warwick’s men may have been involved in the refortification and/or regarrisoning of the castle there. Unlike Beaumont’s retinue, Warwick’s men appear to have followed Edward III’s route, albeit six or seven days after the king. It is tempting to suggest that Warwick’s force remained in the area of Lochindorb so as to ensure that Andrew Murray and his troops did not return. Moreover, although Andrew Wyntoun suggests that the Bruce Scots retreated eastwards towards Forres in the aftermath of their withdrawal from Lochindorb, the English newsletter suggested a retreat westwards towards Ross. If accurate, then Warwick’s covering force would have been in place to ensure that Murray and his men could not shadow the king’s army as it rode towards Aberdeen. Meanwhile, following a route through territory already ravaged by the king’s forces, Warwick’s retinue appears to have suffered quite significant horse losses. It lost at least five mounts on the Lochindorb campaign itself, to which a further thirteen deaths were recorded without date or location provided.\textsuperscript{62} There is no evidence to suggest that these occurred during the northern campaign. It remains, however, a possibility that Beauchamp’s men suffered disproportionately as they progressed through a landscape that had already been subject to devastation. Supply and fodder would probably have been difficult to obtain. The loss of Warwick’s men from Edward III’s own force would also have reduced even further the size of the king’s army as it rode on through Moray and towards Aberdeen.

The final individual who lost his horse did so almost three weeks after the English king’s return to Perth. John Ogle, whose horse died at Aberdeen on 15 August, was a member of Henry Percy’s retinue. Several other members of Percy’s force had been in Perth over two weeks earlier which suggests that they had returned south with the king.\textsuperscript{63} Ogle appears to have been left behind, perhaps to garrison Dunottar, Kinneff or Lauriston, or perhaps even Redcastle, on the Angus coast, to the south of Montrose, a castle to which the Percy family

\textsuperscript{61} TNA, E101/19/36, fo. 7v.
\textsuperscript{62} TNA, E101/19/36, fo. 7v. The lack of detail in relation to lost mounts is unusual within the accounts generally, which tend to record quite carefully the date and location of horse deaths, presumably to avoid official accusations of false claims.
\textsuperscript{63} TNA, E101/19/36, fo. 3.
Redcastle lies along a direct route south from Dunnottar, forming part of a chain of fortresses with the smaller garrisons at Kinneff and Lauriston between the northeast and the Tay estuary. Indeed these coastal fortifications could perhaps be regarded as part of a wider English castle strategy of fortifications linked by sea to supplies and reinforcements at Perth, and designed to control this region.

The reasons for the Lochindorb chevauchée remain to be addressed. The obvious and perhaps primary motivation was the need to rescue Lochindorb. It was, after all, the first thing accomplished on the progress north and the destination of the difficult ride ‘through the mountains.’ The fall of the castle to Murray’s forces while English troops, and the English king himself, were in Scotland would have been a huge blow to the king’s martial reputation. The chivalric nature of the early stages of the campaign, riding quickly through enemy territory and over rough terrain to rescue the damsels in distress at Lochindorb, may also have appealed to the English king’s knightly sensitivities. As indicated above, English chroniclers were fulsome in their praise when the king undertook his perilous ride to Perth with only his household troops to accompany him. The chroniclers appreciated the image of their king performing acts of chivalrous endeavour in the midst of ongoing war with the Scots. Edward III’s ride to rescue Lochindorb also has interesting parallels with Andrew Murray’s own gallant escapade in riding to save his own wife, besieged by David Strathbogie in Kildrummy Castle the year before, and it is unlikely that Edward III was unaware of this episode. The rescue of Lochindorb, therefore, reinforced the king’s heroic persona while simultaneously besting the valiant efforts of Murray. Moreover, the king also had a personal connection to the beleaguered garrison. Katherine Beaumont, an English noblewoman, was the daughter of one of Edward III’s closest allies. Bower even suggested that the countess wrote personally to

65 See for example Scalacronica (King), 123. For a Scottish perspective on the chivalric nature of the campaign, see Chron. Wyntoun (Laing), ii, 429-30; Chron. Bower, vii, 119.
Edward III seeking his aid.\textsuperscript{66} Henry Beaumont’s participation in the raid reinforces the notion that personal relationships played a key role in the decision to relieve Lochindorb.

A secondary purpose of the campaign would appear to have been the capture of the Bruce Scottish leaders, most notably Andrew Murray who had become a notable thorn in the side of Balliol/English forces. He had harried Balliol and Lancaster’s original invasion force and besieged Lochindorb. The activities of this Scottish commander must have been all the more galling for Edward III as Murray had previously been captured during the Roxburgh Bridge skirmish in 1332, but had subsequently been released. In the intervening years Murray had been prominent in the Bruce resurgences that continued to thwart the attempts of Edward III and Edward Balliol to pacify Scotland. His capture, then, was a likely objective of the campaign. The ride north through Badenoch, over rough terrain and at rapid pace, appears to have been intended to catch the Bruce Scots unawares. Scottish sentries, probably placed to counter just such a move, allowed Murray and his men to retreat safely and Barrow has argued that the positioning of the Scottish siege camp in the ‘wood of Stronkalter’ was located to allow egress.\textsuperscript{67} The additional evidence provided by the \textit{restauro equorum} accounts suggests that Edward III still believed that Murray could be captured. The disposition of some, or all, of the earl of Warwick’s retinue to act as a covering force may appear defensive in nature but it could also have been intended to ambush Murray on his return with a small force. Even although Murray evaded capture on this occasion, outflanking Balliol/English forces and re-appearing in southern Scotland to ravage areas of wavering support, Edward III still sought his capture. The march into southern Scotland of a relief army under John of Eltham, which left Newcastle on 28 July, was probably intended either to capture Murray or to drive him back north again towards the waiting forces of Edward III at Perth.\textsuperscript{68} Following the Bruce submissions of 1335 the capture of Murray in the following year would have provided the two Edwards with a significant victory.

\textsuperscript{66} \textit{Chron. Bower}, vii, 119.

\textsuperscript{67} Barrow argues that the position of Murray’s troops north of Lochindorb, on the north bank of the River Findhorn, shielded his retreat and denied Edward III the possibility of forcing a confrontation (Barrow, ‘Wood of Stronkalter’, 77-9).

\textsuperscript{68} See MacInnes, ‘Scotland at War’, 35.
A third purpose for the Lochindorb campaign concerned the *chevauchée*. As a means of warfare, the *chevauchée* was intended to cover as much ground and produce as much destruction as possible in a relatively short period of time. Yet on the Lochindorb campaign destruction occurred only after the relief of the castle. Those areas targeted for ‘fire and flame’ were, as the English newsletter suggested, ‘the best and most fertile areas of Scotland.’ They were also territories with connection to those Bruce Scots involved in rebellion against the two Edwards, most notably Andrew Murray. Importantly, the territories claimed by the Disinherited, such as Badenoch, Atholl, Buchan and Angus, do not appear to have been targeted at all. This suggests a deliberate attempt to secure the support of pro-Balliol elements in north and northeast Scotland while at the same time punishing Bruce supporters. While examples were made of Forres and Elgin, Aberdeen’s transgressions led to its almost total devastation. Edward III remained in the town for two and half days to ensure that it ‘would be totally burned down, without the omission of any house whatsoever, be it the finest in Scotland.’ The newsletter provided reasons for Edward’s focussed determination to see Aberdeen destroyed. English ships, possibly sent north to supply the king’s force, had landed at Aberdeen three days before Edward III’s arrival there. These had been attacked by local men and around fifty English sailors were killed. The Scots also killed several Flemish merchants whom Edward III had ordered to be held in Aberdeen until his arrival. The intensity of the destruction at Aberdeen can therefore be attributed to specific events, with Edward III exacting revenge on the Scots who had killed his men. Some English chroniclers further developed the revenge motif, linking the destruction at Aberdeen to the death of

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70 Rogers, *Wars of Edward III*, 50; Ellis, *Original Letters*, i, 37. Some archaeological and documentary evidence exists to suggest that Aberdeen did indeed suffer devastation around this time. For example damage appears to have been sustained by the Carmelite Friary and its lands around the Green (J.A. Stones, *et al.*, *Three Scottish Carmelite Friaries: Aberdeen, Linlithgow and Perth* (Edinburgh, 1989), 28–32, at 51). One archaeologist suggests that destruction of buildings in the same area led to rebuilding being concentrated in a new area, around Woolman Hill (J.R. Coull, ‘The historical geography of Aberdeen’, *Scottish Geographical Magazine*, 79 (1963), 80–94, at 81). And re-examination of the various medieval coin hoards discovered in Aberdeen retains the possibility that some at least were buried around the time of the English attack on Aberdeen (D.H. Evans and S. Thain, ‘New light on old coin hoards from the Aberdeen area’, *Proceedings of the Society of Antiquaries of Scotland*, 119 (1989), 327–44, at 339).
Thomas Roslin. According to Andrew Wyntoun, the English commander and his troops had ridden to Aberdeen but were ambushed by a party of local men. In the fighting that followed Roslin was killed along with many of his men. The death of a leading commander, a man who had previously commanded the garrison at Edinburgh and whom Wyntoun described as ‘ane off the best knychtis off hand, that men mycht fynd in ony land’, was also likely to have provoked Edward III’s ire. Devastation throughout was, therefore, one of the aims of the chevauchée, but with punishment meted out against specific targets.

Although it has been argued here that Aberdeen suffered disproportionately, both because it was enemy territory and because its inhabitants had infuriated the English king, alternative interpretations are perhaps possible. Intelligence reports reached Edward III in 1336 describing hundreds of French ships being readied in Norman ports, with thousands of armed men ready to embark on a voyage headed either towards the English south coast, or to Scotland. This threat explained the king’s delayed departure for Scotland but his decision to head north also implied that Scotland was the more likely French destination. Indeed, since the two Edwards controlled most of Scotland’s east-coast ports, and since the sea voyage to Dumbarton on the west coast was long and dangerous, Aberdeen was the most likely destination of the French naval assault. Nevertheless, the realities of the Lochindorb campaign suggest that fears of a French invasion in northeast Scotland were not a principal concern in Edward III’s activities. If they had been, then a large campaign along the east coast from Perth to Aberdeen would have been the more logical military move. The English king’s decision to take a small raiding force in the opposite direction, far removed from the sea, suggests that he was not at this stage concerned about a French invasion. Edward III may

73 Chron. Wyntoun (Laing), ii, 422.
74 Penman, David II, 64-5; Rogers, War Cruel and Sharp, 117-9; Sumption, Trial by Battle, 156-61.
75 Ellis, Original Letters, i, 30-2; Rogers, Wars of Edward III, 47-8; Sumption, Trial by Battle, 155-6; Rogers, War Cruel and Sharp, 112-4.
76 Sumption, Trial by Battle, 161; Rogers, War Cruel and Sharp, 118.
77 For evidence of at least one prominent Frenchman – Eugene de Garencières – in Aberdeen at some point between 1334 and 1337, see The Exchequer Rolls of Scotland, ed. J. Stuart et al. (Edinburgh, 1878-1908), i, 453, 454.
have been anxious about the continued flow of goods, money and equipment from the Low Countries to Aberdeen – perhaps demonstrated by the seizure of Flemish merchants in the town ahead of his arrival there – and such concerns may also have encouraged the devastation of Aberdeen. Destruction would potentially remove the town’s ability to act as a base for Bruce support and a destination point for continental aid. The establishment of new Balliol/English garrisons to the south of the town would police local activities and perhaps also prevent further maritime aid from reaching the Bruce Scots. But Aberdeen, though important to the campaign and to possible future English planning, was not the principal target of the Lochindorb chevauchée.

The political situation in northern Scotland may have provided a final motivation for the campaign. The English chronicler, Walter of Guisborough, wrote that during Edward III’s progress through the Scottish north the king passed through territories that had ‘once been his grandfather’s.’ Although Edward I did not ‘conquer’ northern Scotland, his two expeditions in the area probably lingered in the collective English memory. His second campaign in particular, in 1303, perhaps served as a template for Edward III’s own plans for settling his Scottish problem. Edward I had led his armies through northern Scotland to demonstrate his ability to unleash destruction against his Scottish enemies, wherever their location. He also accepted submissions from those Scots willing to enter his service and then entrusted them with guarding the region on his behalf. Edward III may have envisaged a similar outcome for his own campaign. David Strathbogie’s campaigns during 1335 had demonstrated residual support for both himself and his family in the region, and lingering disaffection amongst some northerners with the Bruce settlement of the area. Strathbogie had had the potential to become the locus for Balliol support in the north but his death at Culblean had denied the two

Edwards such a figurehead. This loss could be overcome with an appropriate replacement, and such a figure may have presented itself in the shape of John MacDonald of the Isles.

Having studiously avoided participation in the conflict during its opening stages, MacDonald was in a potentially pivotal position. In previous years he had rejected embassies from both Bruce and Balliol but by 1336 he may have appreciated the need to ally himself with one of the two. Balliol/English strategic interests would be served if MacDonald could be persuaded to act as their representative in northern Scotland and to this end the two Edwards offered MacDonald territorial concessions in order to buy his allegiance. In September 1336 they confirmed his existing possession of an expanded west highland hegemony that had been acquired in the absence of a coherent centralised government. They even allowed MacDonald to extend his influence into the central highlands by granting him wardship of the deceased earl of Atholl’s Lochaber territories. Meanwhile, the sight of Irish forces invading west-coast Scotland in 1335 demonstrated the ease with which English naval sorties could be mounted against the west highlands, and Edward III’s appearance in northern Scotland may have further stressed the dominance of English military might in the region. MacDonald was aware too that the two Edwards might look to other local allies, especially the MacDougalls, exiled since Robert I’s reign. An Ivo of Argyll received gifts of money and armour from Edward III at Perth on 2 and 5 August 1336. Although possibly only a toponymic, ‘of Argyll’ was historically used to denote members of the MacDougall family. Some MacDougalls had returned to Scotland in the wake of Balliol’s invasion in 1332 but the family’s resumption of power in the now MacDonald-dominated west highlands would only have been possible with full Balliol/English support. There was much for MacDonald to consider. Although the two Edwards had been in touch with John MacDonald since the

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81 Ivo of Argyll received £10, as well as a basinet with an aventail and gloves, while his two servants, Patrick Scot and Duncan, his socio, received 20s (BL Cotton Nero C VIII, fo. 279).
middle of May 1336, his final submission did not occur until around 12 September.\(^{84}\) The Lochindorb campaign, during this interim period, brought Edward III’s forces ever closer to MacDonald’s domains and may well have forced a decision upon him.

This article has offered an expanded analysis of the Lochindorb campaign of 1336, providing a more complex chronology of events and examining several motives for the royal *chevauchée*. New evidence provided by the *restauro equorum* accounts, as well as other English administrative evidence, has been used to challenge traditional interpretations of the English king’s northern foray and the strategy he employed during the *chevauchée*. The possibility of a French invasion, hitherto regarded as the principal reason for the campaign, cannot be totally discounted but it was not the only motive. Indeed, Edward III’s actions on campaign were not those of a monarch readying himself for a large-scale French invasion. The rescue of Lochindorb and the raid through northeast Scotland was decidedly small-scale. While the destruction meted out against Aberdeen prevented its use as a disembarkation point for continental supplies, more emotive reasons lay behind its devastation. The town’s blatant opposition to Balliol/English power, demonstrated by the killing of English sailors and Thomas Roslin, led to its ruination. More generally, wreaking havoc in the Scottish north demonstrated the military power of Edward III and the punishments that would be delivered to those who continued to support the Bruce cause. In this sense, Aberdeen acted as an important object lesson for the rest of northern and north-east Scotland, but the king’s actions in Aberdeen were secondary to the *chevauchée* element of the campaign.

The geographical location of events must also be considered in greater depth. The Scottish north was important to both sides in the conflict, and it was in this area that Balliol supporters claimed the majority of their territories.\(^{85}\) Balliol loyalists such as Henry Beaumont and David Strathbogie had previously made some progress in converting parts of northern

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Scotland to their lordship. Strathbogie in particular appears to have been able to call upon disaffected elements within his ancestral lands. The route of the Lochindorb campaign, through areas of latent Balliol support, may have been intended to bolster Balliol support and frighten Bruce partisans. The inducements extended to John MacDonald of the Isles were perhaps part of an attempt to establish a political successor to David Strathbogie in northern Scotland. Had Andrew Murray been captured, the last major representative of Bruce loyalty in the north would have been removed and the way left open for MacDonald expansion in support of Balliol/English aims. Had all this worked it would have forced the Bruce Scots to campaign heavily in the north, to the neglect of campaigns against the English-administered south. Finally, and perhaps most importantly, the rescue of the countess of Atholl was key to the Lochindorb endeavour. It was the first action undertaken on the campaign, it was an event about which contemporary chroniclers wrote extensively, and it fitted the image of the knightly warrior king that a chivalric-minded Edward III cultivated. It was also – briefly – a success. The sight of English troops had convinced some at least that the adoption of Balliol/English allegiance was a necessary choice. The example of MacDonald’s submission is a case in point. Soon afterwards Andrew Murray returned to the region, however, and reconverted much of the populace to Bruce support at the point of the sword. For all his chivalric intimidation, Edward III and his troops would only ever be transitory visitors to the Scottish north. Lacking the resources or the will to revisit the region with similar terrorisation, any loyalty exacted for the Balliol/English regimes was ephemeral.

86 Chron. Fordun, ii, 351-2; Chron. Bower, vii, 115. See also Chron. Wyntoun (Laing), ii, 422; Ross, ‘Men for all Seasons’, 10-11; B. Webster, ‘Scotland without a king, 1329-1341’, in A. Grant and K.J. Stringer (eds), Medieval Scotland – Crown, Lordship and Community: Essays presented to G.W.S. Barrow (Edinburgh, 1998), 223-38, at 229. 87 Submissions in the region south of Aberdeen had also occurred. Anthony Lucy wrote to the archbishop of Canterbury on 19 July – while Edward III and his troops were still in Moray – that ‘the commons of Stirlingshire, Strathearn, Fife, Fotherik, Angus and Kincardine in the Mearns have come to peace.’ This was probably as a result of the earlier operations of Balliol, Lancaster and Edward III from their base at Perth (Calendar of Documents Relating to Scotland, ed. G.G. Simpson and J.D. Galbraith (Edinburgh, 1986), v, no. 758).